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PREFACE 
This assessment of the anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism 
(CFT) regime of Pakistan is based on the Forty Recommendations 2003 and the Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 2001 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and was 
prepared using the AML/CFT assessment Methodology 2004, as updated in February 2008. The 
assessment team considered all the materials supplied by the authorities, the information obtained on site 
during their mission from January 26th to February 8th, 2009, and other verifiable information 
subsequently provided by the authorities. During the mission, the assessment team met with officials and 
representatives of all relevant government agencies and the private sector. A list of the bodies met is set 
out in Annex 1 to the detailed assessment report. 
The assessment was conducted by a team of assessors composed of staff of the World Bank (WB) 
and expert(s) acting under the supervision of the WB. The evaluation team consisted of: Jean Pesme 
(team leader); Ms Heba Shamseldin (World Bank), Emiko Todoroki (World Bank), MM. David Murray 
(World Bank consultant), Gregor Allan (World Bank consultant), Martin Comley (World Bank 
consultant). Mr. David Shannon from the APG Secretariat participated as an observer during the 
assessment visit by prior agreement with the authorities. The assessors reviewed the institutional 
framework, the relevant AML/CFT laws, regulations, guidelines and other requirements, and the 
regulatory and other systems in place to deter and punish money laundering (ML) and the financing of 
terrorism (FT) through financial institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
(DNFBP). The assessors also examined the capacity, implementation, and effectiveness of all these 
systems. 
This report provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in Pakistan at the time of the 
mission or shortly thereafter (no later than March 26th, 2009). It describes and analyzes those measures, 
sets out Pakistan levels of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations (see Table 1) and provides 
recommendations on how certain aspects of the system could be strengthened (see Table 2). The report 
was produced by the WB as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) of Pakistan. It was 
also presented to the APG and endorsed by this organization on its plenary meeting of 9 July 2009. 
The assessors would like to express their gratitude to the Pakistan authorities for their strong 
commitment to the assessment and their full availability and engagement throughout the assessment 
mission and process. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. Pakistan faces significant risks of money laundering and even more significant risks of terrorism 
financing.  Aware of the prevalence of corruption, narcotics trafficking and terrorism, the authorities have 
focused on tackling these predicates.  Pakistan has however not yet sufficiently taken into account money 
laundering and terrorism financing associated with these and other predicate crimes. 
2. There is evidence that criminals laundering funds in Pakistan are purchasing real estate, abusing 
corporate entities to access the financial sector, laundering money through trade and abusing informal 
channels in Pakistan.  Funds for terrorism came from proceeds of crime (including bank robbery, kidnap 
for ransom, and proceeds of drugs flowing from Afghanistan), with cases of cash couriers and misuse of 
charities facilitating terrorist financing.   
3. Despite some good results in forfeiting assets directly linked to corruption and narcotics 
trafficking, the authorities still lack systematic focus on the concept of ‘follow the money’ to tackle profit 
driven crime and terrorism .  The authorities need to recognize the substantive difference between money 
laundering and the predicate crimes.  The authorities have little information on the volume and techniques 
of laundering the proceeds of crime, or on the volume and channels of terrorism financing. 
Key Findings 
 
4. Pakistan has criminalized money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF).  Law 
enforcement authorities still find it difficult to gather evidence for the ML offence without conviction for 
the predicate offence.  Some key predicate offences are missing.  A wide range of terrorism financing acts 
is criminalized.  There is no criminalization of the financing of individual terrorists or terrorist 
organizations, other than proscribed ones.  Pakistan can freeze terrorist assets under UNSCR 1267.  To 
implement UNSCR 1373, Pakistan uses a domestic proscription mechanism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 
1997 (ATA).  Associated freezing mechanisms do not extend to all types of asset.  Domestic proscription 
is limited to certain types of organizations.  Law enforcement and prosecution authorities have powers to 
prosecute ML and TF. They are currently not using these tools.   
5. Pakistan set up its Financial Intelligence Unit (FMU) in December 2007.  Pakistan has taken steps 
to make the FMU operational, but to perform its core functions effectively, the FMU requires more 
resources and a much higher inflow of STRs.  
6. Pakistan has required its financial sector to adopt anti-money laundering/combating the financing 
of terrorism (AML/CFT) preventive measures for several years.  The preventive measures have recently 
been expanded in scope (activities and obligations) by SBP, and eventually by SECP in April 2009, 
outside the review period. More stringent examination and enforcement is needed.  Some progress on 
transparency has been achieved, but access to beneficial ownership of natural and legal persons is not 
ensured. Steps to implement effective measures to protect NPOs from abuse for terrorism financing 
purposes need to be further deepened.  
7. Capacity to engage in mutual legal assistance and administrative cooperation is severely impaired 
for legal and procedural reasons.   
8. The results achieved by the AML/CFT regime are not commensurate with the risks and threats 
facing Pakistan.  To ensure efficient deployment of resources, both in the public and private sectors, and 
effectiveness, Pakistan should prepare as soon as possible a ML/TF risk-analysis, adopt at the highest 
level a national AML/CFT strategy and consolidate its institutional framework.   
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Legal Systems and Related Institutional Measures 
 
9. Pakistan has criminalized money laundering through the Anti-Money Laundering 
Ordinance (AMLO), enacted as an executive order in September 2007, which was validated by 
subsequent constitutional amendment and Supreme Court decision.  The assessment team is satisfied 
that AMLO is a valid and stable law.  
10. The ML offence defined by the AMLO provides a broad definition of the physical element, 
but the range of predicate offences remains too narrow.  A recent executive order enlarged the scope 
of the predicate offences substantially. Some categories, relevant in Pakistan, are still missing.  The law 
does not contain any requirements that mandate prior conviction for a predicate offence.  Investigative 
authorities do not yet perceive this autonomous prosecution of ML as possible evidentiarily.  The 
assessors welcome the authorities’ intention to address this weakness through legislative action. They 
recommend training of prosecutors and judges on the autonomy of the ML offence.  
11. The AMLO equates the criminal liability of legal persons to the liability of the natural 
person that act on its behalf. The definition of person under AMLO includes both legal and natural 
persons but the act goes on to provide that the liability of the legal person consists of the strict liability of 
the officers of the legal entity itself.  There is no established practice of prosecuting legal persons directly 
for the offences committed on their behalf.  Administrative sanctions are not applied when the officers of 
a legal person are found criminally liable.  
12. Pakistan partially criminalized terrorism financing in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA), 
but has not yet ratified the UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism Financing.  The 
provision of funds for the purposes of terrorism is sufficiently covered by criminalization. The acts of 
collection are less clearly covered in full.  In the absence of case law to clarify the provisions, the 
assessors are not satisfied that 1) terrorism extends to acts against foreign governments or populations; 
and 2) that the financing of individual terrorists and un-proscribed terrorist organizations is criminalized.  
Terrorism financing is a predicate offence for money laundering under AMLO.  
13. AMLO provides a conviction-based proceeds of crime recovery regime.  This is 
supplemented by recovery provisions relating specifically to narcotics proceeds (contained in the Control 
of Narcotics Substances Act 1997 [CNSA]) and corruption (contained in the National Accountability 
Ordinance 1999 [NAO]).  The assessors recommend a review of the drafting of AMLO’s forfeiture 
regime to resolve inconsistencies that create excessive avenues for legal challenge.  
14. The results achieved by the AML/CFT criminalization and forfeiture regime are not 
commensurate with the ML and TF risks facing Pakistan.  Although AMLO is a recent statute, the TF 
offence and a narcotics-related ML offence have been available to Pakistan for several years.  The level of 
prosecutions and convictions under the earlier offences is not commensurate with the prevalence of those 
offences.  In particular, despite being criminalized since 1997, there has been very limited use of the TF 
offence and very few TF investigations, despite the large numbers of terrorism offences prosecuted.  The 
adoption of AMLO provides a key opportunity for Pakistan to take more definitive and systematic action 
against ML and TF.  This would also yield benefits in addressing the predicate offences.  
15. Pakistan has the legal basis to implement UNSCR 1267, and has done so in the banking 
sector. Freezing pursuant to UNSCR 1267 is enabled by the United Nations (Security Council) Act 1948, 
which in turn enables the promulgation of Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) – a form of subordinate 
legislation that applies to all persons.  To date, these orders have not contained any provisions for 
sanction in the event of non-compliance. Within the financial sector, dissemination of SROs or domestic 
proscription orders is undertaken only by SBP, with the result that  only banks and exchange companies 
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receive relevant communications and subsequent compliance monitoring.  Pakistan has thus far frozen the 
equivalent of 10 Million USD pursuant to UNSCR 1267.   
16. Pakistan can partially implement UNSCR 1373, and has taken some actions against 
domestic entities in the banking sector. Freezing pursuant to UNSCR 1373 is done using powers under 
the ATA to “proscribe” entities considered to be “concerned in terrorism.” Proscription is limited to 
“organizations,” and freezing action pursuant to proscription is limited to the sealing of the offices of the 
entity, the freezing of its bank accounts and the detention of any cash found in its possession.  This is not 
a comprehensive freeze within the meaning of UNSCR 1373.  Pakistan is able to give consideration to 
requests of other jurisdictions to proscribe entities and freeze accounts under ATA powers, although the 
assessors have doubts about application of ATA proscription provisions in the absence of acts against 
Pakistan.  Pakistan has proscribed 22 domestic organizations under ATA, including five listed by the UN, 
and has frozen the equivalent of approximately USD 150,000.  No guidance has been provided to 
financial sector entities concerning implementation of the freezing obligations.  
17. Pakistan set up a financial intelligence unit, through AMLO, in December 2007; it currently 
remains constrained to effectively fulfill its mission.  The Financial Monitoring Unit is mandated to 
receive, analyze and disseminate STRs.  Its operational independence is currently not sufficiently 
guaranteed, notably on staffing, on budget and on international sharing of information.  The tools and 
staffing resources made available to the FMU to undertake the analysis of STRs are inadequate.  Despite 
the low number of STRs, there is a significant backlog.  All these factors hamper its ability to effectively 
analyze STRs and provide useful disseminations to law enforcement.  The conditions and procedures for 
FMU to participate in international cooperation are too restrictive.   
18. The agencies designated by AMLO and ATA to investigate ML and TF have the necessary 
powers. AMLO designates three federal investigative agencies (Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), 
Anti-Narcotics Force and National Accountability Bureau) to investigate the ML offence.  Similarly, the 
provincial police and the FIA are designated to investigate TF.  
19. The currently highly fragmented institutional arrangements for ML/TF investigation and 
prosecution give rise to practical difficulties in implementation.  Where ML is apparent but the 
predicate offence is unknown, it is unclear which agency will be responsible for investigation and 
prosecution.  In addition, where the predicate offences span the mandate of more than one agency, it is 
unclear how issues of overlapping jurisdictions will be resolved for day to day operations.  Finally, 
responsibilities for investigation of the bulk of profit-driven crime are with the provincial police forces, 
which do not have a mandate to investigate ML. The assessors are not satisfied that the informal 
coordination mechanisms, including the lead agency approach, described by the authorities are sufficient 
to address the structural fragmentation of the institutional arrangements.  
20. The investigative and prosecution agencies have not effectively pursued ML and TF, even if 
the key tools are available to do so.  The assessors recommend more efforts to assess the typology of 
ML and TF in Pakistan, a stronger mobilization to investigate and prosecute ML and TF, and a clearer 
public policy on the prosecution of ML and TF, which should stem from a national AML/CFT strategy 
with high-level, centralized leadership.  
21. Pakistan has not yet implemented an effective regime to cover cross-border transportation 
of currency and bearer negotiable instruments.  Pakistan’s porous borders create a significant 
challenge for enforcement authorities.  Pakistan largely relies on its foreign exchange legislation, 
enforced by Customs and SBP, to address cash-couriers.  This legislation places no restrictions on the 
inbound flow of foreign currency.  Pakistan has a partial declaration system to the extent that regulations 
require those seeking to export more than $10,000 in foreign currency to declare their intention and obtain 
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the SBP’s prior approval.  Neither SBP nor Customs shares information with the FMU on such approvals 
or declarations.   
Preventive Measures—Financial Institutions 
 
22. Implementation of AML/CFT preventive obligations relies exclusively on the prudential 
powers of the financial sector regulators for regulation and enforcement.  This has enabled the 
supervisors to implement CDD and record keeping obligations well prior to the promulgation of AMLO.  
The legal power to issue such regulations has not been challenged to date.  Some entities undertaking 
financial activities as defined by FATF are not covered by the preventive measures (notably the Pakistan 
Post Savings Bank and the Central Directorate of National Savings).  
23. AMLO also creates rule-making powers for the FMU to implement the requirements under 
AMLO.  The FMU’s powers are mainly related to the suspicious and currency transaction reporting 
obligations.  The assessors recommend that Pakistan avoids a fragmentation of rule-making for the 
preventive measures by using the ongoing revision of the Banking Company Ordinance and the SECP 
Act to expressly confer these powers on the prudential supervisors, with proper coordination with the 
FMU.  The assessors also recommend more coordination and harmonization of the requirements to avoid 
the risks of regulatory arbitrage. They welcome the recently set up coordination mechanism between SBP 
and SECP.  
24. SBP has issued prudential regulations covering, inter alia, CDD requirements for banks 
(including Islamic banks), exchange companies and microfinance banks.  The CDD requirements 
cover the key building blocks of the preventive measures.  A significant revision of these regulations 
took place in March 2009, and addressed most of the key shortcomings identified by the assessors. 
Financial institutions covered by SBP cannot hold anonymous accounts, but some concerns remain about 
the reliability of the identification documentation.  This situation is largely being addressed with the 
renewed mandatory update of customer identification with the new Computerized National Identity Card 
(CNIC).  The requirement to complete identification of the customer before opening the business 
relationship is in place.   
25. SBP has recently introduced a requirement to take reasonable measures to identify and 
verify the identity of beneficial owners.  The requirement to identify beneficial ownership should be 
systematic.  SBP Regulations impose on-going monitoring of the business relationships and require banks 
to adopt enhanced due diligence for high-risk customers – the definition of “high-risk” has been tailored 
to the local context.  However, there is no definition of the minimum content of enhanced due diligence 
measures.  The new provisions for simplified due diligence need to be clarified (conditions and scope).  
Institutions supervised by SBP are prohibited from opening or continuing the business relationship in case 
of failure to undertake or update CDD – these situations are part of the red flags for STR issued by SBP.   
26. SBP established enhanced due diligence requirements for foreign Politically Exposed 
Persons in March 2009.  The coverage is not complete (family members and associates are not covered), 
and there is no requirement for enhanced on-going monitoring. SBP has defined satisfactory general 
obligations on cross-border correspondent banking relationships and non face-to-face business 
relationships are deemed high-risk with overall acceptable additional diligence.   
27. SBP indicates it does not permit reliance on intermediaries and introduced business.  The 
assessors consider that the relationship between exchange companies and banks do not present the 
characteristics of introduced business as defined by Recommendation 9.   
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28. SBP requirements for exchange companies are much more basic and focus on core 
identification.  There is no concept of beneficial ownership, high-risk customers or politically exposed 
persons.  
29. The SECP issues separate CDD regulations for each category of institution it covers, and 
those in force at the time of the assessment are not extensive enough.  The financial institutions 
supervised by SECP cannot have anonymous accounts; however, they have not all been required to 
update identification of existing customers using the new CNIC.  For the securities sector, the CDD 
requirements focus on account opening, and do not extend to on-going monitoring.  For the insurance 
sector, CDD requirements are basic and do not cover the beneficiaries of life insurance contracts.  For 
non-bank financial companies, the identification is limited to a standardized form that the industry must 
use, but has not yet adopted outside Modarabas.   
30. SECP CDD requirements are limited and do not cover fundamental CDD requirements. 
These gaps include the verification of identity of the customer, identification and verification of the 
identity of beneficial owners, on-going monitoring of the business relationship, information on the 
purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, definition of high-risk customer and related 
enhanced due diligence, or conduct in case of failure to conduct satisfactory CDD.  
31. SECP has not imposed enhanced due diligence for Politically Exposed Persons.  It has not 
defined due diligence requirements for relations similar to correspondent banking relationships, in 
particular in the securities sector.  SECP has not set out requirements to address specific risks associated 
with non face-to-face business relationships.  SECP has not adopted requirements relative to third parties 
and introduced business, but has indicated that insurance brokers’ licenses preclude them to engage in life 
insurance.  
32. SECP issued in April 2009 (outside the scope of the assessment) a CDD/KYC circular for 
NBFCs which addresses most of the pitfalls identified above. This circular almost entirely mirrors the 
March 2009 SBP regulation.  It is therefore a significant step forward, even if it only covers NBFCs and 
not the other entities regulated and supervised by the SECP. Going forward, the main challenge is 
enforcement of these more demanding requirements.  
Financial institution secrecy is not an impediment to the effective implementation of the AML/CFT 
regime.   
33. Both SBP and SECP have defined satisfactory record-keeping requirements, in particular 
allowing for the reconstruction of individual transactions.  
34. The current CDD requirements represent an improvement in the prevention of ML and TF, 
in particular in the banking sector following their recent revision.  Increased mobilization of financial 
institutions, improvements in identification documentation and enforcement action by SBP have led to 
more effective prevention.  However, this progress needs to be deepened and broadened, particularly with 
exchange companies and all institutions supervised by the SECP.  To be sustained, progress in customer 
identification now needs to be fostered by efforts to strengthen the understanding by financial institutions 
of the ML/FT risks they face.  
35. Banks are required to obtain and maintain full originator information for both domestic 
and cross-border wire transfers regardless of the amount.  The same applies to exchange companies 
for cross-border wire transfers.  The exchange companies are not permitted to undertake domestic wire 
transfers.  For banks, it is required that the full originator information accompany transfers throughout the 
payment chain.  This is not clearly stipulated in the case of exchange companies.  SBP has just set out 
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requirements for banks with regards to incoming wire transfers that are not accompanied by full 
originator information.  In practice, both banks and exchange companies did not process such transfers 
before missing information is obtained, failing which the transfer requests are rejected.  Exchange 
companies are required to use banks if cross-border transfers exceed US$3,000.  
36. AMLO makes implicit reference to paying attention to unusual transactions only when 
reporting STRs, and the only specific requirements regarding unusual transactions are found in 
SBP and SECP regulations.  More detailed examples are provided in Money Laundering Regulations 
2008 but again focusing on the reporting requirement.  
37. Pakistan does not have a framework to require financial institutions to pay specific 
attention to business relationships and transactions with counterparts from or in countries not 
sufficiently applying the FATF Recommendations.  SBP defined these situations as high risk in its 
March 2009 revised CDD requirements, and SECP in its April 2009 Circular for NBFCs. Pakistan does 
not have the legal basis to apply counter-measures.  
38. AMLO creates obligation to report STRs for money laundering to the FMU.  There is also a 
requirement to report to a police officer suspicion of an ATA offence, including TF that is “formed in the 
course of a trade, profession, business or employment”.  No competent authority or private sector 
representative has indicated any awareness of this ATA requirement.  SBP regulations impose an 
obligation to report TF STRs to the FMU.  The scope of the STR reporting obligation under AMLO is 
limited by the still narrow range of predicate offences.  What constitutes a suspicion is defined in AMLO 
is a satisfactory way. The assessors however note that banks seem to adopt a “confirmed suspicion” 
approach – which could, in part, explain the very low level of STRs.  
39. AMLO provides for satisfactory safe harbor and tipping-off provisions.  Safe harbor does not 
extend to the reporting of TF related STRs under the SBP Regulations.   
40. Pakistan issued guidelines for reporting, and examples of “red flags” for suspicion.  A 
standard STR and CTR reporting form was issued in January 2009.  These were circulated by SBP and 
SECP to all regulated institutions.  The Regulation did not contain any guidance on completing the STR 
form.  To ensure quality STR reporting, it will be necessary to issue consistent industry-specific guidance 
developed in coordination between FMU, SBP and SECP.  
41. The level of STR reporting under AMLO by financial institutions is very low.  Only a 
handful of banks are reporting.  This is consistent with reporting under previous requirements.  Several 
factors appear to explain the very low level of reporting.  The reporting entities have an overall poor 
understanding of the ML and TF risks facing Pakistan; authorities have not provided sufficient guidance 
on ML and TF typologies specific to Pakistan; and supervisors have not sufficiently emphasized 
compliance with the reporting obligations.  Overall, few financial institutions have implemented 
automated systems to detect unusual and suspicious transactions; those that have adopted automated 
systems have done so recently.  
42. Both SBP and SECP have defined satisfactory requirements for financial institutions on 
internal controls and audit.  Banks/DFI supervised by the SBP must appoint compliance officers.  The 
compliance officers’ duties must encompass AML/CFT requirements and related risk-management.  
Internal controls and audit for exchange companies is weak. SBP highlighted the need to first strengthen 
the compliance culture of exchange companies as a whole and, second, to foster compliance with their 
CDD and reporting requirements before stepping-up its enforcement on internal controls.  SBP 
acknowledges that further progress by banks on the compliance with internal controls is needed.  SBP 
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notes a significant improvement in the compliance culture. Similar rules have been enacted for NBFCs by 
the SECP.  
43. Monitoring, supervision and enforcement of compliance with AML/CFT requirements is 
undertaken by SBP and SECP.  For securities, the stock exchanges in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad 
are the front-line supervisors, under the apex of SECP, which can also undertake direct supervision and 
enforcement.   
44. SBP has taken the lead in defining and enforcing AML/CFT preventive measures.  SBP’s 
early mobilization has played an important role in establishing a minimum level of ML/FT prevention in 
the institutions under its ambit.  SBP has so far focused its compliance monitoring and enforcement on 
the identification requirements.   
45. The SBP Act and the Banking Company Ordinance provide the SBP with a wide range of 
powers to undertake effective supervision and enforcement.  It has the authority to conduct off-site 
and on-site inspections and to review and access policies, books and records.  It can compel the 
production of or access to all relevant records, documents and information without a court order.  SBP 
issues licenses for the financial institutions under its purview and enforces comprehensive fit and proper 
reviews, both on the promoters and the senior management of the concerned financial institutions.  SBP 
indicates that it aims to satisfy itself that the natural person ultimately exercising control of financial 
institutions are fit and proper.  
46. SBP can impose sanctions on financial institutions as well as their directors and senior 
management.  Criminal sanctions can also be imposed on senior management.  SBP can also impose a 
range of administrative sanctions, from penalties to restriction, suspension or removal of licenses.  Whilst 
individual monetary penalties available to SBP seem low, satisfactory evidence has been provided to 
demonstrate that SBP aggregates fines for individual breaches which increase on a daily basis to achieve 
fines that are significant.  When the failure is systemic, the assessors doubt that SBP could relate it to 
multiple breaches and apply the aggregating approach.  Only in such limited cases are the assessors not 
satisfied that sanctions would not be proportionate, dissuasive and effective.  
47. SBP has taken steps to bring informal remittance services (hawala/hundi) under a 
regulatory framework and strengthened its oversight of money changers through creation of 
exchange companies.  As a result, formal remittances have increased dramatically over the past several 
years.  However, informal markets still exist, especially in the provinces where SBP oversight is weak.  
Bringing the informal sector into regulated channels remains a challenging task for the authorities.     
48. SECP supervisory powers provide the key tools for effective supervision.  It can conduct off-
site and on-site inspections and has the power to access and compel the access to records, documents and 
information.  SECP issues licenses for financial institutions, with appropriate fit and proper tests, 
including on sponsors, but not comprehensively on agents in the securities market.  SECP does not extend 
the fit and proper test to beneficial owners of financial institutions as “sponsors” do not cover all 
beneficial owners as defined by FATF.  
49. SECP can impose sanctions over legal entities and their directors and senior management, 
including criminal sanctions.  A range of administrative and civil sanctions is also available to SECP, 
including penalties and suspension or removal of licenses.  The maximum amount of the pecuniary 
sanctions available to SECP has recently been increased and appears proportionate, dissuasive and 
effective.  However, to date, SECP has not demonstrated that it has imposed sanctions related to non-
compliance with the AML/CFT requirements. SECP does not have to-date a system to identify AML/CFT 
related sanctions.  
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50. Supervision undertaken by the Stock Exchanges is not effective. The level of development of 
the three stock exchanges is very uneven.  It is the assessors’ understanding that most of the on-site 
supervision of the market participants is undertaken by the stock exchanges, with the support of external 
auditors, which conduct “systems audits” with on-site visits.  System audits have a very narrow focus in 
monitoring CDD compliance.  These audits constitute the basis for follow-up action by the stock 
exchanges and are shared with the SECP.  SECP indicated that on several occasions, it had to instruct the 
stock exchanges to take further action through sanctions.  
51. Both SECP and SBP have staff of quality and integrity, with expertise on AML/CFT.  The 
two institutions have demonstrated commitment to foster a more rigorous enforcement culture, with SBP 
clearly taking the lead.  The two institutions need to be better staffed to undertake their AML/CFT 
mandate, and the staff needs more operational training, tailored to the specific ML/FT challenges of 
Pakistan.  
52. Progress has been made in recent years to foster the implementation of preventive 
measures, notably in the institutions supervised by the SBP.  The regulations issued by the SBP and 
SECP, notably the most recent ones, provide a good basis to improve the protection of the financial sector 
against ML/TF abuses.  Enforcement action has been taken by SBP.  It is the assessors’ view that more 
needs to be done to ensure the effectiveness of the control mechanisms in terms of scope of the 
obligations and implementation.  The assessors are particularly concerned by the common perception that 
customer identification measures are a sufficient protection.  
Preventive Measures—Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
 
53. Pakistan has not yet incorporated the Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
(DNFBPs) in its AML/CFT regime.  Casinos are not authorized in Pakistan.  The other DNFBPs 
identified by FATF are present in Pakistan, and generally undertake the activities considered in the 
standard.  Given the high risk of ML in the real estate sector, Pakistan should move forward in this sector 
as a priority.  There will be a need for a carefully designed approach to include DNFBP under the 
AML/CFT regime, given the lack of capacity of regulators and self regulatory organizations covering 
these sectors.  
Legal Persons and Arrangements & Non-Profit Organizations 
 
54. Pakistan’s legal framework for corporate entities requires the registration of all forms of 
legal persons, but the registration data available with the Registrar is limited to formal ownership 
and does not require beneficial ownership information to be included.  Information held with the 
corporate entities and provided to the Registrar is verified by the SECP, with a reasonable level of 
compliance.  This information is available to law enforcement as needed.  However, its value to law 
enforcement is undermined by the absence of beneficial ownership information.  
55. The information required to be included in the trust agreement on trustees, settlors and 
beneficiaries does not cover the concept of beneficial ownership.  Pakistan recognizes trusts through 
the Trust Act of 1882.  Pakistan has adopted a system of registration of trusts; however the requirement to 
register a trust deed is limited to those relating to immovable property.  Registration of trust information 
is not centralized and remains a system of manual records controlled by local and city governments.  This 
information is theoretically available to law enforcement as needed, but is very hard to access in practice.   
56. Important steps have been taken to reduce the exposure of NPOs to abuse for TF but more 
efforts are needed to ensure effective oversight.  NPOs play a vital social and economic role in 
Pakistan, however segments of the NPO sector are at significant risk of abuse for TF.  With external 
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assistance, Pakistan has undertaken a significant review of the legal framework governing non-
governmental organizations.  The regulatory framework covering NPOs is heavily fragmented.  
Regulatory powers to cover the sector are generally broad, with the notable exception of societies.  
Pakistan is taking encouraging steps to raise awareness amongst NPOs and supervisory authorities.  
Levels of compliance by NPOs to provide information on their management, operation and finances 
remains very low, particularly amongst societies.  Progress is being made to centralize available 
regulatory information across the sector and to reach out to NPOs regarding better regulation and risks of 
criminal abuse.  Further work remains to be done and the authorities acknowledge the need to further 
deepen these efforts.  NPO regulators have taken some steps to cooperate and coordinate with other law 
enforcement authorities on the detection and prevention of TF.  
National and International Co-operation 
 
57. Despite having a legal basis, domestic coordination on AML/CFT remains hampered by 
strong institutional fragmentation. AMLO institutionalizes domestic cooperation at the policy level via 
the creation, at the ministerial-level, of a National Executive Committee (NEC), supported by a secretary-
level General Committee.  However, this welcome step has not yet yielded the needed results.  So far the 
NEC has not defined a clear strategy, based on a risk-assessment, to prioritize the implementation of the 
AML regime.  There is no impediment to domestic cooperation and coordination at the operational level, 
but the overall fragmentation of the institutional framework has so far made it difficult to achieve 
measurable results in that respect.  The assessors were not informed of a clear mechanism to coordinate 
and cooperate to develop and implement an effective policy to combat TF.   
58. Pakistan has no overarching mutual legal assistance (MLA) regime. Enabling legislation is 
found in offence-specific legislation such as AMLO, the NAO and the CNSA.  Of these, only the CNSA 
provides an effective MLA mechanism.  Cooperation pursuant to AMLO is dependent upon the 
conclusion of multiple, bilateral agreements covering merely the offence of ML.  No such agreements 
have been concluded.  The effort required to conclude such agreements would be equivalent to that 
required to conclude MLA agreements covering a comprehensive range of predicates.  The need for a 
comprehensive MLA regime in Pakistan is pressing.  Resources should be deployed toward that end 
instead.   
59. Money laundering was made an extraditable offence on March 17, 2009.  Prior to this, it was 
only extraditable where the predicate offence was narcotics-related.  
60. Pakistan’s capacity to provide other forms of international cooperation is excessively 
hampered, either by law or unnecessary procedure.  In particular, even outside of MLA, memoranda 
of understanding must be concluded under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before cooperation 
can occur – SBP and SECP indicate not being covered by this obligation.  Although Pakistan has 
participated successfully in international action against narcotics trafficking, law enforcement agencies do 
not appear to engage in the widest range of international cooperation.  SECP has applied to the IOSCO 
MMOU but is not yet party.  The SBP has limited legal basis to engage into international cooperation, 
even though it indicates that it has done so in some instances.  The conditions on the FMU to undertake 
international cooperation do not meet the Egmont requirements.  
61. Pakistan has not been proactive in seeking all forms of international cooperation at the 
operational level.  Outreach is required to better inform all authorities of the scope of assistance available 
and the utility of international cooperation.  
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Other Issues 
 
62. The main institutions and agencies in charge of implementing the AML/CFT regime are 
confronted with important resources issues, which add to the need for training.  There is no 
framework for data collection and analysis, and institutional fragmentation hinders the review of the 
effectiveness of the regime.  
63. Pakistan presents several features that constitute both a ML/TF risk and important 
challenges in the design and implementation of an effective AML/CFT regime, notably the 
importance of the informal sector and the cash-based nature of the economy.  The significance of 
hundi / hawala and of informal money changers in Pakistan are two telling examples.  While addressing 
the challenges of informality goes well beyond AML/CFT, the assessors recommend that the authorities 
pay high attention to the incentives structures, so as to properly balance the need for formalization with 
the risk of overregulation benefiting to the informal sector.  
64. Pakistan is facing pervasive corruption.  In addition to constituting a significant ML risk, this 
situation creates structural weaknesses which may impede the effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime.  As 
the authorities review their anti-corruption framework, the assessors strongly recommend that Pakistan 
maintains an effective criminalization of corruption and bribery, supports related international 
cooperation and ensures effective investigative and prosecutorial capacity.  They further recommend that 
the investigation methodologies and expertise acquired so far continue to be fully mobilized to pursue 
financial crime.  
65. Based on its assessment of risks and its review of the AML/CFT regime, the assessment team 
suggests to Pakistan the following essential priority action over the next 18 months:  
 Engage as soon as possible a ML/TF risk-assessment in Pakistan, involving all Pakistani 
stakeholders.  This would include any typology identified in ML/TF cases in Pakistan.  This risk-
assessment should also seek inputs from Pakistan’s main international partners to integrate Pakistan-
related typologies that they may have developed; 
 Prepare a national AML/CFT strategy, defining the main objectives and priorities of stakeholders 
and setting out a national policy on ML/TF.  This strategy should be driven by a high-level, 
centralized leadership and should clarify the roles and responsibilities of the main actors, in 
particular in law enforcement and prosecution agencies; 
 Expand the scope of the on-going revision process of AMLO, of the Banking Company Ordinance, 
of the SECP Act and of key regulatory provisions, in particular to: further extend the list of predicate 
offences; ensure the autonomy of the ML offence; clarify the ambiguities surrounding the scope of 
the TF offence and the forfeiture regime; lift the impediments to international cooperation (mutual 
legal assistance and other forms of international cooperation); and confer AML/CFT rule-making 
powers to the prudential supervisors, broaden the CDD requirements for financial institutions;  
 Deepen the engagement of financial institutions, with a mix of awareness raising, provision of 
tailored guidance on the ML/FT risks and typology in Pakistan and more focused enforcement action 
– notably on the suspicious transaction reporting. 
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66. Recognizing the important capacity issues facing Pakistan, the assessors have also tried to 
identify short-term actions that would already significantly improve the Pakistani AML/CFT regime. 
Some of them have already been implemented by the authorities in the course of the assessment, as 
indicated below, and in the body of the assessment report. These top priority reforms are:  
a. Set up an inter-agency working group at the technical level, involving all relevant agencies, to prepare 
a national ML/FT risk and vulnerability assessment. This overall assessment could be usefully 
complemented by targeted assessment for specific sectors, such as NPOs. Deadline for submission to the 
GC, and then the NEC, could be end of December 2009. 
b. Further expand the list of predicate offences for ML under AMLO. 
c. Clarify the ambiguity regarding the extension of TF offences to the financing of acts of terrorism 
committed overseas against foreign governments or foreign people. 
d. Establish the autonomy of the ML offence from the predicate offence. Successful prosecution for ML 
should not be contingent on prior conviction for the predicate offence. 
e. Revise implementation of the existing regime for freezing pursuant to UNSCR1267 with a view to 
ensuring that SROs are unambiguous in their commencement, comprehensive in scope, promptly 
complied with and appropriately enforceable.  
f. Further amend the AML/CFT regulatory framework of banks and exchange companies 
g. Further amend the AML/CFT regulatory framework for all NBFIs supervised by the SECP 
h. Amend regulations or circulars for ECs relating to wire transfer 
i. FMU should issue guidance to all reporting institutions identifying the basis to report suspicion, 
clarifying that that the reporting institution is not required to have ‘evidence’ of that suspicion  and 
explaining how the STR form should be completed. 
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1. GENERAL 
 
1.1. General Information on Pakistan 
67. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was formed in 1947 and shares borders with Iran, Afghanistan, 
China and India. The capital is Islamabad and the financial centre of the country is Karachi. The local 
currency is called the Rupee (the exchange rate used in the assessment is 80 Rs = 1 $). The National 
Language of Pakistan is Urdu but Urdu and English both are used for official purposes. There is also a 
variety of local languages.  
68. Pakistan is located in South Asia, and with population of 160.9 million.1  It is the 6th most 
populous country in the world. Most of the populations (over 95 percent) are Muslims. At the moment, 
the population growth rate is 1.8 percent.2 3  The working age (defined by Pakistan as 10 years & above) 
population is estimated to be around 70 percent.   
69. Pakistan consists of four semi-autonomous provinces and FATA (federally administered and 
tribal area), with total area of 796,096 square kilometers. In terms of area, Baluchistan is the largest 
province whereas Punjab is largest province on population basis.  
70. Despite movements of people from rural to urban centers, the country remains predominantly 
rural. Almost two thirds of the population lives in rural areas.  The literacy rate in Pakistan was estimated 
at 55 percent (67 percent male and 42 percent female) during 2006-2007.4   
The Political and Legal System 
71. The Political System of Pakistan is based on democracy but it has been under the influence of the 
military since it was founded. The federal legislature consists of the Senate (upper house) and National 
Assembly (lower house).  According to the Constitution, the National Assembly, the Senate and the 
President together make up a body known as the Majlis-i-Shoora (Council of Advisers).   
72. Pakistan is a federal country, and significant powers relevant to the AML/CFT regimes are 
devolved to the local government. The level of autonomy of these varies. Recently, the Federal 
Government and the local authorities have not been in a position to exercise their constitutional powers in 
some areas, particularly close to the frontiers with Afghanistan.  The most recent developments, which 
took place during the review period, involved agreements between the Federal Government and the 
Talibans in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) including the Swat valley, leading to even more 
autonomy being transferred to the tribal institutions.  
73. As the assessment was on-going, the political situation in Pakistan further deteriorated, with 
political tensions between the key parties, increased pressure from the Taliban, daily terrorist acts and 
tensions around the re-instatement of the former head of the Supreme Court (eventually re-instated in 
March 2009). Tensions remain extremely high in areas along the Afghan border.  
74. The legal system in Pakistan is based on written laws and the principles of English Common law 
adapted to local circumstances, special laws, case law and local customary law. Among the written laws 
                                                     
1. Source: mid June 2008 report of Population Census Organization.   
2. Average annual growth for 2000-06, Source: World Development Report 2008 
3. Source: Planning and Development Division.  
4. According to Pakistan Social and Living Measurement (PSLM) survey 2006-07.  
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is the Constitution of Pakistan, legislation enacted by the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies, and 
delegated or subsidiary legislation made by bodies under the powers conferred on them by Acts of 
Parliament or Provincial Assemblies. If any provision of an Act of a Provincial Assembly is contrary to 
any provision of an Act of Parliament which the Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of 
any existing law with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List, then the 
Act of Parliament, whether passed before or after the Act of the Provincial Assembly, or, as the case may 
be, the existing law, shall prevail and the Act of the Provincial Assembly shall, to the extent of the 
repugnancy, be void (Article 143 of the Constitution).  
The Economy 
75. Pakistan has been one of the fast growing economies in the world, with an average of 7 percent 
real GDP growth rate during the last five years (2004-2008).  During the last five years, Per Capita 
Income has increased by over 13 percent per annum and was $1085 in 2007-08.   
76. At the time of its independence in 1947, agriculture was the dominant sector of the country and 
contributed over 50 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP).  Its share in the GDP has fallen 
considerably since then, while the share of manufacturing, construction and services has risen. 
Employment wise, agriculture is still the leading sector on which half of the labor force depends directly 
or indirectly.  The services sector over the years has emerged as the main driver of economic growth with 
sectoral share of almost 53 percent.  In 2007-08 economy grew at the rate of 5.8 percent with major 
contribution from services sector (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Economic Indicators  
  2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
1 GDP Growth (percent) 4.7 7.5 9.0 5.8 6.8 5.8 
2 Per capita Income $ 586 669 733 836 926 1,085 
3 
Exchange rate (Rs/US$)-end-
June 57.8 58.2 59.7 60.2 60.4 68.3 
4 
Workers’ Remittances (mn 
US$) 4,236.8 3,871.6 4,168.8 4,600.1 5,493.6 6,450.8 
 
77. The government, over the years, has carried out important reforms, which have contributed to 
improving the trade performance of Pakistan's economy.  In particular, the tariff structure and rules 
governing foreign direct investment (FDI) have been significantly liberalized.  Furthermore, government 
has liberalized a number of sectors such oil exploration, telecommunication and the financial sector which 
has attracted considerable foreign investment in recent years.   
78. Worker’s remittances recorded another strong growth of 17.4 percent in FY08 in comparison to 
previous year’s 19.4 percent. The total remittances were recorded at $6.45 billion in FY08. Pakistan has 
become world’s 12th largest remittances recipient country during 2007 from 17th in 2005.   
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Principles of Transparency and Good Governance and Anti-Corruption efforts 
79. Pakistan indicates that it is pursuing the “Development Framework (2005-2010)” program 
launched by the Government in July 2005. The framework presented the Vision of a “developed, 
industrialized, just and prosperous Pakistan through rapid and sustainable development, in a resource 
constrained economy by developing knowledge inputs”. One of the key thrusts is to strengthen the 
institutional and implementation capacity which addresses issues such as corruption, good governance, 
business ethics and efficiency of the public service delivery system.  
80. Pakistan has taken steps to address corruption and pursuing integrity and transparency as a 
national priority. Pakistan signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003 
and has now become a State Party to the Convention after its ratification in August 2007.  
81. At the time of the on-site mission, Pakistan had a comprehensive legal framework and well 
resourced specialist investigation and prosecution agency i.e. National Accountability Bureau (NAB), to 
proactively combat corruption across Pakistan. Provisions of the Penal Code and the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1947 criminalized corruption by public servants and also made them answerable for assets 
beyond known sources of income.  
82. In addition the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) 1999 not only criminalizes all forms of 
corruption including bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversions of property by a public 
office holder but also criminalizes fraudulent practices, corruption and embezzlement in the private 
sector. All the corruption offences under the NAO are predicate offences for money laundering under the 
Anti Money Laundering Ordinance 2007 (AMLO).  
83. The assessment team was informed that Pakistan has launched a review of its anti-corruption 
framework, with is expected to entail a revision of the legal framework as well as of the institutional one 
(which could translate into a suppression of the NAB). The authorities indicated that this revision 
stemmed inter alia from concerns that the current framework had been abused for political reasons, and 
therefore had, in their judgment, lost part of its credibility. This revision was not completed at the end of 
the assessment period.  
84. Despite the efforts described by the authorities, all the information gathered by the assessment 
team points to continued significant challenges in the fight against corruption – which is viewed by the 
team as a source of significant proceeds for money laundering. For instance, Pakistan ranks 134 (out of 
180) in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. The WBI Governance and Anti-
corruption Indicators also describe a very weak anti-corruption situation, with only very limited progress 
on anti-corruption controls over the period 2004/2008, and a deterioration of the effectiveness of 
government indicators.  
The Efficiency of the Court System 
85. The Constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary and the separation of executive 
and judicial function.  The superior courts of Pakistan comprise the Supreme Court and the provincial 
High Courts.  Inferior courts include the Courts of Sessions and Magistrates’ Courts. Additionally, there 
are specialist federal courts.  Of most significance are the Accountability Courts, which deal with 
corruption related cases, Drug Courts for narcotics-related offences and Anti-Terrorism Courts. Trials are 
conducted without a jury.  
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86. Even if recent history illustrates the strength and power of the court system in Pakistan – notably 
at the highest level, the assessors were also provided very numerous anecdotal evidence of the overall 
inefficiency of the courts. The Assessment Team was advised that in the provinces of Sindh and Punjab, 
delays in the order of 10 years are common.  The Evaluation Team was further advised that, on any given 
court sitting day, a provincial judge or magistrate might have a daily “cause list” of some 70-80 cases and 
that, given the impossibility of discharging such a workload in a single day, adjournments are willingly 
granted.   
87. Further, the capacity of the judiciary to deny applications for adjournment is often highly 
compromised due to an inverse power relationship with the bar. Bar Associations appear to be strong.  
The Assessment Team was advised that, in the past, barristers have successfully boycotted particular 
judges.  Power imbalances are maintained by the fact that, in the lower courts, the legal acumen of 
counsel is frequently greater than that of the presiding judicial officer due to significant differences in 
remuneration.   
88. The Supreme Court is also subject to extraordinary caseload pressure.  Appeals to the Supreme 
Court lie as of right to persons sentenced to death or to life imprisonment – and from determinations from 
the special tribunals.  Although leave is required in other cases and questions of law must be identified (as 
opposed to mere questions of fact), an extraordinarily high percentage of matters end up in the Supreme 
Court.  In civil matters, the damages threshold is set at a mere 50,000 Pakistan rupees. Recommendations 
of the Law & Justice Commission of Pakistan to place more workable limits upon access to the Supreme 
Court have not been followed.  As at 1 July 2005, in excess of 30,000 cases were pending in the Supreme 
Court.  Notwithstanding an annual intake of approximately 12,000 to 15,000 new cases per year, as a 
result of concerted effort this pendency had reduced by March 2007 to 10,000.  Recent upheavals within 
the membership of the Supreme Court have, however, stymied this progress.  The Court’s pendency 
currently sits at approximately 17,000 cases.   
89. In order to address the inefficiencies, Pakistan has resorted to the establishment of special courts. 
The main reason given for this development is the need to achieve more expeditious dispensation of 
criminal justice. A number of special criminal courts have been established the jurisdictions of which are 
defined by reference to subject matter, such as the type of crime being prosecuted.  The three main 
criminal Special Courts are the Accountability Courts, the Anti Terrorism Courts and the Drug 
Courts.5Appeals from these Courts lie with the relevant High Court.  
90. This fragmenting the judicial function across multiple classes of charge – as Pakistan does across 
its Anti Terrorism, Drugs, Accountability and general courts – presents challenges when indictments or 
charge sheets contain multiple counts that sit across the special classes of offence.  It has implications for 
the efficient prosecution of money laundering and terrorism financing cases.  
The ethical and professional requirements for police officers, prosecutors, judges, etc. 
91. The authorities indicated that professional standards and conduct of various law enforcement 
agencies are set out in respective enabling legislation or standard operating procedures. The Police Order 
2002 (repealed Police Act 1861) provides for the duties and powers of police officers. Conduct of law 
enforcement officers is also governed by internal codes of conduct. For example, the NAB’s internal code 
of ethics promotes integrity and positive values.  While acknowledging these efforts, the assessment team 
                                                     
5. Other Special Courts include: Special Courts for Trial of Offences in Banks; Special Courts for Recovery of 
Bank Loans; Special courts under the Customs Act; Special Traffic Courts; Courts of Special Judges Anti-
Corruption; Commercial Courts; Labor Courts; Insurance Appellate Tribunal; Income Tax Appellate Tribunal; and 
Services Tribunals.  
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received anecdotal information that raises concerns at possible corruption in the judicial system, in 
particular in low level courts.  
1.2. General Situation of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism 
92. Pakistan faces significant risks of money laundering from a wide range of predicate offences. 
Particular risks for proceeds of crime in Pakistan include corruption, narcotics (from Afghanistan and 
other countries), fraud, smuggling, vice, weapons trafficking, illegal gambling, and robbery.   
93. Pakistan authorities highlight particular ML risks from its significant undocumented economy 
and informal sectors as well as its geographical position.  There is evidence that the real estate sector, 
abuses of corporate entities, misuse of the financial sector, trade-based money laundering and use of 
informal channels are privileged methods of money laundering in Pakistan.  Authorities recognize that the 
Pakistani rupee is in circulation in parts of Afghanistan and is used in some cases to launder narcotics 
proceeds.  
94. The risks posed by the predicate crimes of corruption, the narcotics trade and terrorism are well 
know to the Pakistani authorities each having had specific legislation and dedicated units (NAB, Anti-
Narcotics Force [ANF] and Federal Investigation Agency[FIA]) to combat these crimes since the late 
1990’s.  The authorities also identify Pakistan’s geographical position as making it susceptible to being 
used as a transit point for narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, smuggling of general items as well as the 
smuggling of funds used for and derived from these crimes.  Pakistan has however not yet sufficiently 
taken into account money laundering associated with these and other predicate crimes.  
95. Assets of narcotic traffickers and corrupt officials have been investigated by the NAB and ANF 
respectively.  Related proceeds have for part been frozen and a more limited share of those assets 
ultimately confiscated. However, the ratio of freezing to confiscation is very low.  ML and asset 
confiscation cases have focused on self laundering, but the assessors were not provided with examples of 
authorities pursuing 3rd parties involved in laundering proceeds of crime, such as bankers, real estate 
agents and other professionals, despite the identified risks.  
96. Pakistan faces very significant risks of terrorism financing.  Authorities identify terrorism, both 
domestic and international, as a very serious threat to Pakistan.  The FIA, Police, military forces and 
others agencies have been deployed to combat the ever growing threat posed to Pakistan by terrorism, 
however, the very significant risks posed by terrorist financing are not as systematically pursued, 
prioritized or resourced.   
97. Authorities recognize that the Pakistan’s economy is abused to support terrorist financing and that 
a significant source of terrorist funds is proceeds of crime, including bank robbery, kidnap for ransom, 
and proceeds of drugs flowing from Afghanistan.  Authorities identified cash couriers and misuse of 
charities as facilitating terrorist financing, including disbursement of international funds.  Actions taken 
by the Pakistan government against particular NPOs highlight the abuse of charities, including religious 
parties.  Authorities also highlight risks for the Pakistan economy, in particular along border provinces, to 
be abused for TF in neighboring regions of Afghanistan.  Recognition of the TF risks in these channels is 
not consistent across Pakistan authorities and no risk assessment or estimation of the size and scope of the 
TF problem has been undertaken, despite the massive counter terrorism effort being deployed by the 
Pakistan government.  
98. The primary agency for the investigation of TF in most cases is the FIA which is under-resourced 
to carry out TF investigations. The primary agency for the investigation of the terrorist act is the 
Provincial Police, unless the matter involves more than one province.  Investigations of specific terrorist 
incidents have not sought to ‘follow the money’ that supports terror groups or terror attacks.  An example 
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of a recent terrorist incident highlights this gap. The terror attack involved a car bomb. Investigations 
identified that the cars, bomb materials and logistics were paid in cash, by the main terrorist group. 
Financial investigations were not conducted to examine the source of funding arrangements or 
disbursements of funds by the concerned group.   
99. Pakistani authorities, pursuant to UNSCR 1267 and domestic circulations resulting from the 
proscription of persons or organizations in relation to terrorism, do freeze the known bank accounts of 
those listed individuals or organizations. Lesser effort, resulting from very limited resources within the 
FIA and police, are placed on any follow-up financial investigation.  
100. Statistics show Pakistan is seeing a general rise in profit driven crime in recent years.  An area of 
particular note is duty fraud (smuggling). There is also some evidence of a more systematic or organized 
criminal enterprises emerging in areas of profit driven crime. This is particularly prevalent in the areas of 
vehicle crime where high-value cars are targeted, the notable growth in the vice trade and human 
trafficking as well as the smuggling of general consumer goods – causing substantial loss of revenue to 
the government. Despite these trends, it is the assessors’ conclusion that Pakistan has not yet approached 
these crimes through the lenses of the wider ML risks posed by these other predicate crimes.  
101. The assessors consider that there is an insufficient perception of risks associated with ML and TF 
which permeates down to into the financial sector. There appears to be a view that preventive measures in 
the financial sector are robust enough and that ML happens elsewhere.  This conclusion appears to the 
assessors at odds with specific cases presented which do highlight the use of main-stream financial 
institutions. 
102. Some success has been seen in measures to promote adoptions of formal remittance channels over 
the hawala / hundi sector and closure of illegal operations. Recent cases highlight a priority on the closure 
of the ‘illegal’ operations, rather than any investigation of sources of any proceeds of crime laundered or 
terrorist funds moved through hawala/hundi.  
103. Other areas of the financial sector and the Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (NFBP) 
have not been prioritized in relation to their ML and TF risks.  As an example real estate, where many 
case examples were given regarding laundering of proceeds of crime.  
104. While non-profit organizations (NPOs) play a very important role in Pakistan society, parts of the 
NPO pose very significant TF risks, in particular in border regions with high levels of terrorist activity.  
There has not been subjected to any systematic review of the ML/TF risks posed within the NPO sector.  
While very significant strides have been taken to improve transparency and support better regulation of 
the sector, NPOs regulated under the Societies Regulation Act 1860, which represent one of the largest 
segments of all NPOs in Pakistan, are subject to very little regulatory oversight or transparency and 
include some high-risk categories of NPOs.  
105. Whilst it is acknowledged that Pakistan has large and porous borders with its neighbors little 
effort or priority is given to cash smuggling at either the ‘official’ crossing points or from targeted 
intelligence at ‘unofficial’ crossing points. The assessors conclude that priority is given to enforce foreign 
exchange controls rather than AML/CFT measures.  
106. The assessors consider that the concept of risk associated with ML and TF is generally not well 
understood. The concept of ‘follow the money’ or conducting asset-based investigations, ML or TF 
investigations should go beyond the current limited application of freezing/seizing assets associated with 
the main offender.  
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1.3.  Overview of the Financial Sector  
107. Pakistan has a progressive and dynamic financial sector, which has grown rapidly particularly 
during the last five years.  While it is predominantly bank-based, in performing its basic function of 
financial intermediation, it also includes a wide range of non-bank financial institutions such as Non-
Bank Finance Companies (NBFCs), Insurance companies, Microfinance banks, Islamic banks and the 
Central Directorate of National Savings (CDNS), in addition to swiftly evolving financial markets.  
108. Banking sector assets constitute 72.6 percent of total financial sector assets (Table 2). While 
NBFCs have increased their market share due to the strong performance of mutual funds in recent years, 
the share of CDNS instruments in total assets continues to decline. On the other hand, the insurance sector 
continues to constitute a small share of total financial sector assets, with a marginal improvement in 
CY06. 
109. One important feature of the banking sector in Pakistan is its dual nature, with rather 
sophisticated banking practices and products offered in Karachi and other main cities and an overall more 
traditional banking sector in rural areas, with important issues of access to finance and outreach to remote 
areas and populations. A recent World Bank study has estimated at 14 percent of the population the level 
of access to formal financial services, and at most 40 percent access to formal and informal financial 
services. This said, the outreach of the financial sector continues to gain ground with the expanding 
network of commercial banks, microfinance institutions and Islamic banks in all parts of the country. 
110. Pakistan’s economy remains cash-based to a significant extent with a large informal and partially 
undocumented sector.  As part of financial sector reforms, the Government is taking aggressive measures 
to reduce the informal financial sector and document the economy completely through various measures, 
including increased automation across the economy, improved banking and financial systems, improved 
record keeping, better identification of citizens (NADRA etc) and incentives to move more of the 
population into formal banking channels.  
Table 2: Asset Composition of Financial Sector     
  CY01 CY02 CY03 CY04 CY05 CY06 CY07 
Asset (bln Rupees) 3044.6 3420.7 3948.2 4523.9 5223.6 5968.0 7126.8 
As percent of Total Assets       
MFIs 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
NBFCs 6.7 6.3 6.7 7.2 8.0 7.9 8.1 
Insurance 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.5 
CDNS 25.7 24.8 25.0 21.6 18.0 16.0 14.6 
Banks 63.8 65.0 64.4 67.3 70.1 71.8 72.6 
As Percent of GDP        
MFIs1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
NBFCs2 4.7 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.9 5.8 6.0 
Insurance3 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.4 
CDNS 18.1 18.2 18.8 16.1 13.3 11.7 10.8 
Banks4 44.8 47.7 48.3 50.1 51.8 52.4 53.9 
Overall 70.3 73.3 75.1 74.5 74.0 73.0 74.2 
1 MFBs consist of Microfinance Banks supervised by the State Bank of Pakistan.    
2 NBFCs include Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), Leasing Companies, Investment Banks, Mod
Housing Finance Companies, Discount Houses, Venture Capital Companies, and Mutual Funds.   
3 Insurance sector include life and non-life insurance companies, and the re-insurance sector.   
4. Banks include all scheduled banks operating in the country 
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Source: SBP Calculations        
 
111. The reform process, and in particular the on-going mergers and acquisitions, have exerted a 
profound impact on the ownership structure of the financial sector. The financial sector is now led by the 
private sector, comprising of both domestic and foreign financial institutions, controlling 62.5 percent of 
overall assets. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the banking sector is on the rise, with some significant 
transactions having been consummated during CY07-CY08.  Another contributing factor in this trend is 
the growing interest of foreign banks in the Islamic Banking industry.   
112. Institution-wise ownership structure of the financial sector indicates that private sector banks 
(holding 77.5 percent of banking sector assets) and private sector NBFIs (with market share of 78.8 
percent in total NBFIs assets) are the major players in their respective segments.  However, in terms of 
asset holdings, the insurance sector is still dominated by public sector entities.  
Banking Sector 
113. The Banking sector of Pakistan comprises of commercial banks and specialized banks (Table 3).  
Within commercial banks, there are public sector commercial banks (PSCBs), local private banks (LPBs) 
and foreign banks (FBs). Table 4 shows that asset share of LPBs was approximately 75 percent of over 
assets.  The Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) were set up to provide long-term financial and 
technical assistance to economic sectors of the country.  The DFIs need to play triple role of catalytic 
financier, knowledge broker and development partner in order to get the resources from both the public 
and private sectors, as well as to build partnerships with the public and private sectors.  
 
Table 3: Balance Sheet of the Banking Sector Billion Rupees 
  CY05 CY06 CY07 
Cash & Balances With Treasury Banks 325.5 416.5 469.3 
Balances With Other Banks 142.2 179.7 147.4 
Lending To Financial Institutions 211.9 214.0 190.6 
Investments – Net 800.2 833.4 1275.3 
Advances – Net 1990.6 2427.7 2689.0 
Other Assets 111.6 180.4 211.6 
Operating Fixed Assets 69.2 89.2 168.5 
Deferred Tax Assets 8.4 12.1 19.6 
TOTAL ASSETS 3659.6 4352.9 5171.4 
LIABILITIES 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bills Payable 43.0 60.2 82.1 
Borrowings From Financial Institution 338.4 438.5 452.1 
Deposits And Other Accounts 2831.9 3255.0 3854.7 
Subordinated Loans 24.0 29.3 30.1 
Liabilities Against Assets Subject To Finance Lease 0.6 0.9 0.9 
Other Liabilities 121.1 157.7 189.8 
Deferred Tax Liabilities 8.3 8.9 17.1 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3367.2 3950.5 4626.8 
EQUITY 292.4 402.4 544.6 
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Non Banking Finance Companies (NBFCs) 
 
114. Non-banking finance sector includes Mutual Funds, Private Equity & Venture Capital Funds, 
Modarabas, Pension Funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts as well as companies engaged in the business 
of Leasing, Investment Banking, House Financing and Investment Advisory Services. The concept of 
NBFC regime was introduced jointly by SBP and the Commission through amendments in the Companies 
Ordinance 1984, pursuant to which regulatory oversight over NBFCs was transferred from the SBP to the 
Commission in 2002.   
115. As at June 30, 2008, there were 63 registered NBFCs having the following classification of 
multiple licenses:  
 
 Type of Business No of Licenses 
Investment Banking Services 12 
Leasing 16 
Housing Finance Services 5 
Investment Advisory and Asset Management Services 35 
Venture Capital 4 
Total 72 
 
116. Some key statistics of NBFCs sector, as at June 30, 2008 are given below in Table 5:  
 
Table 5: Key Statistics NBFCs (Figures in Billions) 
Sector Total Assets Total Deposits 
Mutual Funds 339.718 — 
Leasing Companies 65.920 11.035 
Investment banks 58.017 14.411 
Modarabas 29.703 3.719 
Venture Capital 3.760 — 
Housing Finance 0.149 0.005 
Total 497.267  
Table 4: The Banking System Assets 
billion Rupees       
  CY02 CY03 CY04 CY05 CY06 CY07 
1. Public Sector Commercial Banks (PSCB) 877.6 959.4 653.0 724.5 836.2 1035.9 
2. Local Private Banks (LPBs) 967.5 1211.6 1980.3 2482.9 3174.0 3835.7 
3. Foreign Banks(FBs) 279.6 271.5 303.9 339.4 223.8 172.7 
A. Commercial Banks (1+3+4) 2124.6 2442.6 2937.2 3546.7 4234.0 5044.3 
B. Specialized Banks (SBs) 98.5 99.7 105.8 112.9 119.0 127.1 
All (A+B) 2223.1 2542.3 3043.0 3659.6 4352.9 5171.4 
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117. In terms of assets size, mutual funds constitute 68 percent of the entire NBFCs sector. During last 
several years, mutual funds have shown the highest growth in terms of numbers and assets. Total number 
of mutual funds increased from 67 as of 30-06-2007 to 87 as of 30-06-2008, while their net assets 
increased from Rs.295 billion to Rs. 326.822 billion during the period, depicting a growth of 10percent.  
118. Modaraba is a concept of Islamic finance through which one partner (or more) participate with 
the funds and another with his skill and efforts in some trade, business and industry permitted by Islam. In 
Pakistan, the Modarabas are established and regulated according to the Modaraba Companies and 
Modaraba (Floatation & Control) Ordinance which was promulgated in 1980. Major statistics of 
Modaraba sector as on June 30, 2008 are given in Table 6:  
 
Table 6: Statistics of Modaraba Sector 
Description  
Number of Modaraba companies 41 
Number of Modarabas 27 
Number of Modarabas under winding up 09 
Number of Modarabas under floatation 03 
Total paid-up fund of Modarabas (Rupees in Billion) 7.880 
Total Assets of Modarabas (Rupees in Billion) 29.703 
 
 
119. The performance of NBFCs and Modarabas has been showing improvement with the passage of 
time. In particular, the mutual funds have shown an impressive growth.  However, growth in the housing 
finance sector remained stagnant. It is also pertinent to note the development of venture capital companies 
remains in an infant stage. It is expected that the introduction of framework for Private Equity and 
Venture Capital activity should give boost to this particular sector.  
Insurance sector: 
120. Since the time of Pakistan’s creation, the insurance industry has never received the attention it 
deserved from each successive government. As on June 30, 2008, composition of insurance sector was as 
given in Table 7:  
 
 
Table 7: Composition of Insurance Sector 
 Conventional Takaful 
 Public Private Public Private 
 
Total 
Life  1 4 - 2 7 
Non-Life 1 35 - 3 39 
Re-insurance 1 - - - 1 
Total     47 
 
121. The insurance industry in Pakistan is under-developed relative to its potential with insurance 
penetration at just 0.75 percent. Major reasons for this situation are the lack of awareness, low literacy 
rate; the lack of importance that the individuals give to insurance and the belief amongst large portion of 
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the population that insurance is un-Islamic. However the industry has got potential and over the past few 
years it has shown substantial growth in premiums, as given in Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Growth in Premiums of Insurance Sector 
 2005 2006 2007 
 Rs. 
(Million) 
% Growth over 
last year 
Rs. 
(Million) 
% Growth over 
last year 
Rs. 
(Million) 
% Growth over 
last year 
Life  18,552 27.2 22,574 21.7 27,694 22.7 
Non-Life 27,733 25.6 33,615 21.2 37,830 12.5 
Combined 46,285 26.2 56,189 21.4 65,524 16.6 
 
Capital Market 
 
122. The capital market in Pakistan consists of three stock exchanges located in Karachi, Lahore and 
Islamabad. The principal securities traded on these exchanges are ordinary shares. However, other 
securities such as mutual fund certificates, modaraba certificates, government and corporate bonds and 
Term Finance Certificates are also being traded. The Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) is the largest 
exchange in Pakistan. Key statistics of KSE for last five years are given in Table 9.  
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Table 9: Statistics of Karachi Stock Exchange 
(In millions except companies, index and bonds data) 
  Up to 
31-12-2004 
Up to 
30-12-2005 
Up to 
29-12-2006 
Up to 
31-12-2007 
Up to 
23-09-2008 
Total No. of 
Listed Companies 
661 661 652 654 657 
Total Listed 
Capital - Rs. 
405,646.32 470,427.47 519,270.17 671,255.82 721,722.36 
Total Market 
Capitalization - 
Rs. 
1,723,454.36 2,746,558.97 2,771,113.94 4,329,909.79 2,852,174.54 
New Companies 
Listed during the 
year 
17 19 9 14 10 
Listed Capital of 
New Companies - 
Rs. 
66,837.0 30,090.28 14,789.76 57,239.92 15,312.12 
New Debt 
Instruments Listed 
during the year 
5 8 3 3 6 
Listed Capital of 
New Debt 
Instruments - Rs. 
4,775.0 10,900.00 3,400.00 6,500.00 21,000.00 
Average Daily 
Turnover - Shares 
in million 
343.70 365.64 260.69 268.23 187.06 
 
Remittance and alternative remittance services 
123. As part of its financial sector reforms, Pakistan has reformed the remittance business 
arrangements and has sought to crack down on unregulated money changers and hawala through the 
licensing of exchange companies. This has involved the removal of money changers licenses and the 
conglomeration of such businesses into exchange companies, which are subject to licensing, regulation & 
supervision by the SBP. The exchange companies also need to register with SECP under the Companies 
Ordinance Act. Since the changes, which, according to the authorities, have resulted in cheaper and more 
efficient formal remittance systems, the authorities consider that there has been marked decrease in the 
use of the ARS system and an increase in the use of formal remittance channels. There has been a marked 
increase in inward remittances which have increased by 67 percent during the past four years from $3.87 
Billion in 2003-04 to $6.45 Billion in 2007-08. This is due to the fact that moneys sent by overseas 
Pakistanis to families are being increasingly channeled through the documented banking system and 
exchange companies.  
124. However, recent enforcement action by the SBP and law enforcement illustrates that the 
improvements recently brought to the remittance market will still need intense supervision and 
compliance monitoring by the supervisor to achieve the results sought. In addition, SBP indicates that the 
implementation and full roll-out of the new legislative and regulatory framework faces two significant 
challenges – one is the overall incentive framework and its impact on the formalization of the market; 
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another is the overall weak capacity in the sector, which calls for a phased and progressive tightening and 
implementation of stricter regulatory requirements.  
125. The following table sets out the types of financial institutions that can engage in the financial 
activities that are within the definition of “financial institutions” in the FATF 40+9 (Table 10).  
Table 10: Types of Financial Institutions That Are Authorized To Perform Financial Activity in 
Pakistan 
Regulator SBP SECP Others 
(under respective 
Ministry) 
Financial Activity Which of the Institutions are authorized to undertake this activity 
Acceptance of deposits and other 
repayable funds from the public 
Banks, DFIs  Insurance Companies, Asset 
Management Companies and 
Investment Advisories, Investment 
Banks 
 CDNS and 
Pakistan Post 
Savings Bank 
 
Lending (including consumer credit; 
mortgage credit; factoring, with or 
without recourse; and finance of 
commercial transactions (including 
forfeiting)) 
Banks, DFIs, Housing Finance Companies, 
Leasing Companies and Investment 
Banks. 
 
Financial leasing Banks Leasing Companies  
The transfer of money or value 
(including financial activity in both 
the formal or informal sector (e.g. 
alternative remittance) 
Banks, 
Exchange 
Companies 
 Pakistan Post 
Savings Bank. 
Issuing and managing means of 
payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, 
cheques,  traveler’s cheques, money 
orders and bankers' drafts, electronic 
money) 
Banks  Pakistan Post 
Office. 
Financial guarantees and 
commitments 
Banks and 
DFIs 
  
Trading in: (a) money market 
instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, 
derivatives etc.) (b) foreign 
exchange; (c) exchange, interest rate 
and index instruments; (d) 
transferable securities; (e) 
commodity futures trading. 
Banks, 
Exchange 
Companies 
  
Participation in securities issues and 
the provision of financial services 
related to such issues. 
Banks NBFCs.  
Individual and collective portfolio 
management (covers mgt. of 
collective investment schemes such 
as unit trusts, mutual funds, pension 
funds) 
 REITs, Pension Funds, Asset 
Management companies and 
Investment Advisories 
 
Safekeeping and administration of 
cash or liquid securities on behalf of 
other persons 
Banks Investment Banks  
Otherwise investing, administering 
or managing funds or money on 
behalf of other persons. 
Banks (only 
through the 
establishment 
Asset Management Companies, 
Investment Advisories, Pension 
Funds, Insurance Funds, REITs, 
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Regulator SBP SECP Others 
(under respective 
Ministry) 
of a fund 
management 
subsidiary) 
Private Equity Modarabas 
Underwriting and placement of life 
insurance and other investment 
related insurance (including 
insurance undertakings and 
insurance intermediaries (agents and 
brokers)) 
 Insurance Companies.  
Money and currency changing Banks and 
Exchange 
Companies 
  
 
1.2. Overview of the DNFBP Sector 
Licensed Casino 
126. As gambling is prohibited, there are no casinos in Pakistan.  
Real Estate Agents 
127. There is no central law for registration of real estate agents. In the province of Punjab, real estate 
agents are required to be registered under “Punjab Real Estate Agents and Motor Vehicle Dealers 
(Regulation & Business) Ordinance, 1980. Similarly, “Islamabad Real Estate Agents and Motor Vehicle 
Dealers (Regulation & Business) Ordinance, 1984” requires registration of real estate agents in 
Islamabad. In NWFP “The North West Frontier Province Real Estate Agent and Motor Vehicle Dealer 
(Regulation & Business) Ordinance, 1983” requires real estate agents to register. Besides, real estate 
companies are required to register with SECP.  
Jewelers, Dealers in Precious Metals and Precious Stones 
128. In terms of SRO 391(I)/2001 dated 18 June 2001, all jewelers having turnover above a specified 
threshold are required to register with the Collector of Sales Tax having jurisdiction for registration under 
section 14 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.  
129. In terms of SRO 266(I)/2001 dated 7th May 2001, the exporters of jewelry and gemstones are 
required to register under the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1993. In addition they are 
also required to be registered with the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) and to become member of one of 
the recognized Association such as “All Pakistan Gem Merchants and Jewelers’ Association, Karachi” or 
“All Pakistan Commercial Exporters of Rough and Unpolished Precious and Semi-precious Stones 
Association, Peshawar” or any other association recognized by the Ministry of Commerce under the 
Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961.  
130. The exporters of jewelry and gemstones are required to maintain “Jewelry Pass Book” duly 
authenticated by the EPB. All export and import transaction, as well as import entitlements and actual 
imports are entered in the Jewelry Pass Book and authenticated by the EPB.  
Lawyers 
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131. There are 94000 licensed lawyers in Pakistan, 1800 of which are permitted to appear before the 
Supreme Court. Lawyers in Pakistan are called “advocates.” The Legal Practitioners and Bar Council Act 
1973 governs the profession and a lawyer is only allowed to practice if he/she is properly qualified in 
accordance with this Act.  
Notaries 
132. The notary function is performed by lawyers who meet the qualifications requirement under the 
Notaries Ordinance 1961.  
Accountants 
133. The accounting profession is dominated by the chartered accountants licensed by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP). Outside the membership of the institute there is another 
accounting sector that focuses on conducting audits. On June 30, 2008 the total membership of ICAP was 
4441 chartered accountants.  
Trust and Company Service Providers 
134. In Pakistan “Trust and Company Service Providers” is not recognized as a discrete business 
sector.  
135. However, information received by the assessors indicates that beyond lawyers and accountants, 
other professionals do provide services which are covered by the FATF definition of Trust and Company 
Services Providers.  
1.3. Overview of commercial laws and mechanisms governing legal persons and arrangements 
136. The AMLO and other Pakistani law define ‘person’ to include an individual, a firm, an entity, an 
association or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, a company and every other juridical 
person’ to include a body of persons, corporate and unincorporated.  
137. Besides natural persons, the definition broadly covers the following forms of persons:  
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Partnership  
 Statutory Corporation 
 Legal Arrangements (NPOs, NGOs, trusts etc.) 
 Companies 
 
Sole Proprietor 
138. A “sole proprietorship” is just an informal way of doing business by an individual. To start a 
business as a “sole proprietorship” no prior registration of it is required with any government department 
or authority, if the nature of business does not require prior registration under a law or a license from a 
regulator e.g. banking business requires license and can only be conducted by a company.  
Partnership 
139. A partnership is also not a distinct legal person, but is made of the persons composing it. Creation 
of Partnership is purely a matter of agreement between the parties such an agreement need not even be in 
writing.  
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140. Legal regime for establishment and regulation of partnerships in Pakistan is stated in the 
Partnership Act, 1932 which defines a partnership "as the relation between persons who have agreed to 
share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all."   The registration of 
partnerships is not compulsory by law. It is optional and there is no penalty for non-registration except 
that unregistered firm may not sue or be sued in its own name. [Section 69 of the Partnership Act]  
Statutory Corporation 
141. Statutory corporations or bodies are creation of a statute. They are formed by the Central 
Government or a Provincial Government through a Central statute or a Provincial statute, as the case may 
be. Administration of such statutory corporations is usually vested in a governing body, chairman etc. as 
envisaged under the enabling statute.  
Legal Arrangements 
142. Pakistan adopts a common law system whereby legal arrangement can be formed by way of trust, 
NGO/NPO (Non Government Organization / Non Profit Organization). Trust may be registered under the 
Registration Act, 1908. Further any company, society or other entity duly formed under the relevant law 
may also act as trustee and can run a trust.  
Companies 
143. In Pakistan, companies are recognized as legal entities / persons separate from its owners, 
sponsors or directors etc. The Companies Ordinance, 1984 and the Companies (General Provisions and 
Forms) Rules, 1985 provide the basic regulatory framework for registration and post-incorporation 
requirements for companies. A company comes into being through registration of documents with the 
concerned registrar, being the in-charge of one of the Company Registration Offices (CROs) of SECP. 
The basic two types of company remain as follows:  
144. Private Limited Company - Any one or more persons may by subscribing to a memorandum of 
association for a lawful purpose may form a private company.  
145. Public Limited Company - Any three or more persons may form a public limited company in 
the same manner and purpose.  
146. Other two types of the companies are unlimited companies or companies limited by guarantees.  
Natural Persons 
147. All Pakistani citizens and permanent residents who are 18 years or older are required register with 
National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) and have Computerized National Identity Card 
(CNIC) that is to be used as a formal identification document, including opening of accounts in financial 
institutions, dealings with government departments, entering into contractual relationship, etc. The 
NADRA database also contains information on family members of registered citizens including minors 
who are also required to be notified while registering with NADRA. In Pakistan, currently, the incidences 
of birth are separately registered with the local / district governments.  
148. In Pakistan, as elsewhere in most developing countries, the role of the non-profit sector has been 
growing and has evolved over the years from the limited sphere of charitable and philanthropic 
organizations to the wider public welfare-oriented and development roles to complement the state’s effort.  
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The Non-Profit Sector 
149. Nonprofit organizations are governed by the law through which they are registered and the 
internal governance is controlled by their own constitution, memorandum, rules or bye laws submitted for 
registration or as amended and approved thereafter. While a body of laws governing various types of non- 
profit organizations exist through which these organizations are registered or are recognized, what needs 
to be recognized is that the fundamental right of an individual to associate with others in order to pursue 
common goals is recognized by Article 17 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The NPOs are mainly 
registered under the following laws:  
 The Societies Registration Act, 1860. 
 The Trusts Act 1882.  
 The Charitable Endowments Act, 1890. 
 Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control Ordinance), 1961 
 Local Government Ordinance 2001 
 The Companies Ordinance (Section 42) 1984 
 
150. A total number of 45,121 NPOs have been registered under the aforesaid laws as detailed in 
Table 11.  
Table 11: Size of NPO Sector 
Law of Registration  Number of NGOs % age 
Societies Registration Act 1860 20,189 44.74 
Trusts Act 1882 93 0.22 
Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies 1961 21,364 47.36 
Companies Ordinance 1984 341 0.81 
Charitable Endowments Act 1890 26 0.06 
Local Government Ordinance 2001 3,010 6.81 
Total 45,121 100 
 
151. There is however a very large informal and undocumented NPO sector in Pakistan, the estimated 
size of which is over 100,000 NPOs. The authorities indicated that all NPOs of significant size are 
registered and that non registered NPOs in aggregate do not form a significant percentage of the NPO 
sector in terms of funding or scope of operation.  
1.4.  Overview of strategy to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing 
AML/CFT Strategies and Priorities 
152. Pakistan authorities state that they recognizes the national and global threats from money 
laundering and terrorist financing and are taking coordinated steps to progressively implement a 
comprehensive national AML/CFT system. Pakistan had adopted AML measures prior to the AMLO 
coming into force. Since late 1990s, Pakistan has put in place elements of an AML/CFT regime through 
various existing statutes and regulatory measures. The National Accountability Ordinance 1999 [NAO], 
Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997 [CNSA] and Penal Code contain provisions that criminalize 
some elements of the process of money laundering. The Anti Terrorism Act 1997 [ATA] provides powers 
for authorities to take actions against acts of terrorism, including elements of support for such acts 
including funding of terrorism. SBP proactively issued the Guidelines on Money Laundering and ‘Know 
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Your Customer’ Policy to financial institutions under its supervisory control, before the enactment of the 
AMLO. Before the enactment of AML Ordinance, the CNSA required reporting of narcotics related 
suspicious transactions to the Anti Narcotics Force (ANF). The NAO also required financial institutions 
to report suspicious transactions to the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). Similarly, Prudential 
Regulation M-5, issued by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) also required banks to report suspicious 
transactions to SBP.  
153. Pakistan is a State party to 10 out of 13 UN Conventions relating to terrorism. An inter 
Ministerial Committee is considering accession to the UN Convention on the Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention) and ratification of the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime. Accession to the two Conventions has been submitted to Cabinet for its consideration. 
To enable Pakistan to accede to the UN Terrorist Financing Convention new legislative provisions are 
required to be incorporated. Pakistan recently made ML and TF extraditable, by their inclusion in the 
schedule to the Extradition Act 1972.  
154. Pakistan has signed and ratified SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and 
its additional protocol. Pakistan has also signed the OIC Convention on Combating International 
Terrorism, 1999.  
155. Pakistan stresses that it remains committed to fighting the menace of terrorism to bring security to 
its own people. It emphasizes its commitment and actions to fulfill its international obligations with 
responsibility and to fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Pakistan stresses that it recognizes 
the importance of improvements in relations with India for mutual betterment. The Mumbai terrorist acts 
in 2008 have clearly put the relationship with India under very significant stress, and drastically increased 
the international pressure on Pakistan as far as fight against terrorism and terrorism financing is 
concerned (as well as related engagement in international cooperation).  
156. As a frontline state, Pakistan considers that it is extending full support and active cooperation to 
the international fight against terrorism. 112,000 Pakistani troops are engaged on the border with 
Afghanistan and 822 border posts have been set up to interdict Al-Qaida/Taliban members. The efforts 
have resulted in apprehending more than 700 Al-Qaida operatives and affiliates including some of its top 
leaders like Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin Al-Shibh, Khalid Shaikh Mohammad and Abu Farraj Al Libbi. As 
evidence of these efforts, the authorities emphasize that a large number of country’s own security 
personnel have also been martyred or injured in these operations.  
157. Very significant benefits would be derived from a undertaking a risk assessment that looks into: 
the value of proceeds generated by predicate crime; funds necessary to sustain terrorism or where those 
funds actually come from; how those proceeds are ‘directly’ enjoyed by the criminal (e.g. purchase of 
luxury items, cars, real estate); how they are used to ‘re-invest’ in ongoing criminality or the financing of 
terrorism; who and how they are assisted by in disguising or dispersing those proceeds to avoid detection 
and seizure; and what financial sector and non-financial sector industries and products are susceptible to 
and used by criminal and terrorists. The lack of such a risk assessment severely hampers the effective 
implementation of the various Anti-Money Laundering provisions as well as the effective deployment of 
the limited resources within the various agencies. The authorities indicate that the preparation of such an 
AML/CFT strategy has been launched, that will be submitted to the National Executive Committee 
(NEC) in due time. According to the authorities, it will include a risk assessment. The authorities hope 
that the on-going Asia Development Bank assistance, and in particular its typology component, will 
provide useful inputs to this endeavor.  
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The Institutional Framework for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
158. Pakistan has set up by law a collaborative, multi-agency approach in implementing its AML/CFT 
regime under the AMLO, as described in details below:  
The National Executive Committee (NEC) 
159. In order to effectively enforce the provisions of the AMLO, an Apex body i.e. National Executive 
Committee (NEC) has been established under the Chairmanship of Minister for Finance. Section 5 of the 
AMLO empowers the Federal Government to nominate any other member on the committee. The NEC 
consists of the following: Ministry for Finance or Advisor to the Prime Minister on Finance, Senior 
Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Law, Justice and Human Rights, Minister for Law and 
Justice, Minister for Interior, Governor SBP, Chairman SECP, Director General Financial Monitoring 
Unit (FMU), Chairman National accountability Bureau (NAB)  
160. The mandate of the NEC is to develop, coordinate and frame an annual national policy / strategy 
to fight money laundering; determine offences existing in Pakistan that may be considered to be predicate 
offences; provide guidance and sanction in framing of rules and regulations; make recommendations to 
the Federal Government for effective implementation of AMLO; issue necessary directions to the 
agencies involved in the implementation and administration of the Ordinance and undertake and perform 
such other functions as assigned to it by the Federal Government, relating to money laundering.  
The General Committee (GC) 
161. In order to assist the NEC, a General Committee (GC) has also been formed comprising Secretary 
Finance, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Law, Governor SBP, Chairman SECP and Director General FMU. 
Later, the Director General, Financial Crimes Investigation Wing, NAB has been notified as a member of 
the GC under Section 5(4) (h).  
162. The main objectives of the GC are to take measures as necessary for the development and review 
of the performance of investigating agencies, FMU and the financial institutions and non-financial 
businesses and professions, relating to anti-money laundering; review training programs for Government, 
financial institutions, non-financial businesses and professions and other persons relating to anti money 
laundering; provide necessary assistance to the NEC in carrying out its functions and duties under the 
Ordinance; discuss any other issue of national importance relating to money laundering.  
163. The Director FMU acts as Secretary to the NEC and GC. Each NEC member is responsible for 
implementation of NEC decisions within its purview.  
Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) 
164. The Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) was established immediately after the promulgation of the 
AMLO and is housed in State Bank of Pakistan to receive, analyze and disseminate STRs received from 
reporting institutions. The purpose of the FMU is to facilitate the implementation and enforcement of the 
AMLO nationwide and to co-operate with other countries in the global fight against money laundering, 
terrorist financing and serious crime.  
The Relevant Ministries: 
165. The Ministry of Finance (MoF): The Minister of Finance is the Chairman of the NEC which is 
the approving authority for regulations under the AMLO in addition to the mandate as detailed above. 
The Secretary MOF chairs the GC.  
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166. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA): The MOFA is responsible, among other things, for 
the transmission and receipt of mutual legal assistance requests and plays a vital role in the development 
of treaty relationships relating to extradition, mutual legal assistance and terrorism financing. The MOFA 
has representation on the NEC and GC. The MOFA also makes recommendations to the Government for 
Pakistan’s accession and ratification of the relevant UN instruments. One of functions of MOFA is to 
meet Pakistan’s obligations under SCR 1267 by issuing Statutory Regulatory Orders specifying the 
entities and individuals whose property is to be frozen in accordance with the Resolution. This power is 
exercised under the United Nations (Security Council) Act, 1948.  
167. The Ministry of Interior (MOI): The MOI is the leading agency in maintaining national 
sovereignty and security. The primary responsibility of Interior Division is to ensure internal security. 
Besides, the Interior Division deals inter alia with:  
o National registration of population and issuance of identity cards.  
o Nationality, citizenship and naturalization.  
o Immigration, passports, regulation of entry and exit of foreigners.   
o Control and administration of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Civil Armed Forces 
i.e. Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, Pakistan Rangers and  Coast Guards, Capital 
Development Authority and Islamabad Capital  Territory.  
o Coordination of Policy matters relating to Police, Police reforms and training of Police 
officers through National Police Academy (NPA).  
o Anti-smuggling measures and enforcement of anti-corruption laws.  
168. The Ministry of Law, Justice  & Human Rights (MOLJHR): MOLJHR tenders advice to all 
the Federal Government on legal and constitutional questions as well as the provincial Government on 
legal and legislative matters It also deals with drafting, scrutiny and examination of bills, all legal 
instruments, international agreements, adoption of existing laws to bring them in conformity with the 
Constitution, legal proceedings and litigation through Pakistan concerning the federal government and 
other several subjects.  
169. The Ministry of Social Welfare MOSW: Pakistan is making concerted efforts to pursue a 
consolidated framework for the regulation of charities and NPOs through the MOSW. However, a number 
of provincial and Federal agencies also play various roles in regulating NPOs. The Central Board of 
Revenue (CBR) regulates some charities from the perspective of granting tax-free status, but the Ministry 
of Social Welfare and the Provinces have the lead role.  
Regulatory and Supervisory Authorities 
170. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP): SBP is established under the State Bank of Pakistan Act 
1956 and is an autonomous institution of the Federal Government. SBP is responsible for supervising and 
regulating financial institutions under the Banking Companies Ordinance (BCO), 1962. The institutions 
regulated and supervised by SBP are Commercial and Islamic Banks, Micro Finance Banks, Development 
Finance Institutions and Exchange Companies.  
171. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP): The SECP is a statutory body 
with supervisory and enforcement powers established under the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan Act 1997 which regulates matters pertaining to the incorporation of companies and business 
registration and to promote ethical conducts amongst those involved in the management of a company or 
business. The SECP reports to the Ministry of Finance.  
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172. The Stock Exchanges: In addition to the enforcement / compliance checking for securities 
intermediaries powers of the Commission, the supervision of these is primarily undertaken by the Stock 
Exchanges, which are by law and de facto the front-line supervisors. The level of development and the 
capacities of the three Stock Exchanges are far from similar, and the Karachi Stock Exchange is clearly 
both better equipped and faced with more acute supervision challenges and tasks.  
Law Enforcement Agencies 
173. Pakistan Police: The Pakistan Police is the primary law enforcement agency in Pakistan which 
covers a wide spectrum of law enforcement responsibilities. The general powers of the Police are 
provided under the Police Order 2002 (which amended Police Act 1861) and the Criminal Procedure 
Code (CrPC). The Police has been provided with wide powers of arrest and detention, entry, search and 
seizure and interception of communications.  
174. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB): The NAB is a federal agency entrusted to 
eradicate corruption and abuse of power and is governed by National Accountability Ordinance 1999 
(NAO). It has Headquarter in Islamabad and five Regional Offices at Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, 
Peshawar and Quetta. There are four Divisions dealing with Operations, Prosecution, Awareness / 
Prevention and Human Resource / Finance. Under these Divisions, wings perform their specialized 
functions of Investigation Monitoring, Special Operations, Financial Crimes Investigations and 
Prosecution. The Overseas Wing dealing with international cooperation in corruption cases reports 
directly to the Chairman. Similarly, at the regional level, specialized Wings with dedicated staff perform 
their functions under a Director General.  
175. The NAO provides statutory protection of tenure to the Chairman NAB and the Prosecutor 
General Accountability. The Chairman of the Bureau cannot be removed from office until completion of 
the statutory period of 4 years. This statutory protection provided to Chairman NAB and the Prosecutor 
General Accountability is similar to that provided to a Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.  
176. Federal Investigation Agency (FIA): The FIA was established under FIA Act, 1974. The 
charter of FIA includes inter-alia, the following functions:  
 Keep check on violations of Passport Act and Emigration Ordinance.  
 Investigate economic crime.  
 Carry out any other investigation of white collar crime having inter-provincial and 
international ramifications, entrusted by the Federal Government. 
177. Headed by a Director General (DG), the FIA has the following wings:  
 Crime Wing: Deals the cases of corruption, embezzlement, cheating, forgery and fraud. 
 National Central Bureau (NCB): Interpol in Pakistan was originally set up in 1957. It is 
presently a bureau of FIA located in Islamabad. DG FIA is the head of NCB, under the 
International Criminal Police Organization, Ministry of Interior, HQ General Secretariat. 
NCB is a base of operation for all cases relating to international Police Cooperation, 
fighting against crimes and criminals and all criminal subjected to surveillance, 
identification search, arrest, interrogation and extradition. 
 FIA Academy: FIA has its own Training Academy to impart pre-service and in-service 
training to its officers.  
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 Immigration Wing: Administers 18 immigration check posts (land and sea and air routes) 
and takes cognizance of offences under Passport Act, Emigration Ordinance and Human 
Trafficking.  
178. The FIA has established the Special Investigation Group (SIG) to investigate cases of terrorism 
and terrorist financing. SIG’s duties include the identification of terrorists, creation of a National 
Database of terrorists, identifying and arrest “most wanted terrorists” and coordinating with Provincial 
Governments in the National counterterrorism effort. SIG has multi-disciplinary teams investigating 
terrorism and terrorist financing. SIG is taking steps to develop its financial investigations capacity to 
investigate terrorist financing cases. The SIG indicates that it is conducting numerous inquiries into 
complaints or cases of suspected terrorist financing received through Interpol or Foreign missions in 
Pakistan.  
179. Anti Narcotics Force (ANF): ANF was established under the Anti Narcotics Force Act 1997 and 
is active in pursuing the assets of organized crime involved in narcotic trafficking and investigating 
narcotics related crime.  
180. Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation–Federal Board of Revenue (DG I&I – 
FBR): The DG I&I-FBR was originally created as Directorate of Customs Intelligence and Investigation 
as an attached department of Revenue Division in 1957. In 1995, the Directorate was assigned the role to 
carry out detailed audit of cases of Sales Tax fraud. In 2005 the Directorate was assigned the additional 
responsibilities of integrity management. Consequent upon restructuring under reform process, the 
Directorate was re-designated as Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation – FBR, Islamabad 
with the responsibility of both Direct and Indirect Taxes.  
181. Customs is vested with responsibility for monitoring cross-border currency movements under the 
exchange control mechanism.  
Self-Regulatory Organizations 
182. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP): The ICAP, which is established 
pursuant to the Accountants Act 1967 as the country’s national accountancy body, is the only accountancy 
body empowered by law to regulate the accountancy profession in Pakistan. A chartered or licensed 
accountant who wishes to engage in public practice services must register with the ICAP and possesses a 
valid practicing certificate issued by the ICAP.  
183. The Pakistan Bar Council (PBS): PBC is a statutory organization responsible for safeguarding 
the rights, interests and privileges of practicing lawyers, regulating their conduct and helping in the 
administration of justice. Its composition, powers and functions are described in detail by the Legal 
Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973. An important role assigned to the Bar Council has been the 
promotion of legal education and provision of free legal aid to deserving citizens. The Bar Council may 
also help in the promotion of knowledge about legal issues/problems through holding lectures, seminars 
and conferences.  
184. Apart from PBC, there are bars at each province at high court level which are also governed by 
the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973.  
Other Relevant Agencies 
185. National Database Registration Authority (NADRA): In March, 1998, it was decided to set up 
a national database organization to undertake the function of handling the data being collected through 
National Data Forms during the Population Census 1998. A new ordinance titled as National Database 
and Registration Authority, 2000 (VIII of 2000) was promulgated on March 10, 2000 which empowered 
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NADRA to establish and maintain different multi-purpose database warehouse, networking facilities, 
interfacing between database, and develop and implement Registration System for all persons including 
citizens, foreigners, emigrants and any other persons or things as may be prescribed by the Federal 
Government to means of issuance different cards as under:  
 National Identity Card (NIC) 
 National Identity Card for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) 
 Overseas Identity Card (OID)/Pakistan Card Abroad (PCA) 
 Alien Registration Card (ARC)  
186. The NADRA has developed a sophisticated database management system at national level for use 
by authorized Government agencies thus computerizing major functions of Federal and Provincial 
Governments.  
187. National Alien Registration Authority (NARA): Established under the Ministry of Interior, 
NARA is primarily concerned with the registration, and supervision as well as the maintenance of records 
pertaining to registered foreigners. NARA performs the following functions:  
 Register all the foreigners in Pakistan who immediately before the commencement of the 
Foreigners (Amendment) Ordinance, 2000 (promulgated on July 10, 2000) who had no 
permission to stay in Pakistan.  
 Issue Work Permits to those aliens seeking employment or running own business.  
 It was provided that aliens who get themselves registered with the Authority during the 
amnesty period announced by the Government shall not be proceeded against under the 
Foreigners Act, 1946, during the unauthorized stay. Minor children of the registered alien 
will be registered with their parents, and on reaching adulthood will seek their 
registration in their own right.  
188. Department of Immigration & Passport: The Department of Immigration & Passport is under 
the Ministry of Interior. It deals with issuance of passports, visa, Pakistan citizenship, dual nationality, 
renunciation of Pakistan citizenship, registration of birth of children of Pakistan citizens born abroad and 
annual registration of citizens of Pakistan residing abroad.  
Approach Concerning Risk 
189. Pakistan states that it has adopted an inclusive approach to the scope of the anti-money 
laundering obligations in the financial sector, and has not sought to exclude any of the activities on a risk-
based approach. The authorities are aware that government borrowings from the general public in the 
form of National Saving Schemes operated by CDNS and Pakistan Post Savings Bank are however not a 
subject of AMLO as yet. However, with their plans to adopt an activity-based definition of financial 
institution, they consider that this area will also come then under the ambit of AMLO.  
190. The preparation of an AML/CFT Strategy – which is likely to require some sort of AML/CFT 
assessment – is an explicit task for the GC and NEC. At the time of the on-site mission, no such risk 
assessment has been undertaken – therefore there is no solid basis at this time for the authorities to 
embark onto a risk-based approach to the efforts against ML and FT.  
191. However, some analysis has been undertaken and documented / formalized by NAB of money 
laundering typologies for corruption (as defined by NAO, which is a very extensive definition of 
corruption).  
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192. Two such recent examples of such studies are in the areas of Prize Bonds and Housing Societies 
(real estate sector) – which include recommendations by NAB that reforms be undertaken to address the 
described loopholes.  
Progress since the last Mutual Evaluation 
193. Pakistan has made significant progress since its last APG mutual evaluation, both in terms of 
legislation, regulation and implementation. These are not described in details under this section, as the 
detailed assessment report is in itself a description of these efforts. The adoption of the AML Ordinance 
(AMLO), the AML Statute, which was a key recommendation of the previous assessment, deserves to be 
recognized. 
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2. LEGAL SYSTEM AND RELATED INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES 
Laws and Regulations 
 
2.1. Criminalization of Money Laundering (R.1 & 2) 
2.1.1. Description and Analysis6   
194. Legal Framework: Money laundering is criminalized under s. 3 of the Anti-Money Laundering 
Ordinance 2007 (AMLO) and under s. 12 of the Control of Narcotics Substance Act 1997 (CNSA) and 
ss.11I and 11K of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 (ATA).  
195. The Constitutionality of AMLO: AMLO was issued as a presidential ordinance in exercise of 
the extraordinary powers assumed by the president pursuant to the Proclamation of Emergency of 3rd 
November 2007. According to Article 89 of the Constitution of Pakistan, all ordinances must be 
introduced in the National Assembly as a bill and are automatically repealed at the expiration of a period 
of four months from their promulgation.  This raised concern regarding the validity of AMLO and any 
rules made pursuant to it.  
196. However, by virtue of the Constitution (Amendment) Order (2007), the President amended the 
Constitution and Article 270AAA was introduced. This amendment validated all the ordinances issued 
under the Proclamation of Emergency notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution. It also 
provided that such ordinances shall continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by the 
competent authority. The Constitutionality of The Constitution (Amendment) Order was challenged and 
the Supreme Court in C.P.No.87/07 upheld the constitutionality of the Order including Article 270AAA. 
Accordingly, the assessment team was satisfied that AMLO is a valid law under the Pakistani 
constitutional framework.  
197. The acts of Laundering and the meaning of proceeds (c.1.1-1.2): The Pakistani law has in 
force three offences of money laundering. (1) A general offence of money laundering defined in s.3 of 
AMLO, which extends to a range of predicate offences; (2) a specific offence of laundering the proceeds 
of narcotic offences as defined in s. 12 of the CNSA; and (3) two specific offences of laundering “terrorist 
property” in ss. 11J and 11K.  
198. Section 12 of AMLO reads: “A person shall be guilty of offence of money laundering, if the 
person: (a) acquires, converts, possesses or transfers property, knowing or having reason to believe that 
such property is proceeds of crime; or (b) renders assistance to another person for the acquisition, 
conversion, possession or transfer of, or for concealing or disguising the true nature, origin, location, 
disposition, movement or ownership of property, knowing or having reason to believe that such property 
is proceeds of crime.”  
199. This general offence of money laundering, which will form the basis for the assessment in this 
section, extends clearly to acquiring, converting, possessing, or transferring the proceeds of crime (s. 3a). 
S.3b criminalizes “rendering assistance to another person for concealing or disguising the true nature, 
origin, location, disposition, movement, or ownership of the proceeds.”  S. 3b criminalizes the acts of 
                                                     
6. For all recommendations, the description and analysis section should include the analysis of effectiveness, and 
should contain any relevant statistical data. 
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concealing or disguising as described under the Vienna and Palermo conventions. It is not clear whether 
the words “rendering assistance” in s. 3b impose additional elements that the prosecution will be required 
to prove to secure conviction under this provision. It is also not clear whether these words narrow the 
scope of criminalization in some way.  
200. Discussions with FIA officers responsible for investigating offences under the AMLO confirmed 
that there is no clear understanding of what “rendering assistance” would mean in investigating a case.  It 
is worth noting that the proposed amendments of AMLO that have been recently approved by cabinet will 
clarify this point by removing the words “rendering assistance” from the wording of s.3b.  
201. Worth noting here that s. 12 of the CNSA suffers from certain limitations. It criminalizes broadly 
the acts of “possession, acquisition, use, convert, assign, or transfer” under s. 12a. But when it comes to 
concealing or disguising, s. 12c is very restrictive because it restricts those acts to concealment or disguise 
“by making false declaration in relation to [the assets].”  
202. Table 12 below compares the acts of money laundering proscribed under the three applicable 
legislations:  
Table 12: Comparison of Money-Laundering Offences 
AMLO CNSA ATA 
 Acquisition 
 Conversion 
 Possession 
 Transfer 
 “Rendering assistance” for 
concealing or disguising 
the true nature, origin, 
location, disposition, 
movement, or ownership of 
the proceeds. 
 Possession  
 Acquisition 
 Use 
 Conversion 
 Assigning 
 Transfer  
 Holding or possessing on behalf 
of another 
 Concealing or disguising the 
true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, title, or 
ownership of the proceeds by 
making false declaration in 
relation to the proceeds.  
 
 Entering into or being concerned 
with any arrangement which 
facilitates retention or control by or 
on behalf another of terrorist 
property: by concealment, by 
removal from the jurisdiction, by 
transfer to nominees, or in any other 
way.  
 
 
203. Money laundering occurs when the criminal act occurs in relation to property that constitutes 
“proceeds”. The Ordinance defines “property” in s. 1(s) very broadly fully adopting the definition of the 
Glossary to the Methodology. The term “proceed” is also defined in s.1(r) consistently with 
Recommendation 1 to include property directly or indirectly derived or obtained from the commission of 
a predicate offence.  
204. Requisite Conviction of a Predicate Offence (c.1.2.1): S.3 of the Ordinance does not contain 
any requirement that a prior conviction for the predicate offence is necessary for the proof of money 
laundering. In fact, the ANF has previously brought two cases in which the defendant was charged with 
money laundering under s. 12 of CNSA even though charges with the predicate offence had previously 
been brought and had failed. The court found the defendants not guilty not for the lack of conviction for 
the predicate offence but for the weakness of the evidence submitted by the prosecution.  
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205. The team met with prosecutors and investigators from the Anti-Narcotic Force who confirmed 
that there is nothing in the law to mandate prior conviction and that the issue is more in relation to how 
the law is being enforced and what is perceived as possible to prove.   
206. There is a general sense amongst prosecutors and lawyers that it is not possible to prove money 
laundering in the absence of prior conviction for a predicate offence. This is not because of legal 
difficulties or burdensome evidentiary requirements in the law but rather because of the practical 
difficulties associated with this sort of factual scenario.  
207. The Scope of the Predicate Offence (c.1.3-1.4): Section 2(t) of AMLO defines “predicate 
offence” adopting a list approach that is compounded by a threshold requirement in certain instances.  
The list is attached as a schedule to the AMLO. With the exception of fiscal offences, that are explicitly 
excluded from the scope of the predicate offence in the s.2 (t) this schedule could be amended by Federal 
Government by notification in the Official Gazette. The amendment could add new offences to the 
schedule of predicate offences, modify an entry in the schedule or delete an entry in the schedule. This 
approach to the amendment of the schedule gives it flexibility that allows the scope of the predicate 
offence to be altered when the need arises without a need for legislative amendment. The team, concerned 
about the constitutionality of this method considering the penal nature of the schedule, asked the 
authorities and were assured that this approach has been used in other legislations without challenge and 
that the principle of legality of crimes and penalties is satisfied by the fact that the power of the Federal 
Government is grounded in a specific statutory provision.  
208. After the on-site mission the authorities amended the schedule of offences and expanded it 
covering a wide range of new categories that were not previously included using the power granted in the 
Ordinance as described above. The Government issued an SRO to that effect.  The SRO was published in 
the official Gazette on March 21, 2009.  
209. The Schedule to AMLO includes within the scope of the predicate offences all offences under the 
ATA (1997) and under the Securities and Exchange Ordinance (1969). The scope of these two particular 
categories of schedule offences is further restricted by prescribing that they only include the offences 
under these two acts for which the minimum punishment is a period of over one year. This threshold is 
too high. It excludes any offence within these two categories of offences for which there is no minimum 
punishment or for which the minimum punishment is below one year. The international standard requires 
that for countries that adopt a threshold approach this threshold should not be more than minimum 
imprisonment of six months.  
210. The Table 13 below shows the list of the predicate offences included in the schedule and the list 
of designated categories of offences that they correspond to:  
Table 13: Description of Predicate Offences 
Designated Category Predicate Offences under AMLO 
Participation in an organized criminal group Criminal conspiracy under s. 120B of the PPC. 
Terrorism All offences under the Anti Terrorism Act prescribing a 
minimum punishment for a period of over one year.  
Corruption and Bribery ss. 161-165A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (PPC). 
Corruption and Corrupt Practices under s. 9 of the National 
Accountability Ordinance 1997 (NAO). 
Murder Sections 300 and 316of PPC 
Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage taking Sections 363-366 367-367A, 268-369 and 496 of PPC. 
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Designated Category Predicate Offences under AMLO 
On illegal restraint: 337K, 343-348. 
 
Human Trafficking 366B, 369, 370 and 371 of PPC 
ss.3-5 of the Prevention & Control of Human Trafficking 
Ordinance 2002. 
ss. 17-19 and s. 22 of the Emigration Ordinance (1979) 
Sexual exploitation including of children 366A, 367A, 371A, 371B,  
Theft or Robbery  ss. 379, 380, 381, 381A, 382, 392, 395, and 402 of the PPC. 
Extortion 384 and 385 of PPC  
Illicit trafficking in stolen goods. ss. 411-414 of PPC. 
 
Fraud ss. 417, 421, 422, 423, and 424 of PPC.  
Forgery ss. 465, 467, 468, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 477A 
of PPC. 
Counterfeiting of Currency ss. 489A-E of PPC. 
Counterfeiting and Piracy of Products 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487 and 488 of PPC 
ss. 66-70 of the Copy Right Ordinance, 1962. 
ss.27-29 of the Registered Design Ordinance (2000) 
ss. 99, 101 and 107 of the Trade Marks Ordinance (2001).  
Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs ss. 5,9,11,13,15,41 and 42 of the Control of Narcotic 
Substances Act, 1997. 
Illicit arms trafficking s. 122 of PPC. 
ss.19 &20 of the Arms Act 1878 
s. 13 of  The Pakistan Arms Ordinance (1965).  
 
211. By examining the criminalization provisions within each of the above categories, the team was 
satisfied that the Pakistani law covers a sufficient range of offences within each of these categories. It is 
important to note that in relation to corruption offences the current range under the provisions of PPC and 
NAO is sufficient. However, should the National Accountability Ordinance be abolished, as is currently 
being considered, the range of corruption offences under the PPC will be too limited.  
212. Currently, there are a number of designated categories of offences that are not included within the 
scope of the predicate offence under AMLO. Table 14 shows these uncovered categories and shows the 
corresponding provision of criminalization under the Pakistani law.  
Table 14:  Missing Predicate Offences 
Predicate Offence as per FATF Relevant Section and Statute 
Environmental crime Sections 11, 13,14, 17, 18 of Pakistan Environmental Protections Act, 
1997 
Grievous bodily injury Ss.332-337A-Z of the PPC. 
Smuggling Sections 156 [Items 8,81,82, 89, 93 of the Table], Sections 158 to 192 
of the Customs Act, 1969,  
Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977 [Sections 3,4,173031,33] 
Piracy There is no offence of piracy under the laws of Pakistan. 
Insider trading and market manipulation s. 17 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 on market 
manipulation. There is no criminal offence of insider trading.  
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213. While the Schedule to AMLO includes reference to the offences under the Securities and 
Exchange Ordinance (1969), the threshold approach described above has resulted in excluding from the 
scope of the predicate offence under AMLO the offence of s.17 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 
(1969), which prohibits a range of fraudulent and manipulative practices. The penalty for s.17 of the 
Securities and Exchange Ordinance has no minimum and therefore is excluded from the scope of the 
predicate offence under the AMLO Schedule.   It is also important to note that s. 15A and 15B of the 
Securities and Exchange Ordinance, which prohibit insider trading, have been amended to abolish the 
penal sanction and instate civil penalties instead. The explanation offered by the authorities was that the 
offence of insider trading was very difficult to prove and there were no successful prosecutions under that 
provision during its 15-year life. For that reason, the SECP has opted for an amendment that replaces the 
penal sanction by a civil one, which can be imposed directly by the SECP. As a result, market 
manipulation and insider trading are not predicate for money laundering.  
214. All smuggling offences are categorically excluded from the scope of the AMLO under s. 2(t), 
which defines the predicate offence by reference to the Schedule then adds “but does not include fiscal 
offence.” Because smuggling offences are considered fiscal offences, the smuggling offences could not be 
added to the Schedule and cannot be added without legislative amendment to the AMLO. Considering the 
serious risk of smuggling known in Pakistan, which was confirmed by the various investigative and 
supervisory agencies as well as the customs authorities that the team met with, this omission is considered 
in this assessment to be serious. . The current draft revision of the AMLO under consideration by the 
Executive contains a proposal to add smuggling as a predicate to AMLO. Meeting with the authorities 
revealed that there is general support amongst the relevant agencies for this amendment. Following the 
on-site mission, the authorities advised the team that the draft amendments have already been approved 
by the Cabinet.  
215. The SRO amended the schedule removing s. 365A of the PPC on Kidnapping or abducting for 
extorting property. Now these offences are no longer predicate offenses for money laundering even 
though these crimes are common in the frontier regions and are linked to terrorism financing.  
216. Terrorist Financing as a Predicate Offence: The Schedule to AMLO extends to all the offences 
under the ATA that are punishable by a minimum punishment of one year imprisonment. The terrorism 
financing offence defined in s. 11J of the ATA is punished by a minimum of five years imprisonment, 
which brings it within the threshold defined by the schedule. So, the offence of terrorism financing is a 
predicate offence to the money laundering offence under AMLO.  
217. The ATA also created an independent offence of laundering terrorist property.      S. 11K 
provides: “A Person commits an offence if he enters into or becomes concerned in any arrangement 
which facilitates the retention of control, by or on behalf of another person, of terrorist property: (a) by 
concealment, (b) by removal from the jurisdiction, (c) by transfer to nominees, or (d) in any other way.”  
The term “terrorist property” is defined in s. 1(aa) very broadly to include, amongst other things, 
“proceeds of the commission of acts of terrorism” and “proceeds of acts carried out for the purposes of 
terrorism.” The term proceeds is also defined broadly to include “any property which wholly or partly, 
and directly or indirectly, represents the proceeds of the act (including payments of other rewards in 
connection with the commission.”  
218. The approach of the ATA to create an independent offence of laundering terrorist property” has 
the distinct advantage of bringing the offence of laundering terrorist property within the jurisdiction of the 
special court under the ATA. This has two advantages: (1) it places the predicate offence and the 
laundering offence within the jurisdiction of the same court with the attached benefits of consolidation; 
(2) it gives the offence of laundering the proceeds of terrorism offences the benefits of more expeditious 
adjudication that is characteristic of the special courts.  
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219. On basis of the analysis above, the laundering of the proceeds of terrorism is criminalized under 
Pakistani law both as a predicate offence to the offence of money laundering under AMLO and as a stand-
alone offence under ATA.  
220. Foreign Predicate Offences (c.1.5, 1.8):      the offence of ML under AMLO extends explicitly 
to “foreign serious offences” defined in s. 1(i) as “an offence against the law of a foreign State stated in a 
certificate issued by, or on behalf of, the government of that foreign State, and which, had it occurred in 
Pakistan, would have constituted a predicate offence.” The position of the law is clear and the 
requirement relating to the certification, albeit has not been yet implemented in reality, was described as a 
simple process with to be performed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The definition of dual 
criminality seems to be a functional one rather than a formal one. Discussions with the authorities support 
the conclusion that Pakistan adopts a flexible approach to dual criminality.  
221. The scope of the “foreign predicate offence” is affected by the gaps in the definition of the 
predicate offence identified above.  The amendment of the Schedule introduced by the SRO issued in 
March 21, 2009 expands the scope of the predicate offence substantially and alleviates some of the 
concern; gaps however still remain as identified above.  
222. Self Laundering (c.1.6): The money laundering offence under AMLO, as well as under CNSA, 
extends very clearly to the perpetrator of the predicate offence. This is manifest in the criminalization of 
acquisition or possession under both acts. Even though the assessors have not seen court decisions 
convicting for self laundering under CNSA, in a meeting with the anti-narcotic force, they confirmed that 
convictions of the perpetrators of the predicate narcotic offences for the laundering of the proceeds has 
previously been achieved. The team has also seen cases in which the courts entertained a case against the 
perpetrators of the predicate offence but did not convict for lack of proof.  
223. Ancillary Offences (c.1.7):   AMLO does not criminalize any offences ancillary to money 
laundering. This approach under AMLO is different from the one adopted under CNSA and ATA. The 
draft amendment to s.3, which has been approved by Cabinet introduces a range of ancillary liability that 
once passed will address this issue.    
224. Under section 21-I of ATA, whoever aids or abets any offence, shall be punishable with the 
maximum term of imprisonment provided for the offence or the fine provided for such offence or with 
both.  
225. Section 14 of CNSA prohibits participation, association, conspiracy, attempt, aiding, abetting, 
facilitating, inciting, inducing, and counseling as ancillary offences to the offences punishable under the 
Act. Section 15 ancillary offences are punishable with the punishment provided for the offence or such 
lesser punishment as may be awarded by the Court.  
226. The PPC contains a range of ancillary offences including abetting (ss.109-119), criminal 
conspiracy (s.120A, B), and attempt (s.511). In considering whether the ancillary offences under PPC 
would be applicable to the ML offence under AMLO, it was found that with very few exception, the 
general provision stipulated in PPC are only applicable to the offences of the Code. This is contained in s. 
40 of the PPC, which provides that “the word “offence” denotes a thing made punishable by this code.” 
Since the ancillary offences defined by the PPC are defined by reference to conspiring to commit an 
“offence” or attempting to commit an “offence,” that excludes their application to offences punishable 
under any special law.  
227. Section 40 of the PPC includes a list of exceptions to the narrow definition of the word “offence” 
that extends its meaning to offences punishable under special laws. This exception applies to ss. 109-110 
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& 112-117 relating to the criminalization of abetment. Abetting money laundering is therefore punishable 
under the PPC. According to s. 109, whoever abets ML under AMLO shall be punished with the same 
punishment provided ML offence.  
228. Based on the above, the ML offence under AMLO is not supported by a sufficient range of 
ancillary offences.  
229. Liability of Natural Persons (c. 2.1, 2.2): S. 3 of AMLO criminalizes the acts of persons, 
individuals and others according to s.2 (p), who commit the acts proscribed in s.3 “knowing or having 
reason to believe that such property is proceeds.” S. 12 of CNSA (1997) has a stricter standard in that it 
requires actual knowledge.  
230. The money laundering offence under s. 11K of the ATA goes a step further. The offence of 
laundering terrorist property is a strict liability offence in that it does not impose on the prosecutor the 
requirement to prove the mental element. Instead, under s. 11K (2) it grants the accused a defense against 
conviction for the accused to prove that he “did not know and had no reason to suspect that the 
arrangement related to terrorist property.” 
231. S. 27 of the Qanum-E-Shahadat Order 1984, (hereinafter, Evidence Act) provides for the 
inference of the mental element from objective factual circumstances. The Act goes as far as to say that 
the previous commission of the accused of an offence is a relevant fact to the establishment of the state of 
mind of the accused. The Evidence Act is a general Act that applies to all proceedings. Nothing in 
AMLO, CNSA or ATA qualifies the generality of this rule.  
232. Criminal Liability of Legal Person (c.2.4): The position under the laws of Pakistan on the 
criminal liability of legal persons is rather confusing. The PPC defines the word “person” for the purposes 
of the liability for offences under the Act as including “any company or association, or body of persons 
whether incorporated or not,” which seems to set the criminal liability of legal persons as a general 
principle. AMLO contains a similar definition of person that encompasses all individuals, all juridical 
persons and unincorporated groups of persons.  
233. S. 37 of AMLO, which is titled “Offences by companies” provides that “Where a person 
committing a contravention of any of the provisions of this Ordinance or of any rule, direction or order 
made hereunder, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was responsible for 
such contravention in the conduct of the business of company shall be deemed to be guilty of the 
contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” The section goes on 
to give an officer of the company a defense against liability if he proves that he did know or that he 
exercised all due diligence.  
234. When the assessors probed the issue with the key investigative agencies: FIA, NAC and ANF, it 
became evident that the understanding of corporate criminal liability is confined to the narrow sense 
defined in s. 37. Accordingly, corporate criminal liability under Pakistani law is nothing but the strict 
liability of the responsible natural persons who act on its behalf. All the agencies met, including NAB and 
ANF, which are active in asset investigations, confirmed that they have never prosecuted a body 
corporate in its own capacity and that they have never considered it or considered it possible. They have 
all however agreed that there is nothing in the law itself or in the general principles that prevents such 
prosecution. The omission is just a matter of practice and lack of understanding of the possibility of such 
direct prosecution of the corporation. On this basis, investigative agencies in Pakistan are unlikely to 
pursue criminal liability against legal persons according to the current practice in Pakistan.  
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235. The assessors were also not satisfied that there were alternative sanctions, civil or administrative, 
available against the body corporate who commits section 3 offence of ML under AMLO or ML under 
ATA or CNSA. The authorities do emphasize in that respect that both SBP and SECP have sanctions 
available against legal entities under their purview (which is large for SECP given its role regarding 
corporations). They consider that these civil penalties can be substantial (see recommendation 17). 
However, the assessors note that the legal system of Pakistan does not know the practice of imposing civil 
sanctions against the corporations outside the regulatory framework to which the corporation maybe 
subject, and that no example was provided of using these tools in the AML/CFT context. Even where 
there is in place a regulatory framework that permits the imposition of civil sanctions, there is no practice 
of linking such regulatory action to a successful prosecution of the officers of the corporate body for an 
offence that found the acts attributable to the corporation.  
236. To illustrate, NAB investigators and prosecutors confirmed to the team, that even in instances 
where corporations were found to be involved in the commission of a corrupt practice punishable under 
the Act, there was no liaison with SECP or other regulatory body to invoke the application of available 
sanctions under the regulatory framework to penalize the criminal acts attributable to the corporation. It is 
worth noting that fines are imposed on financial institutions for failure to report suspicious transactions 
under AMLO, but that is within the regulatory and supervisory framework of the SBP.  
237. S. 4 of AMLO makes money laundering punishable by “rigorous imprisonment” for 1-10 years. It 
also imposes mandatory fine of up to one million rupees and mandatory forfeiture of “property involved 
in money laundering.” This is a narrower term than “proceeds of crime” and it is not defined in the 
Ordinance. The section also imposes non-mandatory fine of up to one million rupees that the court may or 
may not impose.    
238. S. 11N of ATA made the offence of laundering terrorist property under s. 11K punishable with 
imprisonment of five years to ten years and with a fine, which is “to be defined by the Court having 
regard to the circumstances of the case” according to s. 2(h).  
239. Of all three ML offences under Pakistani law, the offence of narco-laundering under s. 12 of the 
CNSA defines the severest punishments. S. 12 laundering is punishable by (1) 5-14 years of 
imprisonment; (2) compulsory fine of an amount not less than the prevailing value of the assets; (3) 
compulsory forfeiture of all the assets. The assets are defined very broadly to include all the assets 
belonging directly or indirectly to the accused.  
240. The punishment imposed under s.3 of AMLO, are comparable in severity to those imposed for 
similar offences under the laws of other countries in the region (India: 3-7 years; Australia: 5-25 years,  
Malaysia – 7 years; Indonesia – 5-15 years, Singapore – 7 years, Chinese Taipei – 3 to 7 years, Thailand, 
1 to 10 years, Philippines 7-14 years, ). They are also comparable to the punishments attached to other 
offences of economic nature under special acts: (Fraudulent acts in the securities market: -3 years, 
Corrupt practices: -14 years, Electronic fraud -7 years).  
241. Based on the above, the assessors consider that s.3 sanctions under AMLO are within the regional 
and domestic range for this type of offence in terms of imprisonment. They consider however that the 
pecuniary sanctions do not reflect the potential seriousness of the offence. In that respect they do not 
deem 1 million rupees as a maximum penalty to be sufficiently deterrent to those involved in money 
laundering especially as Pakistan moves towards direct criminal liability of corporations. Under the 
proposed amendments (section 4) the penalty is being raised to Rs. 5 million for both natural and legal 
person involved.  
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242. The forfeiture provision is too narrow and is not sufficient to take the profit out of crime. It is not 
clear why the legislative policy opted for lower imprisonment sanctions for terrorist property laundering 
under ATA. This approach seems inconsistent with the severity and the violent nature of the predicate 
offence. The pecuniary sanctions are however more appropriate under the ATA and gives the courts more 
discretion to impose a fine proportionate to the assets involved.  
Analysis of Effectiveness 
243. There has not been any investigation or prosecution under the ML offences of AMLO, nor ATA.  
244. As for the ML statutes pre-existing AMLO, and in particular  CNSA s. 12, the authorities 
indicated that there has been one or two successful prosecutions for money laundering, albeit in 
connection with a prior conviction for a predicate offence. The assessors have not seen the court’s 
decisions in these cases. The information provided to the assessors did not indicate any meaningful flow 
of on-going investigations or prosecution under these other ML statutes, despite them having been in 
place for a much longer time than AMLO. 
245. The assessors reviewed these indications of the effectiveness of the various ML statutes against 
their evaluation of the ML risk in Pakistan, as presented under the general section of this report. While 
taking note of the efforts undertaken by the authorities with a handful of investigations and prosecutions, 
the assessors are of the view that the results achieved so far, even taking into account the novelty of 
AMLO, are not commensurate with the significant risks facing the country. In and of itself, the assessors 
consider that the legal weaknesses in the ML statutes are to be noted, but are not to be over-played. Based 
on discussions with the authorities, it appears that the key impediments are: 
 Lack of understanding amongst investigating agencies of the scope and possible use of the 
money laundering offence.  
 Lack of capacity to conduct financial investigation at an early stage of the investigative 
process.  
 The agencies quoted extreme difficulty of proving that the money is proceeds due to the very 
high standard of proof required by the courts.  
 
246. As a result of their analysis, the assessors note the legal gaps existing in the legal framework, by 
reference to the Standard and the methodology. In addition, and this is key to their analysis and to the 
rating, the most important issue lies with the lack of effectiveness of the criminalization of ML in 
Pakistan, irrespective of the statute considered.  
 
2.1.2. Recommendations and Comments 
247. In order to meet the international standard:  
 The authorities should expand the scope of the acts of laundering to cover the elements of the 
Vienna and Palermo conventions. 
 The authorities should expand the scope of the predicate offence to cover a range within all the 
designated categories.  
 Create a sufficient range of ancillary offences to support the money laundering offence. 
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 Ensure that money laundering is investigated and prosecuted as an autonomous offence and train 
the investigative authorities so that they can gather evidence in support of the money laundering 
offence regardless of conviction for a predicate offence.  
 Ensure that legal persons are held liable for acts of money laundering. 
 Ensure that there are a proportionate and dissuasive range of sanctions available against legal 
persons who may be liable for money laundering. 
 Review and remove the obstacles that hamper the effectiveness of the investigation and 
prosecution of money laundering. 
 Make sure that the laundering of the proceeds of terrorism financing is fully criminalized. 
 
2.1.3. Compliance with Recommendations 1 & 2 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating7 
R.1 PC - The definition of the acts of laundering misses some of the elements required under 
applicable conventions. The gap is very small 
- 4 of the 20 categories of designated offences are not currently predicate offences to 
ML and piracy and insider trading are not criminal offences in Pakistan. 
- The investigative authorities do not envision the possibility of prosecuting ML as an 
autonomous offence.  
- The main ML offence under AMLO lacks a sufficient range of ancillary offences.   
- There is an overall lack of effectiveness of the investigation and prosecution of 
money laundering reflected in the nearly total absence of cases.  
R.2 PC - It is not currently the practice in Pakistan to charge legal persons for ML offences or 
for the predicate offences and there is not an alternative system of civil sanctions 
applicable to their breaches.  
- The maximum pecuniary punishments allowed for money laundering under AMLO are 
potentially too lenient for the cases involving large proceeds.  
- Despite the existence of a ML offence under CNSA since 1997 and ATA since 2005, 
there has not been any track-record of successful prosecution for ML under those 
statutes. 
- There is overall a lack of effectiveness in sanctioning the ML offence 
 
                                                     
7. These factors are only required to be set out when the rating is less than Compliant. 
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2.2. Criminalization of Terrorist Financing (SR.II) 
2.2.1. Description and Analysis 
248. Legal Framework: The Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 (ATA) as amended in 2001.  
249. Criminalization of Terrorist Financing (c.II.1): To assess whether the criminalization of 
terrorist financing is in line with the international standard, several elements need to be compared for 
consistency: (1) the definition of the acts that would constitute financing; (2) the definition of funds or 
other related concepts that is central to the definition of financing; and (3) The definition of terrorism, 
terrorist acts, terrorists, and terrorist organizations.  
250. The ATA creates several offences of terrorism financing: The Table below summarizes the 
various criminalization provisions under the Act:  
Section  Criminal Acts Recipient of destination of the funds 
11F(5) Soliciting, collecting or raising funds For a proscribed organization 
11H(1) Invites another to provide money or other property Intending that it should be used or 
having reasonable cause to suspect that 
it may be used for the purpose of 
terrorism. 
11H(2) Receives money or other property  Intending that it should be used or 
having reasonable cause to suspect that 
it may be used for the purpose of 
terrorism. 
11H(3) Provides money or other property  Knowing or having reason to suspect 
that it will or may be used for the 
purposes of terrorism 
11I(1) Uses money or other property For the purposes of terrorism 
11I(2) Possesses money or other property Intending that it should be used or 
having reasonable cause to suspect that 
it may be used for the purposes of 
terrorism 
11J Enters into or becomes concerned in an arrangement as a 
result of which money or other property is made available 
or is to be made available  
Having reasonable cause to suspect that 
it will or may be used for the purposes 
of terrorism 
 
251. As the table above shows, ATA criminalizes a wide range of acts that fall broadly within the 
definition of financing under the standard. The question here is whether the acts criminalized by s. 11 
ATA would cover the meaning of “collection” and “provision” of funds by any means directly or 
indirectly as required by the standard.  
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252. In the absence of case law on any of the financing provisions of the ATA, the assessors have to 
rely in the analysis on what can be read in the text of the law.   The law clearly criminalizes the provision 
of money or property under s. 11H (3). While it does not specify that this provision of funds could be 
indirect, there is nothing in s. 11H(3) that makes it restrictive and it is to be expected that the courts would 
take the broad interpretation if it was satisfied that the person knew or suspected that the funds will be 
used for the purposes of terrorism.  The authorities advised the team that the terms have very broad 
definition, which would extend to both direct and indirect methods of collection and provision. They drew 
the attention of the team to the definition of terrorist property in the act, which includes both directly and 
indirectly derived property. The authorities indicated that similar approach would apply to the 
interpretation by courts of the acts that constitute terrorism financing.  
253. Section 11 criminalizes collection or what may be construed as forms of collection in three sub-
paragraphs of the section:  
(1) Soliciting, collecting or raising funds for a proscribed organization (s. 11F (5)) 
(2) Inviting another to provide money or other property (s.11H (1)) 
(3) Entering into or becomes concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or other 
property is made available or is to be made available to another for the purposes of terrorism.    
254. In relation to proscribed organizations, collection is unambiguously criminalized. In relation to 
the other forms of TF, such as the financing of acts of terrorism, the ATA is much less clear. The crime of 
inviting another to provide appears on its face to be too narrow. The assessors read it as referring to a 
direct communication with one other person, and not to the mass collection of funds that may not involve 
direct communication such as placing donation boxes at appropriate places. While the courts may very 
well construe such acts as acts of inviting another and may take a liberal view and not require proof of 
multiple interactions, the words on their face are not very explicit especially by contrast to the acts of 
“solicitation, collection, or fund raising” for a proscribed organization under s. 11F(5).  The authorities 
advised the team that in Pakistan singular form wherever used is construed as embodying the plural as 
well and the judicial interpretations of ‘another’ without doubt would cover invitation at large, to a body 
of persons.  
255. The law criminalizes collection explicitly in relation to proscribed organizations and uses the 
different language of “invite another to provide” when it comes to the criminalization of terrorist acts. 
This variation in the language cannot be considered meaningless because it is agreed universally that 
legislative interpretation assumes that the law maker is purposeful and that legislative language cannot be 
presumed redundant or meaningless. 
256. The act of “entering or becoming concerned with an arrangement” under s. 3 seems to be broad. 
It is not however free of ambiguity. The Act does not define “an arrangement.” It is reasonable to 
interpret such term as capturing all schemes or arrangements for collecting, soliciting or fund raising; 
such as placement of donation boxes, dispatching individuals to collect funds, or even selling publications 
and other items with the ultimate objective of collecting funds.  It will however be subject to judicial 
interpretation and it is not as straight-forward as the term “collection.”  This does not preclude that these 
acts may be covered by s, 11J if the courts interpret that section broadly. 
257. It is important to consider in this context the scope of s. 11I (2), which criminalizes “possession 
of money or other property.” This section may apply to some of the acts of collection in that collection 
should at some stage result in possession. This section is broad and will necessarily capture many 
instances of collection.  It does not serve however to cover the masterminds of collection schemes who 
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never take possession of the funds. The assessors are not satisfied by the argument put forward by the 
authorities that they would be able to apply a concept of “constructive possession” to cover such 
situations.  This ambiguity will only be resolved through the decisions of the courts. 
258. On basis of the analysis above, the provisions of ATA cover the act of providing funds, and cover 
a wide range of the acts of collection. The assessors consider that they provide scope for leaving some 
acts of collection outside the scope of the criminalization under the act because of the lack of 
straightforward criminalization of “collection” except in relation to proscribed organizations. The gap is 
most likely going to be very small.  
259. Apart from the specific offence under s.11D (5) of financing proscribed organizations, all the 
other offences pertain to forms of financing “for the purposes of terrorism.” The Act does not define the 
term “for the purposes of terrorism.” It does however define “terrorism” in s.6. The assessment here will 
be based on a reading of the provisions that drops the word “for the purposes” and examines the scope of 
the Act as if the provisions were criminalizing financing “for terrorism.”  The word “for the purposes” 
may be interpreted by the courts in a way that broadens the scope of the Act.  The assessors’ analysis 
allows for this possibility by accepting that some of the gaps identified maybe addressed through such 
broader interpretation. That is why when a gap is identified it is described more as an ambiguity rather 
than outright omission of exclusion. 
260. Section 6 defined “terrorism” as the use or threat of certain types of violent actions defined in the 
same section, when the use or threat is designed to “coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or 
the public or a section of the public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society” 
(s. 6(1) (b)) or “the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian, or ethnic 
cause.” S.6 (3) goes on to exclude the necessity for proving any specific purpose when the action carried 
out or threatened involves the use of firearms, explosives or any other weapon. In these very broad 
instances, the action is classified as terrorism regardless on any specific purpose or intention.  
261. The action, which constitutes terrorism or an act of terrorism, when used or threatened for the 
purposes defined above, extends to a wide range of violent acts against individuals as well as property. 
The following are relevant to the assessment of compliance with the standard under SRII:  
(1) Action involving the doing of anything that causes death  
(2) Action involving grievous violence against a person or grievous bodily injury or harm to 
person 
(3) Action involving grievous damage to property 
(4) Action involving the doing of anything that is likely to cause death or endangers a person’s 
life; 
(5) Action involving kidnapping for ransom, hostage-taking or hijacking; 
(6)  Action designed to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt a communications system or 
public utility service; 
(7) Action involving serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force him to 
discharge or to refrain from discharging his lawful duties; 
(8) Action involving serious violence against a member of the police force, armed forces, civil 
armed forces, or a public servant. 
(9) Action creating a serious risk to safety of  public or a section of the public, or is designed to  
frighten the  general public and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their 
lawful trade and  daily business, and disrupts civil (civic) life 
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262. Under SRII, countries are required to extend the definition of terrorism for the purposes of the 
financing offences to all the acts that constitute offences under any of the 12 terrorism conventions that 
are annexed to the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Pakistan is party to 11 
out of the 12 applicable conventions, the only exception being the Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material (1980). They are also required to criminalize more generally the financing of acts 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury.  
263. According to the description of the law above, ATA’s definition of terrorist acts complies with 
the requirement of criminalizing the financing of acts that are intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury since these are specifically defined as acts of terrorism under s. 6 of the ATA. The question that 
remains is whether the definition of acts of terrorism under the ATA extends to all acts proscribed under 
the terrorism conventions as required by SRII.  
264. While the ATA does not refer specifically to the Terrorism Conventions or to the provisions 
under Pakistani law proscribing the offences defined under this set of conventions, the ATA defines acts 
of terrorism very broadly as shown above. It is very likely that the courts’ application of s.6 definition 
will cover all of the acts proscribed under the conventions to which Pakistan is a Party. The acts covered 
by the ATA do not extend however to some of the acts that should be criminalized under the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material (1980). Pakistan is not yet a party to this convention.  
265. S.6 (5) of the ATA extends the definition of terrorism to include any act done for the benefit of a 
proscribed organization.  
266. The analysis of the provisions described above shows that ss.11H-J certainly proscribes that 
finance of terrorist acts and the definition of terrorist acts is to a large extent consistent with the definition 
required under SRII.  
267. Also, ss. 11H-J as well as s. 11F (5), certainly extend to the financing of “proscribed 
organizations.” A proscribed organization is an organization that the Federal Government listed it by 
order in the First Schedule to the ATA because it has reasons to believe that such organization is 
concerned in terrorism. So, to the extent that the Federal Government have proscribed an organization in 
the First Schedule to the ATA, any of the financing acts under ss.11H-J, would be criminalized if it is 
carried out for the benefit of such an organization. The ATA does not however give the court the power to 
convict a person for any of the financing offences under ss.11H-J when the act is done for the benefit of 
an organization that has not been proscribed even if that organization may be categorized as terrorist 
within the definition of “terrorist” provided for in s. 6(7).  The ATA also does not include in the definition 
of terrorism acts done for the benefit of individual terrorists despite the existence of s.6 (7) definition of 
“terrorist” that is consistent with the definition of “terrorist” and “terrorist organization” under SRII.  
268. To sum-up, section 11 of the ATA proscribes a wide range of financing acts that cover a major 
part of the possible acts of “provision and collection.” The offences defined in s.11 may leave some minor 
gap in the coverage of possible acts of collection.. The assessors are however satisfied that the breadth of 
the definition makes it reasonable to conclude that this would be the case when the issue arises before the 
courts. The offences certainly extend to the financing of terrorist acts, the definition of which is largely 
consistent with SRII. The offences also certainly extend to the financing of “proscribed organizations.” 
The ATA offences do not however extend to the financing of terrorist organizations that have not been 
proscribed. It does not extend to the financing of individual terrorists. Worth noting that the Act contains 
a definition of “terrorist” that covers both individual terrorists and terrorist organizations and that is 
consistent with the definitions under SRII.  
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269. The definition of terrorism and acts of terrorism does not require that acts have actually occurred. 
It is sufficient that the action is threatened for it to qualify as terrorism. The offences under ss.11H-J also 
do not require that the money and property be used for the purposes of terrorism. It is sufficient that such 
money and property were intended for use. This is consistent with the requirements of SR.II 
270. One ambiguity remains. It is not clear under the Act, whether the definition of terrorism covers 
acts of terrorism that occur overseas and that are directed against foreign governments or foreign 
populations. This is explained in more detail below.  
271. The Act does not extend explicitly to acts of terrorism that are intended to intimidate an 
international organization as required by the TF convention and by SRII.  
272. The Definition of funds, money or other property: The term funds is not defined in the ATA, 
even though it is central to the definition of the offence of collection, solicitation and raising of funds 
under s. 11F(5). This leaves the scope of that offence ambiguous. The term money is defined in s. 
1(aa)(i)(c) to include any cash broadly defined to include: any coins, notes in any currency, postal orders, 
money orders, bank credit, travelers’ checks, bank checks, bankers drafts, and such other kinds of 
monetary instruments as the Federal Government may by order specify.” The ATA however omits to 
define the term property. This introduces ambiguity in relation to the definition of the offences under the 
s. 11 and makes the consistency with SRII contingent on how the courts would interpret the Act.  S. 2(cc) 
provides that “all other terms and expressions used but not defined in this Act, shall have the meanings as 
are assigned to them in the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.” The 
PPC and the CCP do not contain definitions of property and funds, therefore they are not helpful on this 
point.  The authorities provided that the interpretation of these terms is not restrictive and is well-
established in the jurisdiction. It is however worth noting that ATA certainly does not restrict the money 
involved in the financing offences under s. 11 to money derived from unlawful resources. All s. 11 
offences still occur even if the financing was done using money derived from lawful sources.   
273. Ancillary offences to TF: Under section 21-I of ATA, whoever aids or abets any offence, shall 
be punishable with the maximum term of imprisonment provided for the offence or the fine provided for 
such offence or with both.  
274. Attempt is not criminalized as such under the ATA. The financing offences are however very 
broadly defined to encompass the acts of financing regardless of whether or not actual financing has 
occurred. They find sufficient that the act took place with intention, suspicion or knowledge regardless of 
any criminal result. To illustrate:  
 Providing money or other property under s.11H (3) is defined in s. 11H (4) to include giving it, 
lending it or making it available. There is no reference that the money should have actually been 
received as long as it was made available.  
 The offence of entering into funding arrangements under s. 11J occurs even if the money was not 
actually made available for the purposes of terrorism under this arrangement. It is sufficient if it 
was to be made sufficient.  
275. In that sense these offences are mere endangerment offences and they capture the acts that are 
typically encompassed by attempt. It is the view of the assessor that there is no need for additional 
criminalization of attempt within this widely-cast framework of criminalization.  
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276. The Offences of Participation and Organization: Article 11V of the ATA makes it a criminal 
offence to direct activities connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism 
or to direct an organization concerned with this type of activities. This offence is punishable by a 
maximum term of 7 years of imprisonment and to forfeiture of his assets.  
277. Article 11F of the ATA makes it a criminal offence to belong or profess to belong to an 
organization proscribed according to the proscription mechanism defined by the ATA. This is a limited 
version of participation in a criminal group concerned with terrorist acts in accordance with article 2(5) of 
the UN Convention of the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Worth noting that the ATA 
contains a broad definition of an “organization concerned in terrorism” in article 11A.   
278. Terrorism Financing is a predicate offence for money laundering (c. II.2): As discussed 
above, under R.1, terrorism financing is a predicate offence to money laundering under AMLO. In 
addition, s. 11K of the ATA creates an autonomous offence of laundering terrorist property. 
279. It is also worth noting here that the possession of money or other property for the benefit of a 
proscribed organization is a criminal offence under 11I (2).  
280. Extraterritorial Financing: Absent court decisions this question will remain ambiguous. The 
fact that the word Government is defined in s. 1(i) to mean the Federal or Provincial Government of 
Pakistan gives the entire provision an inward focus. The remaining part of s.1 is neutral on the target of 
the threats or acts of violence, which allows it to be applied to any such acts regardless of whether they 
were committed against the interests of Pakistan or not. The domestic understanding of the provision 
however seemed to be shared amongst investigative agencies. When asked by the assessors, they 
indicated that the provisions are likely to be domestic and are not sure to be applicable to acts committed 
against other countries interests. The international standard requires that the law should be clearly 
applicable to the offences of financing of terrorism committed against other countries and foreign 
populations. Recent reporting in the press indicates that Pakistan is moving towards prosecuting 
individuals that were identified as involved in the terrorist attacks that occurred in Mumbai-India in 
January 2009. Should such action succeed before the court, it would indicate that the definition of 
terrorism under ATA extends beyond domestic terrorism. The investigation is however still pending and 
there is no final judicial decision on this matter.  
281. The Liability of Legal Persons: The ATA does not define the term “person” under the Act. S. 
2(cc) provides that “all other terms and expressions used but not defined in this Act, shall have the 
meanings as are assigned to them in the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898.”  The term person is defined in the PPC as including both legal and natural persons.  The criminal 
liability of legal persons is therefore applicable, but it still suffers from the general weakness of this form 
of liability under Pakistani law as described under the analysis of R.2 above.   
282. Proving the intentional element: The same provision of the Evidence Act applies here. 
Inference of the intentional element could therefore be inferred from objective factual circumstances.  
Analysis of Effectiveness  
283. Even though the offence of terrorism financing has been on the books since 2001, there has never 
been any investigation or prosecution of terrorism financing acts. Discussions with the law enforcement 
authorities reflected lack of awareness of the tool of pursuing the finance as means of fighting terrorism. 
While there is good understanding of the risk of terrorism, there is no adequate mapping of the risk and 
methods of terrorism financing amongst law enforcement agencies.  
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2.2.2. Recommendations and Comments 
284. In order to meet the requirements of SRII, the authorities should take the following steps:  
 Remove the ambiguity regarding whether the offence of financing terrorism would apply to 
financing acts of terrorism committed against foreign governments and populations. This could 
be achieved either through legislative amendment, court decision, or authoritative interpretation 
of the provisions of the Act.  
 The law should criminalize the participation in a terrorist organization regardless of whether this 
organization has been administratively proscribed or not. 
 Expanding the scope of the offence to cover the financing of individual terrorists and the 
financing of terrorist organizations even when they are not proscribed.  
 Review the system and identify the reasons for the lack of effectiveness of the financing offences.  
 
2.2.3. Compliance with Special Recommendation II 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
SR.II PC - Pakistani law is ambiguous on the criminalization of financing of individual 
terrorists. 
- Pakistani law is ambiguous on the criminalization of financing of terrorist 
organizations unless they are so proscribed by the Federal Government. 
- There is no definition of property leaving the scope of the financing offences 
ambiguous.  
- There is ambiguity as to whether the offence would extend to the financing of 
terrorism committed against foreign government or populations. 
- The ATA does not recognize explicitly actions designed to intimidate 
international organizations as terrorism. 
- There is overall lack of effectiveness reflected in the fact that there has never 
been any prosecution for terrorism financing. 
 
 
 
2.3. Confiscation, freezing and seizing of proceeds of crime (R.3) 
2.3.1. Description and Analysis 
285. Legal Framework: Provisions relating to freezing and forfeiture are found in AMLO, CNSA, 
NAO and ATA. Other than the NAO, these Acts and Ordinances enable freezing and post-conviction 
forfeiture of “tainted” property.  NAO enables post-conviction forfeiture of any property found to be 
“disproportionate” to the accused’s “known sources of income”: s 10.  
286. Additionally, the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes laws and procedures of general 
application in criminal proceedings to the extent they do not conflict with any procedures established for 
the Special Courts.  Section 517 provides for confiscation of any property “regarding which an offence 
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appears to have been committed or which has been used for the commission of any offence” and therefore 
enables recovery of actual, but not intended, instrumentalities.  
Confiscation of Property related to ML, FT or other predicate offences including property of 
corresponding value (c. 3.1): 
AMLO 
287. AMLO has more than one avenue for forfeiture, each of which is problematic.  Central to this is 
AMLO’s inconsistent use of terminology, such that it is unclear what, exactly, is able to be forfeited 
under any of the available mechanisms.  
288. Section 4 of AMLO is the punishment provision.  In addition to prescribing penalties of 
imprisonment and fines upon conviction for money laundering, it sets out liability to forfeiture of 
“property involved in the money laundering”.  
289. The term “property involved in the money laundering” is undefined.  “Proceeds of crime” is 
separately defined.8  The Evaluation Team is therefore not convinced that s4 enables forfeiture of 
proceeds of crime.  
290. Sections 8 and 9 offer an alternative, four-staged avenue of forfeiture by way of a provisional 
freezing mechanism that, upon conviction, may lead to forfeiture of the frozen assets.  The four stages 
are: (i) provisional attachment by an investigator; (ii) confirmation of provisional restraint by the Court; 
(iii) Court declaration, following trial, that the order be rendered “final”; and (iv) apparent conversion of 
attachment into an order for forfeiture.   
291. As with s 4, assets amenable to this process of forfeiture are inconsistently described as “proceeds 
of crime” and/or “property involved in money laundering” – with the result that the ambit of forfeiture 
under these provisions is also unclear.  
292. Forfeiture under the s 9 procedure is further complicated by s 17(5), which provides as follows:  
(5) After passing the order for forfeiture under sub-section (6) of section 9, the Court shall direct 
the release of all properties other than the properties involved in money laundering to the persons 
from whom such properties were seized. 
293. As noted, s 9(6) provides that property frozen “shall” be forfeit upon conviction.  Property frozen 
includes both proceeds and “property involved in money laundering”: s 9(3) (b).  On its face, however, s 
17(5) reduces the scope of an s. 9 order to only “property involved in money laundering”.  
                                                     
8. Under s 8, an investigating officer may provisionally “attach” property reasonably believed to be “proceeds of 
crime or involved in money laundering”.  In this context, then, “property involved in the money laundering” is 
clearly distinguished from proceeds.  However, provisional attachment can be rescinded simply upon proof “that the 
property is not involved in money laundering” – no mention is made of the possibility that the property might 
nonetheless be proceeds.  Equally, the test for whether a provisional order should be brought before the court for 
confirmation is simply whether it appears to concern “property involved in money laundering”.  The position is 
further complicated by the fact that the Court can declare such an order to be “final” – with the result that the 
property is then amenable to forfeiture – if the property “is proceeds of crime or involved in money laundering”: ss 
9(3)(b) & 9(6). 
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294. It is unclear whether the phrase “property involved in the money laundering” denotes 
instrumentalities.  If it does, the mechanisms in sections 4, 8 and 9 would extend to instrumentalities of 
laundering – but not to instrumentalities of the predicate offence.  As noted, the CrPC enables forfeiture 
of instrumentalities.  
295. This term does not extend to intended instrumentalities of laundering: the “involvement” referred 
to in the phrase “property involved in the money laundering” is actual involvement, not intended 
involvement.  
296. Because it is unclear whether proceeds are forfeitable under AMLO, it is also unclear whether 
indirect proceeds, or proceeds held by third parties, are forfeitable, even though the definition of 
“proceeds of crime” expressly extends to indirect proceeds.  
CNSA 
297. Section 13 of the CNSA provides for forfeiture following conviction for the money laundering 
offence under s 12.  
298. Section 13 refers to forfeiture of simply “the assets”.  This must be a reference back to “the 
assets” laundered under s 12.  Assets capable of being laundered, and therefore forfeited, are assets 
“derived, generated or obtained, directly or indirectly” from the commission of specified “narcotics 
offences” (including offences against the Customs Act).  The provision extends to assets held in the 
offender’s name or in the name of “associates, relatives or any other person”.   
299. In addition, where a person is convicted of an offence under the CNSA and is sentenced to more 
than three years, all assets “derivable from trafficking in narcotic substances” are forfeit unless the 
offender satisfies the Court “that they, or any part thereof, have not been so acquired”: s 19.  Money 
laundering under s 12 is punishable by a minimum of 5 years, with the result that, following conviction 
for that offence, a reverse burden of proof always applies to proceeds of trafficking.  The Evaluation 
Team was told that, for this reason, money laundering under s 12 is a useful charge against which to 
secure a conviction.  
300. Save to the extent that derived assets might include instrumentalities, the CNSA does not appear 
to extend to forfeiture of actual or intended instrumentalities (although the CrPC does).  However, the 
Evaluation Team was advised that the Special Court will, upon conviction, generally order the forfeiture 
of all assets that are provisionally frozen, which may well extend to instrumentalities and derivative 
assets.  
301. Derivative proceeds are forfeitable to the extent that they are either (i) derived “indirectly”, 
within the meaning of s 12 or (ii) “derivable from trafficking” in cases where s 19 applies.  
NAO 
302. Section 10 of the NAO provides for forfeiture of proceeds of corruption and corrupt practices by 
enabling post-conviction forfeiture of assets either “found to be disproportionate” to the offender’s 
“known sources of his income” or “acquired by money obtained through corruption and corrupt practices 
whether in his name or in the name of any of his dependents, or benamindars.”  Benamindars are, 
essentially, nominees.  
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303. Because property amenable to forfeiture is any property found to be disproportionate to an 
accused person’s known source of income, the NAO extends to forfeiture of derivative proceeds and, 
potentially, instrumentalities.  
ATA 
304. The ATA enables forfeiture of proceeds.  Section 11Q(6) provides that, where a person is 
convicted of one of the terrorist financing offences contained in sections 11H to 11K, the Court may order 
forfeiture of any money or other property received as payment or other reward.  This does not extend to 
derivative assets.  
305. Under s 11R, there is also scope for civil-based forfeiture of cash seized from a “proscribed 
organization”.  This is considered below in relation to Special Recommendation III.  
306. Under s 11V, the assets of any person convicted of “directing” organizations concerned in 
terrorism or terrorist activity may be forfeited.  
307. The ATA also enables forfeiture of instrumentalities.  Where a person is convicted under sections 
11H or 11I (which variously establish the offences of collection, receipt, possession or use of money or 
other property, intending or suspecting it to be used “for the purposes of terrorism”), the Court may order 
forfeiture of any property that is in the person’s possession at the time of the offence and is intended to be 
used (or suspected might be used) “for the purposes of terrorism”: s 11Q(2) and (3).  Similarly, where a 
person is convicted of being concerned in an arrangement, pursuant to which property is made available 
“for the purposes of terrorism”, the property made available is amenable to forfeiture: s 11Q (4).  
308. The scope of instrumentalities forfeiture is unclear.  As noted earlier in this report, “for the 
purposes of terrorism” is not defined.  “Terrorism” is defined in terms that do not include terrorist 
financing, other than for a proscribed organization: sections 6(1) and 6(5).  Unless the entity concerned is 
proscribed, therefore, instrumentalities of terrorist financing are unable to be confiscated.  Where the 
entity is proscribed, offices and accounts (which might represent either instrumentalities or derivative 
proceeds) may be frozen.  However, there is no avenue for ultimate forfeiture.  
309. It is not certain whether property amenable to forfeiture remains forfeitable when held by a third 
party.  This is because, following a conviction under sections 11H or 11I, the Court may order forfeiture 
of any property that is “in the person’s possession at the time of the offence” and is intended to be used 
(or suspected might be used) “for the purposes of terrorism”: s 11Q(2) and (3).  
Provisional Measures to Prevent Dealing in Property subject to Confiscation (c. 3.2):   
310. General mechanisms to give effect to provisional attachment are found in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure.  The Revenue Officer can prohibit disposition of property situated in rural areas and is 
competent to enforce the prohibition.  Sub-Registrars appointed by the government have similar powers 
with respect to urban property.  Receivers can be appointed. Attachment orders can also be marked 
against registered titles.  Intangible assets can be frozen by informing the person who has right or interest 
in the property or by informing the authorities concerned with the transfer of such rights.  
AMLO  
311. As noted, initially a burden rests upon a person named in a section 8 provisional attachment order 
to convince the investigating officer that the property concerned is not “involved in money laundering”.  
This is done pursuant to a notice issued by the investigating officer that “shall call” upon the person, 
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within not less than 30 days, “to indicate the sources of his income, earning or assets, out of which or by 
means of which he has acquired the property”: s 9(1).  If dissatisfied with the explanation, the 
investigating officer must make formal application for the Court to confirm the attachment.  
312. If the accused person is acquitted, the attachment shall cease to have effect.  If convicted, the 
court “shall, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the person concerned, make and order for 
forfeiture of such property”: s 9(6).   
CNSA 
313. Section 37 of the CNSA enables provisional freezing of assets of an “accused” where there are 
reasonable grounds for believing such a person has committed an offence against that Act.  For an initial 
period of seven days, freezing is pursuant to direction of the Director General.  Freezing thereafter is 
determined by the Court.  At this stage, property susceptible to freezing by the Court extends to assets of 
not only the “accused” but also his “relatives and associates”.  “Assets” is broadly defined to include 
property owned, controlled or belonging to an accused, whether directly or indirectly, or in the name of 
his spouse or relatives or associates whether within or outside Pakistan for which they cannot reasonably 
account.   
NAO 
314. Under s 12 of the NAO, the Chairman of the NAB has power to order the freezing of property of 
any person suspected of having committed an offence against that Ordinance.  Such a freeze can extend 
also to the assets of any relative or associate of that person and any person acting on his behalf.  Section 
12 also provides for the processes by which such a freeze can be practically effected, including by way of 
appointment of receiver, taking possession, prohibiting rental payments and “such other methods” as the 
Chairman may deem fit.   
315. Such freezes are effective for 15 days, following which a court order is required.  
ATA 
316. The ATA does not confer provisional powers other than in relation to cash or the offices and 
accounts of a “proscribed organization”.  Officials, however, referred the evaluation team to s 5(5) of the 
FIA Act 1974.  This section empowers members of the FIA to direct that any property that might 
constitute “the subject-matter of [an] investigation” not be removed or disposed of.  Its purpose is to 
ensure that property that is central to an investigation is preserved before “an order… for its seizure is 
obtained”, rather than to enable restraint of other property on the simple basis that it might become 
subject to an order for forfeiture. Further, the applicability of s 5(5) is limited to offences falling within 
the investigatory remit of the FIA, which does not include terrorism per se.   
317. Under section 11O, an “authorized officer” may seize and detain any cash he reasonably suspects 
either (i) is intended to be used for the purposes of terrorism, (ii) constitutes resources of a “proscribed 
organization” or (iii) is “terrorist property” within the meaning of the Act.  “Terrorist property” is defined 
as including proceeds of acts of terrorism or of acts carried out for the purposes of terrorism: section 
2(aa).  Detention of any such cash beyond a period of 48 hours requires Court order.  A Court is 
empowered to order continued detention if “justified pending completion of an investigation of its origin 
or derivation”.   
318. Under section 11R, an “authorized officer” may then apply to the Court for an order for forfeiture 
whether or not proceedings have been instituted in relation to any offence with which the cash may be 
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connected.  This section also confers rights of audience upon any other party who may claim an interest in 
the cash.  Rights of appeal are provided under section 11S.  
319. As noted, provisional restraint under the ATA is also available over the offices and funds in 
accounts of “proscribed organizations”.  Such offices and funds are liable to forfeiture upon conviction 
for any of the offences set out in section 11H to 11M, namely upon conviction for the various terrorist 
financing offences or for the offence of failing to disclose a reasonable belief that another person has 
committed an offence against the Act.  
320. Beyond this, the offence provisions operate to effect a limited freeze on certain dispositions of 
other types of asset.  For example, assets in the control of third parties are frozen to the extent that it is an 
offence to become concerned in an arrangement as a result of which “money or other property” is “made 
available” for the purposes of terrorism: section 11J.  However, the offence provisions do not constitute a 
prohibition upon disposition per se.  In each case, there must be the requisite mens rea, which is generally 
expressed in terms of knowledge or intention concerning an underlying “purpose of terrorism”.  
Ex Parte Application for Provisional Measures (c. 3.3): 
AMLO  
321. An investigating officer may provisionally “attach” property reasonably believed to be “proceeds 
of crime or involved in money laundering” without prior notice.  
CNSA 
322. Provisional freezing under s 37 of the CNSA is pursuant to merely the direction of the Director 
General.  The Director General has delegated this power to appropriate law enforcement personnel.  
NAO 
323. There is no need for prior notice of freezing by the Chairman of the NAB under s 12.  
ATA 
324. Detention of cash can be effected without prior notice.  Freezing of offices and accounts is a legal 
consequence of proscription, which occurs without prior consultation.  
Identification and Tracing of Property subject to Confiscation (c. 3.4):  
325. As noted under Recommendation 28, the assessors were not made aware of any problems in 
relation to powers of search and seizure or powers concerning production of general or banking 
documentation.   
Protection of Bona Fide Third Parties (c. 3.5):  
326. The Evaluation Team was advised that Article 199 of the Constitution provides an avenue of 
redress for third parties aggrieved by freezing, seizing or forfeiture action.  This article enables the High 
Court to make orders that, inter alia, protect certain rights protected by the Constitution.   
327. Aside from the convoluted nature of a writ process seeking Constitutional orders from the High 
Court, this provision is of limited use in the present context.  Article 23 of the Constitution affords a right 
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to possession of property, subject to “reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest”.  A 
petitioner would need to show that the laws enabling freezing, seizing or forfeiture action were not 
reasonably enacted in the public interest.  Article 24 protects against dispossession other than in 
accordance with the law.  It is protection from laws that do enable dispossession that is relevant in the 
present context.  
AMLO 
328. A person claiming an interest in property that is provisionally attached is afforded an opportunity 
of convincing the “investigating officer” that the property is not involved in money laundering: section 
9(2).  This provides limited protection only.  Where the investigating officer does determine that the 
property is involved in money laundering, he/she “shall” apply for confirmation of the order.  
Furthermore, as noted, the order automatically becomes “final” if this is “proved in Court”, after which 
forfeiture “shall” ensue.  The protection afforded by the requirement that, before ordering forfeiture, the 
Court provide persons with “an opportunity of being heard” (s 9(6)) is very unclear.  There is no 
provision for equitable compensation.  
CNSA 
329. Under section 33(2) third party claimants may apply for the setting aside of any order of 
confiscation.  This right must be exercised within 30 days of the order, although this may also be 
extended.  Unlike under the AMLO, NAO and ATA, this provision affords full third party protection: the 
issue is not whether the property was used or acquired in a particular way, but simply whether the third 
party “may claim any right thereto”.  
NAO 
330. Under the National Accountability Ordinance, third parties have rights to object to provisional 
orders made by the Chairman: section 12.  Rights to object must be exercised within 14 days (subject to 
only one right of extension for a further 14 days).  The legislation provides no grounds or guidance upon 
which any objections stand to be considered.  
331. The NAO does not permit appeals against final orders for forfeiture, which are automatic upon 
conviction.   
ATA 
332. As noted, the ATA confers a power of civil-forfeiture of cash.  Section 11R of the ATA confers 
upon third party claimants to detained cash an “opportunity to be heard” by the Court.  Section 11S 
confers a right of appeal to the High Court.  The sole basis of any objection by a third party complainant 
appears to be that the cash is not “of a kind as defined in section 11Q”.  That is to say, as under AMLO, 
unwitting third parties have no redress if their property has been misused by terrorists or terrorist 
financiers.  Furthermore, the right of appeal under section 11S is available only to “parties” to the 
proceedings.  It is unclear whether a third party claimant is conferred standing as a “party” simply by 
being conferred an “opportunity to be heard”.  
333. Most significantly, no protection is afforded to bona fide third parties holding an interest in non-
cash assets that are susceptible to post-conviction forfeiture under section 11Q on the basis that they 
“might be used for the purposes of terrorism”.  
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334. The Court’s powers to order forfeiture appear to be discretionary.  No guidance is provided as to 
how that discretion is to be exercised.  Presumably, the overarching requirement is that the discretion be 
exercised “in the interests of justice”.  It is arguable (although unclear), therefore, that third party interests 
may be taken into account as an element of the exercise of the overarching discretion to order forfeiture.  
Nonetheless, the legislation should be more specific in this respect.  
Power to Void Actions (c. 3.6):  
335. The only provision enabling the avoidance of contractual or other arrangements entered into by 
persons who knew (or should have known) that such arrangements would prejudice the recovery of 
property liable to confiscation under AMLO is s 23 of the NAO.  This section renders it an offence for 
“an accused person or any relative or associate” to transfer or create a charge on “any property owned by 
him or in his possession” once the Chairman NAB has initiated an investigation and pending 
determination before the Court.  It further deems any such transfer or charge to be “void”.   
336. Aside from this, s 206 of the Penal Code does not enable the avoidance of contractual or other 
arrangements but does render it an offence to undertake certain actions to prevent the operation of an 
actual or likely forfeiture order.  
Additional Elements (Rec 3)—Provision for a) Confiscation of assets from organizations principally 
criminal in nature; b) Civil forfeiture; and, c) Confiscation of Property which Reverses Burden of Proof 
(c. 3.7): 
337. Section 31 of the Prevention of Smuggling Act provides for civil forfeiture of “property which is 
reasonably suspected to be acquired by international (but not inter-Provincial) smuggling.  A “Special 
Judge” may issue a notice calling upon any person reasonably suspected of holding property acquired by 
smuggling to “show cause” why that property should not be forfeited.  Where, following hearing, the 
Judge is “satisfied” that the property is acquired by smuggling, the property may be forfeited: s 32.  The 
burden of proof in such hearings rests with the respondent: s 33.  The ANF advised that, because this 
power is civil-based and entails a reverse burden of proof, it is well-used by that agency in cases of 
international drug trafficking.  
338. As noted, s 19 of the CNSA itself supplies a reverse burden in cases where the offender is 
sentenced to more than 3 years.  
339. Forfeiture of “disproportionate assets” under s 10 of the NAO is effectively also pursuant to 
reverse burden whenever consequent upon a conviction for the offence of being in possession of 
“disproportionate” assets (under s 9): the offence itself places a burden upon the accused to prove lawful 
provenance.   
Analysis of Effectiveness 
340. The Terrorist Financing offence – and hence the associated forfeiture provisions of the ATA – are 
untested.   
341. Similarly, there have been no convictions under AMLO, with the result that the level of 
effectiveness of that Act’s forfeiture regime is undemonstrated.  As noted, however, ambiguities in its 
forfeiture provisions are liable to undermine effectiveness.  The Evaluation Team was advised that the 
legal profession and the Courts in Pakistan vigilantly endeavor to protect the “fundamental rights” to 
possess property that are enshrined in the Constitution.  Where laws intruding on these rights are 
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ambiguous, they are vulnerable to challenge.  Additionally, AMLO presents certain procedural 
complexities that have the potential to impact the effectiveness of the regime.   
 It purports to direct forfeiture as an automatic consequence of a “final” order yet confers the 
offender an opportunity to be heard – and without providing any guidance as to the purpose of 
any such hearing.   
 For all the attachment process does not legally require an individual “to indicate the sources of his 
income, earning or assets” when called upon, the fact that failure to cooperate will in all 
probability lead to continued freezing arguably compromises the privilege against self-
incrimination enshrined in Article 13 of the Constitution. 
 The “Court” that considers whether “it is proved... that the “property is proceeds of crime or 
involved in money laundering” is the trial court (i.e., the court determining the substantive 
proceedings for a predicate or money laundering offence).  The Evaluation Team was advised 
that the trial Court would receive not only evidence relevant to the charge at hand but also 
evidence relevant to the provenance of the restrained property.  Because affected persons must be 
provided a minimum of 30-days to “show cause” why the property ought not be restrained, it is 
unclear how provisional restraint of any property discovered within 30-days of trial can result in 
forfeiture. 
342. The CNSA and the Prevention of Smuggling Act supply appropriately enabling powers that 
appear to be well-used by the ANF.  The Evaluation Team was advised that an average prosecution in the 
Special Court takes approximately only 1 year to resolve and that conviction rates are high:  between  
January 2005 and the end of December 2008 the conviction rate stood at 88.51 percent.  Additionally, at 
the time of the Evaluation Team’s visit, some 258 asset investigation cases were either in train, in trial or 
under appeal.  It is standard operating procedure that, upon commencement, investigations are referred to 
one of five “Regional Directorates” for a determination as to the utility of conducting parallel asset-
related investigations.  
343. However, it was made clear to the Evaluation Team that the ANF pursues only investigations 
associated with a predicate offence and has not yet pursued as a stand-alone offence a charge under s 12 
of the CNSA.  Further, there are often considerable systemic impediments to seeking forfeiture.  Since the 
inception of the CNSA in 1997, USD60.18 million in assets have been frozen pursuant to action taken by 
the ANF under ss 12 and 19 of that Act and s 31 of the Prevention of Smuggling Act.  To date, however, 
under 10 percent of this has been actually forfeited (USD5.85 million).  This was explained to the 
Evaluation Team as a consequence of court delays in seeking forfeiture orders from the Special Court: 
applications for forfeiture are frequently sought against leaders within organized criminal groups who 
have considerable resources to legally resist.  The Evaluation Team was further advised that, as a result, it 
is not uncommon for forfeiture applications to take 10 – 15 years to resolve.  The high percentage of 
assets frozen but not forfeited therefore represents not so much a poor conversion rate but systemic 
impediments to the efficient adjudication of forfeiture applications.  
344. Similar impediments stymie official attempts to realize assets that are, finally, subject to 
forfeiture orders.  The Evaluation Team was advised that, of the USD5.85 million in assets subject to 
forfeiture orders, only USD0.65 million has actually been realized.  This was explained as a consequence 
of the method of realization – public auction – and the employment by organized criminal syndicates of 
intimidation tactics aimed at dissuading prospective bidders.   
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345. Under the NAO, in the 3.5 years between 2005 and mid-2008 assets to the value of 9.9 billion Rs 
were forfeited.   
2.3.2.  Recommendations and Comments 
346. The ambiguities and procedural deficits in AMLO’s forfeiture provisions, as identified in this 
report, should be remedied.  In particular:  
 It should be made clear that post-conviction forfeiture under s 4 covers proceeds of crime (both 
direct and indirect).   
 The inconsistencies in terminology within sections 8 and 9 should be resolved, such that both 
proceeds of crime and instrumentalities are clearly amenable to freezing and forfeiture.   
 The uncertainties surrounding the procedures for seizing, freezing and forfeiture should be 
clarified.   
 The Act should also cover forfeiture of property of corresponding value. 
 Powers of provisional freezing in terrorism and terrorist financing related cases should be 
introduced. 
 Third parties should be afforded protection under AMLO and the ATA.  Third party protection 
under NAO should extend to protection against forfeiture, as well as provisional freezing. 
 Power to void actions taken to prejudice recovery of property subject to forfeiture should extend 
to beyond forfeiture under the NAO.  
 Procedures within the counter-narcotic Special Courts should be reviewed with a view to 
ensuring far greater expedition in the disposal of forfeiture applications (for example, by way of 
judicially-enforced time-tabling orders.  
2.3.3. Compliance with Recommendation 3 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.3 PC  AMLO’s forfeiture provisions do not clearly enable forfeiture of 
proceeds of crime.   
 Only the NAO permits forfeiture of property of corresponding value.   
 There is no capacity to provisionally freeze under the ATA. 
 Only the CNSA offers effective protection to third parties. 
 Only the NAO confers power to void actions.  
 Levels of forfeiture under the NAO are not high.   
 The effectiveness of forfeiture under the CNSA is blunted by systemic 
impediments in the Special Court.   
 AMLO’s attachment and limited confiscation powers have not been 
tested.    
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2.4. Freezing of funds used for terrorist financing (SR.III) 
2.4.1. Description and Analysis 
347. Legal Framework:  The key mechanisms for freezing assets in accordance with the relevant 
UNSCRs are Statutory Regulatory Orders (to give effect to UNSCR 1267) and proscription under the 
ATA (to give effect to UNSCR 1373).9  
Freezing Assets under S/Res/1267 (c. III.1): 
348. Freezing under UNSCR 1267 is enabled by virtue of the United Nations (Security Council) Act 
1948.  Section 2 of that Act provides that the Central Government may, “give effect to any decision” of 
the Security Council by way of “order published in the official Gazette”.  In particular, the Government 
may make such provisions “as appear to it necessary or expedient for enabling… measures to be 
effectively applied and… for the punishment of persons offending against the order.”  
349. Orders made pursuant to this power are termed Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs).  SROs 
constitute a form of subordinate legislation.  SROs are issued with each amendment to the 1267 list.  
Once promulgated, they are published in the Gazette.  
350. SROs relating to UNSCR 1267 that have been issued to date direct that “bank accounts, funds 
and financial resources, including but not limited to those used for the provision of internet hosting or 
related services” of listed entities shall “stand frozen”.   
351. These SROs are expressed to take effect either “from the date of implementation of instructions” 
issued by the State Bank of Pakistan “or” from the date of implementation by any other duly authorized 
authority.   
352. SROs apply to all persons in Pakistan.  Express provision within the United Nations (Security 
Council) Act 1948 enables SROs to provide “for the punishment of persons offending against the order”.   
To date, no SROs have made such provision.  
353. The SROs do not define the meaning of “stand frozen”.  Nor do they define the meaning of 
“funds”.  In practice, however, subject to a person becoming aware of the freezing requirement via the 
Gazette, the implementation of such freezes is limited by the extent of to which SROs are specifically 
disseminated.   
354. Officials advised that, once notification of a UN designation is received, SROs are promulgated 
within 10-12 hours, frequently on the evening of the same day although often late in the evening.  These 
are then immediately disseminated.    
Freezing Assets under S/Res/1373 (c. III.2):   
355. Section 11B of the ATA enables the Federal Government to “by order” list in the First Schedule 
to the Act “organizations” that it considers to be “concerned in terrorism” (the definition of which has 
been considered earlier in this report).  “Organizations” is defined as “any group, combination or body of 
                                                     
9. As noted earlier, (i) the offence provisions operate to effect a limited form of freeze in instances where the 
person in a position to make a disposition is aware of some nexus between the property and a terrorism-related 
purpose and (ii) there is power to seize and detain cash that can be linked to terrorism in one of the proscribed ways. 
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persons acting under a distinctive name”.  Proscription, therefore, cannot extend to individuals or even 
clandestine organized criminal groups.  The need for some distinctive name renders proscription 
appropriate only to organizations of a political, religious or military nature – as is reflected by the 22 
proscriptions made to date.10  
356. Proscription does not affect a comprehensive freeze in accordance with UNSCR 1373.  Freezing 
is limited to the sealing of the offices of the entity, the freezing of its accounts and the detention of any 
cash found in its possession: s 11E and s 11O.   
357. Additionally, a proscribed organization must submit “all accounts of its income and expenditure 
for its political and social welfare activities and disclose all finding sources to the competent authority 
designated by the Federal Government”: s 11E (2).  
358. The lead agency for proscription is the Ministry of Interior.  The process is coordinated by the 
National Crises Management Unit.  Material taken into consideration includes intelligence received from 
a range of agencies, including provincial police.  The decision to proscribe is taken by the Minister of 
Interior.  The entity concerned need not be notified beforehand.  
359. Freezing “without delay” in the context of UNSCR 1373  means upon having reasonable grounds, 
or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that a person or entity is a terrorist, one who finances terrorism 
or a terrorist organization.  Given limitations upon the scope of entities capable of being frozen pursuant 
to the ATA, the proscription process is unable to effect freezing without delay.   
Freezing Actions Taken by Other Countries (c. III.3): 
360. The proscription process might enable Pakistan to implement some level of freezing over the 
assets of entities listed by another State – but only where the entity is one possessing a “distinctive name”.   
361. Proscription has not been used this way to date.  Nor are there any established processes that 
would enable it to be so used.  Uncertainty as to whether the ATA is purely “domestically-focused” (as 
discussed in relation to SRII) may limit Pakistan’s capacity to use the proscription process this way – 
unless the entity concerned is also a domestic threat to Pakistan.  
Extension of c. III.1-III.3 to funds or assets controlled by designated persons (c. III.4):  
1267 - SROs 
362. SROs cover (i) assets held by the listed entity and those held on behalf and (ii) assets and 
derivative assets.  
1373 - ATA 
363. The limited freezing powers available under the ATA apply only to assets of “proscribed 
organizations”, namely, “its” offices and accounts.  Whether offices and accounts held by third parties on 
                                                     
10. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sepha-e-Muhammad Pakistan, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Sipah-e-Sahaba 
Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Jaafria Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Jaafria Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, 
Tehreek-e-Islami, Al-Qaeda, Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan, Jamiat-ul-Ansar, Jamiat-ul-Furqan, Hizb-ul-Tehrir, Khair-
un-Naas International Trust, Balochistan Liberation Army, Islamic Students Movement of Pakistan, Lashkar-e-
Islam, Ansar-ul-Islam, Haji Namdar Group, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. 
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behalf of a proscribed organization can be frozen is unclear.  The requirement that the organization be one 
operating under a “distinctive name” might suggest that any offices associated with that name would 
come within the ambit of any freeze.  
Communication to the Financial Sector (c. III.5): 
364. SROs are initially circulated to a range of agencies:  
 Ministry Secretaries: Interior, Finance, Law Justice & Human Rights, Information & 
Broadcasting. 
 Other federal entities: State Bank of Pakistan, ISI, Investigation Bureau, NAB, FIA, National 
Crisis Cell of Ministry of Interior, Attorney General, Electronic Media Regulatory Authority. 
 Provincial entities: the Chief Secretaries and Home Secretaries of each of the provinces. 
 
Notably, SECP is not included in this list.  In terms of immediate freezing of financial assets, the critical recipient 
in this list is the SBP.   
365. SBP communicates SROS and designations to reporting entities within its remit. Approval is 
required from the Governor of SBP.  Once approval is obtained, circulation (via fax) is made to the Chief 
Executive / President of each of the regulated entities.  Heads of financial institutions are required to 
inform the SBP of any overseas travel, with the result that the SBP is aware of an alternative contact for 
dissemination.  To further expedite this process, the Deputy Governor-SBP now grants approval for the 
issuance of directives.  
366. The Evaluation Team was advised that outward dissemination from SBP in this fashion “often” 
occurs the same day as receipt of the SRO by SBP but sometimes occurs the following day (if related UN 
designations were made in the afternoon, being late at night in Pakistan).  Receiving entities are required 
to especially designate receiving officers.  Receiving entities are required to report back to SBP the results 
of implementation, whether via nil return or otherwise.  The report-back deadline is stipulated in the 
disseminated Circular.  Typically, this is within 5 to 15 days11.  The precise time frame depends upon an 
assessment by SBP of the likelihood of regulated entities possessing assets of the listed entity.  
367. Notification of proscriptions under the ATA occurs by way of (i) dissemination within 
Government of a preliminary “Notification”, advising that a Statutory Regulatory Order has been 
promulgated and is to be published in the Gazette and (ii) actual Gazettal of the Order.  The Evaluation 
Team was provided with two sample Notifications that had been disseminated within Government.  The 
listed recipients in each case varied but in both cases included the Secretary of the Ministry of Finance – 
in one case this was expressly stated to be for the purpose of enabling the Secretary to “take further 
necessary action with regard to freezing of bank accounts etc” of the proscribed entity.12   
368. Unlike SROs relating to UNSCR 1267 entities, the SBP does not receive ATA Notifications 
directly.  The Ministry of Finance forwards notifications to SBP for onward dissemination by SBP.   
                                                     
11. This report-back period has now been reduced to 5-7 days. 
12. The Home Secretaries of the Provinces are also listed, presumably to ensure that provincial law enforcement 
agencies enforce the other (non-financial) aspects of freezing under the ATA. 
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Guidance to Financial Institutions (c. III.6): 
369. SBP has not issued any guidance pertaining to the implementation of freezes, concerning the 
accrual of interest to frozen accounts or permissible withdrawals pursuant to UNSCR 1452.  In practice, 
SBP permits such accounts to be credited but will not permit withdrawals.  
De-Listing Requests and Unfreezing Funds of De-Listed Persons (c. III.7):  
SROs 
370. Delisting under UNSCR 1267 can occur via promulgation of an amending SRO.  
ATA proscriptions  
371. Pursuant to s 11C of the ATA, the Federal Government must appoint a Proscribed Organizations 
Review Committee for the purpose of reviewing applications for “delisting”, i.e. removal from the First 
Schedule.  This has not yet occurred.  Officials were unable to advise the Evaluation Team who might sit 
on such a committee.   
372. A proscribed organization has 30 days to file a review application, after which the Committee 
must decide the matter within 90 days.  The proscribed organization has a right of appeal to the High 
Court.  
373. Additionally, s 11U confers upon a proscribed organization a right to apply for a review of the 
proscription after three years on the basis “that the reasons for its proscription have ceased to exist”.   
Unfreezing Procedures of Funds of Persons Inadvertently Affected by Freezing Mechanism (c. III.8):  
374. The Evaluation Team was advised that false positive name-hits are a real issue in Pakistan.  and 
that reporting entities discovering name-hits will either (i) wait for confirmation from the SBP before 
freezing an account but endeavor to delay transactions pending confirmation or (ii) implement a freeze 
instantly but make its continuation contingent upon SBP approval.  The Evaluation Team was advised 
that this process of confirmation was frequently required with the recent proscription of Jamaat-ul-Daawa 
in December 2008. The team was also advised that confirmation can take up to 5 days. 
Access to frozen funds for expenses and other purposes (c. III.9):  
375. The Evaluation Team was advised that the courts have jurisdiction to allow access to frozen 
assets for the purpose of meeting basic expenses.  No cases were cited in support.  Further, it is difficult to 
see how access might be granted.  The SROs do not permit of exception.  Similarly, under s 11E of the 
ATA the freezing of accounts and sealing of offices is a mandatory consequence of proscription.  
Moreover, enabling such access may well constitute an offence against one of the terrorist financing 
provisions – particularly section 11K, which renders it an offence for a person to facilitate control by 
another person of terrorist property.  
Review of Freezing Decisions (c. III.10):  
376. Appropriate recourse to the High Court is available to any proscribed organization dissatisfied 
with a decision of the Proscribed Organizations Review Committee.  
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Freezing, Seizing and Confiscation in Other Circumstances (applying c. 3.1-3.4 and 3.6 in R.3, c. III.11)  
377. Pakistan’s capacity to freeze terrorist assets is dependent upon the issuance of an SRO or 
proscription under the ATA.  Confiscation is limited to forfeiture of seized cash of proscribed 
organizations or post-conviction forfeiture, the scope of which is mentioned under Recommendation 3.  
Protection of Rights of Third Parties (c. III.12): 
378. Neither the SROs nor the ATA provide protection to unwitting third party claimants whose 
property may have been frozen as a result of misuse by, for example, a terrorist organization.  
Enforcing the Obligations under SR III (c. III.13):  
379. SROs apply to all persons in Pakistan.  However, they do not provide for sanction in the event of 
transgression.  This is despite express provision within the United Nations (Security Council) Act 1948 
enabling SROs to provide “for the punishment of persons offending against the order”. Nonetheless, 
officials advised the assessment team that SBP has “a range of [sanctioning] tools available and can 
invoke powers against banks as well as against management and board of directors as per severity of 
situation”.  No legal basis for this proposition was offered.  Nor is one readily apparent.   The principal 
sanctions provision under the BCO is s 83.   Sanctions under s 83 are triggered only where there has been 
a contravention of a provision of the ordinance itself or of any "order, rule or direction made or condition 
imposed thereunder".  The only sanction that appears to the assessors to be of more general applicability 
is s 41A, which enables the removal from office of a banking officer.  This power is available – and 
therefore of possible relevance to enforcement of freezing requirements – whenever removal of office is 
“in the public interest”.  
380. Officials also alluded to the possibility that the SROs themselves impliedly confer a sanctioning 
power in that they expressly contemplate “implementation of instructions issued by the State Bank of 
Pakistan [and other authorized federal or provincial entities]”.  This argument is not convincing.  
Implementation of instructions is mentioned only in the context of defining when the freezes take effect 
(i.e., upon “implementation of issued instructions”).  At most, this reference supports an implied authority 
on the part of the SBP to actually issue such instructions.  Officials advised that SBP does not do this.  It 
has the power to do so under s 41 of the BCO.  If this power were used, sanctions for non-compliance 
would be available. As noted later in this report, any person who is “knowingly a party” to a breach of a 
directive under s 41 is liable under s 83(5) to a fine of 200,000 Rs with a continuing liability of 10,000 Rs 
for every additional day of contravention.  
381. There is no provision in the ATA for penalty in the event of non-compliance with a freeze 
mandated under s 11E.  The argument above - that, within UNSCR 1267-related SROs, there is an 
implied delegated authority to sanction - could not apply to sanctions for non-compliance with ATA 
freezes.  
382. Monitoring for compliance with the SROs and proscriptions under the ATA is limited to systems 
audits undertaken by the SBP as part of its AML/CFT supervision.  
383. In 2003, the SBPs power to enforce compliance with UNSCR 1267 was successfully challenged 
in the High Court of Sindh.  That case concerned the freezing of accounts pertaining to a registered trust 
called the Al Rasheed Trust.  In that case, a direction under s 41 was issued.  However, critical to the 
Court’s decision to declare the SBPs direction to freeze to be ultra vires was the fact that, at the time the 
direction was issued, no SRO had been promulgated by the Government.  The assessors were advised 
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that, since then, communications from the SBP concerning freezing have all been subsequent to the 
promulgation of SROs and have not been challenged.   
384. As noted earlier in this report, any person who is “knowingly a party” to a breach of a directive 
under s 41 issued by the SBP to effect a freeze is liable to a fine of 200,000 Rs with a continuing liability 
of 10,000 Rs per annum for every additional day of contravention: s 83(5) Banking Companies Ordinance 
1962.   
385. SBP advised that it is unaware of any instances of non-compliance freezing obligations under 
UNSCR 1267 or under the ATA.  
Additional Element (SR III)—Implementation of Measures in Best Practices Paper for SR III (c. III.14): 
386. Several of the measures contained in the Best Practices Paper for SRIII are not implemented.  For 
example: there are no procedures for providing access to frozen funds or other assets in accordance with 
S/RES/1452 (2002); there are no hold-harmless or public indemnity laws; there is no system for mutual, 
early, and rapid pre-notification of pending designations to other jurisdictions; there are no procedures to 
ensure that law enforcement authorities provide feedback to financial institutions indicating how financial 
intelligence is being used to support law enforcement actions.  
Additional Element (SR III)—Implementation of Procedures to Access Frozen Funds (c. III.15): 
387. As noted, Pakistan’s capacity to grant access to frozen funds is questionable.  
Analysis of Effectiveness 
388. It is the view of the Evaluation Team that, given the risks present in Pakistan the domestic 
proscription under the ATA of only 22 entities is not high.  The Evaluation Team accepts, however, that 
under the ATA proscription is limited to certain types of organization possessing a distinctive name.  
389. Significantly, over USD10 million in assets have been frozen to date in accordance with UNSCR 
1267.  Approximately USD150,000 in assets have been frozen pursuant to domestic proscription.  
390. Additionally, as noted, the Evaluation Team was advised that in the absence of indemnity from 
litigation some reporting entities await “confirmation” from SBP before initiating freezing action 
following a name-hit.  Because of the relatively high prospect of false positives in the context of Pakistan, 
this practice is common.   
391. The Evaluation Team was further advised that often there are delays in the provision of 
confirmation to banks as to whether accounts subject to name-hits do indeed belong to the listed entity.  
In such circumstances, some reporting entities resort to endeavoring to delay cooperation with withdrawal 
requests by the affected customer.  
2.4.2. Recommendations and Comments 
392. The authorities should consider the following recommendations: 
 The ATA should be amended so as to provide a mechanism for the freezing of assets of entities 
covered by UNSCR 1373 that are not organizations with a distinctive name (and therefore unable 
to be proscribed).   
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 The scope of property capable of being frozen should be expanded to cover all assets.  Under the 
SROs it is expressly limited to “bank accounts, funds and financial resources, including but not 
limited to those used for the provision of internet hosting or related services”.  Action under the 
ATA is limited to offices, accounts and seized cash.   
 SROs should come into force upon promulgation, such potential ambiguity as to whether they 
take effect “from the date of implementation of instructions” issued by SBP or from the date of 
implementation by “any other duly authorized authority” is resolved.   
 Non-compliance with freezing obligations should be made enforceable via sanction.  With respect 
to entities regulated by SBP, this could be done very simply via the issuance of a single directive 
under s 41 of the BCO concerning all entities proscribed or listed to date (and future 
disseminations by SBP being similarly coupled with related directions).  Additionally, an SRO 
could be issued providing penalties and enforcement procedures (as contemplated under the 
United Nations (Security Council) Act 1948).  Such an SRO would ensure that non-compliance is 
generally sanctionable, including in relation to unregulated entities. 
 Dissemination of SROs and notifications of proscriptions should extend to SECP, such that the 
power to direct and enforce freezing action is not limited to those entities regulated by SBP. 
 The report-back period of 5 to 15 days should also be reviewed, particularly such that same-day 
turn-around is required where entities have IT systems capable of concluding a same-day data-
matching.    
 Consideration should be given to conferring reporting entities with indemnity from litigation 
arising from freezing action, so as to address the concerns of entities reluctant to undertake 
freezing action in the absence of confirmation from SBP. 
 Guidance should be provided to entities expected to undertake freezing action – particularly if, as 
recommended here, entities regulated by SECP are to be newly subject to enforced compliance.  
Such guidance should consider matters such as access to funds, as set forth in UNSCR 1452.  
 Protection should be more clearly and readily extended to third parties inadvertently affected by 
freezing action. 
 
2.4.3. Compliance with Special Recommendation III 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
SR.III PC  Freezing of assets of non-1267 entities is limited to financial assets and 
compromised by the need for such entities to possess a “distinctive 
name”. 
 Although SROs relating to 1267 entities are of general application, only 
the freezing action of entities regulated by SBP is monitored 
 Freezing of assets of 1267 entities does not extend to all assets. 
 
 Non-compliance with freezing obligations is not sanctionable.  
 In the absence of indemnity/hold-harmless provisions, some entities do 
not effect freezes without confirmation that there has been no false-
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positive name-hit, which may take up to five days.   
 Pakistan’s capacity to freeze assets of entities in line with foreign 
country freezing measures is not clear nor are there any established 
procedures enabling consideration of foreign requests for freezing.. 
 No guidance has been provided to entities expected to undertake 
freezing action. 
 There are no provisions for the protection of bona fide third parties. 
 
 
 
Authorities 
 
2.5. The Financial Intelligence Unit and its Functions (R.26) 
2.5.1. Description and Analysis 
393. Legal Framework:  The Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU), the FIU for Pakistan, was established 
as an independent body as a result of the promulgation of the Anti-Money Ordinance (AMLO) in 
September 2007 and its listing in the official Gazette on 4 December 2007.  
394. Separate and multiple reporting requirements existed for some years prior to AMLO under the 
NAO, CNSA and SBP Prudential Regulations. These statutes and instruments nominated a number of 
agencies as competent to receive STRs.  In the years immediately prior to the AMLO, an agreement was 
reached to allow the SBP to serve as the point of receipt for all STRs provided under the various 
instruments, and agreed that SBP would be responsible for forwarding on STRs to NAB, ANF and the 
Police. An AML Unit in the BRPD of the SBP performed the function to receive and pass on STRs, 
however no analysis was undertaken. The majority of STRs received in the pre-AMLO period were 
directed to the NAB.  
395. Section 6 AMLO deals with: the appointment of its Director General; makes the FMU subject to 
the supervision and control of the General Committee; deals with the functions of the FMU: receipt, 
analysis, dissemination, creation and maintenance of a database; co-operation with foreign FIUs and 
LEA; to represent Pakistan at FIU forums; submission of reports to the NEC; frame regulations regarding 
STRs and CTRs in consultation with SPB and SECP; engagement of experts (where necessary) to 
implement the Ordinance; and any functions to fulfill the Ordinance.  
396. Section 7 AMLO deals with reporting requirements for STRs and CTRs and allows the FMU to 
prescribe the extent and manner of reporting. It also mandates reporting entities report directly to the 
FMU.  CTR implementation will require regulations to be issued before the system is put into effect.  
397. Section 26 AMLO Sets out arrangements regarding agreements with foreign countries whereby 
the Federal Government may enter into such agreements.  
398. The FMU issued the Money Laundering Regulation (6 January 2009) to all covered institutions, 
which reinforces the obligations in AMLO to report STRs and designates a standard reporting form for 
STRs.  
399. Prior to the Money Laundering Regulations 2008 the SBP issued Prudential Regulations, which 
are still in force, requiring reporting of suspicion to the FMU.  
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400. The ATA s11L contains the following requirement to make a report related to suspicion of TF to 
a police officer rather than the FIU:  
where a person (a) believes or suspects that another person has committed an offence under this 
Act; and (b) bases his belief or suspicion on information which comes to his attention in the 
course of a trade, profession, business or employment, he commits an offence if he does not 
disclose to a police officer as soon as is reasonably practicable his belief or suspicion, and the 
information on which it is based.. 
Establishment of FIU as National Centre (c. 26.1): 
401. The FMU was established on 4 December 2007 as a National Centre for the receipt, analysis, and 
dissemination of STRs and other data related to ML and TF. Previous requirements required separate STR 
reporting to the SBP, NAB and ANF and the Police based on the suspected predicate crime, whilst very 
low in number, these have not been forwarded to FMU for incorporation in their database. These previous 
reporting requirements have been superseded by s7 AMLO.  
402. At the time of the onsite visit the FMU had a Director General and four staff, all whom were 
drawn from the SBP. One member of the FMU staff had benefitted from an earlier secondment to the 
NAB.  
403. Section 7 AMLO mandates the reporting by ‘financial institutions’, of suspicion of ML and TF to 
the FMU. However, section 11L ATA has a more general and wider reporting requirement to a police 
officer of any offences against the ATA, which includes TF, from any person not just ‘financial 
institutions’ this creates the potential for two separate reporting requirements in relation to TF.  
404. Receipt: At the time of the onsite visit the FIU had not yet established an online system of 
reporting. All STRs were sent to the FMU by courier service and received by the FMU Director General 
or a delegated officer in his absence.  
405. Since its inception FMU has received a total of 170 STRs in 2008 and 350 STRs in the period 
January – April 2009, and those were received exclusively from the banking sector. The assessors were 
also informed that the quality of the reports FMU is receiving is generally quite poor. Both of these 
factors affect the quality of eventual analysis.  
406. Analysis: Following receipt of STRs, they are assigned to designated staff for analysis. FMU 
analysts undertake a range of checks. For the vast majority of all STRs the FMU requests further 
information from the reporting institution, both to fill in the gaps in the reported STR and to gain further 
account records. FMU analysts cross check STRs with current FMU data holdings and a commercial 
PEPs database. FMU analysts generally do not go to either FIA, ANF, Customs or the Police for criminal 
records or criminal intelligence, except in the case of checking the names against the FIA’s list of ATA 
Schedule 4 proscribed organizations.  Analysts regularly cross check with NAB’s data holdings as well as 
accessing SECP company records. FMU is working towards having online access to the NADRA 
database, which cross references various data holdings and the national ID card system.  
407. AMLO mandates the creation and maintenance of a database within the FMU; currently retrieval 
of STRs and other data as well as the overall analysis of STRs are seriously hampered by the lack of such 
an effective database application. FMU is currently using a poorly designed Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
as its database application. The analysis department, effectively all 4 FMU staff (everyone except the DG 
FMU), is generally under resourced to effectively undertake its core functions – additional work and 
current working practices also impinges on effectiveness  
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Guidelines to Financial Institutions on Reporting STR (c. 26.2): 
408. FMU is required to frame regulations in consultation with SBP and SECP for ensuring receipt of 
STRs and CTRs from the financial institutions and non-financial businesses and professions with the 
approval of the NEC. In accordance with this mandate Regulations mandating the form of reporting were 
issued in 6 January 2009 by the FMU, SBP and the SECP. Whilst these regulations designate the forms 
on which to report STRs and CTRs they do not give any guidance on discretionary or mandatory fields 
nor is there guidance on the nature and or extent of detail required in each field. Such guidance on 
completion of the STR form is particularly important as the ‘language’ used in the form is primarily 
banking sector specific yet the single STR form is designed to be used by all reporting entities.  
Access to Information on Timely Basis by FIU (c. 26.3): 
409. The provisions with s6(4)(b) AMLO focus on access to official information for analysis: “to 
analyze the STRs and CTRs and in that respect the FMU may call for record and information from any 
agency in Pakistan (with the exception of income tax information) concerning the person in question. All 
such agencies shall be required to promptly provide the requested information”. Access to this ‘official’ 
information is on an indirect case-by-case basis, and there is a lack of systematic approach to gathering 
further information to aid analysis of STRs. Such an approach effects timeliness of enquiries and response 
time and also hampers effective analysis of STRs. The FMU has direct access to only limited information:  
 FIA database on proscribed organizations and their associates 
 SECP database which includes Company registration information. 
 Credit Information Bureau (CIB); 
 World Check database.  
 
410. The FMU is negotiating with the National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) to gain 
online access to the NADRA database, which is a comprehensive national holding of various data sets 
related to all National Identity Card holders in Pakistan.  
Additional Information from Reporting Parties (c. 26.4): 
411. FMU access to financial information does not appear to be explicitly covered within AMLO, and 
the FMU relies on Section 6(4) (d) of AMLO which provides for the FMU to analyze STRs and CTRs 
and, to achieve that role, to call for information from any agency in Pakistan. This does not clearly extend 
FMU the power to call for additional information from reporting parties, albeit in practice banks appear 
willing to co-operate in the provision of additional data covering STRs when requested by the FMU.  The 
reason for this cooperation from banks may well be because they view the FMU as part of the SBP (this is 
a matter of general perception by the financial sector) and see the provision of information as a 
requirement of their supervisor. . Given the lack of clear powers within AMLO, there is a need for the 
FMU to clearly indicate the powers of another competent authority, whether SBP, SECP or some other 
regulator, which authorizes the FMU to obtain additional information from reporting parties to aid in 
analysis of FMU data.  
Dissemination of Information (c. 26.5): 
412. Section 6(4)(c) empowers FMU to disseminate, after having considered the reports and having 
reasonable grounds to suspect, the STR and any necessary information can be disseminated to the 
‘investigating agencies’. The definition of ‘investigating agency’ is contained in s2 (k) AMLO which 
designates only the NAB, ANF, and the FIA and therefore does not allow for dissemination to other 
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investigative agencies such as provincial Police, customs or the tax authority. FMU does disclose 
intelligence to the NAB, FIA and ANF. However, there is no clear policy regarding dissemination. Where 
it appears to be explicitly a drug, corruption or terrorist offence dissemination is clear but where the 
offence is not known or apparent involves multiple types of offences there is no clear policy on who the 
information should be disseminated to.  The assessors note however, that the lack of a clearly defined 
policy on dissemination, to date, taking into account the low levels of STR reporting, has not yet been 
seen as a problem in dissemination by the FMU.  
Operational Independence (c. 26.6): 
413. s6 (2) AMLO states “The FMU shall have independent decision making authority on day-to-day 
matters coming within its areas of responsibility”.  
414. However s6(3) AMLO also places the FMU “subject to the supervision and control of the 
General Committee”, in reality this is not the case – as the General Committee has devolved this 
responsibility to the Governor of the SBP. Whilst this may appear to be a pragmatic approach it raises two 
issues: (i) regarding independence and autonomy of the FMU by place it directly under the Governor SBP 
and (ii) whether AMLO allows or even intended such powers to be devolved from the GC. Also FMU is 
currently physically housed within the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) with its Director General and four 
staff currently being drawn or seconded solely from the SBP putting a higher and sole reliance upon the 
SBP for its support.  
415. Some concerns have been expressed regarding the operational independence of the FMU given 
this oversight by the GC. As such, the standard does not imply an absence of oversight on an FIU (the 
FMU in this case) – it seems on the opposite a rather good policy to have the FMU report on its results 
and be accountable in relation to its overall performance against national objectives. The concern 
regarding operational independence is also related to the decision regarding the dissemination of STRs 
post-analysis. In that respect, the concern (on paper) of risk of interference under the direct and sole 
supervision of the Governor is higher – the team was provide many assurances that no interference has 
been taking place on specific STRs.  
416. Other issues affecting the independence and autonomy of FMU are (i) the lack of a detailed and 
devolved budget (ii) the current lack of ability for the FMU to independently recruit staff; FMU is still 
where it was at its inception a year ago with only a DG and four staff. Both of these issues, the assessors 
were informed, are held-up in discussions between the SBP and the Ministry of Finance and also in the 
case of new staffing the need to officially ‘Gazette’ such posts and on whose authority the Gazette entry 
should be placed. Each of these issues raises the question of its autonomy and is also seriously affecting 
the effectiveness of the FMU.  
Protection of Information Held by FIU (c. 26.7): 
417. Information is generally held securely and disseminated in accordance with the law. FMU does 
have secure and separate facility within the SBP which is accessible via electronic key which identifies 
and allows access to authorized users. Within the unit computer access is restricted by individual 
password entry. All staff within the FMU is bound by the SBP public sector integrity and secrecy 
provisions. FMU staff is drawn from the SBP and are subject to a ‘vetting’ process prior to their 
employment.  
418. Physical storage of document was resolved during the on-site assessment whereby FMU secured 
a large ‘walk-in safe’, within their unit, for storage of STRs and other documents. IT security 
requirements are dependent upon services provide by SBP.  FMU does not have data back-up routines for 
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the protection of FIU data. FMU does not currently have its own disaster recovery plan; while there may 
be a recovery plan for SBP this may not adequately take account of FMU-specific needs.  
Publication of Annual Reports (c. 26.8): 
419. Section 6(4) (g) AMLO requires the submission to the NEC of an annual report containing 
recommendations based upon necessary information and statistics regarding countermeasures which can 
be taken to combat money laundering and such reports shall provide an overall analysis and evaluation of 
the STRs limited to details of the investigations and prosecutions that have been or are being conducted in 
relation to the offence of money laundering in Pakistan. FMU has been operational since December 2007 
and to date has not published such a report. It is also FMUs interpretation of AMLO that apart from the 
annual report for the consumption of NEC, there is no provision in the AMLO whereby FMU could issue 
its annual reports to the public. There are no specific provisions in AMLO requiring the competent 
authorities to make periodic public reports, however, there are also no provisions prohibiting this.  
Membership of Egmont Group (c. 26.9): 
420. FMU has considered and is pursuing membership of Egmont but has not yet formally applied for 
membership.  
 
Egmont Principles of Exchange of Information Among FIUs (c. 26.10): 
421. In the opinion of the assessors the international requirements for sharing information contained 
within AMLO and general procedures, for governmental department and agencies, would fall short of the 
Egmont principals. S 4(e) AMLO on the face of it allows the FMU to share information with international 
counterparts. However, s26 AMLO which has a wider mandate than just the FMU international co-
operation requires the intervention of the Federal Government to enter into an agreement to undertake 
foreign co-operation – it is the interpretation of Pakistani officials that s26 overrides the provision within 
s6(4)(e) in the process of providing co-operation. Further, as a matter of standard operating practice, 
international co-operation for all the department/agencies has to be routed through the Foreign Ministry, 
notwithstanding the requirement to involve the Federal Government in agreements the necessity to route 
requests through the Foreign Ministry would affectively rule out spontaneous co-operation to or from the 
FMU.  
Analysis of Effectiveness 
422. FMU is acknowledged for the valuable contribution it has made to Pakistan’s AML/CFT efforts 
and in its co-ordination role with other agencies particularly in matters affect the work of the NEC and 
GC. The DG FMU through the statutory functions (within AMLO) acts as secretary to both NEC and the 
GC has also inherited the Secretariat functions to both committees. With the very limited resources 
available to FMU these additional and sometimes ad-hoc functions are impacting on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the FMU to fulfill the core functions of and an FIU (FMU in this case): receipt, analysis 
and dissemination. At the time of the on-site assessment the FMU had a back-log of STR’s which was 
estimated to amount to 40 days.  
423. FMU is wholly under resourced in the area of manpower and skill but generally has good support 
services provided the SBP. Technical resources in the area of database application are wholly inadequate 
to fulfill its function currently and more so to the future.  A broader range of skills and more specific 
training would assist staff in their analysis function.  
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2.5.2. Recommendations and Comments 
424. The authorities should consider the following recommendations:  
 ATA requirements to report suspicion of TF offences should include a requirement for a report to 
be made to the FMU as the national centre for receiving all ML and TF related STRs, even if TF 
related STRs are made in parallel to the police.  
 FMU should clearly indicate the powers of other competent authorities which are used to 
authorizes the FMU to obtain additional information from reporting parties to aid in analysis  
 Authorities should provide guidance to reporting entities on the completion of STRs. 
 FMU should ensure that systematic procedures are in place to make use of indirect access to other 
information for analysis to ensure timeliness of obtaining information.  
 FMU policies for dissemination should be clarified to help overcome the fragmentation of 
responsible investigating agencies. 
 Legal and working practice constraints do not meet Egmont principals 
 DG FMU should set out an action plan detailing current and medium term needs including 
staffing and infrastructure requirements to meet the FMU’s core functions of receipt, analysis and 
dissemination as well as its ancillary functions assigned through AMLO and those undertaken to 
support the NEC and GC. 
 A devolved budget should be allocated to the DG FMU to appropriately implement the action 
plan. 
 There needs to be clarity in relation to operational independence and autonomy of the FMU. 
Language in s6 (3) AMLO “FMUs… supervision and control of the General Committee” also 
needs to be reviewed and clarified to ensure the perception of operational independence and 
autonomy is maintained. 
 A working practices document need to be developed for FMU operations including: priorities for 
STR reporting requirements (with SBP and SECP); STR quality; dissemination policies to take 
into account law enforcement fragmentation; standard operating procedures for analysis; 
procedures for information requests and responses; security policies including physical security 
and visitors. Consideration should be given to amending AMLO that gives FMU explicit access 
to additional financial information needed in to undertake its functions.   
 Separate the FMU database from the SBP IT systems and implement a policy for IT back-up and 
disaster recovery planning. 
 FMU should prepare an FMU Annual Report which includes statistics typologies and trends 
 The FMU should implement the Egmont Principles for information exchange. Powers for 
international co-operation should be clarified to allow FMU autonomy to participate in 
international cooperation. 
 FMU staff should be trained in typologies of criminal (including terrorist) structures and money 
flows specific to Pakistan.  
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2.5.3. Compliance with Recommendation 26 
 Rating Summary of factors relevant to s.2.5 underlying overall rating  
R.26 PC  ATA requirements to report suspicion of TF offences do not provide for 
reporting of such STRs to the FMU 
 No guidance is given to reporting entities on the completion of STRs. 
 FMU does have indirect access to other information for analysis but the lack of 
a systematic approach to this affects timeliness of obtaining such information.  
 Effectiveness of dissemination is impacted by staff experience and the lack of 
clear policies that deal with the differing ‘investigative agencies’. 
 FMU is judged not to have sufficient operational independence and autonomy. 
 No reports and or statistics are published 
 Legal and working practice constraints impede information sharing 
 
 
2.6. Law enforcement, prosecution and other competent authorities—the framework for the 
investigation and prosecution of offenses, and for confiscation and freezing (R.27, & 28) 
2.6.1. Description and Analysis 
Legal Framework and Designation of Authorities ML/FT Investigations (c. 27.1): 
425. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 provides law enforcement agencies (both federal and 
provincial, including the police) overarching investigative powers for all crimes.  There is additional 
legislation dealing with the federal investigation agencies’ powers detailed below.  
426. Drug offences and related ML fall within the jurisdiction of the ANF.  Public sector corruption 
and banking fraud, and allied ML, falls within the jurisdiction of the NAB.  
427. The ATA creates offences of terrorism and TF. Responsibility for the investigation of the acts of 
terrorism, including terrorist financing falls to the provincial police. Responsibility for TF investigation 
involving inter-province or international aspects rests with the FIA – notwithstanding that the two crimes 
may be interlinked.  
428. Investigation of serious crime, for example organized car crime and the vice trade, falls to the 
provincial police.  However, the investigation of any associated ML would fall to the FIA. Immigration or 
passport related crime and white collar crime with inter-provincial or international ramifications fall with 
the jurisdiction of the FIA –as does any allied ML.  
429. Section 6(4) (c) AMLO assigns to designated ‘investigative agencies’ the task of pursuing ML 
investigations that emanate from the STR analysis and dissemination.  The designated ‘investigative 
agencies’ are defined in s2 (k) AMLO as NAB, ANF and the FIA – and any other law enforcement 
agency as may be notified by the Federal Government. This provision however deals solely with the 
investigation of the disseminated product from the FMU and not the wider investigation of ML or TF.  
430. Section 24 AMLO sets out who may be an investigating officer and, thereby, exercise the powers 
set out in the Ordinance. In addition to the staff of the investigating agencies, the federal government may 
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designate an officer of the federal or provincial governments to act as an investigating officer.  Pakistan 
has not yet designated any additional agencies as investigating agencies, nor appointed individuals as 
investigating officers.  Customs is currently being considered to be included as an investigative agency; 
however, the route currently being considered to include them is by substantive legislative amendment to 
the Ordinance. 
431. Section 39 AMLO is relevant to investigations of ML and TF that are not initiated by way of 
STRs. It states that the provisions of AMLO shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the NAO, 
CNSA and ATA. Accordingly, existing investigation powers under that legislation remain applicable to 
the investigation of ML, predicate offending and asset recovery.  The FIA Act was amended in October 
2008 to also include the investigation of offences punishable under AMLO.   
432. Section 21 AMLO defines offences punishable under AMLO as non-cognizable crimes and as 
such would fall within the general investigative powers of the Provincial Police (subject to the 
information being laid before a magistrate).  
 
Ability to Postpone / Waive Arrest of Suspects or Seizure of Property (c. 27.2): 
433. Scope to postpone or waive (in order to gather evidence) either the arrest of a suspected person or 
the seizure of monies depends upon whether the crime is designated as ‘cognizable’ or ‘non-cognizable’. 
Cognizable crime may be investigated by an officer in-charge of a police-station, without the order of a 
Magistrate. ‘Officer in-charge of a police station’ has been defined under the CNSA FIAA and NAO in 
terms that ensure that the power to ‘postpone or waive’ rests within the investigating agency. In cases 
concerning non-cognizable offences, the power to investigate (and thereby postpone or waive) rests with 
a Magistrate.  
434. Drug trafficking and associated ML under the CSNA, terrorism and TF under the ATA and public 
sector corruption, bank fraud and associated ML under the NAO are all cognizable offences. However, 
under AMLO the ‘stand-alone’ offence of ML is non-cognizable. The two processes for investigation 
(cognizable and non-cognizable) in cases where the underlying ML scenarios are identical create a wholly 
fragmented approach to the ability to ‘postpone or waive’ the arrest or seizure’.  
435. The assessors were not made aware of any examples of the use of postponement or waiver.  
Indeed, the examples supplied showed that early seizure was the normal practice.  
Additional Element—Ability to Use Special Investigative Techniques (c. 27.3):  
436. There is no legal bar on law enforcement agencies using special investigative techniques like 
controlled delivery and undercover operations while conducting investigation of money laundering or 
terrorist financing. This is demonstrated, in particular, by the ANF in drug related operations. The Qanun-
e-Shahadat Order, 1984 allows use of modern techniques. Whilst these techniques are being used in the 
investigation of predicate crimes, no evidence was provided to the assessors that showed they are being 
used or considered in the tracing of criminal assets or investigation of ML and TF as stand-alone offences.  
Additional Element—Use of Special Investigative Techniques for ML/FT Techniques (c. 27.4): 
437. See comments above regarding 27.3 
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Additional Element—Specialized Investigation Groups & Conducting Multi-National Cooperative Investigations 
(c. 27.5): 
438. There are no specialized groups or bodies that focus specifically upon the investigation of ML or 
upon the seizure, freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime – whether for domestic or international 
operations.  If the predicate crime was thought to fit with another agency the whole case would generally 
be handed over.  
439. There is evidence of good collaboration between FIA and the provincial police, in particular 
regarding domestic terrorist operations.  The FIA has established the Special Investigation Group (SIG to 
investigate terrorism cases, which would include terrorist financing investigations and the SIG works 
closely with the provincial police and other investigations authorities. The SIG has been involved in 
multi-national cooperative investigations with various international partners in relation to terrorism and 
aspects of terrorist financing investigations being pursued by foreign partners.  
 
Additional Elements—Review of ML & FT Trends by Law Enforcement Authorities (c. 27.6): 
440. There was no evidence of agency-level analysis of ML and or TF techniques and or trends or of 
the ML or TF components of operations being ‘de-briefed’. Available forums were not being widely used 
to share ML and TF trends at a multi-agency level between LEAs and the FMU.  
Ability to Compel Production of and Searches for Documents and Information (c. 28.1): 
441. Section 165 Criminal Procedure Code 1898 provides the power for law enforcement to obtain 
banking and similar documents.  Permission in writing of either a Session Judge or the High Court is 
required. Wider search powers, available on the authority of a police officer, are available when the 
sought material is not banking documents. Other Powers also exist under the Bankers' Books Evidence 
Act, 1891. Additionally AMLO s14 and 15 also provide investigating officers with powers to survey, 
search and seize for the purpose of investigation (but not in relation to banking records). The search 
powers also allow material to either be seized or obtained.  
442. NAB has additional powers under s19 NAO to call for information from any person, bank or 
financial institution. Specifically, sub-section (d) states that NAB may “require any bank or financial 
institution, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, to provide 
any information relating to any person whosoever, including copies of entries made in a bank’s or a 
financial institution’s books such as ledgers, day books, cash books and all other books including record 
of information and transactions saved in electronic or digital form, and the keepers of such books or 
records shall be obliged to certify the copies in accordance with law”. The search powers also allow 
material to either be seized or obtained.  
443. ANF has additional powers.  Under s31 (d) CNSA, an authorized officer may require any bank or 
financial institution, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, to 
provide any information whatsoever. More general powers of search are provided under s20 (on the 
authority of a court) and s21 (on the authority of authorized officers). The search powers also allow 
material to either be seized or obtained.  
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444. The ATA has various provisions relating to general search and seizure. ATA does not appear to 
have exclusive provision for the obtaining of banking material and would rely upon the Criminal 
Procedure Code.  
Power to Take Witnesses’ Statement (c. 28.2): 
445. S. 161 Criminal Procedure Code 1898 gives the general power for investigation officers to take 
witness statements.  Section13 (3) AMLO also allows for the obtaining of statements relating to certain 
searches in relation to ML.  
Resources of the prosecution services 
 
446. The NAB, FIA and ANF possess limited in-house prosecutorial capacity.  The enabling 
legislation of these agencies permits them to significantly depend upon the services of Special Prosecutors 
appointed from the private bar.  That said, the internal prosecution wing of the NAB is currently 
understaffed.  Formerly, there were 5-7 prosecutors per regional office.  Owing to the non-renewal of 
many contracts of service across the agency, each office currently has only 1 or 2 prosecutors.   
447. In the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, prosecutions for agencies other than the specialist 
enforcement agencies (NAB, FIA and ANF) are undertaken by a provincial “Prosecution Service”.  These 
Services are headed up by a Provincial Prosecutor General.  Prosecutors are subject to codes of conduct.  
448. The Evaluation Team was advised that staff retention presents challenges to these Prosecution 
Services.  Prosecutors are grossly underpaid compared to counsel in private practice and appointments are 
generally pursuant to short-term contract.  Staff retention is a problem.  Independence of prosecutorial 
function is compromised.  In Punjab, the office of Prosecutor General has been vacant for a considerable 
time.  Officials, however, advised the Evaluation Team that provincial prosecutor pay scales have been 
revised and special allowances and other benefits made available. However, it was accepted that, at the 
federal level, there is need for improvement. 
449. As a further corollary, the skill levels of prosecutors from the Prosecution Services are generally 
well below those of opposing defence counsel.  The Evaluation Team was advised that this imbalance is a 
common contributor to acquittals.  Officials advised that the appointment of eminent lawyers as Special 
Public Prosecutors in high profile cases has yielded positive results.  
450. The Sindh and Punjab provinces also have Offices of the Advocate General to undertake 
appellate work in the High Courts.  Staff retention within these offices is better, with tenured prosecutors 
receiving better rates of remuneration.  
451. In the other provinces, prosecutions outside the remit of the specialist enforcement agencies are 
undertaken by barristers from a panel of accredited counsel.  
452. Meetings with justice sector representatives consistently bore out a need for greater training of 
prosecution counsel and the judiciary in the field of financial investigation and the adducing of associated 
evidence.  
Resources of Law Enforcement Authorities 
 
453. LEA Resourcing: In relation to the FIA, it wholly under resourced in the areas of ML and TF to 
effectively fulfill these functions (see also comments under criteria 27 and 28) in all areas of manpower; 
specialist skill; and technical resources. The current structure within FIA only allows for a dedicated unit, 
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the SIG, to deal with terrorism and terrorist related financing areas of operation – this unit has 
approximately 100 staff dealing with a wide mandate in terrorism nationally and only 5 TF specialists – 
this does not reflect the size and to terrorist incident affecting Pakistan. No such explicit specialism exists 
for ML.  
454. NAB is better resourced and has greater access to specialist skill and technical resources. And has 
specialty dealing with the financial investigations, The Banking Wing with expertise drawn from other 
agencies and the commercial sector. However these structures do not reflect a priority to the investigation 
of ML as it affects corruption and public sector fraud, priority has been set around voluntary recovery and 
investigation of directly recoverable assets.  
455. ANF was established in 1995 and had in its original mandate, in relation drug assets, a ML 
mandate and prior to FMU the receipt of STR relating to drug suspected assets and has structures dealing 
with the financial aspects of drug trafficking. The focus of their financial operations appear to centre 
around pure asset seizure mainly connected to the principals concerned in the drug trafficking offence as 
opposed the crime of drug related ML. Whilst there clearly are skill within the ANF, they acknowledge 
that greater knowledge and training is required to adequately equip then to deal effectively with ML as a 
standalone crime. The lack of skill factor may also be borne out in the financial recovery statists of ANF 
which shows only 10 percent is confiscated based on what ANF originally seized, or froze.  
456. FMU is wholly under resourced in the area of manpower and skill but generally has good support 
services provided the SBP. Technical resources in the area of database application are wholly inadequate 
to fulfill its function currently and more so to the future. The current structure can and does only reflect 
the current staffing levels i.e. the DG and four analysts. Skills, whilst good, are limited to the experience 
of the 4 staff who are all drawn from the SBP (albeit one of the staff benefitted – and benefits FMU – 
with a previous secondment to NAB. A broader range of skill and more specific training would assist in 
their analysis function (see additional comments in criteria 26).  
Analysis of Effectiveness 
457. ANF, NAB and FIA have achieved results in the discovery, freezing and seizure of proceeds and 
associated assets and have deployed staff to undertake this work. However, these operations have neither 
extended to the wider aspects of the laundering of funds nor entailed investigations of ML or TF as 
‘stand-alone’ crimes. None of these agencies have set aside any additional or devoted resource/manpower 
to deal with the addition work brought about by promulgation of AMLO in September 2007. Taking all 
the factors into consideration, Pakistan does not have effectively designated law enforcement authorities 
that have responsibility for ensuring that ML and FT offences are properly investigated.  
458. Lack of clarity in laws regarding investigative powers (and/or understanding of those laws) is 
seriously hampering the investigation of ML and TF – as is the two tiered approach to cognizable and 
non-cognizable offences concerning (effectively) the same crime of ML.  
459. Section 21(2)(b) AMLO enables a court to take cognizance of the AMLO ML offence “provided 
that where the person accused is a financial institution, the investigating officer or any other authorized 
officer, as the case may be shall, before filing such complaint, seek the approval of the FMU.”.  LEAs 
perceived that this section creates a barrier to investigation. Their interpretation of this subsection is that 
the wording precludes the investigation, without consent of the FMU, of not only the financial institution 
but also individual employees of such institutions, and that such consent would not readily be given by 
the SBP or the FMU. The assessors do not share these views and do not see there to be a barrier to 
investigation here.  
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460. Responsibility for the investigation of the acts of terrorism and terrorist financing falls to the 
provincial police whereas the responsibility in practice for terrorist financing investigation falls to the 
FIA. The FIA also has power to investigate immigration or passport related crime and white collar crime 
with inter-provincial or international ramifications as well as any allied money laundering. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the two crimes (predicate and ML) may be interlinked there is a separation 
of responsibility / agency dealing with the two parts of the investigation.  
461. Further, the investigation of serious crime, for example organized car crime and the vice trade, 
falls to the provincial police as would the associated ML, however, no evidence was provided to the 
assessors that demonstrated the Provincial Police had experience or capacity to investigate the associated 
ML crimes.  
462. There are no policies or procedures to deal with crimes that cut across inter-agency jurisdiction, 
in particular, the investigation of money laundering or terrorist financing. The overall approach to the 
investigation of ML and TF is fragmented.  
463. The FIA is the agency with the largest mandate covering both ML and TF but is not properly 
resourced to actually take on this mandate. It has over 3000 officers nationally to cover the wide range of 
offences within its mandate – of which ML and TF forms only a small part. Within FIA, there is the 
Special Investigation Group (SIG) which specializes in responsibilities dealing with terrorism and TF. 
The number of dedicated experts for TF is 5 officers.  Whilst they can, and do, call on assistance of other 
officers, this resource is not proportionate to the size and magnitude of the TF problem, taking into 
account the number and seriousness of terrorist incidents and supporting international TF operations.  
464. There was little evidence of ML or TF being pursued as a stand-alone offence. Investigations 
were centered on the seizure of assets directly related to the principal (or close associate) concerned with 
the predicate crime. In the view of the assessors, a primary reason for this limited application of the ML 
or TF provisions and the lack of focus of investigative / prosecution authorities to ‘follow the money’ 
does not come from deficits within AMLO, NAO, CNSA and ATA or other laws. It also stems from a 
lack of mobilization on the risks posed by money laundering or terrorist financing as such, not in relations 
to the predicates.  
465. Benefit would be derived from a risk assessment that looks into: the value of proceeds generated 
by predicate crime; funds necessary to sustain terrorism and where those funds actually come from; how 
those proceeds are ‘directly’ enjoyed by the criminal (e.g. purchase of luxury items, cars, real estate); how 
they are used to ‘re-invest’ in ongoing criminality or the financing of terrorism; how criminals are assisted 
in disguising or dispersing those proceeds to avoid detection and seizure; and what financial sector and 
non-financial sector industries and products are susceptible to and used by criminal and terrorists.  
466. Whilst the provisions to ‘waive or postpone…’ exist in law, in practice this was not seen in regard 
to the seizure of monies. Here also, the culture of “follow-the-money” does not appear to prevail – even 
though the concept of allowing the main commodity (drugs etc) to move in circumstances of controlled 
delivery is well known and often used by the investigative agencies.   Such examples should be used in 
ML and TF investigations. Case examples were not quoted were the monies were allowed to move in 
order a ML or TF investigation could be pursued to gather evidence of either predicate crimes or of ML 
or TF themselves. To the contrary, case examples were given showing early interdiction of monies that 
would have allowed for ongoing investigations.  
467. The assessors were not made aware of any problems in relation to search, seizure or production of 
general or banking documentation or concerning obtaining of witness statements. However, no statistics 
or other empirical evidence was produced to show the effective use of these provisions.  
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468. The NAB, which has significant experience of the investigation of proceeds of corruption and has 
specialist investigation powers, has undergone significant contraction of resources in recent times and, 
according to ministerial statements, may soon be replaced.  The assessment team notes the strong 
investigations methodologies and experience developed by the NAB and the need to ensure that this 
capacity is retained in some form within Pakistan agencies to effectively investigate and prosecute the 
proceeds of corruption and related ML.  
2.6.2. Recommendations and Comments 
469. It is recommended that the authorities consider the following recommendations:  
 Pakistan should, as matter of priority, ensure that those agencies designated to pursue 
investigations of ML and TF are responsible and resourced to properly pursue ML and TF 
investigations, including ML cases beyond cases of ‘self-laundering’ or the overt proceeds from 
the principal involved in the predicate crime.  
 Pakistan should ensure proper investigation of ML and TF is supported by a sufficient 
understanding of investigative powers across all investigative agencies.  
 All agencies responsible for investigating ML and TF should be properly resourced to ensure 
effective investigations.  
 The investigative agencies should appoint and adequately resource dedicated financial 
investigators to: deal with asset-based investigations allied to the predicate crimes within their 
jurisdiction (including terrorism; ML and TF allied to the predicate crime) and; investigate ML 
and TF as a stand-alone crime irrespective of whether the source of information emanates from 
the FMU or any other source.  
 High-level training in current laws for all investigative agencies, and in particular for all 
dedicated financial investigators within these agencies, is essential, including training to dispel 
the misconception that a predicate offence conviction is required prior to 
investigating/prosecuting ML. 
 Pakistan should consider making all MF offences and associated investigations as cognizable to 
support a single approach to investigation. 
 The authorities should adopt a clear and definitive policy on the concept of “lead agency” for the 
investigation and prosecution of ML and TF.  
 Greater use of tools and techniques used in predicate crime investigation, such as the controlled 
delivery, would assist in understanding the concepts of ‘follow-the-money’.  
 The Pakistani authorities should ensure that deployment of skilled financial investigators across 
all provincial and federal agencies with mandates to investigate ML and TF and asset recovery.  
 Statistical framework should be put in place, particularly in relations to production, seizure, 
search and the obtaining of statements across all agencies.  
 
2.6.3. Compliance with Recommendations 27 & 28 
 Rating Summary of factors relevant to s.2.6 underlying overall rating  
R.27 PC  There is no evidence of standalone investigations into ML or TF. Those 
investigations that have taken place are generally associated with overt proceeds 
  83
from the principal involved in the predicate crime. 
 A general insufficient understanding of investigative powers across all 
investigative agencies and the FMU contributes to the lack of investigations 
into ML or TF.  
 The primary agency for investigation of TF (FIA) is insufficiently resourced to 
effectively to ensure proper investigations. 
  
R.28 LC  Evidence was not produced to demonstrate effective use of provisions 
for search, seizure or production of general or banking documentation or 
concerning obtaining of witness statements in relation to ML or TF.  
 
 
2.7. Cross Border Declaration or Disclosure (SR.IX) 
2.7.1. Description and Analysis 
470. The Legal Framework: The Foreign Exchange Act of 1947 empowers the SBP to regulate the 
import and export of currency.  Customs Authorities derive their authorities from the Customs Act of 
1969.  
Mechanisms to Monitor Cross-border Physical Transportation of Currency (c. IX.1): 
471. Pakistan has not yet implemented an effective regime to cover cross-border transportation of 
currency and bearer negotiable instruments.  Through its currency controls, Pakistan has instituted a 
partial declaration system that only covers people taking foreign currency out of Pakistan and people 
taking out or bringing in more than 3,000 Pak Rupees.  Notification No.F.E.2/98-SB requires any person 
transporting more than $10,000 in foreign currency out of Pakistan to obtain permission from SBP before 
taking the foreign currency out of Pakistan.  Carrying more than $10,000 in foreign currency out of 
Pakistan without SBP’s permission is prohibited.  Bringing in or taking out more than 3,000 Pak Rupees 
is also prohibited.  The limited declaration requirement does not cover bearer negotiable instruments.  
There is no declaration or disclosure requirement for people entering Pakistan. 
 Under the limited declaration system mandated by Notification No. F.E. 2/98-SB, SBP authorizes 
individuals or employees of exchange companies to carry more than $10,000 in foreign currency out of 
Pakistan.  Individuals who want to take more than $10,000 in currency out of Pakistan must demonstrate 
a need to take the currency out of Pakistan before SBP grants permission.  Exchange company employees 
taking more than $10,000 in foreign currency out of Pakistan must take the following steps: 
 Each exchange company representative must report to the SBP booth at the Karachi or Lahore 
airport at least four hours before the flight’s scheduled departure. 
 The representative must produce a letter that jointly addresses SBP and Customs officials and 
describes the particulars of the foreign currency transaction.  SBP officials, Customs officials 
and the exchange company each retain a copy of the letter.  The representative must also 
complete a declaration certificate, which details the denominations and amounts of foreign 
currencies. 
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 The representative brings the foreign currency to the SBP booth, where SBP and Customs 
officials verify the amount and denomination of the foreign currency.  After verifying the 
count, SBP officials vacuum pack the currency to prevent tampering. 
 Customs may check the currency at any point after the foreign currency has been packed and 
sealed. 
Request Information on Origin and Use of Currency (c. IX.2): 
472. When Customs officials discover that someone is taking more than $10,000 in foreign currency 
out of Pakistan or transporting more than 3,000 in Pak Rupees across the border, they have the authority 
to request and obtain further information from the carrier.  The Customs Act gives Customs officials the 
power to investigate the unauthorized movement of goods across Pakistan’s borders.  Section 2 of the 
Customs Act defines “goods” and includes “currency and negotiable instruments.”  Among Customs 
Authorities’ powers:  
 To search and arrest any person on reasonable ground and belief with or without warrant 
(Sections 158, 161, 162, 163 and 167 of the Customs Act); 
 To screen or X-Ray bodies of suspected persons for detecting secreted goods (Section 160 of the 
Customs Act); 
 To stop and search conveyances (Section 164 of the Customs Act); 
 To compel aircraft to land for examination and search of goods (Section 164 of the Customs Act); 
 To break open the lock of any door, fixture or package for making search (Section 164 of the 
Customs Act); 
 To summon persons to give evidence and produce documents or things and to examine persons 
(Sections 165 and 166 of the Customs Act); 
 To seize or detain things liable to confiscation; (Section 168 of the Customs Act); and 
 To impose penalties and to confiscate goods (Sections 179, 156 and 157 of the Customs Act).  
 
Restraint of Currency (c. IX.3): 
473. Sections 168 and 172 of the Customs Act empower officials to seize or detain goods liable to 
confiscation.  Customs authorities can charge cash couriers who make false declarations with smuggling, 
which carries a penalty of 14 years imprisonment and a fine of up to ten times the amount of currency 
smuggled.  The Supreme Court has upheld Customs authorities’ powers to seize and detain currency and 
has affirmed Customs’ application of the smuggling statute to people who make false declarations.  
Retention of Information of Currency and Identification Data by Authorities when appropriate (c. IX.4):  
474. The SBP’s Foreign Exchange Department closely holds records of currency declarations.  
Customs authorities maintain records of all seizures of goods, including currency.  
Access of Information to FIU (c. IX.5): 
475. SBP and Customs authorities do not share information about declarations with the FMU.  During 
the on-site visit, Pakistan Customs authorities stated that they do not notify the FMU about suspicious 
cross-border incidents or by making declaration information available to the FMU in some other way.  
Pakistan Customs authorities said the law limits dissemination of Customs information and that there is 
no legal provision that allows them to share information with the FMU.  Section 155H authorizes 
Customs to grant access to its computerized trade databases to other agencies only so that those agencies 
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may perform statistical research or to analyze import and export records.  Other access is prohibited.  
Customs authorities said this provision prevents them from giving wide access to the records to the FMU.  
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Domestic Cooperation between Customs, Immigration and Related Authorities (c. IX.6): 
476. Authorities said that the SBP, the FMU and Customs Authorities have an excellent working 
relationship.  But Customs Authorities said they do not notify the FMU about suspicious cross-border 
incidents, and neither Customs authorities nor the SBP Foreign Exchange Department share declaration 
information with the FMU.  There is, however, cooperation between the SBP’s Foreign Exchange 
Department and Customs authorities as described in Criterion IX.1.  
 
International Cooperation between Competent Authorities relating to Cross-border Physical 
Transportation of Currency (c. IX.7): 
477. Pakistan Customs shares information through Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices (RILO) 
program.  The RILO program facilitates the exchange of information on illegal customs activities among 
customs authorities worldwide.  Pakistan is able to share information internationally through the RILO.  
Sanctions for Making False Declarations / Disclosures (applying c. 17.1-17.4 in R.17, c. IX.8)  
478. The assessors concluded that there is no provision of law that prevents the prosecution of legal 
persons for criminal offenses.  (See Section 2 for details)  But, in practice, Pakistani authorities charge 
natural rather than legal persons.  Assets owned by firms are attached if need be.  The foreign exchange 
regulations contemplate civil fines for exchange companies that violate the regulations.  
Sanctions for Cross-border Physical Transportation of Currency for Purposes of ML or TF (applying c. 
17.1-17.4 in R.17, c. IX.9): 
479. Customs authorities are not empowered to investigate terrorism financing, but they can refer 
suspected terrorism financing matters to the FIA.  Customs authorities also lack the power to investigate 
money laundering, and must instead refer cases of suspected money laundering to the relevant agency.  
Customs authorities do, however, have the authority to investigate smuggling, narcotics trafficking and 
fraud.  
Confiscation of Currency Related to ML/FT (applying c. 3.1-3.6 in R.3, c. IX.10): 
480. Sections 168 of the Customs Act authorizes Customs officials to detain and seize cash, bearer 
negotiable instruments, precious metals or jewels that they believe are related to unlawful activity.   
Confiscation of Currency Pursuant to UNSCRs (applying c. III.1-III.10 in SR III, c. IX.11): 
481. Customs can confiscate currency pursuant to the U.N. Security Council resolutions.  The SROs 
relating to UNSCR 1267 provide for the freezing of “funds and financial resources” of designated entities 
and individuals.  Section 168 of the Customs Act empowers Customs authorities to seize or detain any 
goods brought into or taken out of Pakistan in breach of any prohibition or restriction.  The Customs Act 
defines currency, bearer negotiable instruments, jewels and precious metals as goods.  Customs 
Authorities, acting under the authority granted by Section 168, can therefore freeze funds when currency, 
bearer negotiable instruments, precious metals or jewels are physically transported by or on behalf a 
person or entity designated under UNSCR 1267.  Similarly, authorities can seize cash belonging to 
organizations proscribed under Section 11E the ATA.  
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Notification of Foreign Agency of Unusual Movement of Precious Metal and Stones (c. IX.12): 
482. Section168 of the Customs Act empowers Customs authorities to investigate illicit movements of 
precious metals and precious stones.  The import and export of such items are tightly regulated.  
Individuals may import or export items of a personal nature, and businesses (such as jewelers) operate 
under a separate set of import/export restrictions, which are announced annually along with the federal 
budget.  Customs authorities share information through RILO and through bilateral relationships under 
mutual legal assistance agreements.  
 
Safeguards for Proper Use of Information (c. IX.13): 
483. SBP and Customs officials keep reports of cross-border transportation of currency confidential.  
SBP shares information about cross-border transportation of currency with Customs only when it grants 
permission to someone taking more than $10,000 in foreign currency out of Pakistan.   
Additional Element—Implementation of SR.IX Best Practices (c. IX.14):  
484. The deficiencies in Pakistan’s legal regime inhibit its effective implementation of the SR.IX Best 
Practices Paper.  Pakistan, for example, cannot establish interdiction operations to stop people bringing 
bulk cash into Pakistan, because bringing foreign currency is not prohibited or regulated.  Pakistan has, 
however, implemented some of the SR.IX Best Practices.  It has, for example, established a document 
review process in which it inspects the passport, visa and airline ticket of incoming and outgoing 
passengers.  
Additional Element—Computerization of Database and Accessible to Competent Authorities (c. IX.15): 
485. Section 155H authorizes Customs to grant access to its computerized trade databases to other 
agencies so that those agencies may perform statistical research or to analyze import and export records.  
Other access is prohibited.  Customs authorities said this provision prevents them from giving wide 
access to the records to the FMU.  
Analysis of Effectiveness 
486. Given Pakistan’s porous borders, effectively implementing its limited disclosure system is 
difficult.  In practice, the limited declaration system is in place only at the airports in Karachi and Lahore.  
487. Table 15 shows the amount of currency seized by Customs authorities in violation of the currency 
control law from 1 July 2006 to mid-June 2008.  Although Customs authorities maintain case-specific 
data, they could not provide the number of incidents, nor could they provide figures that measured the 
amount of currency seized in a consistent manner.  This reveals a lack of effectiveness in record keeping 
and data sharing procedures and raises doubts about whether the information that Customs authorities 
provide to the FMU on an annual basis has any investigative value.  
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Table 15: Currency Seized by Customs Authorities 
488. The low volume of seizures raises doubts about how effective Pakistan Customs is in detecting 
illicit movements of bulk currency.  Although Pakistan’s porous borders impair Pakistan’s ability to 
prevent or detect all bulk cash smuggling, Pakistan has seven international airports where Customs 
authorities screen incoming and outgoing international travelers.  
2.7.2. Recommendations and Comments 
489. Pakistan’s limited declaration system is not an operational element of Pakistan’s AML/CFT 
regime, because, among other things, domestic coordination is lacking.  SBP and Customs authorities do 
not share information about declarations with the FMU.  The SBP also does not inform Customs 
authorities or the FMU when it denies a person’s request to take more than $10,000 out of Pakistan.   
Seizures are reported to the FMU on an annual basis, but Pakistan Customs is not currently authorized to 
share information with the FMU on a more regular or timely basis.  Pakistan Customs is also not 
authorized to share information with the FMU when there is a suspicion of ML or FT.  In addition, the 
limited declaration system does not apply to couriers bringing currency into Pakistan or to Pakistan 
rupees.  
490. Pakistan is considering implementing a declaration system, but its challenging geography makes 
its borders porous.  Establishing secure borders and enforcing anti-smuggling laws is difficult. Despite the 
difficulty of enforcing these laws at all potential points of entry, Pakistan should take efforts to combat 
cash couriers, in particular those that support TF and ML related to the narcotics trade.  
 Pakistan should implement a disclosure or declaration that achieves AML/CFT objectives and 
covers all forms of currency and bearer negotiable instruments.  
 SBP, as the foreign exchange regulator, and NBR (Customs), as the border enforcement agency, 
should share export control information with the FMU.  
 SBP and Customs officials should share with the FMU all permission requests — both granted 
and denied — on a timely basis.   
 Customs should share information with the FMU upon discovery of a false declaration.  
Currency 
Amount seized 
(1 July 2006 
to mid-June 2007) 
Amount seized 
(1 July 2007 
to mid-June 2008) 
Foreign currency equivalent Pakistan rupees — 25,658,700 
Pakistan rupees — 330,000 
Euros 100,000 — 
Pounds sterling 8,015 — 
Counterfeit U.S. dollars 9,900 500,000 
U.S. dollars 143,843 80,000 
Chinese Yuan 2,800 — 
UAE dirham 614,800 — 
Indian rupees 244,000 2,540,700 
Counterfeit Indian rupees — 126,800 
Indonesian rupiah 5,006,00 — 
Qatar riyal 39,992 — 
Saudi riyal 237,100 — 
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 Customs authorities should share information with the FMU when they have a suspicion of ML 
or TF.  
 Pakistan should ensure that powers available to customs to detect, interdict, seize and sanction 
cases of cash couriers are effectively implemented and related international cooperation is 
pursued.  
 
2.7.3. Compliance with Special Recommendation IX 
 Rating Summary of factors relevant to s.2.7 underlying overall rating  
SR.IX NC  Pakistan’s partial declaration system is focused on foreign exchange 
control rather than AML/CFT and only covers people transporting 
foreign currency out of Pakistan and does not cover people bringing 
foreign currency into Pakistan, any movement of Pakistan rupees or 
bearer negotiable instruments 
 SBP and Customs authorities do not share information about 
declarations with the FMU.  
 Customs authorities do not share information with the FMU upon 
discovery of a false declaration. 
 Customs authorities do not share information with the FMU when they 
have a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing. 
 The existing regime is not effectively implemented. 
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3. PREVENTIVE MEASURES —FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Customer Due Diligence & Record Keeping 
 
3.1. Risk of money laundering or terrorist financing 
491. At the time of the on-site mission, the laws and regulation in place in Pakistan did not foresee a 
risk-based approach to AML/C+FT. In particular, no legal steps had been taken to reduce or simplify 
some preventive measures to situations where there is a proven low risk of money laundering or terrorism 
financing. The revised prudential regulation on CDD issued by the State Bank of Pakistan in March 2009 
now creates the first building blocks of such a framework. SECP adopted on April 28, 2009 (i.e. outside 
the period under consideration for this assessment) a regulation for Non-Bank Financial Companies that 
mirrors the revised SBP prudential regulation.  
492. No risk analysis has been undertaken so far in the financial sector, or by financial institutions As 
indicated in the supervision section, supervisors of the financial sector partially adopt a risk-based 
approach (though not in a structured way) to supervision.  
493. Microfinance institutions are regulated and supervised by SBP. As such, they are covered by the 
AML/CFT instructions issued by SBP. It is however the assessors’ understanding that so far, no practical 
measure has been taken to effectively integrate them in the fight against money laundering and terrorism 
financing, or to enforce their compliance with these obligations. The authorities indicated that this 
decision was taken on the basis of the very limited size of this sector, and their appreciation that priority 
(from a risk perspective) shall be given to the traditional banking sector. They also indicate that 
Microfinance banks are members of the “compliance forum”, therefore exposing them to AML/CFT 
related discussions between SBP and supervised entities.  
494. Certain entities providing financial services (or undertaking financial activities) as defined by the 
FATF Standard are currently not covered by the AML/CFT framework, in particular the financial services 
of Pakistan Post (Pakistan Post Savings Bank) and the CNDS, which is the institution managing the 
government borrowing from the general public in the form of national savings scheme. However, this 
does not result from a risk analysis undertaken by the authorities. Pakistan notes that the proposed 
amendments to the AMLO intend to bring Pakistan Post under the AML/CFT requirements.  
 
3.2. Customer due diligence, including enhanced or reduced measures (R.5 to 8) 
3.2.1. Description and Analysis 
495. Legal Framework: The Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance does not set out obligations on the 
financial sector related to the preventive measures, except for the suspicious transaction reporting 
obligations. Most of the customer due diligence had actually been defined before the enactment of the 
AMLO, by the financial sector supervisors, on the basis of their rule-making powers on prudential issues.  
496. The general framework for supervision, and the legal basis for the financial sector supervisors to 
issue rules and regulations, is described in further details under the supervision section of this report. In 
essence, this regulatory framework – for the legislative part - has not been amended since the enactment 
of the AMLO, but provides a sound basis for regulators and supervisors to fully integrate AML/CFT in 
the prudential remit. Prudential regulations are amended on a regular basis – and SBP issued a major 
revision to the CDD regulation on March 9th, 2009, to some extent as a result of the on-site visit and 
related discussions with the SBP. SECP issues a similar regulation on April 28th, 2009 for NBFCs.  
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As a result, the relevant legal framework for preventive measures / customer due diligence is as follows: 
 For the institutions regulated and supervised by the State Bank of Pakistan (banks – conventional 
and Islamic, micro-finance banks, development finance institutions – DFIs, Exchange 
companies):  
 Prudential regulations (PR) M1 to M5 essentially for banks and DFIs  
 Circulars for Exchange companies 
 For the institutions regulated and supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (securities markets, non-bank financial companies, insurance), the various relevant 
regulations and circulars are more fragmented and diverse. Some of them are not issued by the 
SECP, but by the Stock Exchanges directly. In the document as a whole, Non-Banking Finance 
Company includes Modarabas, Leasing Companies, Housing Finance Companies, Investment 
Banks, Discount Houses, Asset Management Companies and Venture Capital Companies. 
 Securities markets. Each Stock Exchange has defined its own Regulations. Given the size of 
the market, and the indications by the Lahore and Islamabad Exchanges have used it as a 
reference, the assessment team has focused on the Karachi Stock Exchange and relied on the 
associated documentations and materials. As far as CDD is concerned, the cornerstone of the 
requirements are found in the General Regulations of the Stock Exchange, and in particular in 
article 74 which requires the members of the Exchange to use a “standardized account 
opening form” (SAOF) for new account opening, and to bring into conformity existing 
operating accounts by March 31st, 2004. 
 Insurance. No regulation relevant to AML/CFT has been issued by SECP. 
 NBFCs – the relevant legal basis is the “non-banking finance companies and notified entities 
regulations, 2008”, issued on November 20, 2008, and in particular its article 9 “prevention 
of NBFCs involvement in money laundering and other illegal trades”. On April 28th, 2009 
(i.e. after the cut-off date for this assessment, SECP issued a “Customer Due diligence 
(CDD)/Know Your Customer (KYC)” Circular. It is the assessors’ understanding that 
Modarabas are covered by this Circular. 
 Modarabas specific regulations and circulars. On the issues relevant to AML/CFT, the 
Modarabas Regulations do not add to the NBFCs Regulations, which explicitly apply also to 
the Modarabas. 
Laws, regulations and other enforceable means 
497. The Pakistani financial sector supervisory agencies rely on their general supervisory and 
enforcement compliance powers – as described in the “supervision” section of this report – to regulate 
and supervise preventive measures. This approach is in line with their practice before the enactment of 
AMLO, as they had already taken action to set up such preventive measures. As a result, the authorities 
have not inserted provisions on the supervision of compliance by financial institutions with their 
AML/CFT obligations in AMLO, but agreed that SBP and SECP would continue to issue regulations in 
consultation with the FMU.  
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498. Against this background, the assessors have reviewed whether this recourse to the general 
regulatory powers of the two financial supervisors could be challenged. This review also took into 
consideration the High Court decision relative to the freezing powers of the SBP described in relevant 
section of this report. It is worth noting that the High Court decision did not challenge as such the 
regulatory powers of SBP on AML/CFT issued, but rather noted that the process chosen by the Federal 
Government then was not in line with the UN Act itself. All in all, the assessors are satisfied that the 
reliance on the general regulatory powers of the SBP and SECP provides a legal basis sound enough to 
consider that their respective regulations are in force and enforceable. They also note that several 
sanctions have been imposed on this basis, which were not challenged before Court.  
499. Under Pakistan hierarchy of norms, these regulations are considered as secondary legislation. As 
described later in this report, both SBP and SECP have the related relevant enforcement and sanctioning 
powers. Furthermore, the relevant “apex” act for SBP and SECP set out their legal capacity to issue 
circulars and to enforce them. As a result, the assessors are satisfied that the regulations do meet the 
criteria to be deemed “laws and regulations” under the Methodology.  
500. Neither SBP nor SECP have to date issued guidelines relevant to AML/CFT, which could 
complement the circulars/prudential regulations. SBP uses the “compliance forum” to provide guidance to 
the financial institutions it regulates. SBP also indicates that such guidelines will be prepared in 
consultations with the professionals and FMU.  
501. SBP issued new CDD regulations on March 9th, 2009 (together with two amendments to the 
AML/CFT regulations). SECP issued its CDD Circular on April 28, 2009.  As indicated at the outset of 
this report, the cut-off date for this assessment is March 26th, 2009. As a result, the SBP regulations were 
fully taken into account in the report, both in the analysis and in the ratings. The SECP one is described in 
the relevant sections, but as it falls outside the review period, it is not factored in the ratings. In line with 
the Methodology and practice with other assessments, the assessors have described the preventive regime 
that was in place at the time of the on-site mission. This allows a better understanding of the steps taken 
by the authorities after the on-site visit. This also allows an analysis of implementation and effectiveness 
of a regime that had been in place for several years. As far as effectiveness is concerned, the assessors are 
neutral on the new SBP Regulation, but draw lessons from the previous regime in their review.  
502. Insurance. The assessment team was not provided documentation that would amount to any 
regulation, circular or guideline relative to CDD for the insurance sector, including life insurance. As 
indicated in the general section, the insurance market as a whole, and even more so the life insurance one, 
is very limited in Pakistan. There are very few players on the life insurance market, which is dominated 
by a public company. The authorities seem to consider this as a comforting element (which is not the 
view of the assessment team), and note that in their view, the life insurance sector is both de minimis, and 
not specifically subject to ML/FT risks. In this report – except in some instances in the supervision related 
recommendations, the assessors have not given weight to the insurance sector, and have on purpose not 
gone in details in the analysis of this sector. As indicated below in the recommendations sections, they 
advise the authorities to put in place meaningful and effective preventive measures in life insurance.  
Prohibition of Anonymous Accounts (c. 5.1): 
503. Pakistan has developed a mechanism for the issuance of identity cards for all its adult citizens, 
managed by NADRA (see general presentation). NADRA indicates that to date, 85 percent of the adult 
population has received such ID. Strong incentives have been put in place by the authorities to ensure an 
increasing coverage of the NADRA ID, notably by forbidding access to several public services in the 
absence of it. However, NADRA considers that it will not be able to reach a much higher coverage, 
within intrinsic limitations in poor and remote areas.  
504. NADRA indicated that the security features of these cards result in a low level of counterfeiting 
or ID fraud – and law enforcement agencies didn’t report ID related difficulties. The assessors note 
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however that the accuracy of the system developed by NADRA relies significantly on the ID checks when 
a first-time ID card is issued. NADRA indicated that several checks and cross-checks are then 
undertaken, including of family relationships, but indicated that birth certificates are not systematically 
used in this context.  
505. Several estimates presented by the authorities indicate that more than 3 million illegal migrants 
live in Pakistan. In order to clarify their situation, the authorities have created NARA in 2000, mandated 
to provide identification cards to these migrants. These cards provide rights equivalent to those of the 
CNIC, except the right to vote and to obtain a passport. NARA issues such cards to all illegal immigrants 
which apply, even if they can not present any identification documents. The submission are checked with 
NADRA and other relevant agencies (including law enforcement), and biometric identification is retained 
in NARA database. No further information is required from the applicant. So far, NARA has issued 
150.000 identification cards. Despite the security measures in place, the assessors are seriously concerned 
that NARA cards could easily be obtained under fictitious names, and uses to establish business relations 
in financial institutions.  
SBP 
506. The authorities indicated that the concept of numbered accounts also does not exist in Pakistan. 
As far as anonymous accounts are concerned, old Prudential Regulation M1 specified (section 8.A ii) that 
“for all bank clients/customers including depositors and borrowers, banks/DFIs shall obtain the attested 
copies of CNICs by December 31, 2008”. The new PR M1 is even more specific, as it indicates in article 
5 (a) that “Banks/DFIs should not open and maintain anonymous accounts or accounts in the name of 
fictitious persons”.  
507. In addition, the new PR-M1 requires that “(a) For customers / clients whose accounts are dormant 
and an attested copy of account holder’s Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) is not available in 
bank’s / DFI’s record, banks / DFIs shall not allow operation in such accounts until the account holder 
produces an attested copy of his / her CNIC and fulfill all other formalities for activation of the account 
and (b) For all other customers / clients including depositors and borrowers, banks / DFIs shall obtain the 
attested copies of CNICs by June 30, 2009. Banks / DFIs shall discontinue relationship with such 
customers who fail to submit a copy of their CNIC by the above deadline.” This last requirement will 
imply that any potential existing account where identification was not undertaken in line with the current 
identification document – and therefore the new NADRA card for citizens - would be closed.  
SECP 
508. SECP issued a circular dated February 21, 2003 to all Non Banking Finance Companies (NBFC), 
stating that “all Non Bank Financial Institutions shall accept deposits from an investor only after ensuring 
that an account has been opened in the investor’s name using an account opening form, which will be 
developed by the respective industry associations in consultation with the Commission”. All deposit-
taking after this circular therefore required identification of the investor – including for business 
relationships established prior to this circular. NBFCs were then given several months to comply with this 
requirement, and since, SECP indicated that it checked the identification of customers in the context of its 
supervision. The information provided to the assessors on the status of implementation of this 
requirement, and how it was monitored, was unclear. Only the securities industry and Modarabas have 
approved a Standardized Account Opening Form (SAOF).  
509. Article 9-2-a of the NBFC Regulations replicates word by word this requirement. It is further 
added that a NBFC shall “determine the true identity of the prospective customer”. Further, NBFCS are 
required to ensure that “care shall be taken to identify ownership of all accounts and those using safe 
custody”. Finally, article 9-2-c requires NBFCs to “establish effective procedures for obtaining 
identification from new customers and devise a policy to ensure that business transactions are not 
conducted with persons who fail to provide evidence of their identify”.  
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510. In addition, article 9-2-e requires NBFC to “establish effective procedures for monitoring of 
borrower accounts […], checking identities and bonafide of remitters and beneficiaries of transactions”.  
511. As far as Modarabas are concerned, a similar clause (clause 4) appears in the Modaraba 
Prudential Regulation Part IV which states that “Modarabas shall establish specific procedures for 
ascertaining customer status and his sources of earning for monitoring of accounts on a regular basis for 
checking identities and bonafides of remitters and beneficiaries […]”. 
512. There is therefore only partial coverage of the types of customers by NBFCs as the full range of 
CDD (as prescribed by the Regulations) only applies in situations where the NBFCs is accepting deposits 
– which is only a limited subset of the potential range of business relationships. Article 9-2-b and 9-2-c 
are broader in their coverage (“all accounts”, “business transactions”) however. The absence of a clear 
and direct requirement to identify all customers is however noticeable and un-explained – even if a 
reading of all subsequent requirements combined would seem, all in all, to cover all regular business 
transactions (but not walk-in customers). It is the authorities’ views that the business of NBFCs do not 
lend itself to walk in customers.  
513. It is worth noting however that only the Modarabas industry (and the securities industry – see 
below) has developed a standardized account opening form. At the time of the assessment, all other 
NBFCs therefore did not have standardized requirements to follow when undertaking CDD.   
514. Given the limited coverage of the requirement to determine the “true identity” of the customer, as 
well as the absence of standardized account opening forms (except for Modarabas) since 2003, it is highly 
possible that accounts and/or business relationships exists within NBFCs with either anonymous 
customers or fictitious names.  
515. The CDD/KYC Circular issued end of April 2009 will allow addressing some of these issues as 
far as NBFCs are concerned, as it clarifies what information is needed for each type of customer. In 
addition, article 3.b states that “for all existing customers including depositors and borrowers, NBFCs 
shall obtain the copies of the CNICs and all required information/documents latest by September 30, 
2009”.  
516. Securities. The Standardized Account Opening Form (SAOF), forming part of the General 
Regulations of the stock exchanges, lay out the requirements of identifying the customer. Per its very 
name, this SAOF is focused on account opening – and therefore does not cover situations where 
transactions could occur without establishing a business relationship or opening an account. However, the 
Karachi Automated Trading System (KATS) Regulations, revised in December 2008, require that for 
every bid and offer through the KATS, members use a Unique Identification Number (UIN) for their 
clients (this requirement is in place since June 2006). The UIN is a single identification number for each 
client regardless of operation through any broker/ exchange, which would also be necessary for clients 
without an account with a member. All orders are required to be mapped to the designated UIN. The 
Group Account Facility for shares owned beneficially by investors and maintained by participants in the 
Group Account of the Central Depository System (CDS) has also been abolished in 2005 to enable 
identification of clients. Due to UIN the client is not only identifiable by a broker but can also be 
identified by the trading systems available at exchanges.  
517. However, per the definition of UIN in this Regulations (article 2, definition), there are situations 
where the UIN is not specific to the client, but to the Exchange member acting for the client (for instance, 
foreign institutional investor, mutual funds…). In such situation, the capacity to identify who is the 
underlying client – or the beneficial owner of the transaction – will ultimately rely on the Exchange 
members’ internal CDD.  
When is CDD required (c. 5.2): 
SBP 
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518. Old PR-M1 (section 4) specified that “copies of the CNIC […] shall invariably be verified before 
opening the account”. As far as occasional customers (walk-in customers) were concerned, PR-M1 
(section 9) required that banks and DFIs ‘undertake CDD, including identifying and verifying the identity 
of walk-in customers conducting transactions above an appropriate limit to be prescribed by the 
banks/DFIs themselves”. SBP had not provided guidance on the maximum amount it would deem 
acceptable, but has indicated to the assessors that it would review the institutions’ specific threshold to 
ensure they are commensurate with their activities.  
519. As far as funds transfers (including wire transfers) are concerned, PR-M2 (section 1 c) requires 
that “meaningful and accurate originator information (name, address and account number)” be included in 
the transfer. It further indicates that “if satisfied, [bank/DFI may] substitute the requirement of mentioning 
address with CNIC, passport, driving license or similar information number for this purpose”.  
520. None of the KYC-related sections of the old PR M1 required financial institution to undertake 
CDD when there was suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing, regardless of any threshold. 
The only references in the old PR to situations where the financial institution has doubts about the 
veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data appeared in old PR-M1 (section 
8 i and ii respectively), which stated that a) for clients whose accounts are dormant and an attested copy 
of the CNIC is not on file, no transaction should be allowed until a CNIC is provided and all other 
activation formality are fulfilled and b) “banks/DFIs shall discontinue relationship with such customer 
which fail to submit a copy of their CNIC” by December 31, 2008. These requirements reflected the 
overall approach under the KYC-related requirements under the PR, i.e. that the CNIC is systematically 
deemed reliable and adequate (for natural persons). It is worth noting in that respect that none of these 
requirements was drafted in the perspective of customers being legal persons.  
521. The new PR-M1 is now much more comprehensive and specific, as article 4 essentially mirrors 
the FATF standard. The new paragraph so indicates that CDD must be undertaken when “(a) establishing 
business relationship; (b) conducting occasional transactions above rupees one million13 whether carried 
out in a single operation or in multiple operations that appear to be linked; (c) carrying out occasional 
wire transfers (domestic / cross border) regardless of any threshold; (d) there is suspicion of money 
laundering / terrorist financing; and (e) there is a doubt about the veracity or adequacy of available 
identification data on the customer.”  
ECs: 
522. In the case of currency exchange, the ECs are required to obtain name, address and ID/Passport 
Number of the customer for currency exchange exceeding US$10,000 (or equivalent in other currencies) 
as per para. 23 of the Rules and Regulations for ECs issued under the Foreign Exchange Circular No.09 
(July 30, 2002). In 2008, Foreign Exchange Circular No. 2 was issued requiring ECs to submit 
information on transaction above US$5,000 (or equivalent in other currencies) when the transaction 
relates to sale or purchase of foreign currencies, or outward remittances. The SBP provides a form which 
requires information on name of the customer, CNIC number, address, amount and denomination of the 
currency sold to the customer, amount and denomination of currency purchased from the customer. There 
is no specific requirement to undertake CDD when there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist 
financing, or when there are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer 
identification data.  
523. In the case of remittances, as per the Rules and Regulations (para. 24), ECs are required to obtain 
name, address, and other particulars of both the remitter and beneficiary regardless of the amount 
involved. “Other particulars” are not specified by the SBP. The information on outward remittances above 
US$5,000 must be submitted to SBP with the following information: name of the remitter, CNIC or 
                                                     
13. One million Rs equals $ 10.000. 
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passport number of the remitter, address of the remitter, name and address of beneficiary, account number 
of beneficiary abroad, amount and currency of the outward remittance, and the account number of 
Exchange Company used for remittance. Ambiguity remains as to what “other particulars” needs to be 
obtained when the transactions are inward remittances of all amounts and outward remittances of less 
than US$5,000. Similarly, there is no specific requirement to undertake CDD when there is a suspicion of 
money laundering or terrorist financing, or when there are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of 
previously obtained customer identification data.   
524. Further, ECs are required to take prior approval of SBP before effecting sale of foreign currencies 
to the customers and undertaking outward remittances of US $50,000 or above (or equivalent in other 
foreign currencies) as per Foreign Exchange Circulars No. 6 and 7 of 2008.  
SECP 
525. SECP indicates that all NBFCs, Modarabas and Mutual funds have been asked to ensure that an 
account has been opened in the investor’s name before undertaking any business transaction with the 
customer. As indicated above, this is indeed the requirement for NBFC when there is deposit taking by 
the NBFCs – but other types of business relationships are not covered that directly. Many situations 
foreseen under Recommendation 5 for Customer Due Diligence are therefore not considered for NBFCs 
(see earlier comment on the SECP views regarding walk in customers). It is worth noting however that 
NBFCs are not allowed to conduct any cash transactions (receiving or making payment) above Rs 50.000 
($500 equivalent) – but there is no requirement that would cover the situations of related cash transactions 
(smurfing).  
526. For the securities market, as indicated above, the Exchanges member have to identify the 
customer before opening an account, using the SAOF. There is no mention of occasional customers (and 
no mention that was provided to the assessors that transactions can only occur if an account has been 
opened). The authorities consider that even occasional customer would have to open an account and to be 
registered with a UIN – and that it is the responsibility of the broker to ensure that a client’s transactions 
are done only through his own account / client code registered against his UIN. However, the team has 
not been able to identify an explicit requirement not allowing “walk-in” customers, who would not be 
required to open an account. 
 
Identification measures and verification sources (c. 5.3): 
SBP 
527. Old PR-M1 (section 3) required financial institution to « determine the true identity of every 
prospective customer”. SBP distinguished between the “correct identity” (proper identification of a 
natural or legal person based on accurate identification documentation) and the “true identity”, which 
amounted to the establishment of a customer profile (see below).  
528. The new PR-M1 is more complete and detailed, as article 5 (b) states that “all reasonable efforts 
shall be made to determine identity of every prospective customer. For this purpose, minimum set of 
documents to be obtained by the banks / DFIs from various types of customers / account holder(s), at the 
time of opening account, as prescribed in Annexure-VIII of the Prudential Regulations for Corporate / 
Commercial Banking. While opening bank account of “proprietorships”, the requirements laid down for 
individuals at Serial No. (1) of Annexure-VIII shall apply except the requirement mentioned at No. (3) of 
the Annexure. Banks / DFIs should exercise extra care in view of the fact that constituent documents are 
not available in such cases to confirm existence or otherwise of the proprietorships.”  
529. In addition, the new PR-M1 now explicitly distinguishes between the identification and the 
verification of identity, and article 6 states that “verification is an integral part of CDD / KYC measures”. 
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The same article goes on stating that “copies of CNIC wherever required in Annexure-VIII are invariably 
verified, before opening the account, from NADRA through utilizing on-line facility or where the banks / 
DFIs or their branches do not have such facility from the regional office(s) of NADRA”.  
530. Annexure VIII of the PR defines the acceptable identification documentation for each type of 
customer, with the following categories: individuals; partnership; Joint Stock Company; clubs, societies 
and associations; agent accounts; trust account; executors and administrators. Agent accounts have been 
abolished in the meantime by the SECP. In addition to these requirements, notes to the annexure define 
specific acceptable circumstances under which alternative identification mechanisms may be used by 
banks and DFIs, which a limitative definition of these. For instance, if the customer uses a NARA card 
instead of the CNIC, the bank account can then only be opened in Rupees (while other documentation 
issued by NADRA might be used for customers opening accounts in both local and foreign currency). 
This Annexure has not been modified with the issuance of the revised PR-M1 on CDD.  
ECs 
531. As stated earlier, ECs are required to obtain, in the case of foreign exchange transactions, name, 
address and ID/Passport Number of the customer (para. 23 of the Rules and Regulations for ECs, Foreign 
Exchange Circular No.09 issued on July 30, 2002), and in the case of remittances, name, address, and 
other particulars of both the remitter and beneficiary regardless of the amount involved (para. 24 of the 
same Rules and Regulations for ECs).  
532. The para. 23 of the Rules and Regulations for ECs requires “due verification” of customers for 
foreign exchange transactions, however, it is not explicit in the case of remittance transfers. In practice, 
ECs require government issued ID cards from customers, such as CNIC, NARA, Passport, etc.  
SECP 
533. As described above, the key requirement is article 9 of the NBFCs regulations (see text above for 
the relevant clauses). In addition to being too restrictive in its coverage, article 9 does not set out a 
distinction between the identification of the customer and the verification of the identity of the customer. 
There is no requirement that reliable, independent source documents, data or information.  
534. The Modaraba Association of Pakistan (MAP) has also developed two sets of account opening 
forms (individual and investors) with the help of SECP and the approved forms are being used for all 
deposit taking activities. According to the account opening forms, it is mandatory for all investors to 
provide an attested copy of the National Identity Card for verification to the bank branch at the time of 
presenting an application for subscription of shares of a company. The attested photocopy, after 
verification, is retained along with the application.  
535. The April 2009 SECP Circular provides for a more detailed approach, as article 2 (“minimum 
information/documents) lays out the information that NBFCs shall require for each category of customer 
(individual, sole proprietorship, partnership account, joint stock company, club societies and association, 
trusts and executors and administrators). The Circular also distinguishes between identification and 
verification of identity. In a nutshell 
536. In the securities markets, the information to be provided per the SAOF are:  
 For natural persons: national identify card number (or passport number for non-residents) 
 For legal persons, registration number, certified copy of the Board Resolution; certified copies of 
the Memorandum and Articles of Association; list of authorized signatories and list of nominated 
persons allowed to place orders. 
 
Identification of Legal Persons or Other Arrangements (c. 5.4): 
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SBP 
537. As indicated earlier, Annexure VIII of the PR details the identification documents required for 
legal persons and other arrangements. On substance, the requirements are to identify the persons 
purporting to act on behalf of the customers are verified through documents like Board of Director’s 
resolution in case of company and authority letter/ power of attorney in other cases, as well as constituent 
documents. For joint stock companies, it is further required that attested copies of the identity cards of all 
the directors be provided. In parallel, old PR-M1 (section 3) specified that the documents relevant for the 
identification of natural persons must be used when opening an account for proprietorships, and that 
“extra care [be applied] in view of the fact that constituent documents are not available in such cases to 
confirm existence or otherwise of the proprietorships”. As indicated earlier, new PR-M1 re-states this 
attention. Finally, old PR-M1 (section 6) defined specific and equivalent requirements to open an account 
operated by an officer of the Federal, Provincial or Local Government.  
538. The new PR-M1 builds on the same Annexure. In addition, in its article 9 listing high risk 
situations triggering enhanced due diligence, the new PR-M1 lists “legal persons or arrangements 
including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) / not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) and trusts / 
charities.” This approach therefore requires any legal person or arrangement to be subject to additional 
CDD – which content is however not prescribed by the PR-M1. The only definition of the content of the 
required enhanced due diligence requirement under new PR-M1 relates to Politically Exposed Persons 
(see Recommendation 6).  SBP also indicates that it plans to issue guidance to help banks and DFIs to 
implement these requirements.  
ECs 
539. ECs are only allowed to accept natural persons as customers. Thus, no legal persons can go to 
ECs for currency exchange or remittance transfers. However, there is no mechanism for ECs to know 
when an individual comes to ECs on behalf of legal persons if the individual requests the transactions in 
that capacity.  Authorities claim that the nature or purpose of transaction required to be disclosed would 
generally prevent business transactions by individuals as such transactions would tend to be for higher 
amounts and mostly to businesses as beneficiaries or recipients.  
SECP 
540. As indicated earlier, on the Modarabas associations have designed a SAOF, as well as the Stock 
Exchanges. In both cases (the requirements are the same), the information required from legal entities 
cover proof of incorporation, legal form, address and provisions on the powers to bind the legal person. 
There is no requirement on information relative to the directors. There is a requirement to determine 
whether the customer is acting on behalf of another person, and if the case, to identify the customer (no 
requirement to verify the identity). There is no specific provision in case the account holder is a trust. 
Separate account opening forms are in place for corporate entities, individuals and Modarabas as 
indicated above.  
541. The April 2009 Circular for NBFCs, as indicated above, is now much more specific on the 
documents to be provided for legal persons, and on substance aligns the regime with the SBP one. “Non-
legal persons and arrangements including non-governmental organizations (NGOs)/not-for-profit 
organizations (NPOs) and trusts / charities” are deemed high-risk customers (article 4), subject to 
enhanced due diligence.  
Identification of Beneficial Owners (c. 5.5; 5.5.1 & 5.5.2): 
SBP 
542. Para 6 of old PR-M1 required that “Bank / DFI and their branches shall obtain satisfactory 
evidence duly verified / authenticated by the branch manager which shall be placed on record in respect 
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of (i) the true identity of the beneficial owners of all accounts opened by a person, entity etc, (ii) the real 
party in interest or controlling person/entity of the account(s) in case of nominee or minors account.”. As 
indicated above, the definition by SBP of true identity did not amount to beneficial ownership per FATF. 
PR-M1 (section 6) referred to “beneficial ownership”, but this notion was not defined in the PR, and none 
of the requirements set out by the PR was to be understood as equivalent to the identification and 
undertaking of reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial ownership of business 
relationships. By the same token, the reference to the “real party in interest or controlling person/entity” 
was not defined as covering beneficial ownership, and was anyway limited to specific business 
relationships (SBP indicated that nominee account refers to group accounts, which has been suppressed).  
543. At best, the provision under old PR-M1 (section 5) were understood as requiring financial 
institutions to determine whether the customer is acting on behalf of another person, and to then identify 
this third party.  
544. None of the requirement under the old PR called for financial institutions to understand the 
ownership and control structure of the customer and to determine the natural persons that ultimately own 
or control the customer. The various documents required for the identification, as laid out in the Annexure 
VIII, did not provide the financial institutions with such information. As for trust accounts, Annexure 
VIII required financial institutions to collect “attested photocopies of identity cards of all the trustees” and 
“certified copies of ‘instrument of trust’ or trust deed”. Even if such “instrument of trust” or trust deed 
were to contain information on the settlors and beneficiaries of the trust, the PR did not require their 
identification, nor reasonable steps to be taken to verify their identity.  
545. The new PR-M1 goes into much more depth in that respect. Beneficial ownership is not defined 
itself (even though the new PR-M1 makes an explicit mention to the FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations), 
but article 5 (e) prescribes the following: “for customers that are legal persons or for legal arrangements, 
banks / DFIs are required to take reasonable measures to (i) understand the ownership and control 
structure of the customer (ii) determine that the natural persons who ultimately own or control the 
customer. This includes those persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or 
arrangement.” This is de facto the equivalent of the beneficial ownership definition under 
Recommendation 5.  
546. The requirements regarding beneficial ownership under new PR-M1 are now specific:  
 Article 5 (c) requires banks / DFIs to “identify the beneficial ownership of accounts/transactions 
by taking all reasonable measures” 
 Article 5 (e) specifies this requirement for legal persons and arrangements (see above) 
 Article 6 (b) requires that “the identity of the beneficial owner is verified using reliable 
information/ satisfactory sources”. There is no definition of what constitutes “reliable information 
/ satisfactory source”. The authorities consider that banks and DFIs have enough benchmarks and 
understanding of what would be deemed reliable, and note that the absence of such definition 
maintains on the banks and DFIs the need to satisfy the supervisor that they have fully in 
substance the requirement, and not simply adopt a box checking approach. 
 
547. The new PR-M1 sets up substantive obligations regarding identification and verification of 
identify of beneficial owners, as well as understating of the ownership and control structure of legal 
entities and legal arrangements. However, article 5 (b) and (e) fall short of the requirements to identify the 
beneficial owner in all instances, as the “reasonable measures” flexibility applies to the identification, and 
not only to the verification requirement.  
EC 
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548. In remittance transactions, the Exchange companies are required to obtain particulars of both the 
remitter and beneficiary regardless of the amount. However, this does not appear to extend to the 
identification of beneficial ownership, nor it is clearly stipulated in the Rules and Regulations and various 
circulars issued thereafter.  
SECP 
549. Under the Prudential Regulations of Modaraba as well as NBFC & Notified Entities (NE) 
Regulations 2008, financial institutions have been advised to bring into place proper procedures that 
would entail checking identities of the beneficiaries of any business transaction. There are requirements to 
determine whether the customer is acting on behalf of another person, and then to identify that person (but 
not to take reasonable steps to verify his/her identity) in the SAOF. The account holder at the time of 
opening the account is required to provide details regarding the person who will be operating the account 
i.e. either the account holder himself or any other person authorized to operate and execute transactions 
jointly or severally. There is no requirement for the financial institutions to verify this information. In 
case of corporate clients, the SAOF requires that a Board Resolution be provided, authorizing and 
empowering representative(s) either singly/jointly for the broker on all matters pertaining to the 
maintenance and operation of the Account.  
550. As indicated above, article 9-2-b requires from NBFCS that “care shall be taken to identify 
ownership of all accounts and those using safe custody”.  
551. None of the regulations require (or even refer to the concept) identification of the beneficial 
owner, and reasonable steps to be taken to verify the identity of the beneficial owner.  
552. The April 2009 NBFCs Circular sets up requirements that are on substance aligned with the new 
PR-M1 issued by the SBP – and the actual language is very similar. Article 2.b requires that “NBFCs 
should determine whether the customer is acting on behalf of another person, and should then take 
reasonable steps to obtain sufficient identification date […] to verify the identity of the beneficiary”. 
Article 2.c states that “for customers that are legal persons or legal arrangements, NBFCs are required to 
take reasonable measures to (i) understand the ownership and control structure of the customer, (ii) 
determine that the natural persons who ultimately own or control the customer. This includes those 
persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement.” As indicated earlier, 
there is also now a stand-alone article on verification.  
553. The requirements in the securities market do not cover beneficial ownership.  
SECP 
554. Same as 5.5.  
Information on Purpose and Nature of Business Relationship (c. 5.6): 
SBP 
555. As indicated above, SBP considers under old PR-M1 that the notion of “true identity” amounts to 
the definition of customer profile. There is however no direct requirement to obtain information on the 
purpose and nature of the business relationship. PR-M1 (section 7 ii) only sets out a requirement that 
banks/DFIs “put in place a system to monitor the accounts and transactions on a regular basis”.  In 
parallel, PR-M2 (section b) requires that “transactions which are out of character/inconsistent with the 
history, pattern or normal operation of the account, involving heavy deposits / withdrawals / transfers 
should be viewed with suspicion and properly investigated”. Indirectly, this requirement sets out a 
requirement close to that of establishing a customer profile (history, pattern and normal operation the 
account), even if it later on only focuses on large transactions - therefore excessively limiting the scope of 
the requirement.  
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556. On this issue also, new PR-M1 is more specific. Article 13 de facto requires information on the 
“on purpose and intended nature of business relationship”, as banks and DFIs are instructed not to open 
the account or business relationship if they are not satisfied by the related information they received.  
SECP 
557. There is no requirement on NBFCs or Exchange members to obtain information on the purpose 
and intended nature of the business relationship. The April 2009 NBFCs circular adopts the same 
approach as the new PR-M1, through the combination of article 6 and 7. 
 
Ongoing Due Diligence on Business Relationship (c. 5.7; 5.7.1 & 5.7.2): 
SBP 
558. PR-M1 (section 7 ii – see above) requires monitoring of the accounts and transactions, while 
section 7 ii requires banks and DFIs to “update customer information and records, if necessary, at 
reasonable intervals”. In addition, PR-M2 (section b) requires that banks and DFIs set up “specific 
procedures […] for ascertaining customer’s status and his sources of earnings, for monitoring accounts on 
a regular basis”.  
559. The new PR-M1 notes in the opening paragraph of its article 8 that “CDD / KYC is not a onetime 
exercise to be conducted at the time of entering into a formal relationship with customer / account holder. 
This is an on-going process for prudent banking practices” and then goes on by detailing the related 
requirements that banks / DFIs should respect, including “(b) put in place a system to monitor the 
accounts and transactions on regular basis and (c) update customer information and records, if any, at 
reasonable intervals”.  
SECP 
560. There is no direct and explicit requirement on on-going due diligence in the various regulations 
relevant for NBFCs. The NBFCs regulations however requires (article 9-2-e) the set up of effective 
procedures for monitoring of borrower accounts and (article 9-3) that “all transactions into or from the 
account maintained with the NBFC which are not usual transactions shall be thoroughly scrutinized and 
properly investigated by the NBFC”. Clause 4 of Modaraba Prudential Regulation Part IV states that 
Modarabas shall “establish specific procedures […]for monitoring of accounts on a regular basis […].The 
transactions, which are out of character with the normal operation of the account involving high deposits, 
withdrawals and transfers, shall be viewed with suspicion and properly investigated.’  
561. These two latter requirements provides a partial and limited basis for on-going monitoring, but 
the requirement assumes that the NBFC would be able to identify the unusual transactions – which would 
suppose the existence of a “customer profile”, which is not an obligation as indicated above.  
562. There is no explicit requirement in the NBFCs regulations that CDD be regularly updated and 
kept relevant.  
563. There is no requirement on keeping the CDD information up-to-date and relevant, or to undertake 
on-going due diligence in the securities market.  
564. The new SECP circular now contains a whole article on “record updation”, which language 
mirrors the SBP Regulation one (“CDD/KYC is not a onetime exercise to be conducted at the time of 
entering into a formal relationship with customer / account holder. This is an on-going process and this is 
end, NBFCs are required […]”. The specific requirements are the same as those defined in article 8 of the 
new PR-M1.  
Risk—Enhanced Due Diligence for Higher Risk Customers (c. 5.8): 
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SBP  
565. PR-M1 (section 8) required the development of guidelines that include “the description of the 
types of customers that are likely to pose a higher than average risk to a bank/DFI”. It indicated that the 
following factors “should be considered”: “customer background, country of origin, public or high profile 
position, nature of business, etc.” It further identified situation that enhanced due diligence be applied to 
five categories of business relationships: with customer from certain countries (lax KYC and ML 
regulations, links with off-shore centers); customers in cash-based businesses in high-value items and 
high net worth customers with no clearly identified source of income; customers for which the 
banks/DFIs “have reason to believe that [they have] been refused banking facilities by another bank/DFI; 
correspondent banks’ accounts; non face-to-face customers.  
566. The notion of “enhanced due diligence” was not defined, and the drafting of this section did not 
make it totally clear that the enhanced due diligence requirement applied both to the types of customers 
presenting certain characteristics to be “considered” by banks/DFI and the five categories of business 
relationships – however, a common sense reading of the article led to this conclusion.  
567. Out of the four examples of higher risk categories, two were not relevant in Pakistan’s context 
(no private banking, no nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form).  Non-resident customer were not 
covered by the PR. Trusts were covered. One important benefit of the PR was that it added categories of 
business relationships that seem relevant in the context of Pakistan.  
568. The new PR-M1 goes much further regarding higher risk categories of customers or business 
relationships. Article 9 of the new PR-M1 requires that enhanced CDD be applied in explicit situations, 
which include “high-risk customers, business relationships or transactions”, which include (the PR-M1 
list is not presented as exhaustive): “i) non-resident customers; ii) private banking customers; iii) legal 
persons or arrangements including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) / not-for-profit organizations 
(NPOs) and trusts / charities; iv) customers belonging to countries where CDD / KYC and anti-money 
laundering regulations are lax; v) customers with links to offshore tax havens; vi) customers in cash based 
businesses; vii) high net worth customers with no clearly identifiable source of income; and viii) 
customers in high-value items etc. “. Here again, some categories do not seem most relevant in the 
context of Pakistan (but are in line with Recommendation 5), while others are better tailored to the local 
situation.  
ECs 
569. There is no specific requirement for ECs to undertake enhanced due diligence for high-risk 
customers. However, there are various controls in place. For example, sender and beneficiary for 
remittance transfer should be identified regardless of the amount. Remittance transactions above 
US$3,000 (or equivalent in other foreign currencies) should be sent through banks, making it a bank-to-
bank transfer where the remittance is deposited into a bank account of the beneficiary. Foreign currency 
transactions and outward remittances above US$5,000 (or equivalent in other foreign currencies) should 
be reported to SBP along with the information on customers. The same transactions above US$50,000 (or 
equivalent in other foreign currencies) require a prior approval from SBP.  
SECP 
570. The NBFCs regulations do not define high risk situations and do not require enhanced due 
diligence for higher risk categories of customers, business relationships or transactions. The situation is 
the same for the securities market.  
571. The recent NBFCs Circular now defines categories of high-risk customers and business 
relationships, with a specific paragraph dedicated to this issue. The categories substantially mirror the 
ones defined by the new SBP PR-M1. NBFCs are required to conduct enhanced due diligence on these 
customers, business relationships or transactions.  
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Risk—Application of Simplified/Reduced CDD Measures when appropriate (c. 5.9) / Simplification / 
Reduction of CDD Measures relating to overseas residents (c. 5.10) / Simplified/Reduced CDD Measures 
Not to Apply when Suspicions of ML/TF or other high risk scenarios exist (c. 5.11) / Risk Based 
Application of CDD to be Consistent with Guidelines (c. 5.12): 
SBP 
572. Until March 2009, SBP had adopted a uniform approach to CDD, without reduced or simplified 
CDD measures.  
573. The new PR-M1 now opens the door for simplified due diligence, as article 11 states that “Where 
there are low risks and information on the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner of a customer 
is publicly available, or where adequate checks and controls exist, banks / DFIs may apply simplified or 
reduced CDD / KYC measures”. How the CDD requirements can be simplified or reduced is left to the 
financial institutions. A list of possible situations where such simplification may occur is provided as 
purely indicative (“following cases may be considered”), and is limited to: “(a) Financial institutions 
provided they are subject to requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing consistent 
with the FATF recommendations and are supervised for compliance with those requirements; (b) Public 
companies that are subject to regulatory disclosure requirements and such companies are listed on a stock 
exchange or similar situations ; (c) Government administrations or entities.”. Article 12 requires that such 
simplified or reduced CDD do not apply when there is risk of ML or FT, or when the customer resides in 
a country not applying satisfactorily the FATF Recommendations (no such list of countries has been 
officially provided by SBP to the banks/DFIs). SBP has not issued guidelines to banks/DFIs on the extent 
of the CDD measures on a risk-sensitive basis. It indicates that implementation issues would be dealt with 
in the context of regular discussions with the banks and DFIs professional associations.  
SECP 
574. The NBFCs regulations do not allow for simplified or reduced CDDs in case of proven low risk. 
It is the same in the securities market.  
575. The new NBFCs Circular now creates the possibility for simplified or reduced CDD/KYC 
requirements “where there are low risks and information on the identity of the customer and the beneficial 
owner is publicly available, or where adequate checks and controls exist”. The Circular goes on giving 
examples of situations where reduced or simplified CDD may apply (FIs subject to satisfactory preventive 
measures and supervised, publicly listed entities).  
Timing of Verification of Identity—General Rule (c. 5.13): 
SBP 
576. As indicated earlier, identification must occur before establishing the business relationship. The 
maximum limit available for verification of documents is five days, within which the verification from 
NADRA of the documents has to be completed. When the customer is a legal person or arrangement, 
there is no timeline set out for the bank/DFIs to verify the documents with the relevant registrars. The 
issuance of the new PR-M1 has not modified this timeline. The authorities indicate that banks and DFIs 
would not allow operations with legal persons to occur as long as the verification has not taken place, and 
that absent provisions of the relevant documentation for verification, the relationship would end up 
terminated.  
ECs 
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577. The Rules and Regulations for ECs (para. 23, Foreign Exchange Circular No.09 issued on July 
30, 2002) requires identify of customers to be verified before transaction in the case of currency 
exchange, however, the Rules and Regulations are silent pertaining to verification of customer identify 
requirement and its timing of verification in the case of remittance transfers. Nevertheless, as stated 
earlier, in practice, ECs require government issued ID cards from customers, such as CNIS, NARA, 
Passport, etc, and this is done before effecting the transactions.   
SECP 
578. The NBFC regulations (taken as a whole, as indicated earlier) indicate that the identification must 
take place before engaging into the transaction or the business relationship. However, as the notion of 
verification of the identity is not foreseen, there is no time requirement in that respect. The authorities 
point out article 9 of the 2008 NBFCs Regulation as setting a requirement regarding the verification of 
identity – however, the assessors consider this article to only refer to identification, and not verification of 
identity (see earlier for the content of this article).  
579. The Exchange Regulations, as quoted above, indicate that identification of the account holder has 
to take place before undertaking any transaction (and the UIN requirement indicates a similar approach). 
In most securities markets, the market pressure to realize the transactions usually does require separating 
between the identification and the verification of identity. This is not done in Pakistan – making it likely 
that transactions are undertaken without proper identification. More fundamentally, there is no 
requirement to verify the identification requirement, at any time. The authorities are of a different view, 
and consider that the identification requirements amount to a verification requirement.  
580. The 2009 NBFC Circular now clarifies this situation, as it now explicitly separates identification 
and verification of identity, under two different articles. Article 3 (on verification) focuses on the 
identification through NADRA (“copies of CNIC wherever required are invariably verified”), and 
explicitly requires this verification to take place “before opening the account”. This article does not cover 
the verification in case of legal entities.  
Timing of Verification of Identity—Treatment of Exceptional Circumstances (c.5.14 & 5.14.1): 
SBP 
581. The PR does not foresee such exceptional situations as such. However, both the old and the new 
PR-M1 indicate that the CDD records and documentation must “indicate, in writing, if any exception is 
made in fulfilling the CDD / KYC measures”.  
SECP 
582. SECP states that financial Institutions under its purview are not allowed to undergo any business 
transaction or to establish any business relationship before proper identification of the customer or legal 
entity (see above).  
583. However, for all FIs under the ambit of the SECP, there is no requirement to verify the identity of 
the customer or account holder. The new Circular does not consider possible exceptional circumstances.  
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Failure to Complete CDD before commencing the Business Relationship  (c. 5.15), Failure to Complete 
CDD after commencing the Business Relationship (c. 5.16):  
SBP 
584. The old PR-M1 (section 8A ii) required that banks/DFIs “discontinue relationship with such 
customers who fail to submit a copy of their CNIC by the above deadline”. PR-M1 (section 4) required 
that banks/DFIs “invariably” verify the CNIC. However, it should be noted that these requirements 
focused on situations where the customer is a natural person, and did not envisage failure to complete 
CDD for a legal person. They did not envisage either situation where the natural person would be a walk-
in customer, as they contain language associated with account opening. There was no indication in the PR 
main text itself requiring banks/DFIs to consider filing an STR in such cases. However, Annexure IX to 
the PR (characteristics of financial transactions that may be a cause for increased scrutiny under PR-M5) 
contained an example (A (4)) dealing with a customer not providing the information required by the 
bank/DFI.  
585. The new PR-M1 is more complete and direct, as it states that “in case banks / DFIs are not able to 
satisfactorily complete required CDD / KYC measures including identity, beneficial ownership or 
information on purpose and intended nature of business relationship, account should not be opened or any 
service provided and instead reporting of suspicious transaction be considered. Similarly, relationship 
with existing customers should be terminated and reporting of suspicious transaction be considered if 
CDD / KYC is found unsatisfactory.”  
ECs 
586. The Rules and Regulations for ECs are silent as to what course of actions should be taken when 
satisfactory CDD cannot be established. In practice, ECs told the assessors that they do not perform 
transactions under such a circumstance.  
SECP 
587. The NBFC regulations state in article 9-2-c that NBFCs should be able to ensure that “business 
transactions are not conducted with persons who fail to provide evidence of their identity”. This 
requirement only concerns business transactions (and not accounts or relationships), and does not impose 
on NBFCs to consider making a suspicious transaction report in such cases. The authorities consider (see 
above) that the UIN requirement would cover situations not captured by “business transactions”. 
588. The 2009 NBFC Circular contains language in its article 8 on measures to be adopted in case the 
CDD is not completed satisfactorily – with the same drafting as the SBP PR-M1.  
589. There is no requirement covering the securities market.  
Existing Customers—CDD Requirements (c. 5.17) / Existing Anonymous-account Customers – CDD 
Requirements (c. 5.18): 
SBP 
590. Per old PR-M1 (section 8A ii), the identification with the new NCIC of all customer was 
mandatory by December 2008, and SBP collected regular updates of compliance. In addition, the existing 
customers were subject to on-going CDD as required under Para 7 of PR-M1 which provided that KYC/ 
CDD is not a onetime exercise to be conducted at the time of entering into a formal relationship but an 
on-going process. Indications received both from the regulator and the private sector was that significant 
efforts had to be made to push towards the identification of all customers, particularly in more remote 
areas.  
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591. The new PR-M1 further clarifies the issue – but also lengthens the deadline to June 30, 2009 – in 
its article 7. This articles deals with three different issues – dormant accounts, existing customers and 
awareness raising. As far as existing customers are concerned, article 7 (b) requires the following: “for all 
other customers / clients including depositors and borrowers, banks / DFIs shall obtain the attested copies 
of CNICs by June 30, 2009. Banks / DFIs shall discontinue relationship with such customers who fail to 
submit a copy of their CNIC by the above deadline.” The last paragraph of article 7 of the new PR-M1 
encourages banks to undertake awareness raising towards existing and prospective customers. It also 
“advises” banks and DFIs to report back to SBP on their compliance with the June 30, 2009 deadline.  
SECP 
592. SECP indicates that at the time where the new identity cards were issued, it has directed NBFCs 
to regularly update the record of existing customers on a periodic basis. The legal document stating this 
requirement has not been shared with the assessment team. In addition, the assessors did not receive 
indication on a requirement to identify all existing customers at any point in time, either with specific 
deadlines or guidance on risks and materiality. In the view of the assessors and on the basis of the 
information provided, NBFCs therefore have not been required to apply CDD to existing customers on 
the basis of materiality and risks. As indicated earlier, the April 2009 NBFC circular now clarifies the 
legal requirement, with a deadline for completion as of September 30, 2009.  
593. For the securities market, article 74 of the General Regulation seems to imply that all existing 
customers shall have been identified by end of March 2004. No clear indication was given to the assessors 
on how this process was undertaken and supervised – in a context where the UIN, as indicated earlier, do 
not seem to cover all possible cases of identification.  
Foreign PEPs—Requirement to Identify (c. 6.1): 
SBP 
594. As indicated above (high risk categories of business relationships), old PR-M1 (section 8) 
required banks/ DFIs to develop description of high-risk customers, which include “public or high profile 
position” – which criteria “should be considered” by banks/DFIs in defining risk profiles. This 
requirement was for banks/DFIs to have in place risks management systems to determine whether a 
customer holds a high profile position.  
595. The absence of differentiation between domestic and foreign “public or high profile position” 
customer is welcome. As indicated earlier, the provision did not make an explicit link between high risk 
business relationships and enhanced due diligence, and these were not spelt out.  
596. Most important, the approach elicited by SBP presented the following difficulties:  
 There was no definition of “public or high profile position” – there was therefore no assurance 
that banks/DFIs would cover the scope of PEPs as defined by FATF; 
 When the customer held a “public or high profile position”, this as a factor to be considered by 
the bank/DFIs, this was not a mandatory requirement to apply enhanced due diligence. 
597. The new PR-M1 is now more specific and detailed on the PEPs requirements. Article 9 (b) now 
establishes a mandatory link between enhanced due diligence and “politically exposed persons or 
customers holding public or high profile positions”, as the introductory paragraph of the article states that 
“banks/DFIs shall conduct due diligence when dealing [with PEPs]”.  
598. In addition, article 10 (b) of the new PR-M1 requires banks and DFIs to set up “appropriate risk 
management systems to determine whether a potential customer, a customer or the beneficial owner is a 
politically exposed person/ holder of public or high profile position”  
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599. However, there is no definition in new PR-M1 of a PEPs, and not mention in the PR that the 
enhanced due diligence must also apply to business relationships with family members or close associates 
of PEPs. It is also noteworthy that the requirement under article 9 applies when the PEP is the customer, 
while article 10 considers the situation where the PEP is the beneficial owner of the transaction, account 
or business relationship. All in all, the assessors are satisfied that this covers all situations where a PEP is 
the beneficial owner.  
ECs 
600. ECs are not specifically required to pay special attention to PEPs.  
SECP 
601. There is no PEP requirement for any of the financial institutions within the purview of the SECP. 
The April 2009 NBFC Circular now lays out PEPs requirements that are close to with the new SBP PR-
M1 ones.  
Foreign PEPs—Risk Management (c. 6.2; 6.2.1): 
SBP 
602. The old PR-M1 did not create such a requirement.  
603. The new PR-M1 also defines (only for PEPs, customers holding public or high profile positions, 
not for the other categories of customers or business relationships) what is the expected minimum content 
of the enhanced due diligence. Article 10 requires financial institutions to seek senior management 
approval to open or maintain business relationships with PEPs or with customer who become PEPs.  
SECP 
604. There is no PEP requirement for any of the financial institutions within purview of the SECP. The 
language in the April 2009 NBFC Circular is the same as in the new PR-M1.  
Foreign PEPs—Requirement to Determine Source of Wealth and Funds (c. 6.3) /  
SBP 
605. The PR does not require such determination. The old PR-M2 (section b) created a general 
requirement for all customers to ascertain “source of earnings”, which was narrower than source of 
wealth. There was no additional related due diligence for PEPs, or any other category of high-risk 
customers.  
606. The new PR-M1 provides with significant steps forward, as article 10 (b) requires banks and DFIs 
to set up “appropriate risk management systems […] to determine the sources of wealth /funds of 
customers, beneficial owners for ongoing monitoring on regular basis.” This combines with the general 
requirement for on-going due diligence. There is however no requirement for enhanced on-going 
monitoring of the business relationship. The authorities indicated that would engage banks and DFIs as 
needed should guidance be needed on this.  
SECP 
607. There is no PEP requirement for any of the financial institutions within the purview of the SECP. 
In its April 2009 NBFC Circular, SECP has adopted a requirement that is different, as the requirement is 
that “the sources of wealth/funds for such customer, shall be monitored on a regular basis” – which is 
different from determining their source.  
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Foreign PEPs—Ongoing Monitoring (c. 6.4): 
 
SBP 
608. All business relationships are to be subject to on-going monitoring (see above).  
SECP 
609. The April 2009 NBFC Circular now sets out a requirement for on-going monitoring for all 
business relationships.  
Domestic PEPs—Requirements (Additional Element c. 6.5): 
SBP 
610. The current SBP requirement does not restrict the PEPs requirements to foreign customers 
holding public or high profile functions.  
SECP 
611. The SECP April 2009 NBFC Circular does not make distinction between domestic and foreign 
PEPs.  
Domestic PEPs—Ratification of the Merida Convention (Additional Element c. 6.6): 
612. Pakistan has ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in 2007.  
 
Recommendation 7 
613. Legal Framework: The Prudential Regulations for Corporations and Foreign Exchange Circular 
Letter No. 5 govern banks’ correspondent relationships.  SBP Foreign Exchange Circular Letter No. 1 of 
2009 governs Exchange Companies’ correspondent relationships.  
614. Securities brokers do not have correspondent relationships.  Foreign investors must establish a 
bank account and a trading account in Pakistan to trade securities listed on the Islamabad or Karachi stock 
exchanges.  
Gathering information about respondent institution and assessment of AML/CFT Controls in Respondent 
Institution (c. 7.1 and c. 7.2): 
SBP 
615. The SBP requires that banks entering into correspondent relationships perform due diligence on 
respondent institutions. Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Prudential Regulation M-4 require banks to pay particular 
attention to respondent banks’ KYC and AML/CFT programs.  Paragraph 1 of Prudential Regulation M-4 
lays out eight factors banks should learn when entering into correspondent relationships:  
 Know your customer policy (KYC) 
 Information about the correspondent bank’s management and ownership 
 Major business activities 
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 Their location 
 Money laundering prevention and detection measures 
 The purpose of the account 
 The identity of any third party that will use the correspondent banking services (i.e. in 
case of payable through    accounts) 
 Condition of the bank regulation and supervision in the correspondent’s country. 
ECs 
616. Foreign Exchange Circular No. 1 of January 2009 requires ECs to follow detailed guidelines 
when selecting foreign entities for home remittances to ensure that the respondent institution is effectively 
supervised and has a physical presence and is affiliated with a regulated financial group. It also requires 
ECs to pay particular attention when continuing relationships with respondents operating in jurisdictions 
that have poor KYC standards or have been “identified by the Financial Action Task Force as being ‘non-
cooperative’ in the fight against money laundering.”  Before signing an agreement, exchange companies 
must ensure the respondent is licensed in its home jurisdiction and assess the respondent’s KYC and 
AML programs.  
Approval of Establishing Correspondent Relationships (c. 7.3): 
SBP 
617. Per paragraph 6 of Prudential Regulation M-6, banks must obtain approval of senior management 
before entering into a correspondent relationship.   
 
ECs 
618. Foreign Exchange Circular No. 1 of January 2009 specify due diligence of foreign entities in 
home remittance arrangement. According to SBP ECs must obtain SBP’s prior approval before entering 
into a home remittance agreement with a foreign financial institution.  SBP also indicates that the request 
to enter into such an agreement must bear the signature of the EC’s chief executive.  FE Circular No. 1 of 
January 2009 does not lay out these two specific requirements. The SBP also indicates that it must 
approve any amendments to the agreement, and it reserves the right to terminate the agreement.  
 
Documentation of AML/CFT Responsibilities for Each Institution (c. 7.4):  
SBP 
619. When establishing correspondent relationships, banks require each other to provide information 
about AML/CFT safeguards through a comprehensive questionnaire.  This questionnaire is not in itself a 
regulatory requirement, but is the way FIs have chosen to achieve the substantive requirement. According 
to regulators, the questionnaire forms the basis for the documentation of each institution’s AML/CFT 
responsibilities. It is the assessors’ understanding that there is no regulatory requirement that the two 
financial institutions establish a clear understanding as to which institution will perform the required 
measures.  
 
ECs 
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620. When ECs enter into correspondent relationships, the contract must grant the Exchange Company 
“ownership rights” of all related records to the Exchange Company.  The Exchange Company must 
maintain those records for five years.  The foreign entity must also provide the Exchange Company with 
originator information for inbound remittances worth more than $1,000.  
 
Payable-Through Accounts (c. 7.5): 
SBP 
621. Paragraph 5 of Prudential Regulation M-4 requires that banks be satisfied that the respondent 
institution has performed CDD on those customers who may have direct access to the correspondent 
accounts.  Paragraph 5 of Prudential Regulation M-4 also requires banks to ensure that their respondent is 
able to provide relevant customer identification data upon request to the correspondent bank.  
ECs: 
622. The concept of payable-through accounts does not apply for ECs.  Foreign Exchange Circular No. 
8 of 2006 prohibits ECs from maintaining correspondent accounts for or with foreign money remitters.  
All transactions must be processed through bank accounts, and ECs are prohibited from book clearing 
foreign transactions.  
 
Recommendation 8 
Misuse of New Technology for ML/FT (c. 8.1): 
SBP 
623. At the time of the on-site visit, regulators said that no banks are offering prepaid cards and that 
Internet banking is limited because of concerns about fraud.  Regulators also said that some banks had 
initiated limited tests of mobile banking services.  Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) are available at 
banks and some other locations.  
624. The SBP has not issued regulations requiring banks to have policies in place to prevent the 
misuse of new technologies in money laundering or terrorist financing schemes.  SBP has, however, 
issued a policy paper on “Branchless Banking.” The paper was intended to start the policy discussion on 
branchless banking, including mobile banking. The paper addresses difficulties in maintaining adequate 
internal controls when outsourcing some functions.  It notes that relying on third parties to keep records 
might present money laundering and terrorist financing risks.  The paper makes clear that the prudential 
regulations apply to transactions conducted through new technology.   
625. Some banks have initiated limited mobile payments services.  SBP regulators said that banks that 
wish to launch new services first need to seek their permission and that they assess banks’ planned 
AML/CFT safeguards in determining whether to grant permission.  No banks are offering prepaid cards, 
and Internet banking is limited because of concerns about fraud.  
SECP 
626. At the time of the on-site visit, regulators said that no brokers or exchanges are offering online 
trading.  During a visit to a stock exchange, however, the assessment team saw signs advertising the 
exchange’s new online trading services.  In 2005, the SECP issued Internet Trading Guidelines that 
require brokers and exchanges to have policies in place to prevent the misuse of new technologies in 
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money laundering or terrorist financing schemes.  Section 4, paragraph 4 states that service providers 
must “safeguard the integrity of the service including controls to prevent: non-compliance with laws, 
rules, regulations and guidelines issued by the Commission, leading to illegal transactions, fraud or 
malpractice.”  
627. The SECP has not issued regulations or guidelines that require other NBFCs to take such 
measures as may be needed to prevent the misuse of technological developments in money laundering or 
terrorist financing schemes. However, at the time of the on-site visit, no NBFCs were offering services 
that took advantage of new technologies.  
Risk of Non-Face to Face Business Relationships (c. 8.2 & 8.2.1):  
SBP 
628. Paragraph 8 of old SBP Prudential Regulation M-1 lays out additional steps that banks should 
take during the KYC process for non-face-to-face account opening.  But it does not require banks to 
undertake enhanced due diligence with respect to non-face-to-face transactions.  Although banks have not 
yet adopted mobile banking or other cutting edge payment methods, banks do maintain ATM machines, 
which facilitate non-face-to-face transactions.  
629. At least one non-bank financial institution, however, appears to be providing value transfer 
services via the Internet and mobile phones.  Amaana indicates that customers can transfer funds and 
make payments via e-mail and mobile phone text messaging.  
EC 
630. SBP has not issued guidelines or regulations pertaining to new technologies for ECs, However, 
according to the authorities, all EC customer transactions are conducted in person.  
SECP 
631. The SECP’s “Internet Trading Guidelines” also do not specifically address the money laundering 
and terrorist financing risks associated with non-face-to-face business.  Brokers who wish to offer Internet 
trading must submit their plans for offering the service.  But when the SECP reviews the plan, its review 
is limited to ensuring that the proposed Internet service has “adequate controls and procedures in place to 
ensure confidentiality of information, integrity and availability of the service; together with contingency 
plans in the event of a loss of service.”  SECP said that no exchange is offering Internet trading, but the 
assessors saw advertisements on the Islamabad Stock Exchange for an upcoming Internet trading system 
posted prominently in its offices, explicitly referring to non face-to-face account opening. The SECP has 
not issued guidance for NBFCs.   
Sum-Up 
Recommendation 5 
632. Pakistan has made important progress on the core CDD requirements and the existence for 
several years of minimum CDD requirements as well as the roll out of the CNIC are key factors reducing 
the risk of remaining un-identified accounts. The legal framework, and the practice of the supervisors, 
makes it most likely that the number of accounts in fictitious names is limited. However, the strong 
limitation of the NARA, the still remaining gaps in the dissemination of the NADRA and the difficulties 
faced by SBP to ensure compliance in remote areas cannot allow the assessors to definitively conclude on 
the absence of un-identified accounts in the banking sector, even though this is likely to remain limited. 
As far as the securities sector is concerned, and despite the introduction of the UIN, the same reasons and 
the fact that the supervisory framework does not provide enough comfort in that respect (see section on 
supervision) lead the assessor to conclude that this risk appears higher. The September 2009 deadline for 
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completion of identification of existing customers under the new requirements per the April 2009 NBFC 
Circular is a step in the right direction.  
633. With the enactment of the revised PR-M1 on March 2009, the CDD requirements for banks and 
DFIs are now overall in line with the requirements under the FATF standard. In that respect, the new PR-
M1 represents a very significant (and welcome) step forward as far as the legal framework is concerned. 
On substance, the most important improvements are: the introduction of a clearer requirement to verify 
the identity of the customer; the new requirements on beneficial ownership; the clarification of the 
obligations regarding on-going monitoring and the introduction of requirements on enhanced due 
diligence for high risk customers, transactions and business relationships.  
634. With the new PR-M1, the key remaining legal pitfalls for banks and DFIs are:  
 The narrow scope of the identification requirements for legal persons and arrangements, as they 
do not extend to the identification of the directors (except for joint stock companies) 
 There is no definition in the new PR-M1 of what enhanced due diligence in high risk scenarios 
should entail, and for instance, no cross-reference is made to the enhanced due diligence 
applicable to PEPs, as suggested by the Standard. The authorities rightly note that too prescriptive 
an approach may lead to “box checking behaviors” from banks and DFIs, and that it is more 
important to them that banks and DFIs define themselves their risk procedures and seek 
clarification from the regulator / supervisor on an on-going basis. The assessors see merit in this 
stance and agree that all details of the enhanced due diligence are not to be spelt out in 
regulations. However, it seems important to them, and it is required by the standard, that a 
minimum level of additional diligences be required by the regulator, on top of which banks and 
DFIs can define their own internal procedures. 
 The conditions for simplification or reduction of the CDD requirements in low risk scenarios are 
too open ended, and not enough guidance has been provided to the financial institutions, or 
situations of proven low risk have not been sufficiently defined. There is no definition either of 
the minimum level of CDD to be then implemented. The authorities consider that their approach 
is sufficiently ring-fenced. 
 
635. As far as the SECP is concerned, the current requirements are more basic, and the cornerstone of 
an effective CDD regime – i.e. obligations regarding beneficial ownership – are not present. The SECP 
related requirements (as evidenced by the SAOF where they exist) are focused on account opening, and 
on the identification of the customer and the collection of information through the CNIC, or registration 
information in case of legal persons. While important, these requirements however are very limited, and 
would not allow financial institutions to develop a genuine understanding of their customer, and to 
develop a customer profile on which on-going monitoring could be exercised.  
636. The following issues are not adequately covered, in aggregate, by the SECP requirements:  
 definition of the situations for identification of the customer outside the account opening or 
establishment of a business relationship (occasional customers, doubts about the veracity or 
adequacy of previously obtained customer data) 
 requirement to verify the identity of the customer 
 requirement to identify the directors or trustees of legal persons or legal arrangements 
  113
 requirement to identify beneficial ownership, and to take reasonable steps to verify the identity of 
the beneficial owner (except for situation where the customer is acting on behalf of another 
person) 
 requirement to obtain information on the nature and intended purpose of the business relationship, 
and to conduct on-going due diligence 
 requirements to perform enhanced due diligence for higher risks categories of customers, 
transactions or business relationships 
 requirements – particularly relevant for the securities markets – on the timing of the verification 
 requirements related to situations where CDD cannot be satisfactorily completed 
 requirements on existing customers 
 
637. As far as NBFCs are concerned, the April 2009 Circular goes a long way towards addressing 
these gaps, as described above for each criteria.  
Recommendation 6 
638. The SECP has not defined any requirement on PEPs, and the Exchanges have not filled this gap 
in the securities market.  As indicated earlier, and for NBFCs, the April 2009 Circular addresses the bulk 
of the requirements.  
639. Prior to the enactment of the new PR-M1, the SBP PEPs requirements for banks and DFIs were 
incomplete, and left excessive flexibility to financial institutions, as they were not considered higher risk 
on a systematic basis. In addition, there was no definition of the content of the enhanced due diligence 
requirements.  
640. The new PR-M1 addresses these issues, but still does not define PEPs, and does not extend the 
enhanced due diligence requirements to family members or associates. There is no requirement for 
enhanced on-going due diligence on PEPs.  
Analysis of Effectiveness 
641. Assessing the effectiveness of the implementation of the CDD requirements is made difficult by 
the adoption in March 2009 of the revised PR-M1 by the SBP. The assessors were not in position to 
assess the effectiveness of implementation of this new regulation, and therefore adopted a neutral stance 
on it. However, the assessors focused their assessment on the implementation at the time of the on-site 
visit, based on the legal and regulatory framework then enforceable. While recognizing that this is not the 
legal framework against which the rating of the legal framework is conducted (see below), they 
considered that such review of effectiveness provided the needed indications on the reactivity of financial 
institutions to the legal requirements. They of course expect financial institutions to swiftly take measures 
to implement the March 2009 SBP Regulation and the April 2009 SECP NBFC Circular. They took note 
of the SBP statement that banks and DFIs have implemented CDD/KYC requirements for quite some 
time, and that SBP has pushed towards effective implementation of internal policies that contribute to 
effective CDD requirements.  
642. As far as banks and DFIs are concerned, the main focus of SBP and of the financial institutions 
appeared to assessors as being on the identification of the customer and the collection of information 
through the NADRA system. The assessors of course noted that the legal requirements are more 
comprehensive than the reliance in the CNIC, but all interlocutors (particularly private sector ones) put 
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significant emphasis on this step. The loopholes in the identification systems have been described 
previously. However, in addition, the sense of the assessors was that both the supervisors and the banks 
and DFIs considered that their due diligences were on substance completed once the check with the 
NADRA database was done.  
643. The assessors are mindful that the standard does not prescribe in any way what documents should 
be deemed reliable by the assessed country. However, it is their reading of the methodology that they 
should review the effectiveness of that choice. In that respect, the assessors are concerned by the almost 
single reliance on NADRA and NARA, and in particular on NARA, given their conclusion that some 
gaps remain in the reliance of issuance of NARA cards. 
644. The information provided by SBP, as well as the statistics on sanctions (see supervision section) 
indicate that it took significant efforts to SBP to foster a satisfactory level of compliance with the 
requirements to identify customers with the NADRA / NARA cards, and that only a substantial increase 
in the level of fines led to meaningful improvements across the board. SBP notes that this progressive 
phase-in reflects cost consideration as it did not allow that costs related to the NADRA verification be 
passed on to customers. The assessors understand this concern, but still note, as indicated by the 
evolutions of fines (see section on Recommendation 17) that only when SBP significantly stepped up its 
pecuniary sanctions did financial institutions more aggressively implement CDD requirements. The 
assessors also note that the deadline for full identification of existing customer was postponed on several 
occasions, as it appeared that important weaknesses remained. 
645. Another important indicator is the overall number of STRs submitted by banks and DFIs (which 
are the main providers of STRs). Even though the reporting obligation under AMLO is relatively new, 
other reporting obligations pre-existed, and had already translated in low levels of reporting. In the 
assessors’ views, and given their assessment of the ML and TF risk in Pakistan, this is an indication that 
on-going due diligences remain insufficient in practice. Of course, this is only a rough measure of 
effectiveness of CDD/KYC, but given the AML/CFT risks in Pakistan, it appear s to the assessors that it 
provides an additional indication of mixed effectiveness.  
646. Finally, as far as banks and DFIs are concerned, there is a duality in the financial sector, and at 
times within financial institutions. Some banks and DFIs have set up overall sophisticated practices and 
internal controls or systems – at least for parts of their customer base – while other have yet to implement 
such practices. There is also a duality between the banking practices in cities, or in favor of the formal 
sector, and those in remote areas. The acquisition of internal systems is costly, and is clearly a burden for 
banks and DFIs, all the more so at a time where SBP is pushing for enhanced capital requirements.  
647. As far as the institutions supervised by the SECP are concerned, it is the assessors’ view that the 
focus on the collection of information out of the NADRA system is even more pronounced. The absence 
of SAOF beyond the modaraba and securities sector is also an evidence of a lack of effectiveness of the 
regulatory regime in place. The absence of STRs submitted by the NBFCs and the securities industry 
comforts this view.  
648. In terms of enforcement, the information provided by the authorities does not reflect an active 
enforcement stance. Very few sanctions, if any, have been taken for lack of compliance with the existing 
framework. In the securities sector, the guidelines for audit reviews (see supervisory section) are minimal, 
and only focus on the use of the SAOF (and therefore do not cover any other of the existing CDD 
requirements).  
649. It is worth noting however that several of the institutions met by the assessors did have systems 
and procedures going beyond the regulatory requirements – and the assessors’ overall conclusion that the 
CDD requirements are not sufficiently effective does not reflect judgment on the practices of these 
institutions (which would anyway not be in the scope of this assessment). This conclusion reflects a 
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synthetic judgment, which also reflects the assessors’ analysis of the ML and FT risk in Pakistan, and 
therefore confronting the financial sector.  
650. As far as Recommendation 5 is concerned, the revision of the PR-M1 is a very significant step 
forward. The assessors have adopted a neutral view on the effectiveness of its implementation, given the 
date of its adoption. However, as required by the methodology, they factored in their conclusions on the 
effectiveness of the previous regime in their ratings for Recommendation 5. As a result, their rating under 
Recommendation 5 first results of an analysis of the legal framework (with the new PR-M1 factored in), 
to which is added their review of effectiveness based on their findings at the time of the on-site mission.  
651. Overall, the new legal framework is significant improved by the new PR-M1, all the more as 
banks and DFIs represent a major share of the financial sector as a whole. However, the NBFCs and 
securities still account for a meaningful share too. Against this background, the assessors have given more 
weight to the situation in the banking sector, but have also reflected the relatively less positive situation 
outside the remit of the SBP. As a result, in terms of quality of the legal framework, the overall situation 
is downgraded by the important weaknesses outside banks and DFIs, and further by the overall lack of 
effectiveness of the regime, particularly given the existing risks.  
652. As far as Recommendation 6 is concerned, the regime pre-existing the adoption of revised PR-
M1 did not entail any of the key requirements. There are still substantial weaknesses under the new PR-
M1, particular the absence of definition of who is a PEP and the absence of coverage of family and close 
associates of PEPs. The effectiveness of the implementation of the new PR-M1 cannot be assessed – but 
the issues related to the effectiveness of the implementation under Recommendation are likely to impact 
the implementation of Recommendation 6. In addition, even though PEPs requirements were reviewed 
prior to the issuance of the new PR-M1 as this topic was covered under the Inspection Manual, these 
reviews only covered the requirements in place before March 2009. It is noted that this contributed to 
raising awareness on PEPs issue in the banking sector.  The assessors note that several of the banks (in 
particular big banks) met had CDD/KYC procedures and internal controls that indeed contained PEPs 
requirements, at times going beyond what the legal requirements were then. In particular, some of these 
internal controls and procedures did cover PEPs and their families and associates. However, even if parts 
of the financial sector decide on a voluntary basis to adopt a definition of PEPs more in line with the 
international standard, this would not allow the supervisor to take action. Here again, despite the 
importance of the banking sector, the absence of any requirement for the non-banking sector as whole has 
a negative impact on the overall rating.  
653. Following the on-site visit, the authorities provided examples of enforcement action taken by SBP 
that is relevant to the effectiveness of the PEPs regime. Before the enactment of the March 09 new PR-
M1, as indicated in paragraph 638, the requirement was to cover PEPs in the context of risk management 
systems for higher risk customers. SBP has provided the team with evidence of 13 enforcement actions, 
including towards big banks, on the basis of this requirement. It is worth noting that these enforcement 
actions can impact the risk rating of the concerned banks, with possible impact on the capital adequacy 
ratios or the possibility to open new branches. The assessors therefore consider them as credible and 
dissuasive.  On this basis, the assessors consider that the authorities have taken positive action, and that 
the effectiveness of the regime; the existence of “drivers” issued by the banking supervisor; and the 
routine compliance monitoring by SBP supports the rating for R6. 
 
3.2.2. Recommendations and Comments 
654. The authorities should:  
 Address the remaining (small) gaps in the NADRA, and more importantly those related to 
NARA, to ensure that they are appropriate identification tools 
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 Lessen the exclusive reliance on NADRA (and NARA) identification cards as the cornerstone 
for identification and verification of identity 
 Strictly enforce the deadline for identification of existing accounts by June 2009 for SBP and 
ensure that all existing accounts are properly identified for SECP by September 2009 
For SBP: 
 Enlarge the scope of the identification requirements for legal persons and arrangements, as 
they do not extend to the identification of the directors (except for joint stock companies) 
 Clarify the minimum level of additional diligences for enhanced due diligence in high risk 
scenarios 
 Specify the conditions for simplification or reduction of the CDD requirements in low risk 
scenarios, and provide guidance to the financial institutions on situations of proven low risks, 
as well as on the definition either of the minimum level of CDD to be then implemented 
 Enforce the new and additional requirements under revised PR-M1 
 Define PEPs, and extend the enhanced due diligence requirements to family members or 
associates 
 Require enhanced on-going due diligence on PEPs, and their family members and associate 
 In entering into correspondent relationship, require banks to establish a clear understanding as 
to which institution will perform the required measures. 
 Clearly address the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with new 
technologies.   
For ECs:  
Amend the AML/CFT regulatory framework of ECs to include:  
 Specifying “other particulars” that ECs need to obtain for inward remittances of all amounts and 
outward remittances of less than US$5,000. 
 Type of identification documents that should be used for verification of customers and the 
timing of verification of customers for remittance transfers. 
 An obligation to conduct CDD on occasional customers when suspicion of ML or TF arises 
regardless of the value of the transaction or when there are doubts about the veracity or 
adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data. 
 An obligation to identify and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of beneficial 
owners. Beneficial owners should be defined consistent with the standard.  
 Defining the enhanced due diligence measures for high-risk customers. 
 An explicit requirement as to what course of actions should be taken when satisfactory CDD 
cannot be established.  
 Defining the enhanced due diligence measures required in relation to foreign PEPs.  
 Obligation to require senior management to approve new correspondent relationship. 
 
For SECP 
 define the situations for identification of the customer outside the account opening or 
establishment of a business relationship (occasional customers, doubts about the veracity or 
adequacy of previously obtained customer data) 
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 require to verify the identity of the customer 
 require to identify the directors or trustees of legal persons or legal arrangements 
 require to identify beneficial ownership, and to take reasonable steps to verify the identity of the 
beneficial owner  
 require to obtain information on the nature and intended purpose of the business relationship, and 
to conduct on-going due diligence 
 require to perform enhanced due diligence for higher risks categories of customers, transactions 
or business relationships 
 specify – particularly relevant for the securities markets – the requirement on the timing of the 
verification 
 set out requirements related to situations where CDD cannot be satisfactorily completed 
 set out requirements for PEPs 
 specifically address the money laundering and terrorist-financing risks associated with new 
technologies and non-face-to-face transactions 
 issue regulations or guidance on new technologies and non-face-to-face technologies for NBFCs 
other than brokers. 
 
655. Regarding SECP, the assessors welcome the April 2009 NBFC Circular, and note that it goes a 
long way towards addressing the key gaps. They encourage SECP to ensure its effective implementation 
as soon as possible. They also note that weaknesses identified in sectors under the responsibility of the 
SECP which do not belong to NBFCs still remain to be addressed.  
 
3.2.3. Compliance with Recommendations 5 to 8  
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating  
R.5 PC  Lack of coverage of some financial institutions, particularly Pakistan 
Post 
 Excessive reliance on NADRA and NARA, without due consideration to 
the remaining weaknesses of these identification sources, particularly 
NARA 
 Excessive emphasis on NADRA and NARA cards as ultimate 
identification and verification of identity tools 
 Overall lack of effectiveness 
For SBP 
 The narrow scope of the identification requirements for legal persons 
and arrangements, as they do not extend to the identification of the 
directors (except for joint stock companies) 
 There is ambiguity on the minimum content of enhanced due diligence 
in high risk scenarios 
 The conditions for simplification or reduction of the CDD requirements 
in low risk scenarios are too open ended, and not enough guidance has 
been provided to the financial institutions, or situations of proven low 
risk have not been sufficiently defined. There is no definition either of 
the minimum level of CDD to be then implemented 
For ECs 
 Ambiguity as to “other particulars” that ECs need to obtain for inward 
remittances of all amounts and outward remittances of less than 
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 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating  
US$5,000. 
 Lack of clear guidance on the type of identification documents that 
should be used for verification of customers and the timing of 
verification of customers for remittance transfers 
 No obligation to conduct CDD on occasional customers when suspicion 
of ML or TF arises regardless of the value of the transaction or when 
there are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained 
customer identification data. 
 No obligation to identify and take reasonable measures to verify the 
identity of beneficial owners.  
 No enhanced due diligence measures for high-risk customers. 
 No explicit requirement as to what course of actions should be taken 
when satisfactory CDD cannot be established.  
For SECP 
Absence of 
 definition of the situations for identification of the customer outside the 
account opening or establishment of a business relationship (occasional 
customers, doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained 
customer data) 
 requirement to verify the identity of the customer 
 requirement to identify the directors or trustees of legal persons or legal 
arrangements 
 requirement to identify beneficial ownership, and to take reasonable 
steps to verify the identity of the beneficial owner (except for situation 
where the customer is acting on behalf of another person) 
 requirement to obtain information on the nature and intended purpose of 
the business relationship, and to conduct on-going due diligence 
 requirements to perform enhanced due diligence for higher risks 
categories of customers, transactions or business relationships 
 requirements – particularly relevant for the securities markets – on the 
timing of the verification 
 requirements related to situations where CDD cannot be satisfactorily 
completed 
 requirements on existing customers, with a specific deadline 
 
R.6 PC  No requirement on PEPs for the financial institutions under SECP 
 No definition of PEPs, and no coverage of family members or 
associates, for financial institutions covered by SBP 
 No requirement for enhanced on-going due diligence on PEPs, and their 
families and associates, for financial institutions covered by SBP 
 Insufficient effectiveness 
 
R.7 LC  Banks are not required to establish a clear understanding as to which 
institution will perform the required measures. 
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 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating  
 . 
R.8 LC  Banks are not required to have policies and procedures in place to 
address any specific risks associated with non-face-to-face transactions. 
 
 
3.3. Third Parties And Introduced Business (R.9) 
3.3.1. Description and Analysis 
656. Legal Framework: SBP Prudential Regulations require banks to perform customer due diligence 
and therefore exclude the possibility of third-party and introduced business.  The SBP has made limited 
exceptions to this rule, and the assessment team also found that the requirement that Exchange Companies 
conduct wire transfers over $3,000 through their bank accounts, which amounts to third-party business.  
The SECP’s NBFC regulations hold NBFCs ultimately responsible for any activities that third parties 
conduct on their behalf, but those regulations do not thoroughly address the AML/CFT safeguards 
required for third-party and introduced business.  
Requirement to Immediately Obtain Certain CDD elements from Third Parties (c. 9.1) and Availability of 
Identification Data from Third Parties (c 9.2): 
SBP 
657. SBP said it does not permit banks to rely upon third parties to perform any elements of the CDD 
process or to introduce business but that it was aware of two cases in which banks relied on third parties 
to perform CDD.  SBP said it permitted two banks to use an introducer located in a foreign country to 
perform CDD for Pakistanis working on contract in that country.  In those cases, a foreign government 
agency was responsible for obtaining and immediately sending all CDD information, including the 
documents, to Pakistan.   
658. The assessors examined whether the manner in which exchange companies use their bank 
accounts to conduct wire transfers on behalf of customers has aspects of introduced business.  Exchange 
companies conducting wire transfers worth more than $3,000 must do so through their bank accounts.  
When conducting those transfers, exchange companies are not required to provide information about the 
originator of the wire transfer.  Banks are not required to demand information about the originator of the 
wire transfer, and they are not required to satisfy themselves that exchange companies can produce CDD 
documentation without delay.  The assessment team concluded that this arrangement does not fall within 
the scope of Recommendation 9.  The interpretive note to Recommendation 9 states that “This 
Recommendation also does not apply to relationships, accounts or transactions between financial 
institutions for their clients.”  As ECs are financial institutions with separate and independent AML/CFT 
requirements, the placement of funds in the bank is a transaction between financial institutions and not 
introduced business.  
659. For exchange companies themselves, authorities said the concept of third part and introduced 
business does not apply.  The person conducting the transaction is presumed to be the owner of the funds 
involved in the transaction. 
SECP 
660. The SECP’s Prudential Regulations for NBFCs compel financial institutions that the SECP 
regulates to ensure that each customer fills out the account opening form before accepting deposits.  The 
Prudential Regulations for NBFCs further state that “effective procedures shall be instituted for obtaining 
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identification from new customers and a policy shall be devised to ensure that business transactions are 
not conducted with customers who fail to provide evidence of their identity.” There is no express 
prohibition on the use of third parties to collect account-opening forms from customers or to verify 
customers’ identities, but the regulations make clear that the ultimate responsibility for customer due 
diligence lies with the NBFC.  There is also no explicit requirement that NBFCs relying on third parties to 
satisfy themselves that copies of documents relating to the CDD process will be made available by the 
third party without delay or to satisfy themselves that the third party is regulated and has measures in 
place to comply with the CDD requirements set out in R.5 and R.10. 
Regulation and Supervision of Third Party (applying R. 23, 24 & 29, c. 9.3), Adequacy of Application of 
FATF Recommendations (c. 9.4) and Ultimate Responsibility for CDD (c 9.5): 
661. When SBP allowed the banks to rely on a foreign government to perform CDD, SBP ensured the 
foreign government observed FATF standards.  SBP made clear to the participating banks that the 
ultimate responsibility for CDD remained with the bank.  Likewise, the SECP regulations make clear that 
NBFCs are responsible for making “efforts to determine the true identity of the customer before 
extending its services.” At the time of the assessment, the SECP did not require NBFCs take into account 
whether introducers are located in countries that apply FATF standards.  On April 28, 2009, the SECP 
issued a circular requiring NBFCs to consider introductions made by counterparties in countries that do 
not adequately apply the FATF standards as high risk.  
 
3.3.2. Recommendations and Comments 
662. The SECP should set forth specific requirements concerning third-party and introduced business 
for entities it regulates.  Specifically, it should require financial institutions to immediately obtain the 
necessary information concerning certain elements of the CDD process, to satisfy themselves that 
supporting documentation will be made available by the third party without delay, to satisfy themselves 
that the third party is regulated and has measures in place to comply with R.5 and R.10 and to satisfy 
themselves that third parties in other countries are in jurisdictions that apply the FATF standards.  
 
3.3.3. Compliance with Recommendation 9  
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.9 LC  SECP does not require entities it regulates to immediately obtain from 
the third party the necessary information concerning certain elements of 
the CDD process. 
 SECP does not require entities it regulates to satisfy themselves that 
copies of documents relating to the CDD process will be made available 
by the third party without delay. 
 SECP does not require entities it regulates to satisfy themselves that the 
third party is regulated and has measures in place to comply with the 
CDD requirements set out in R.5 and R.10. 
 At the time of the assessment, SECP did not require entities it regulates 
to take into account whether countries in which the third party is based 
apply the FATF Recommendations. 
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3.4. Financial Institution Secrecy or Confidentiality (R.4) 
3.4.1. Description and Analysis 
Inhibition of Implementation of FATF Recommendations (c. 4.1): 
663. Section 7(4) of the AMLO permits financial institutions to comply with STR requirements 
notwithstanding any other provision of law.  Law enforcement agencies said they can compel financial 
institutions to produce relevant records and have not encountered undue difficulty in obtaining records 
from financial institutions.  Section 40 of the Banking Companies Ordinance empowers SBP to inspect 
any banking company and its books and accounts.  Section 31 of the Exchange Companies Rules and 
Regulations compels exchange companies to provide records to SBP upon demand.  Section 282G of the 
Companies Ordinance empowers SECP to compel information from regulated entities.  
664. No provision of law prohibits competent authorities from sharing information.  SECP has an 
MOU with SBP to facilitate information sharing among regulators.  
665. Section 33A of the Banking Companies Ordinance permits disclosure of information among 
financial institutions if it is in accordance with law, practice customary among bankers, necessary or 
appropriate.  
666. Internationally, the SECP has signed MOUs with various multilateral and international 
organizations. Presently, MOUs have been signed with the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission, the Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri 
Lanka and for the establishment of the South Asian Securities Regulators Forum. These MOUs generally 
cover matters of regulatory concern including sharing of financial and other supervisory information, 
technical expertise and inquiries for the purpose of effective regulation and prevention of illegal activities. 
During the year 2008, the SECP singed an MOU with the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
to establish framework for mutual assistance and to facilitate the exchange of information between both 
the authorities to enforce and ensure compliance with their respective securities and futures laws and 
other regulatory requirements.  
3.4.2. Recommendations and comments 
 
3.4.3. Compliance with Recommendation 4  
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.4 C  
 
 
3.5. Record keeping and wire transfer rules (R.10 & SR.VII) 
3.5.1. Description and Analysis 
667. Legal Framework: SBP Prudential Regulations require banks to maintain records.  For Exchange 
Companies, the obligation to maintain records flows from the Rules and Regulations for Exchange 
Companies.  NBFCs, including Modarabas, are required to maintain records by the Prudential 
Regulations for NBFCs. Brokers are governed by the Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, by the 
Securities and Exchange Rules and by the rules of the stock exchanges of which they are member.  
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Federal government rules require Pakistan Post to maintain certain records.  The office of the Auditor 
General of Pakistan oversees compliance with these rules.  
668. Financial institutions with which the assessment met during the on-site visit said they maintained 
records in accordance with the law.  Law enforcement agencies with which the assessment team met 
during the on-site visit said they found financial records to be complete.  
Record-Keeping & Reconstruction of Transaction Records (c. 10.1 & 10.1.1): 
SBP 
669. SBP Prudential Regulation M-3 requires banks to maintain transaction records for at least five 
years.  The regulations states, “Banks/DFIs shall therefore maintain, for a minimum of five years, all 
necessary records on transactions, both domestic and international.  The records so maintained must be 
sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions.”  In practice, law enforcement agencies 
reported that they have found that bank records have allowed them to reconstruct individual transactions.  
When the records relate to suspicious activity, banks must maintain the record until the SBP gives the 
bank permission to destroy it.  Banks must also maintain records when the records are needed as evidence 
in legal proceedings.  
 
ECs 
670. Rule 21 of the Rules and Regulations for Exchange Companies require exchange companies to 
maintain records required of all dealings between Exchange Companies and their customers for a time 
period specified SBP, but SBP has not specified the timeframe. When it relates to transactions with 
foreign entities under business agreements, record must be kept for 5 years as per the Foreign Exchange 
Circular No. 1 of January 2009. However, on a comprehensive basis, SBP has not clarified the time 
period for record keeping relating to all the transactions.  
SECP 
671. Section 53 of the SECP’s NBFC regulations require NBFCs to maintain for 10 years:  
 journals, cash books and other records of original entry forming the basis of entry in any ledger;  
 ledgers (or other comparable record) reflecting assets, liabilities, income and expenses;  
 ledgers (or other comparable record) showing at any time securities which are receivable or 
deliverable;  
 record of transactions with the bank;  
 register of transaction in securities; and 
 record of the meetings of the board of directors.   
 
672. Section 7 of the Securities and Exchange Rules (1971) require that every stock exchange prepares 
and maintains such books of account and other documents as will accurately disclose a true and fair 
picture of the state of affairs of the exchange at any point of time. The books of accounts and documents 
are required to be preserved for a period of not less than five years and include journals, cash book and 
any other records of original entry forming the basis of entries into any ledger; ledgers reflecting asset, 
liability, reserve, capital, income and expense ledgers (or other comparable record) showing the position 
in respect of each member as on the settlement day of the securities which the member had bought or sold 
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since the last preceding settlement day and which had been transferred through a Clearing House 
maintained by the stock exchange.  
673. Section 7 of the Securities and Exchange Rules (1971) also require brokers to prepare and 
maintain for a period of not less than five years the daily record of all orders for purchase or sale of 
securities, all purchases and sales of securities, all receipts and deliveries of securities and all other debits 
and credits; ledgers (or other comparable records) reflecting asset, liability, reserve, capital, income and 
expense accounts; ledgers (or other comparable records) reflecting securities in transfer, securities 
borrowed and securities loaned and securities bought or sold, of which the delivery is delayed; and record 
of balance of all ledger accounts, records of transactions with banks and the duplicates of memos of 
confirmation issued to customers.  
Pakistan Post 
674. Appendix 3, Section II, Paragraph 1(A) of the federal government rules require Pakistan Post to 
retain savings bank journals permanently.  
 
Record-Keeping for Identification Data, Files and Correspondence (c. 10.2): 
SBP 
675. SBP Prudential regulation M-2 requires that banks maintain customer identification records for at 
least five years after terminating the business relationship.  Banks must maintain copies of the documents 
upon which they based their initial due diligence.  Banks must also maintain business correspondence for 
at least five years after terminating the business relationship.  
ECs 
676. The SBP has not required Exchange Companies to retain records of customer identification 
except in the case of home remittances transactions where all related records should be maintained for at 
least five years.  
 
SECP 
677. At the time of the on-site assessment, the SECP did not require NBFCs to maintain records 
pertaining to customer identification or to maintain business correspondence with customers.  The 
regulations pertained only to transactions, not other types of business records.  The SECP did, however, 
require stock exchanges and brokers to maintain business correspondence with customers and of customer 
identification data.  On April 28, 2009, the SECP issued a circular that said NBFCs must maintain records 
pertaining to customer identification for a period of five years.  
Pakistan Post 
678. Pakistan Post considers customer identification records part of the ledger, and customer 
identification records are therefore permanently retained 
Availability of Records to Competent Authorities in a Timely Manner (c. 10.3): 
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SBP 
679. The SBP has not required banks to ensure that all customer and transaction records and 
information are available to law enforcement on a timely basis.  Although the SBP Prudential Regulation 
M-3 contemplates requests by domestic competent authorities for records, it does not establish a 
timeframe in which banks must respond to such requests or require that banks provide the records on a 
timely basis.  
EC 
680. The SBP has not required ECs to provide information to domestic competent authorities on a 
timely basis, although it does require that ECs provide information during compliance examinations, and 
it may examine ECs at any time.  The regulations do not require ECs to provide information law 
enforcement on a timely basis 
SECP 
681. Under the Companies Act, the SECP has the power to compel NBFCs to provide information.  
But the SECP’s regulations do not require NBFCs to provide information to domestic competent 
authorities on a timely basis.  The regulations do not require NBFCs to provide information to law 
enforcement on a timely basis.  
Pakistan Post 
682. Section 152/1 of Pakistan Post’s Miscellaneous Rules requires Pakistan Post to turn over records 
to law enforcement agencies in a timely manner upon demand.  
 
Obtain Originator Information for Wire Transfers (applying c. 5.2 & 5.3 in R.5, c.VII.1): 
SBP 
683. Para 1(c) of PR-M2 requires banks/DFIs to include accurate and meaningful originator 
information (name, address and account number) on funds transfers regardless of the amount. Banks/DFIs 
may, if satisfied, substitute the address with CNIC, passport, driver’s license or similar identification 
number for this purpose. Because of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act 1947, only bank account 
holders can send wire transfers across-borders. For domestic transfers, there appears no legal or 
regulatory prohibition with regards to wire-transfer services for walk-in customers, however, in practice, 
banks do not offer services to walk-in customers.  
684. Para 1(b) of PR-M2 requires that specific procedures be established for ascertaining customer’s 
status and his source of earnings, for checking identities and bonafides of remitters and beneficiaries, for 
retaining internal record of transactions for future reference, among others. The SBP requires that 
exchange companies conducting wire transfers worth more than $3,000 must do so through their bank 
accounts. When conducting those transfers, exchange companies are not required to provide information 
about the originator who requests the wire transfer, nor banks are required to demand information about 
the originator of the wire transfer, and they are not required to satisfy themselves that exchange 
companies can produce CDD documentation without delay. 
ECs: 
685. In case of ECs, the Rules and Regulations (Foreign Exchange Circular No. 09 issued in July 
2002) require all remittance transaction receipts to contain name, address, and other particulars of both 
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the remitter and beneficiary (para. 24). In addition, all dealings between an EC and its customers shall be 
supported by official duplicate receipts, one to be given to the customer and the other to be kept record for 
a period to be specified by SBP. Every receipt should be sequentially numbered. There is no specific 
provision with regards to the requirement to verify identity of customers except an implicit requirement 
for outward remittances above US$5,000.  
686. There is no enforceable obligation imposed on Pakistan Postal Savings Bank with regards to wire 
transfer requirements.  
Inclusion of Originator Information in Cross-Border Wire Transfers (c. VII.2): 
SBP 
687. Para 1(c) of PR-M2 requires the full originator information be obtained for all the wire transfers 
regardless of the amount, and the full originator information to remain with the transfer or related 
message throughout the payment chain.  
ECs 
688. While the Rules and Regulations (Foreign Exchange Circular No. 09) are explicit in obtaining the 
full originator information, it is not clearly stipulated whether the full originator information should be 
included in the message or throughout the payment chain.  
 
Inclusion of Originator Information in Domestic Wire Transfers (c. VII.3): 
689. The above requirement applies to all the wire transfers both domestic and cross-border in the case 
of banks/DFIs. The authorities informed the assessors that ECs are not allowed to undertake domestic 
remittances.  
Maintenance of Originator Information (c.VII.4): 
SBP 
690. Para 1(c) of PR-M2 requires the full originator information to remain with the transfer or related 
message throughout the payment chain for all the wire transfers regardless of the amount. Authorities 
informed the assessors that banks/DFIs are not allowed to execute the wire transfers without the full 
originator information accompanying the transfers. Record keeping of all the transactions is required for 5 
years under PR-M3, Record Retention.  
ECs 
691. The Rules and Regulations (Foreign Exchange Circular No. 09) para. 21 require the official 
receipts be kept for a period to be specified by SBP. SBP has not specified the time ECs should maintain 
transaction records, except in the case of incoming remittances through agreements with foreign entities.  
Risk Based Procedures for Transfers Not Accompanied by Originator Information (c. VII.5): 
SBP 
692. After the on-site mission, SBP amended the PR M-2 to specify handling of wire transfers that 
lack complete originator information. This amendment was informed to banks/DFIs via a circular letter 
No. 07 issued on March 09, 2009. The revised PR M-2 requires beneficiary financial institutions to adopt 
effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers that are not accompanied by 
complete originator information. It advises that such wire transfers when seen with suspicion, may require 
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reporting to the FMU or terminating the transaction. It further advises banks/DFIs to remain careful and 
consider limiting or terminating business relationship when originating financial institutions do not 
comply with those requirements.  
693. Authorities and banks have indicated to the assessors that banks do not credit the wire to the 
beneficiary when it is not accompanied by full originator information. Banks usually request full 
originator information from ordering banks, or in the event that the full originator information is still not 
obtained, banks reject the incoming wire transfer.   
ECs 
694. As stated earlier, when ECs engage in remittances/transfers, they are required to mention the 
names, address, and other particulars of both the remitter and beneficiary on the duplicate receipts, one to 
be provided to the customer and the other to be kept with them. In addition, foreign Exchange Circular 
No.1 of January 2009 requires ECs to include in the agreement with the foreign entities for home 
remittances the originator information sent from the foreign entities. It states that “For transaction greater 
than USD1,000 the agreement should require foreign entity to provide address of senders in addition to 
his/her name. However, address may be substituted with any unique identification number/national 
identity number/customer identification number/date & place of birth.”  
695. Beyond this, the Rules and Regulations or Foreign Exchange circulars are silent on how to handle 
the incoming remittances with incomplete originator information. In practice, incoming remittances are 
accompanied with name of beneficiary, reference number and other particulars, and ECs verify the 
identity of beneficiary in order to ensure that the remittance is paid out to the correct beneficiary.  
Monitoring of Implementation (c. VII.6): 
SBP 
696. SBP supervision department undertakes on-site examination and off-site monitoring of banks and 
DFIs for compliance against the prudential regulation on corporate and commercial banks which includes 
KYC and AML. Compliance with the wire transfer requirements specified in the PR-M2 is assessed 
within this context. The same supervision department also undertakes on-site examination of ECs at a 
minimum, on an annual basis. Findings of the on-site inspection are forwarded for further action by the 
Foreign Exchange Policy Department which is responsible for making the rules and regulations governing 
ECs.  
Application of Sanctions (c. VII.7: applying c.17.1 – 17.4): 
697. The SBP has a range of power and tools available to sanction banks/DFIs against non-compliance 
with regulations. The administrative enforcement powers includes but not limited to removal of 
managerial persons, super-session of board of directors, prohibition of certain activities, imposition of 
monetary penalties and cancellation of license. These enforcement powers are also complemented by the 
availability of criminal sanctions (see supervision section for more details).   
698. On the other hand, the SBP does not have a range of sanctions that are effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive when it comes to ECs. Power granted to SBP with regards to sanctions against ECs under 
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (amended in 2002) is the right to suspend or revoke license. 
SBP may take any other actions as deemed necessary but it is not clear what the other actions might be. 
At the time of the on-site mission, six licenses of ECs have been suspended or revoked by the SBP. The 
violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is also punishable with criminal sanctions.  
Additional elements: elimination of thresholds (c. VII.8 and c. VII.9) (c. VII.8 and c. VII.9): 
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699. The PR M-2 requires all the outgoing wire transfers including those cross-border wire transfers 
below EUR/USD 1,000 to contain full and accurate originator information. In the case of ECs, receipts of 
all remittance transfers, both incoming and outgoing, should include name, address, sequenced number, 
together with other particulars of both remitter and beneficiary.   
3.5.2. Recommendations and Comments 
700. The authorities should consider the following recommendations. 
 The SBP and SECP, as appropriate, should require banks, exchange companies and NBFCs to 
provide information to domestic competent authorities on a timely basis.  While examiners have 
the authority to demand data during an examination, there is no legal requirement that banks or 
exchange companies provide information to law enforcement on a timely basis. 
 The SBP should require exchange companies to maintain records of customer identification for at 
least five years after the termination of a business relationship. 
 The SECP should require NBFCs to maintain records of customer identification for at least five 
years after the termination of a business relationship. 
 The SECP should require NBFCs to maintain correspondence between the business and the 
customer for five years. 
 Authorities should bring Pakistan Postal Savings Bank within the AML/CFT regime. 
 
701. With regards to wire transfers conducted by ECs, SBP should issue:  
 an explicit requirement that full originator information should accompany the wire transfer; 
throughout the payment chain.  
 an explicit requirement to verify identify of originator;  
 a specific time period for which ECs should maintain all the transaction records (not just 
incoming remittances) and client information. This time period should not be less than 5 years.  
 an explicit set of requirements supported by sanctions for the handling of incoming wire transfers 
that do not contain full originator information.  
 
In addition, when ECs use their bank accounts to conduct wire transfers on behalf of their customers, 
banks should be required to obtain information on the originator who requests the wire transfer 
through ECs, and exchange companies should be required to maintain and produce without delay 
supporting documentation for the CDD process. 
3.5.3. Compliance with Recommendation 10 and Special Recommendation VII  
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.10 PC  The SBP has not through law or regulation required that banks or 
exchange companies provide information to domestic competent 
authorities on a timely basis. 
 The SBP has not defined the time period for which Exchange Companies 
must maintain records. 
 The SECP has not through law or regulation required that NBFCs provide 
information to domestic competent authorities on a timely basis. 
 The SECP has not through law or regulation required that NBFCs 
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maintain records of customer identification for at least five years after the 
termination of a business relationship. 
 The SECP has not through law or regulation required that NBFCs 
maintain records of correspondence with customers for at least five years 
after the termination of a business relationship. 
 The SBP has not through law or regulation required that exchange 
companies maintain records of customer identification for at least five 
years after the termination of the business relationship. 
  
SR.VII LC   No clear obligations for ECs with regards to verification of the identify of 
originator, handling of incoming wire that lacks full originator 
information, and sending full originator information throughout the 
payment chain.  
 Banks are not required to obtain originator information or documentation 
from ECs conducting wire transfers on behalf of third parties. 
 Pakistan Postal Savings Bank is not subject to the wire transfer 
requirements when they engage in wire transfers/remittances. 
 
 
 
3.6. Monitoring of Transactions and Relationships (R.11 & 21) 
3.6.1. Description and Analysis 
702. Legal Framework: AMLO makes indirect reference in s7 (1) (c) to transactions that “has no 
apparent lawful purpose after examining the available facts, including the background and possible 
purpose of the transaction”. Indirect reference is also made to record keep in s7(3) but only where a STRs 
or CTRs have been made then records have to be kept for a period of five years subsequent to termination 
of its business relationship. S7 AMLO overall deals with the actual reporting of STRs as opposed to 
unusual transaction systems and controls.  
703. The Money Laundering Regulation 2008 s.4 (2) makes indirect reference to transaction that have 
“no apparent lawful purpose” when giving examples of suspicious transactions. The purpose, again, 
within the Regulations is for the making of STRs and not as a ‘control mechanism’ for the reporting 
entities.  
Special Attention to Complex, Unusual Large Transactions (c. 11.1) & Examination of Complex & 
Unusual Transactions (c. 11.2): 
704. The principal framework regarding the monitoring unusual transactions for SBP supervised 
institutions is in SBP prudential regulations PR-M2. Para 1(b) provides that specific procedures be 
established for ascertaining customer’s status and his source of earnings, for monitoring of accounts on a 
regular basis, for checking identities and bona fides of remitters and beneficiaries, for retaining internal 
record of transactions for future reference. The transactions, which are out of character/inconsistent with 
the history, pattern, or normal operation of the account involving heavy deposits / withdrawals / transfers, 
should be viewed with suspicion and properly investigated.  
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705. And PR-M5 Para 1 provides that banks / DFIs should pay special attention to all complex, 
unusually large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or 
visible lawful purpose.  The background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be 
examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help the relevant authorities in 
inspection and investigation.  
706. The SECP has only issued relevant regulations for Modarabas. Regulation 8 of NBFC and Clause 
4 Prudential regulations concerns record keeping and transaction that are out of character be scrutinized.  
707. Discussions with private sector representatives during the on site visit indicated that banks, by 
and large, have systems to detect complex, unusual, patterns of transaction and threshold indicators. 
Modarabas also had some systems but not as refined as those of the banks.  Whilst these systems were in 
place banks and Modarabas showed little understanding of risks posed by ML or TF which would 
indicate ‘rules’ used within the systems were probably not advanced as they could be.  
708. Other reporting entities (outside banks and Modarabas) showed little or no signs of having either 
manual or automated systems in place to identify complex, unusual transaction.  
709. Banks and Modarabas did have systems to examine transaction identified by their systems; the 
degree of examination varied by institution and was in the main based on the general understanding of 
ML and TF which is generally quite weak.  
710. In other institutions the lack of identification de facto means there is no examination.  
 
 
Record-Keeping of Findings of Examination (c. 11.3): 
711. S. 7(3) AMLO requires record keeping regarding unusual transactions but only where and STR 
(and CTR) has been made. “Every financial institution shall keep and maintain a record of all STR and 
CTRs filed by it for a period of five years subsequent to termination of its business relationship with the 
particular client whose transaction was reported.”  
712. Record keeping from the Companies Ordinance 1984 which is overarching for all companies; 
financial institutions fall within the definition of a company: s230(6) mandates the keeping of records but 
is limited to specific documents: books, accounts etc for a period of not less than 10 years. This however 
does not all records in relation to findings regarding unusual transactions.  
713. Prudential regulations issued by SPB and SECP mandate the keeping of records for a period of 5 
years. But no specific time period has yet been determined for ECs.  
714. The assessors were informed by the SPB, SECP (and other officials) as well as law enforcement 
officers that day-to-day records were generally kept for the required period (5 years) and were available 
for inspection. This reference was to general record keep and was not specific when it came to records in 
relation to unusual transactions and their examination were also being kept. Whilst AMLO does provide 
for such record keep it is narrow in its scope in that it only requires the maintenance of such records 
where a STR or CTR has been made but such records are not required where an unusual report had been 
generated within the institution but was not reported to FMU.  
Special Attention to Countries Not Sufficiently Applying FATF Recommendations (c. 21.1 & 21.1.1): 
715. Foreign Exchange Circular No. 1 of 2009 requires Exchange Companies entering into 
correspondent relationships to ensure that the respondent institution, to ensure that the respondent 
institution is effectively supervised and has a physical presence and is affiliated with a regulated financial 
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group and to pay particular attention when continuing relationships with respondents operating in 
jurisdictions that have poor KYC standards or have been “identified by the Financial Action Task Force 
as being ‘non-cooperative’ in the fight against money laundering.  Before signing an agreement, exchange 
companies must ensure the respondent is licensed in its home jurisdiction and assess the respondent’s 
KYC and AML programs.  
716. SBP Prudential Regulation M1 - 9(e), amended after the onsite visit and during the review period, 
requires Banks and DFIs to conduct enhanced due diligence when establishing business relationships or 
realizing transactions with counterparts in countries not sufficiently applying FATF recommendations. At 
the time of the on-site visit, there was no evidence that systems allowing the implementation of these 
enhanced due diligences where in place, prior the issuance of the revised PR-M1, and in particular 
whether the SBP had provided any indication of which would be those countries. To support their 
argument that they have taken action, the authorities note that SBP has circulated to banks and DFIs the 
names of Iranian banks – but didn’t specify whether this action was taken as a result of United Nations 
requirements, or concerns on Iran’s AML/CFT regime.  
717. SBP PR-M4 only requires banks / DFIs should pay particular attention when continuing 
relationships with correspondent banks located in jurisdictions that have poor KYC standards or have 
been identified by Financial Action Task Force as being “non-cooperative” in the fight against money 
laundering. The requirement, within this regulation does not go beyond the correspondent relationship.  
Examinations of Transactions with no Apparent Economic or Visible Lawful Purpose from Countries Not 
Sufficiently Applying FATF Recommendations (c. 21.2): 
718. As no rules and regulations or systems are in place covering this specific issue therefore no 
examinations is taking place.  
Ability to Apply Counter Measures with Regard to Countries Not Sufficiently Applying FATF 
Recommendations (c. 21.3): 
719. None of the supervisory bodies have any specific rules, policies or procedures in place to address 
this issue. In line with their analysis (see Recommendation 23) of the very broad prudential remit of SBP, 
the assessors note that SBP is likely to be in position to require banks and DFIs to apply counter-measures 
(at least several of those described by the FATF). The assessors note however that SBP has not taken such 
action thus far. 
3.6.2. Recommendations and Comments 
720. The authorities should consider the following recommendations. 
 Banks and Modarabas have implemented a system to monitor for unusual transactions. Beyond 
those sectors, there is virtually no implementation due to a lack of clear regulation to other 
sectors. Work needs to be undertaken by the supervisory bodies to strengthen the systems within 
banks and Modarabas and across all other area implement such systems. 
 The generally low level of understanding of the risks posed by ML and TF do not aid the 
examination of transaction (within banks and Modarabas) to determine legitimacy or otherwise of 
the transactions. Training and awareness raising based on a national risk assessment covering ML 
and TF (which currently does not exist) would greatly assist in this area. 
 The legal and regulatory framework for monitoring transactions emanates solely from prudential 
regulations affecting only those supervised by SBP. Its effective implementation is weak in 
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relations to banks and in other sectors non-existent. Consideration should be given to 
incorporating all the principals of: monitoring; examination; record keeping; and systems for 
dealing with countries not applying FATF standards in an amendment to AMLO. This should 
then be underpinned with more detailed regulations from the supervisory bodies that reflect the 
different business areas covered by the supervisors.  
 Record keeping requirements are generally fragmented and inconsistent across different laws and 
regulations, situation which affects the ability of financial institutions have records available 
regarding unusual transaction. AMLO is not specific in relation to the keeping records relating to 
internal unusual reports. AMLO should be amended to explicitly deal with record keeping in 
relation to unusual reports generated within a financial institution whether they are reported to the 
FMU or not.  
 Requirements under Recommendation 21 should be laid out outside the banking sector (SECP) 
3.6.3. Compliance with Recommendations 11 & 21  
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.11 PC  Outside banks and Modarabas there are no legal or regulatory 
requirements or systems dealing with monitoring or examination and 
therefore no controls within other institutions to deal with monitoring or 
examination of transactions. 
 Effectiveness of the ability for banks and Modarabas to examine 
transactions is impeded by a generally poor understanding of the ML 
and TF risks faced by Pakistan or internationally. 
 Record keeping in relation to the examination of internal unusual reports 
not sent to FMU is not explicit. Effectiveness in relation to record 
keeping for unusual reports that formed STRs was not evidenced. 
 
R.21 PC  Despite recent progress for financial institutions supervised by SBP, 
there are no rules or regulations for all other types of FIs 
 Pakistan is not in legal position to implement counter-measures for non-
bank financial institutions 
 
 
 
3.7. Suspicious Transaction Reports and Other Reporting (R.13-14, 19, 25 & SR.IV) 
3.7.1. Description and Analysis 
Legal Framework and Requirement to Make STRs on ML and TF to FIU (c.13.1IV): 
721. Section 7(1) AMLO requires every ‘financial institution’ to make STRs (including attempted 
transactions) to the FMU no later than 7 days after of forming the suspicion that transaction: (a) involves 
funds derived from illegal activities or is intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise proceeds of 
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crime; (b) is designed to evade any requirements of this section; or (c) has no apparent lawful purpose 
after examining the available facts, including the background and possible purpose of the transaction.  
722. The requirement to report covers all ‘predicate crimes’ for ML and TF as listed in the Schedule to 
AMLO, however, this Schedule does not cover all predicate crimes covered under Recommendation 1 
(see Recommendation 1).  
723. SBP has issued Prudential Regulations, PR-M5, which date back to 2005 to give guidance on 
‘suspicion’ and required reporting of STRs.  These regulations only cover institutions supervised by SBP 
and did not extend to SECP-regulated entities.  
724. The FMU issued, under the AMLO, Money Laundering Regulations to all reporting entities in 
January 2009. They further reinforce the requirement to make STRs. Annex 1 of the Regulations includes 
guidance on identifying suspicion and examples of suspicious transactions related to both ML and TF.  
Section 13 of Annex 1 gives specific guidance on TF related STRs and is based on the FATF’s Guidance 
for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing. 
STRs Related to Terrorism and its Financing (c. 13.2 and SRIV):  
725. There is no direct mandatory obligation to file an STR when there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect that funds are linked to, related to, or are to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist 
organizations. 
726. Offences under the ATA are included as predicate crime for the purpose of AMLO. However, the 
test for suspicion is focused on funds derived from illegal activities and actions to hide or disguise 
proceeds of crime, rather than transaction related to TF, which may involve legitimately derived funds. 
Funds derived from terrorism or terrorist financing offences would be covered by the AMLO provision. 
Section7 (1) AMLO (the legislative reporting requirement) does not directly mention TF:  
Every financial institution shall file with the FMU, to the extent and in the manner prescribed by 
the FMU, Suspicious Transaction Report conducted or attempted by, at or through that financial 
institution if the financial institution knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that the transaction (or a 
pattern of transactions of which the transaction is a part):  
(a) involves funds derived from illegal activities or is intended or conducted in order to hide or 
disguise proceeds of crime; 
(b) is designed to evade any requirements of this section; or 
(c) has no apparent lawful purpose after examining the available facts, including the background 
and possible purpose of the transaction. 
 
727. On the basis of S 7, the STR obligation therefore covers proceeds of crime derived from terrorist 
financing. Similarly, the obligations would cover suspicious transactions related to proceeds of crime 
which may be terrorist funds. It is however not a straight and direct reporting obligation on terrorism 
financing. 
728. In relation to TF reporting: s7 AMLO only mandates reporting from ‘financial institutions’ to the 
FMU, however, s11L ATA has a general reporting requirement to a police officer of all offences under 
the ATA (which includes TF) from all persons, not just ‘financial institutions’, which potentially creates a 
separate obligation to file a report of suspicion of TF. No statistics were provided to demonstrate that any 
reports have been made to the police under section 11L of the ATA that relate to TF.  
No Reporting Threshold for STRs (c. 13.3) 
729. The reporting requirements under s7 AMLO are wholly suspicion based, regardless of value; the 
requirement also includes attempted transactions being reported.  
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Making of ML and TF STRs Regardless of Possible Involvement of Tax Matters (c. 13.4, c. IV.2): 
730. Reporting requirements for STRs are suspicious based and although fiscal offences are not 
predicate offences in AMLO, STRs are required to be filed regardless of the possible involvement of tax 
matters.  
Additional Element - Reporting of All Criminal Acts (c. 13.5): 
731. Section 7 of AMLO meets the additional elements to report all criminal acts.  
Protection for Making STRs (c. 14.1): 
732. S. 12 AMLO provides for protection for making STRs: “No civil or criminal proceedings against 
banking companies, financial institutions, etc., in certain cases.- Save as otherwise provided in section 7, 
the financial institutions, non-financial businesses and professions, intermediaries and their officers shall 
not be liable to any civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings against them for furnishing information 
required under this Ordinance or the rules made hereunder.”  
Prohibition Against Tipping-Off (c. 14.2): 
733. s34(1) AMLO The directors, officers, employees and agents of any financial institution, non-
financial business or profession or intermediary which report a suspicious transaction or CTR pursuant to 
this law or any other authority, are prohibited from notifying any person involved in the transaction that 
the transaction has been reported. (2) A violation of the sub-section (1) is a criminal offence and shall be 
punishable by a maximum term of three years imprisonment or a fine of rupees one hundred thousand or 
both. (3) Any confidential information furnished by a financial institution, non-financial business and 
profession, intermediary or any other person under or pursuant to the provisions of this Ordinance, shall, 
as far as possible, be kept confidential by the FMU, investigation agency or officer as the case may be.  
Additional Element—Confidentiality of Reporting Staff (c. 14.3): 
734. See comments above regarding s 34(3) AMLO.  
 
Recommendation 19 
Consideration of Reporting of Currency Transactions Above a Threshold (c. 19.1) 
735. S 12 AMLO s2(c) AMLO defines “CTR” as meaning a report on currency transactions exceeding 
such amount as may be specified by the National Executive Committee. This threshold has not yet been 
set so CTR reporting is not yet in force.  
736. S 7(2) AMLO envisages the reporting of CTRs “to the extent and in the manner prescribed by the 
FMU, be filed by the financial institutions with the FMU immediately, but not later than seven working 
days, after the respective currency transaction”.  
737. The Money Laundering Regulations s5 also layout out provisions for the making of CTR but, as 
yet, does not provide the threshold required for reporting. The assessors were informed that this was a 
policy decision in order that they may strengthen the STR reporting regime and also have adequate IT 
systems prior to implementation the CTR regime.  
Additional Element—Computerized Database for Currency Transactions Above a Threshold and Access 
by Competent Authorities (c. 19.2) 
738. Cash and currency transaction reporting has not been introduced. If the threshold for CTR 
reporting was mandated (by Regulation) there would not be any database application suitable to store or 
make the information available to competent authorities.  CTR reporting would be consider, the assessors 
are informed, when such an application was available to the FMU.  
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Additional Element—Proper Use of Reports of Currency Transactions Above a Threshold (c. 19.3): 
739. No such system is yet in place. 
Guidelines that will assist financial institutions and DNFBP (c 25.1): 
740. The Money Launder Regulations 2008 (issued Jan 2009) circulated to all “financial institutions” 
contain indicators of suspicious behavior. These Regulations, however, contain predominantly examples 
of M/L and concentrate mainly on banking sector activities.  
741. Prudential Regulation - PRM5 - issued by the SBP issued to financial institutions they supervise, 
since 2005 and updated, also contain similar guidance to the regulations.  
742. SECP and other supervisory bodies had not issued any such guidance to the institutions they 
supervise but have now circulated the Money Laundering Regulations.  
 
FIU to Provide Adequate and appropriate feedback (c 25.2) 
743. No examples were provided to the assessment team that demonstrated that feedback was 
provided, at a general level; statistics etc; or at the specific level. Indeed it is the view of the FMU that 
AMLO does not mandate this form of feedback so they are not required to provide it. The only evidence 
of minor feedback was acknowledgement of receipt of STR usually because they are hand delivered. It is 
not conceivable that hand-receipt / acknowledgment can realistically continue as the reporting sector 
grows.  
 
 
Analysis of Effectiveness: 
744. As the Regulations were only issued on January 6th the effectiveness of the ‘new’ reporting 
requirement was not able to be fully assessed as STRs had not started to appear in the newly mandated 
format.  The reporting requirements prior to these regulations were not effective as they required the 
FMU calling for additional information / documents from reporting entities to assist in analysis to the 
expected standards as opposed to the correct information of documents being made available in the 
reports.  
745. However, a suspicious reporting regime existed in relation to institutions supervised by the SBP 
by way of prudential regulations which date back to 2005 (these are still applicable today) and by 
obligations in the NAO. The previous requirements resulted in poor levels of reporting and only from 
banks.  
746. Since enactment of AMLO in December 2007, the combined effect of AMLO and these 
prudential regulations had at the time of the on-site assessment only produced 170 STRs in 2008 and 350 
STRs in the period January – April 2009, and those were received exclusively from the banking sector. 
Even taking into account the small number of reporting banks together with the size and complexity of 
their banking products this number was still surprisingly low. This does not represent good effective and 
adequate reporting across the whole of the banking sector nor does it take account of any effective 
implementation in other financial institutions. The enforcement of the long standing prudential reporting 
requirements has been weak and non-existent in other areas. See additional comment in Section 2.5 FIU.  
747. There was no indication provided to the assessors that any reports had been received specifically 
in relation to TF during the review period. The authorities indicated that they have received since a 
limited number of additional STRs that, prima facie, seem to be related to TF.  
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748. Financial Institutions felt there was a requirement to go beyond the forming of a mere suspicion 
and that they needed to ‘evidence’ that suspicion.  
3.7.2. Recommendations and Comments 
749. The authorities should consider the following recommendations. 
 The list or predicate offences required to be reported for the purpose of ML needs to cover all 
predicate crimes covered under Recommendation 1. 
 There should be a direct mandatory obligation to file an STR when there are reasonable grounds 
to suspect that funds are linked to, related to, or are to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or 
terrorist organizations. 
 The inconsistencies within the reporting requirements regarding TF need to be explicitly 
addressed by an amendment to AMLO. 
 Further encourage improved reporting, both in terms of quality and quantity. Care should be 
taken thought not to encourage defensive reporting or reporting for the ‘sake of numbers’. 
Training and then an effective feed-back combined with enforcement action, where necessary, 
needs to be considered. 
 FMU should further engage SBP and SECP to devise an integrated approach to foster reporting. 
This approach should be based on  the potential risk posed by the different sectors  
 Deepen the training of staff in financial institutions, taking into account (i) possible ‘loopholes’ 
created by the non-reporting of tax matters and explain how this can be used to cover transactions 
that are otherwise suspicious and should be reported and (ii) that whilst transactions should be 
properly reviewed by an institution before making an STR the ‘burden’ on the institution did not 
amount to the institution have to evidence a suspicion.  
 Revise the reporting Guidelines (i) incorporate different examples covering sectors other than 
banking and (ii) provide more Pakistani based examples. 
 FMU needs to address the whole issue of the lack of feedback as a matter of urgency. If there is a 
perceived or real prohibition (the assessors see no legal prohibition) regarding the provision of 
feedback this needs to be also addressed urgently. 
 The maintaining of confidentiality by the FMU and other investigative bodies is potentially 
undermined by language used in s34 (1) (3) AMLO which states “shall, as far as possible, be kept 
confidential by the FMU… ”. This does not determine when or where such confidentiality may be 
broken.  
 
3.7.3. Compliance with Recommendations 13, 14, 19 and 25 (criteria 25.2), and Special 
 Recommendation IV 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.13 PC  Not all predicate crimes in Rec 1 are covered. 
 Whilst AMLO covers reporting across all financial institutions only 
banks have reported and in very low numbers. 
 The overall STR regime is not working effectively.  
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R.14 C   
R.19 C   
R.25 PC  Guidelines are only predominately banking orientated; no account is 
taken of other reporting entities. Examples shown are also generic 
international examples with little or no local context. 
 There is no effective feedback being offered via the FMU or other 
competent body. 
SR.IV NC  There is no direct mandatory obligation to file an STR when there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are linked to, related to, or are 
to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organizations. 
 TF STR obligations are limited to proceeds of terrorism 
 
 Emphasis on reporting requirements are biased towards ML and not TF. 
 Despite the prevalence of terrorism in Pakistan, implementation of the 
obligation to report TF related STRs is very weak.  
  
 
 
 
 
Internal controls and other measures 
 
3.8. Internal Controls, Compliance, Audit and Foreign Branches (R.15 & 22) 
3.8.1. Description and Analysis 
750. Legal Framework: SBP Prudential Regulations require banks to establish internal controls.  For 
Exchange Companies, the obligation to establish internal controls flows from the Rules and Regulations 
for Exchange Companies.  NBFCs are required to establish internal controls by the Prudential 
Regulations for NBFCs.  Modarabas have additional obligations under the Prudential Regulations for 
Modarabas.  Brokers are governed by the Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, by the Securities and 
Exchange Rules and by the rules of the stock exchanges of which they are members.  The regulatory 
regime does not cover Pakistan Post when it provides financial services.  
751. Financial institutions with which the assessment team met during the on-site visit had established 
compliance departments and had designated compliance officers at the management level.  However, at 
the time of the assessment, the regulatory regime was missing key elements, such as internal audit and 
training requirements for certain sectors. 
Establish and Maintain Internal Controls to Prevent ML and TF (c. 15.1, 15.1.1 & 15.1.2): 
SBP 
752. Banks must establish and maintain internal controls to prevent money laundering and terrorist 
financing.  SBP Prudential Regulation M-1 requires banks to establish a compliance unit with a full-time 
head of compliance, to put in place systems to detect unusual activity and to maintain proper records of 
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customer identification.  Compliance officers have timely access to account files, which contain customer 
identification data, other CDD information, transaction records and other relevant information.  
753. Banks must have policies and procedures in place to ensure records are properly maintained.  
SBP Prudential Regulation M-3 requires banks to maintain all transaction records for at least five years 
and to maintain records relating to suspicious activity until the bank gets permission from SBP to destroy 
the records.  SBP Prudential Regulation M-3 requires banks to retain CDD records for at least five years 
after terminating a business relationship.  CDD records are kept with the account files, to which 
compliance officers have timely access.  
ECs 
754. ECs are required, as per Rules and Regulations (para. 33) issued under the Foreign Exchange 
Circular No.09 (July 30, 2002) to “adopt proper techniques of internal control such as internal audit.” 
This requirement is not specific to AML/CFT and does not address detail of the internal control system in 
terms of coverage. The SBP is taking a gradual approach to regulating ECs, and therefore has not yet 
required exchange companies to appoint compliance officers.  Anticipating this requirement, many ECs 
have appointed compliance officers at the management level.  
SECP 
755. NBFCs, including Modarabas, regulated by the SECP are also required to establish internal 
controls to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.  The NBFC rules issued in 2003 require 
NBFCs to appoint at the management level a compliance officer who is responsible for reporting the 
status of compliance to the SECP.  The Prudential Regulations for Modarabas have a similar, overlapping 
requirement to establish an anti-money laundering program, including the appointment of a compliance 
officer at the senior management level.   
756. At the time of the on-site visit, the NBFC rules also required institutions regulated by the SECP 
to maintain all transaction records for at least 10 years and to monitor transactions for suspicious activity 
but did not specify the period for which NBFCs must retain the records related to customer identification.  
On April 28, 2009, the SECP issued a circular requiring NBFCs to maintain records related to customer 
identification.  
757. The stock exchanges in Islamabad and Karachi have required brokers to develop policies and 
procedures to maintain records, including CDD documentation, for five years.  But they have not required 
brokers to appoint a chief compliance officer or to monitor for suspicious activity.  
 
Independent Audit of Internal Controls to Prevent ML and TF (c. 15.2): 
SBP 
758. Banks must maintain adequately resourced independent audit functions.  Prudential Regulation 
G-6 requires banks to establish a separate department “to conduct audit of the bank’s / DFI’s various 
Divisions, Offices, Units, Branches etc. in accordance with the guidelines of the Audit Manual duly 
approved by the Broad of Directors.”  The regulations require the internal auditors to report directly to the 
board of directors’ internal audit committee.  Annexure VII-B of the Prudential Regulations states that 
key executives may not head more than one functional area that would result in a conflict of interest 
within the organization.  “For example the departments of Audit and Accounts cannot be headed by the 
same person,” Annexure VII-B says.  The regulation does not require sample testing.  
ECs 
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759. Exchange companies must also establish an internal audit function.  Paragraph 33 of the Rules 
and Regulations for Exchange Companies states: “The company shall adopt proper techniques of internal 
control such as internal audit.”  Although the regulation does not require independent and resourced audit 
function or specify reporting lines, SBP has encouraged exchange companies to ensure the auditor has 
sufficient autonomy.  The regulation does not require sample testing.  
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SECP 
760. Part I, Paragraph 5 of the Prudential Regulations for NBFCs requires NBFCs to maintain 
adequately resourced independent audit functions. The regulations states: “An NBFC shall have an 
Internal Audit Department whose head shall report to the board of directors of that NBFC directly and 
shall, inter alia, be responsible for compliance with these Regulations and for establishing an effective 
means of testing, checking and compliance with the policy and procedures established by it.”  Modarabas 
have a similar, overlapping internal audit requirement under Part IV of the Prudential Regulations for 
Modarabas.  
761. The securities exchanges in Islamabad and Karachi have not required brokers to maintain an 
adequately resourced and independent audit function to test compliance (including sample testing) with 
these procedures, policies and controls.  
Ongoing Employee Training on AML/CFT Matters (c. 15.3): 
SBP 
762. Banks are required to establish ongoing employee training programs.  SBP Prudential Regulation 
M-1 requires banks to develop a plan to provide periodic training to employees on initial and ongoing 
customer due diligence.  In addition, SBP Prudential Regulation M-2 requires banks to inform employees 
of their personal responsibility to implement effective AML/CFT safeguards and to train employees.  
 
 
ECs 
763. There is no specific provision that requires ECs to undertake ongoing employee training on 
AML/CFT matters.  
SECP 
764. At the time of the on-site visit, NBFCs, including Modarabas and securities brokers were not 
required to provide ongoing employee training programs.  On April 28, 2009, the SECP issued a circular 
require NBFCs to establish ongoing training programs for their workers.  
Employee Screening Procedures (c. 15.4): 
SBP 
765. Banks are required to put in place screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring 
employees.  SBP Prudential Regulation G-1 requires banks to “develop and implement appropriate 
screening procedures to ensure high standards and integrity at the time of hiring all employees, whether 
contractual or permanent.”  
EC 
766. SBP must approve Exchange Companies’ chief executives.  Exchange Companies are not 
required to put in place screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees.  
SECP 
767. Securities brokers are required to be registered with the SECP.  People who have been convicted 
of fraud or breach of trust are ineligible for registration, as are partners of brokerage firms or directors of 
brokerage companies that have been convicted of an offense.  Similar disqualifiers apply to people who 
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want to register as agents of registered brokers. Brokers hiring agents must certify that the agent is fit and 
proper per criteria established in Members Agents and Traders (Eligibility Standards) Rules of 2001.  
Therefore, the hiring broker must de facto have in place screening procedures to ensure that the agents 
meet high standards.  
768. Screening, however, does not apply for all employees of securities brokers, nor does it apply to 
all employees of other NBFCs, including Modarabas.  Only executives of other types of NBFCs, 
including Modarabas, are required to be subject to screening procedures to ensure high standards.  
Application of AML/CFT Measures to Foreign Branches & Subsidiaries (c. 22.1, 22.1.1 & 22.1.2) 
SBP 
769. SBP Prudential Regulation M-5 requires Pakistani branches of foreign bank and foreign branches 
of Pakistani banks to comply with SBP regulations or the relevant regulations of the relevant foreign 
jurisdiction, whichever are more exhaustive.  SBP regulators are of the view that banks that are unable to 
comply with an SBP regulation because of differences between AML/CFT regimes would inform SBP of 
the problem, but there is no legal requirement that banks inform SBP when a foreign branch is unable to 
observe AML/CFT measures because of a conflict of laws in the host country.  
ECs 
770. ECs are not allowed to open foreign branches or subsidiaries.  
SECP 
 
771. The NBFC Regulations (2008) require NBFCs to obtain SECP’s approval before establishing 
operations outside Pakistan.  Authorities said no NBFCs have asked for approached SECP about 
establishing foreign operations.  As a result, SECP has not issued a rule requiring NBFCs to inform then 
when a foreign branch is unable to observe AML/CFT measures because of conflict of laws in the host 
country 
Analysis of Effectiveness: 
772. The SBP has strong credibility as a banking supervisor and has used its power to foster 
compliance.  But as far as the securities market is concerned, the assessors are not satisfied with the 
effectiveness of the regulatory or supervisory regimes.  For NBFCs, the SECP is better equipped, but its 
examination manual is too narrow in scope.  It does not cover key requirements, such as STRs or ongoing 
due diligence.  (See Section 3.1 for details). SECP indicates that it will revise its examination manual to 
reflect its new CDD circular, issued in April 2009. 
773. Training concerning ML and FT trends, techniques and methods cannot be fully effective absent 
a comprehensive risk assessment.  Pakistan has yet to provide a comprehensive risk assessment to 
financing institutions, nor has it conducted private sector outreach on illicit finance risks.  
3.8.2. Recommendations and Comments 
 
774. The authorities should consider the following recommendations. 
 The FMU should assist banks in identifying ML and TF trends so that banks tune their internal 
controls and ongoing training programs to address better the ML and TF risks in Pakistan. 
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 The SBP should expand its internal control requirements for exchange companies to require the 
appointment of a compliance officer and establish and maintain strong internal policies and controls.  
The SBP should also embody its recommendation that the auditors be independent in a formal rule. 
 The SECP has required NBFCs to establish ongoing training programs for their employees.   
 The SECP should require NBFCs to implement screening standards to ensure all their employees 
meet the highest ethical standards.  The SECP should also extend the requirement to all beneficial 
owners of NBFCs. 
 Brokers should be required to designate chief compliance officers and to establish and maintain an 
adequately resourced independent internal audit function. 
 
3.8.3. Compliance with Recommendations 15 & 22 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.15 PC  The SECP does not require NBFCs to establish initial and ongoing 
training programs to make their employees aware of the AML/CFT 
obligations or of ML and TF trends. 
 The SECP does not require all NBFCs to implement screening standards 
to ensure all their employees meet the highest ethical standards. 
 Brokers are not required to designate compliance officers, to have an 
adequately resourced independent internal audit function or to monitor 
for suspicious activity. 
 The SBP does not require exchange companies to appoint compliance 
officers, nor it requires exchange companies to develop and maintain 
sufficient internal controls to prevent ML/TF 
 The SBP does not require exchange companies to establish an 
independent audit function. 
 The regulatory regime does not cover Pakistan Post when it provides 
financial services. 
  
R.22 LC  The SBP has not issued a regulation requiring financial institutions to 
inform SBP when foreign branches cannot observe AML/CFT measures 
because of a conflict of laws in the host country. 
 
 
3.9. Shell Banks (R.18) 
3.9.1. Description and Analysis 
775. Legal Framework: Capital requirements and licensing procedures as well as Para.3 of Prudential 
Regulation M-4.  
Prohibition of Establishment Shell Banks (c. 18.1): 
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776. Regulators said that Pakistan’s capital requirements and licensing process discourage anyone 
from establishing a shell bank in Pakistan.  Regulators said they have not licensed any shell banks, nor 
have they allowed any shell banks to operate in Pakistan. SBP has the legal capacity to deny licensing to 
any potential or actual shell bank.  
Prohibition of Correspondent Banking with Shell Banks (c. 18.2); Requirement to Satisfy Respondent 
Financial Institutions Prohibit of Use of Accounts by Shell Banks (c. 18.3): 
777. Paragraph 3 of Prudential Regulation M-4 prohibits banks from entering into or continuing a 
correspondent relationship with a shell bank.  The regulation also requires banks to guard against entering 
into correspondent relationships with foreign financial institutions that permit their accounts to be used by 
shell banks.  
 
3.9.2. Recommendations and comments 
3.9.3. Compliance with Recommendation 18 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.18 C  
 
 
 
 
Regulation, supervision, guidance, monitoring and sanctions 
 
3.10. The Supervisory and Oversight System—Competent Authorities and SROs. Role, 
Functions, Duties, and Powers (Including Sanctions) (R. 23, 29, 17 & 25) 
3.10.1. Description and analysis 
778. Legal Framework: There are mainly two regulators for the financial sector in Pakistan:  
 State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) regulates and supervises the banks (of all forms, except investment 
banks), DFIs and Exchange Companies. 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) regulates all Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions (including investment banks). In addition, the SECP is the regulator / supervisor for 
the Company Law, and several of its powers for its supervision of non-bank financial institutions 
are defined in this Act. It is worth noting that provisions of the Companies Act (and related 
sanctions) can be used towards banks, DFIs, and ECs – and are then to be enforced by the SECP. 
Finally, as far as securities markets are concerned, most of the regulatory and supervisory powers 
are shared between the SECP and the Exchanges – which are the front-line supervisors – and are 
de facto solely exercised by the Exchanges. 
779. The assessment team was also advised that Pakistan has launched a significant revision of several 
of the key acts governing the financial sector, including the banking law and the SECP law.  They were 
also informed that these revisions may entail a new division of labor between the SBP and the SECP, as 
the former may see its remit expanded.  
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780. Even if not as complex as some other countries, the assessors have however noted that overall, 
the legal framework for financial supervision is rather complex and fragmented, as the various powers (in 
particular of the SECP) are scattered across various laws and regulations – and in particular between the 
“general laws” governing the regulator / supervisor (apex laws) and the ones specific to certain categories 
of entities.  
781. As a consequence, the assessors – with the help of the authorities – have prepared Tables 16 and 
17 in order to make it easier for the reader to identify the relevant legal basis.  
 
Table 16:  State Bank of Pakistan 
 Power to 
regulate 
Power to 
issue 
guidance 
Power to 
license / 
register 
Power to 
supervise 
Power to 
access 
information 
Power to 
conduct on-
site 
inspections 
Power to 
sanction 
Apex 
legislation 
SBP Act 
1956 
BCO 1962 BCO 1962 SBP Act 
1956 
BCO 1962 
BCO 1962 BCO 1962 BCO 1962 
Banks / 
DFIs 
SBP Act 
1956 
BCO 1962 BCO 1962 SBP Act 
1956 
BCO 1962 
BCO 1962 BCO 1962 BCO 1962 
Exchange 
companies 
FERA, 
1947 
FERA, 
1947 
FERA, 
1947 
FERA, 
1947 
FERA, 1947 FERA, 1947 FERA, 1947 
 
Table 17:  Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
 Power to 
regulate 
Power to 
issue 
guidance 
Power to 
license / 
register 
Power to 
supervise 
Power to 
access 
informatio
n 
Power to 
conduct 
on-site 
inspections 
Power to 
sanction 
Apex 
legislations 
       
NBFCs Companies 
Ordinance, 
1984 
Section 282 
B 
Section 282 
C 
Section 20 
of SECP 
Act and part 
VIII A of 
the 
Companies 
Law 
Section 282 
G 
Section 282 
I 
Section 282 
J & K 
Modarabas Modaraba 
Companies 
and 
Modaraba 
(Floatation 
& Control) 
Ordinance, 
1980 read 
with SECP 
Act 
A specific 
power to 
make 
regulations 
by the 
Commissio
n is ending 
enactment 
in the 
Ordinance. 
However 
The federal 
Government 
Part II 
Section 4 to 
6 
Section 20 
of the SECP 
Act and the 
Modaraba 
Ordinance. 
Section 32 
of SECP 
Act 
Section 21 
of the 
Modaraba 
Ordinance 
during 
investigatio
ns 
Section 21 
of the 
Modaraba 
Ordinance 
and section 
29 -31 of 
the SECP 
Act 
Section 31 
and 32  of 
the 
Modaraba 
Ordinance  
these are the 
specific 
section 
however, 
there are 
various 
section that 
empower 
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 Power to 
regulate 
Power to 
issue 
guidance 
Power to 
license / 
register 
Power to 
supervise 
Power to 
access 
informatio
n 
Power to 
conduct 
on-site 
inspections 
Power to 
sanction 
can make 
rules under 
section 41 
of the 
Ordinance. 
Further the 
Commissio
n may make 
Regulations
, etc. under 
the SECP 
Act. 
 
SECP to 
impose 
sanctions 
Securities 
Markets 
Securities 
and 
Exchange 
Ordinance , 
1969 (SEO 
69) 
Read with: 
SECP Act 
Section 33 
of SEO 69 
for Rule 
making by 
the Federal 
Government 
and section 
34 of SEO 
69 for 
Regulation 
making 
Section 4 to 
Section 5 A 
of SEO 69 
Section 20 
of SECP 
Act SEO 69 
Section 6 
and section 
21 of SEO 
69 
 Section 32 
of SECP 
Act 
Section 21 
of SEO 69  
read with 
section 29 - 
31 of SECP 
Act 
 
Section 22 
and section 
24 of SEO 
69 
 
782. The legal framework is further complicated by the fact that the AMLO is silent on the preventive 
measures beyond the suspicious transactions reporting requirements. It does not contain any reference to 
the preventive measures to be adopted by financial institutions in the context of AML/CFT. Article 44 
refers to “power to make regulation”, and states “subject to the supervision and control of the national 
executive committee, FMU may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such regulations as may be 
necessary for carrying out its operations and meeting the objects of this Ordinance”. Similarly, article 6, 
which defines the powers of the FMU, states that the FMU may “frame regulations in consultation with 
SBP and SECP for ensuring receipt of Suspicious Transactions Reports and CTRs from the financial 
institutions and non-financial businesses and professions with the approval of the National Executive 
Committee”, and “to perform all such functions and exercise all such powers as are necessary for, or 
ancillary to, the attainment of the objects of this Ordinance”. The authorities indicate that they plan to 
amend the AMLO to allow for the FMU to recommend to the regulatory authorities to issue regulations 
on CDD and ancillary record-keeping.  
783. In practice, SBP and SECP had issued regulations relevant to the fight against money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism before the enactment of the AMLO, using their general supervisory 
powers. As the AMLO is silent on which body is in charge of the regulation / supervision of financial 
institutions on the AML/CFT preventive measures (except for the regulations related to STRs and CTRs), 
SBP and SECP have maintained the same practice as before September 2007 when AMLO was enacted. 
This approach has never been challenged in court, while sanctions have been issued both by SBP (and the 
Exchanges) on the basis of non-compliance with CDD requirements.  
784. As far as regulation of the reporting obligation is concerned, the AMLO gives primacy to the 
FMU, in consultation with SBP and SECP (and as indicated in other sections of this report, FMU has 
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used this power). It is worth noting however, that SBP has also issued regulations covering the reporting 
requirements (PR-M2 and the annexure on “red flags” for reporting).  
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Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions (c. 23.1) / Designation of Competent Authority (c. 
23.2): 
785. There is at the moment no formal designation through the AMLO of the competent authorities 
having responsibility to ensure that financial institutions adequately comply with the requirements to 
combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Even as far as the reporting requirements are 
concerned, there is no authority designated in AMLO to control compliance. The only indirect mention 
appears in article 37 (liability for failure to file suspicious transaction report and for providing false 
information), which sets out a criminal sanction for failure to report any suspicious transaction (article 37-
1). Article 37-2 then states that in case of conviction, SBP or SECP “may revoke [the] license or take any 
other administrative action, as it deems appropriate”.  
786. As indicated above, SBP and the SECP (together with the Exchanges) are supervising the 
implementation of the AML/CFT related regulations that they have issued on the basis of their general 
regulatory powers.  
SBP 
787. For banks and DFIs, the main provisions laying out the regulatory and supervisory powers of 
SBP are laid out respectively in article 40A (responsibility of State Bank), 41 (Power of the State Bank to 
give directions) and 40 (Inspection) of the Banking Companies Ordinance.  
788. Article 40A states that “its shall be the responsibility and duty of the State Bank to systematically 
monitor the performance of every banking company so as to ensure that it is complying with the 
applicable statutory criteria and banking rules and regulations”.  
789. Article 41 states that “where the State Bank is satisfied that (a) in the public interest; or (b) to 
prevent the affairs of any banking company being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of 
the depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the banking company […], it is necessary to 
issue directions to banking companies generally or to any banking company in particular, it may, from 
time to time, issue such directions as it deems fit, and the banking companies or the banking company, as 
the case may be, shall be bound to comply with such directions”  
790. Article 40 gives power to SBP to inspect banking companies as follows: “the State Bank may, at 
any time, and, on being directed so to do by the Federal Government, shall, inspect any banking company 
and its books and accounts”.  
ECs 
791. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 (amended in 2002) empowers SBP to regulate and 
supervise ECs, thus the SBP is the designated competent authority to ensure compliance of ECs with 
prudential requirements, which are deemed by SBP covering AML/CFT. Exchange Policy Department of 
SBP issue regulations, circulars, guidance, among others, to ECs while the banking inspection department 
of SBP is responsible for on-site inspections. The findings of the on-site inspections are shared with the 
Exchange Policy Department.  
SECP 
792. The SECP has been empowered with the regulation, supervision and promotion of self regulatory 
organizations for ensuring their effective role in the development of a broad-based, vibrant and efficient 
capital market. Article 20 of the SECP Act includes powers to register and license, regulate, supervise and 
conduct investigations. In parallel, part VIII A of the Companies Act as amended defines the provisions 
relative to the establishment and regulation of non-banking finance companies – which comprise the 
following forms of business: investment finance companies, leasing, housing finance services, venture 
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capital investment, discounting services, investment advisory services and asset management services. 
Article 282 A to N define the range of powers granted to the SECP, which include the powers: to make 
rules and regulations; to register; to issue directions; to remove; to supersede the Board of Directors; to 
require to furnish information; to conduct special audit; to conduct inquiries; to impose penalties.  
793. Article 282B (power to regulate) provides a very comprehensive basis for SECP to issue 
regulations (“such regulations may provide for any matter which the Commission deems fit for the 
effective regulations of NBFCs and notified entities and their business and activities”). Article 282D 
(power to issue directions) provides the SECP with the power to issue directions “when it is satisfied that 
it is necessary and expedient to do so (a) in the public interest”.  
794. Several articles of Part IX of the SECP Act (article 40 – power to make regulations, article 40A – 
penalty for violation of rules and regulations, article 40B – power of the Commission to issue directives, 
circulars, guidelines, etc.) grant the SECP the classical regulatory and supervisory powers for all financial 
institutions under its remit.  
795. For NBFCs, SECP has used its general supervisory powers to supervise and enforce AML/CFT 
related requirements, deriving either from the SECP Act, the Companies Act or the sector specific 
legislation.  
796. SECP as the regulator of the capital market has been entrusted with the regulatory oversight of 
the three stock exchanges i.e. the Karachi Stock Exchange, the Lahore Stock Exchange and the Islamabad 
Stock Exchange; and the National Clearing Company and Central Depository Company.  
797. The exchanges act as frontline regulators for their members, brokers, agents of brokers and listed 
companies. The stock exchanges through the implementation and enforcement of a comprehensive set of 
regulations, as the frontline regulators, ensure that the regulatees comply with essential requirements for 
increasing transparency and market integrity for enhancing investor confidence.  
798. The powers of the Karachi Stock Exchange are defined in its Memorandum and Articles of 
Association of the Karachi Stock Exchange and include the powers to regulate and supervise, as well as to 
take follow-up action against its members (see article IV of the Memorandum – object of the exchange 
and articles 52 and 53 of the Articles of Association14. 
799. The articulation and division of labor between the SECP and the Exchanges is laid out in the 
Securities and Exchanges Act, essentially in Chapter VI. It gives the Federal Government power to make 
rules (article 33), the Exchanges power to make regulations “subject to the prior approval of the 
Commission” (article 34-1) and the Commission power to direct the Exchanges to make regulation 
(article 34-4), and if the Exchange does not comply, the capacity for the Commission to substitute then.  
800. The assessors’ understanding of the functioning of this two-level regulation and supervision of 
the securities markets (on the basis of the example of the KSE) is that regulations are prepared by the 
KSE, and issued after their clearance by the SECP. The licensing is a responsibility of the SECP, on the 
basis of due diligence undertaken by the KSE and completed by SECP. Inspections and examinations 
(called special audits – see below) are mandated by the KSE, which outsources most of them to audit 
companies. Reports on special audits are then received by the KSE, which can take action on this basis. 
                                                     
14. The Directors may, from time to time, pass and bring into effect rules and regulations as may be considered in 
the interest of or conducive to the objects of the Exchange; and they may in like manner at any time and from time 
to time rescind or vary or add to or delete any of the rules and regulations for the time being in force. The rules and 
regulations for the time being in force shall be binding on all the members and officers of the Exchange, and all 
persons claiming through or against the members and officers of the Exchange shall respectively observe and 
conform to the rules and regulations for the time being in force. 
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These reports are also transmitted to the SECP, together with the follow-up action by KSE. SECP can 
decide to either give additional directions to the KSE, or decide to take action on its own.  
Fit and Proper Criteria and Prevention of Criminals from Controlling Institutions (c. 23.3 & 23.3.1): 
SBP 
801. State Bank is enforcing comprehensive Fit and Proper criteria through Circular No. 4 April, 2007. 
This circular has been adopted by reference to Regulation G1 (corporate governance / board of directors 
and management) of the Prudential Regulations for corporate / commercial banking. Part A of this 
Regulation G1 requires banks and DFIs to provide information for clearance by SBP of appointments of 
President, Chief Executive and Directors, which all need to meet the fit and proper tests.  
802. The Fit and Proper Test is applicable on the sponsors (both individual & companies) who apply 
for a commercial banking license, the investors acquiring strategic/controlling stake in the banks/DFIs, 
major shareholders of the banking companies and for the appointment of Directors, CEO, and Key 
Executives of the banks/DFIs. Amended to the circular itself is a comprehensive document laying out the 
fit and proper tests and their coverage.  
803. The coverage of the fit and proper test is large:  
 Key executives include the CEO; any executive acting as second to the CEO including Chief 
Operating Officer, deputy Managing director; chief financial officer; head of internal audit; head 
of compliance; head of operations. 
 Major shareholder “means any person holding 5 percent or more of the share capital of a bank / 
DFI individually or in concert with family members” 
 Sponsor shareholder “means an individual, company or any other person whose shares are held in 
safe custody with SBP […]” 
 Substantial ownership / affiliation “means beneficial shareholding of more than 20 percent by a 
person and/or by his dependent family members, which will include his/her spouse, dependent 
lineal ascendants and descendants and dependent brother and sister”. 
 
804. The fitness & propriety will be assessed on the following broad elements:  
a. Integrity, Honesty & Reputation 
b. Track Record 
c. Solvency & Integrity 
d. Qualification & Experience 
e. Conflict of Interest 
f. Others 
 
805. The three first criteria are applicable to all categories of individuals – while strategic investors 
and sponsors are assessed against the “criteria for setting up of a commercial bank” issued by SBP and the 
Code of corporate governance issued by SECP (see below).  
806. Each of the criteria is then made explicit, and under “integrity, honesty and reputation”, it is 
required that the individuals “have not been convicted / involved in any fraud/forgery, financial crime 
etc., in Pakistan or elsewhere, or is not being subject to any pending proceedings leading to such a 
conviction”.  
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807. The “guidelines and criteria for setting up of a commercial bank” have been issued by SBP in 
reference to its powers to issue/authorize commercial banking licenses (section 27 of the Banking 
Companies Act). Per its title, this document provides for guidelines described as drafted “for the ease of 
different stakeholders and general public”. SBP indicated that all reviews of applications for commercial 
banking licenses (but not Islamic commercial banks, covered by separate guidelines) are conducted 
according to these guidelines and criteria. Article 5 (fit and proper criteria for sponsor directors) 
disqualifies sponsor director who would have “been convicted on account of any criminal or financial 
irregularity whatsoever” or “been associated with any illegal activity concerning banking business deposit 
taking, financial dealing and other business”.  
808. None of the applicable laws, regulations or guidelines make mention of the beneficial owners of 
banks and DFIs, and their submission to the fit and proper tests. However, the comprehensive definition 
of sponsors, substantial shareholders and major shareholders added to the practice of SBP which makes 
its best efforts to identify the beneficial owners when reviewing licensing application are satisfactory in 
the eyes of the assessors. SBP indicates that the current revision of the Banking Companies Ordinance 
should address this issue.  
ECs 
809. The Rules and Regulations for ECs (para. 15) set requirements for directors of an EC as follows: 
director should possess appropriate knowledge to carry out the exchange business; should not have been 
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude; shall not have failed to honor liabilities towards 
banks, tax authorities or other government agencies; and shall not have been declared bankrupt nor have 
been subjected to attachments of their assets by the courts. There is also a limitation on directorship where 
directors of ECs are not allowed to hold the director’s office in more than one EC, nor they are allowed to 
borrow or avail credit or defer payment with EC in any form (para 16).  
SECP 
810. Market entry is strictly governed under the NBFC rules which provide an extensive fit and proper 
criteria to be followed to ascertain that any person holding a management position or controlling interest 
in the NBFC is not only capable of managing the affairs of the NBFC but also has a clean credit history as 
well as criminal record. It is ascertained that the proposed director/ key executive of the company has not 
been convicted of any criminal record.  
811. For NBFCs, the fit and proper criteria and scope are defined in Schedule VIII of the NBFC 
regulations, and their content and scope are similar to those applicable to banks and DFIs. Article 282C of 
the Companies Ordinance requires that all NBFCs receive a license issued by the SECP before engaging 
in business. In addition, article 9 of the NBFCs Regulations requires prior approval by the SECP for the 
appointment of directors and chief executives.  
812. As far as the securities markets are concerned, article 5a of the Securities and Exchanges 
Ordinance requires registration of brokers and agents. Article 4 of the “brokers and agents registration 
rules” requires that to be eligible as a broker, a person must not have “been convicted of an offence 
involving fraud or breach of trust”. Registration can be cancelled in case of conviction for a criminal 
offence. The assessors were not provided with a definition of “breach of trust 
813. As far as agents are concerned, the eligibility criteria set out in these registration rules do not set 
out fit and proper tests, and the form to be submitted for application does not contain requests for 
information on past criminal conduct.  
814. As for the SBP, the definition of sponsors, significant and major shareholders (which are close to 
those of SBP, with slight differences in the thresholds) do not refer explicitly to beneficial ownership. As 
far as the market intermediaries are concerned, the information received by the assessment team indicates 
that there is no active verification of the beneficial owners.  
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Application of Prudential Regulations to AML/CFT (c. 23.4): 
815. As AML and CFT measures and requirements are considered as full part of the prudential regime 
by SBP and SECP, all regulatory and supervisory measures apply similarly (licensing and structure, risk 
management, on-going supervision and global consolidated supervision).  
Licensing or Registration of Value Transfer/Exchange Services (c. 23.5): 
816. Apart from licensed banks, ECs and Pakistan Post Savings Bank offer value transfer/exchange 
services. SBP regulates, supervises, and issues license to ECs under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 
1947 (amended in 2002). Before applying for license, ECs have to incorporate under the Companies 
Ordinance 1984 and register with SECP. Opening of each business location also requires prior approval 
of SBP (Ref: FE Circular No. 9 of 2002, Circular Letter No. 9 of 2004 and Circular Letter No. 17 of 
2005).  
817. Pakistan Post is a government department under the Ministry of Postal Services. It is expected 
that the regulation and supervision of the Pakistan Post Savings Bank will be transferred to SECP.  
Monitoring and Supervision of Value Transfer/Exchange Services (c. 23.6):  
818. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 empowers SBP to regulate and supervise ECs. The power 
for supervisors to monitor ECs is detailed in rules and regulations for ECs that “[t]he company shall fully 
abide by all the regulations, instructions, directives, circulars and other communications issued by the 
State Bank and subject its records and documents to the examination, inspection and supervision of the 
State Bank” (para. 31), and “[t]he State Bank reserves the right to inspect the activities of Exchange 
Company at any time it finds appropriate to ensure adherence to the regulations issued by the State Bank” 
(para. 32). The scope of AML/CFT preventive measures for ECs are very narrow and limited at this point, 
focusing mainly on basic customer due diligence. Pakistan Post Savings Bank is not subject to any 
AML/CFT measures. Suggested amendments to AMLO, however, intend to bring the Postal Savings 
Bank under the AML/CFT regime.  
Licensing and AML/CFT Supervision of other Financial Institutions (c. 23.7): 
819. As indicated at the outset of the “preventive measures” section, the insurance sector (while 
regulated and supervised for prudential reasons) is covered by the AMLO as far as reporting requirements 
are concerned, but is not subject to any other AML/CFT requirements. It is also not being supervised for 
AML/CFT. As indicated earlier, it is the assessors’ view that the insurance sector does not present a 
significant ML/FT risk – but no risk assessment has been conducted, and there is therefore no proven low 
risk.  
820. Microfinance institutions are regulated and supervised for prudential purposes, and are subject to 
some CDD requirements. They come under the SBP overall regulatory framework. It is however the 
assessors understanding that they are currently not supervised for AML/CFT purposes. The financial 
services of the Post are not regulated and supervised for AML/CFT purposes, nor the CNDS. The 
assessors do not deem these financial institutions face low risk, and that no risk assessment has been 
undertaken, thereby not providing the underlying argument of proven low risk.  
Guidelines for Financial Institutions (c. 25.1): 
821. State Bank has issued examples of red flags of potential transactions.  
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822. SECP has not provided guidelines for financial institutions on the implementation of the 
AML/CFT requirements.  
Power for Supervisors to Monitor AML/CFT Requirement (c. 29.1): 
SBP 
823. As indicated earlier, the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 empowers State Bank to regulate 
and supervise banks / DFIs. The regulations and other instructions issued through circulars are subsidiary 
legislation (and as mentioned, AML/CFT issues are deemed of prudential nature). Non-compliance of 
regulations and circulars carry sanctions like penalties and action against management.  
ECs 
824. See c. 23.6.  
SECP 
825. See above and below on the powers of SECP to monitor compliance.  
Authority to conduct AML/CFT Inspections by Supervisors (c. 29.2): 
SBP 
826. Section 40 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 empowers State Bank to carry out inspection 
of banks and prepare reports. State Bank has a dedicated department namely – Banking Inspection 
Department (on-site). Inspection of banks/ DFIs is carried out in a structured way in accordance with the 
Manual of Inspection, which includes a specific Inspection Manual on “anti-money laundering”, issued in 
January 08. The procedure extends to review of policies, procedures, books and records. Given its large 
powers to access information set out in article 43A (power to call for certain information) as described 
below, SBP can use sample testing methods – and indicates doing so on a routine basis. Inspection 
findings of AML/ CFT component are recorded in a separate Annexure. BID is in the process of 
developing a more comprehensive Manual for AML/ CFT separately.  
827. SBP indicated that its program of examination is based on a regular rotation of financial 
institutions examined, as well as targeted examination when SBP so deems necessary (including for risk-
related reasons).  
 
Table 18: Supervisor Related Statistics – SBP – On-site Examinations involving AML/CFT 
component 
(Number of on-site examinations involving AML/CFT component.  AML/CFT component is part and parcel of full 
scope inspections.  Total number of monetary penalties imposed during the last 4 years: 396) 
Name of Regulator Type of Institutions 2007-08 2007* 2006** 2005** 
State Bank of 
Pakistan 
Public Sector Commercial 
Banks 
4 4 4 4 
-do- Private Sector Commercial 
Banks 
17 22 22 22 
-do- Foreign Banks 2 5 6 6 
-do- Specialized Banks 3 4 4 4 
-do- Microfinance Institutions 4 5 3 3 
-do- Islamic Banks 2 5 2 3 
-do- Foreign Exchange Companies 38 26 26 - 
-do- Others 4 9 7 4 
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Notes: *Plan for six months as the inspection plan was aligned with the department’s Business Plan and 
Performance Management Year.   **Full year plan i.e. Jan-Dec.   
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Total number of monetary penalties imposed during the last 4 years: 396 
EC: 
828. As stated in the criterion 23.6, the rules and regulations stipulates that “[t]he State Bank reserves 
the right to inspect the activities of Exchange Company at any time it finds appropriate to ensure 
adherence to the regulations issued by the State Bank” (para. 32).  The banking inspection department of 
SBP is responsible for on-site inspections. The findings of the on-site inspections are shared with the 
Exchange Policy Department of the SBP which issues regulations, circulars, guidance, among others, to 
ECs. The SBP has undertaken inspection of all the ECs that are category A type (full-fledged ECs 
permitted for both currency exchange and remittances) while those of category B (only permitted for 
currency exchange operation) started only last year. Occasionally inspection was undertaken twice a year 
as per request from the Exchange Policy Department; otherwise, SBP conducts an annual inspection of 
ECs.  
SECP 
829. Article 282H of the Companies Act requires that “the Commission shall monitor the general 
financial condition of a NBFC or a notified entity and, at its discretion, may order special audit and 
appoint an auditor to carry out detailed scrutiny of the affairs of NBFC or a notified entity”. Article 282I 
allows the Commission to “cause an enquiry or inspection to be made […] into the affairs of a NBFC […] 
or of any of its directors, managers or other officers.”  
830. The SECP is empowered to inspect a regulated entity under SECP Act (article 29 – investigations 
and proceedings by the Commission), Securities & Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (article 21) and rules made 
there under. In addition to legal powers of SECP stated in earlier sections, SECP Act 1997 (Sec-31) also 
empowers Investigation Officer forcible entry.  
831. Article 29 of the SECP Act states that “the Commission may suo moto conduct investigations that 
is an Offence under this Act […]”. Article 30 defines the powers of the “officer carrying out an 
investigation or inspection”. Article 31 states that “an investigative officer of the Commission may enter 
any place or building by force, if necessary”.  
832. SECP indicated that it conducts its on-site examination of NBFCs on the basis of risks, and for 
instance, in 2007, inspected all deposit taking institutions.  
833. Article 21 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance gives the Commission (SECP) – either by its 
own decision or at the request of at least 10 percent of the members of an Exchange - power to “cause an 
enquiry to be made by any person appointed in this behalf into (a) the affairs of, or dealings in, any 
Exchange; or (b) the dealings, business or any transaction in securities by any broker, member, director or 
officer of an Exchange”. Section 3 of the same article gives “power to enter any premises”.  
834. For the Exchanges’ members, the cornerstone of the on-site inspection is the “system audit”, 
which is set out in the “regulations governing system audit of the brokers of the Exchanges”. These audits 
are outsourced by the Exchanges to private audit companies, chosen in a selected panel. As far as 
AML/CFT is concerned, only three criteria are directly relevant (out of a 5 pages regulation): the one on 
the SAOF, the one on the identification of the person who gave the order and the one on record keeping. 
There is for instance no reference to internal controls, on-going monitoring, and STR requirement. The 
table below (under sanctions) describes the number of system audits undertaken, as well as the follow-up 
actions.  
835. Overall, roughly 50 on-site examinations were directly conducted by SECP on 2006 and 2007 – 
which can focus as needed on a specific issue. SECP indicated in that respect that in 2007, these system 
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audits focused significantly on the implementation and compliance with the UIN requirements. In 2008, 
only the Exchanges undertook on-site examinations.  
836. The Exchange can also conduct examinations on their own (Monitoring and Surveillance 
Department). The information provided to the assessors indicates that these examinations are very rare.  
837. The Inspection Manual for Non Bank Financial Companies contains provisions related to 
AML/CFT (designation of compliance officer, implementation of CDD, existence of controls and 
procedures to detect suspicious transactions, training programs, checking of account holders against 
freezing lists 
Power for Supervisors to Compel Production of Records (c. 29.3 & 29.3.1):  
SBP 
838. The Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 empowers State Bank to call or access any type of 
record of banks/ DFIs. Article 43A of the Banking Companies Act allows SBP to compel the production 
of information, documents or records, to search premises when “it appears to State Bank that a company, 
firm or any other person whatsoever the business of banking in contravention of subsection (1) of section 
27”, which sets out the need to have a license to conduct business, and to then abide to the conditions and 
terms of this license.  
839. On the same line section 40(4) requires that it shall be “the duty of every director or other officer 
of the banking company or any company or firm or person referred to in section 27A to produce to any 
officer, hereafter in this section called the inspecting officer, making an inspection under this section, all 
such books, accounts and other documents in his custody or power and to furnish him with such 
statements and information relating to the affairs of the banking company or any company or firm or 
person referred to in section 27A1 and within such time as the inspecting officer may require”. SBP 
powers to compel production of or access to such information are not predicated on a court order. The 
inspection teams examine and analyze the efficacy of banks’ procedures and controls, including any 
analysis to detect unusual or suspicious transactions.  
ECs 
840. SBP has the power to access records and documents of ECs under the Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act as well as the Rules and Regulations for ECs 2002, para. 31.  
SECP 
841. The Commission is empowered to require all NBFCs to furnish any information under the powers 
conferred to it by section 282 G of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, which reads as follows: “(1) The 
Commission may, at any time, by notice in writing, require NBFCs generally, or any NBFC in particular 
to furnish it within the time specified therein or such further time as the Commission may allow, with any 
statement or information or document relating to the business or affairs of such NBFC or NBFCs 
(including any business or affairs with which such NBFC or NBFCs is or are concerned) and without 
prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, may call for information, at such intervals as the 
Commission may deem necessary”.  
842. Article 21 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance define the inspection powers of the SECP 
(see above). It contains provision that impose to “furnish such information and documents […] relating to 
or having a bearing on the subject-matter or the enquiry as the person conducting the enquiry may 
require”, and allows the person conducting the enquiry to “compel[ling] the production of documents”. 
Article 22 prescribes penalties for refusal to communicate the required information (with a sanction up to 
50 M Rs, and a daily penalty rate of 200.000 Rs in case of continued contravention).  
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843. Rule 3 of the Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of books and Records) Rules, 2001 “(the 
Inspection Rules)” stipulates that the Commission may order inspection of books and record required to 
be maintained by a member of stock exchange.  
844. The Brokers’ “code of conduct”, which is annexed to the Brokers and Agent Registration Rules, 
requires in section D-2 that brokers provide information to the Commission or to the Stock Exchange on 
books, special returns, correspondence, documents and papers – as required. Failure to respect this 
requirement can lead to suspension of registration.  
Powers of Enforcement & Sanction (c. 29.4):  
SBP 
845. The Banking Companies Ordinance provides range of enforcement actions and sanctions which 
can be taken against banks if any of the provision of the said Ordinance or rules/ regulations there under 
are violated. The enforcement powers includes but not limited to removal of managerial persons, super-
session of board of directors, prohibition of certain activities, imposition of monetary penalties and 
cancellation of license.  
ECs 
846. SBP has the power to suspend or revoke license from EC at any time or take other necessary 
actions as deemed necessary, as per the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act sub-section (5) of section 3AA 
and the Rules and Regulations for ECs 2002 (para. 42).  
SECP 
847. As for the other powers of the SECP as supervisors, its powers of enforcement and sanction are 
described in the same set of laws and regulations.  
Availability of Effective, Proportionate & Dissuasive Sanctions (c. 17.1) / Designation of Authority to 
Impose Sanctions (c. 17.2):  
848. Sanctions for non-compliance with AML/CFT requirements are set out both in the AMLO (for 
the reporting requirement) and in the various prudential laws and regulations governing the financial 
sector. Article 33 of the AMLO creates a criminal liability for failure to file STRs and to provide false 
information (“whoever willfully fails to comply with the suspicious transaction reporting requirement 
[…] or give false information shall be liable for imprisonment for a term that may extend to three years or 
with fine which may extend to one hundred thousand rupees or both”). As noted earlier, criminal 
conviction for failure to report can also lead to the revocation of license or adoption of administrative 
action by the SBP and SECP. As SBP and SECP have also incorporated the reporting obligation within 
their prudential requirements, the sanctions for failure to comply defined under these prudential rules 
would also be applicable.  
849. Article 37 of the AMLO (offences by companies) also prescribes that in case of contravention 
with any of the provisions of AMLO or any rule set under AMLO by a company, any person who was 
responsible for this failure “shall be deemed guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be 
prosecuted against and punished accordingly”, “provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall 
render any such person liable [..] if he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or 
that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention”.  
SBP 
850. Sanctions under the Banking Companies Ordinance are defined in part V of the Ordinance, and 
are composed of a mix of criminal and administrative sanctions, including penalties. In addition, the 
authorities refer to section 41D of BCO which allows the State Bank to refer for prosecution directors, 
chief executives or other officers of banking companies “who, in its opinion has knowingly acted in a 
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manner causing loss of depositors’ money or of the income of the banking company”. An explanatory 
note to this article indicates that “for the purpose of this section a director or chief executive or other 
officer shall be deemed to have acted knowingly if he has departed from normal banking practices and 
procedures or circumvented the regulations or related credit restrictions laid down by the State Bank of 
Pakistan from time to time”. It is the assessors’ view that this last provision seems not applicable to 
AML/CFT issues however. SBP indicates that specific AML/CFT provisions have been incorporated in 
the current draft of the revised Banking Act.  
851. State Bank, being the regulator of banks/ DFIs is empowered to apply monetary and penalties in 
case of violations. However, if the contravention /violations fall under an offence, action is taken through 
a specialized court of law, including imposition of fines. Only SBP can refer a case to the special court.  
ECs 
852. As stated above, SBP has the power to suspend or revoke a license from EC at any time, or take 
other measures as deemed necessary. The violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is also 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both. In 
addition, any currency, security, gold or silver, or goods or other property in respect of which the 
contravention has taken place may be confiscated. The range of administrative sanctions available to SBP 
is not delineated, nor the amount of fines that can be imposed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 
specified. Revocation or suspension of license is the only sanction taken against ECs to date.  While not 
specified in the FERA and associated rules and regulations, SBP claims that in the absence of monetary 
penalty, it resorts to regulatory actions like issuance of warning letters, suspending the business 
operations from particular locations, suspension of a particular business activity, etc. SBP is currently 
pursuing introduction of monetary penalties against ECs. The current sanction regime and in particular, 
the implementation of the sanction regime against ECs do not seem to the assessors as proportionate, 
dissuasive and effective.  
SECP 
853. As far as NBFCs are concerned, the Companies Ordinance provides the SECP with the powers to 
remove the chairman, directors chief executives or any other officers (art, 282E), to supersede the Board 
of Directors (art. 282F) and the power to impose penalties “for failure, refusal to comply with, or 
contravention of any provision of this Part” (art. 282 J). Art. 282J covers contravention to the Act as well 
as “the rules or regulations made under section 282B or regulation, circular or directive or any direction 
or order passed by the Commission”, and the sanction can apply to the NBFC “or its officers”. Art. 282 J 
also contains a refusal of the burden of the proof for “every director, manager or other officer or person 
responsible for the conduct of its affairs”, who “shall, unless he proves that the failure or contravention or 
default took place or committed without his knowledge, or that he exercised all diligence to prevent its 
commission, be deemed of the commission of the offence”. Sanction under art. 282 J include fines “up to 
50 million Rs” against ($ 650.000) the legal entities and their directors, managers and officers, as well as 
power to suspend or cancel licenses. As indicated earlier, the SECP can also issue directions.  
854. The SECP Act also grants the SECP power of enforcement and sanction, in art. 20 (“conducting 
investigations in respect of matters related to this Act”) and in Part IV (enforcement and investigation), as 
described earlier. Article 40 A (penalty for violation of rules and regulations), states that “any rule made 
under section 39 or regulation made under section 40 may provide that a contravention thereof shall be 
punishable with a fine which may extend to ten millions Rs and, where the contravention is a continuing 
one, with a further fine which may extend to one hundred thousand Rs for every day after the first during 
which such contravention continues”.  
855. The Securities and Exchange Ordinance provides for the cancellation of registration of the 
Exchange (art.7) and penalties for contravention (provision of documents, refusal to comply with any 
order or direction, contravention or failure to comply with the Ordinance or rules and regulations) against 
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any person (art. 22). The penalties under art. 22 are fines, up to fifty million Rs, and daily two hundred 
thousand Rs fines in case of continuing contraventions. As persons designates either natural or legal 
persons, the provision of art. 22 can apply to directors or officers of market intermediaries.  
856. The Regulations governing system audit of the brokers of the Exchange lay out (article 7) the 
fines available in case of defaults or non compliance which can be imposed by the Exchange. The 
maximum amount per default is 25.000 Rs ($ 310). The broker himself can be fined. Article 7 allows for 
the Commission to take action on its own if it is not satisfied by the follow-up to the penalty, and it can 
also be mobilized by the Exchange. The Exchange can also initiate disciplinary proceedings against the 
broker, as per the Articles of the Exchange (the Board can institute disciplinary action against members of 
the Exchange – i.e. suspension or cancellation of membership).  
Ability to Sanction Directors & Senior Management of Financial Institutions (c. 17.3): 
SBP 
857. The sanctions available in relation to banks can extend to any person, being the chairman, 
director, chief executive or an officer of a bank as provided under sub-sections 1A and 1AA of section 83.  
858. SBP can under section 41A remove directors and managerial persons from office (under very 
wide circumstances “association […] likely to be detrimental to the interests of the banking company or 
its depositors or otherwise undesirable”; “public interest”; “to secure the proper management of any 
banking company”).  
ECs 
859. The sanction regime against ECs does not specify that sanction can be taken against directors and 
senior management of ECs.  
 
 
SECP 
860. As far as NBFCs are concerned, the Companies Ordinance provides the SECP with the powers to 
remove the chairman, directors chief executives or any other officers (art, 282E), to supersede the Board 
of Directors (art. 282F).  
Range of Sanctions—Scope and Proportionality (c. 17.4): 
SBP 
861. Article 42 of the Banking Companies Ordinance sets out the powers of SBP to follow-up on 
findings of inspections and examinations. These include the possibility to issue directions or orders or 
calling on meetings of directors.  
862. Under article 83 (5), the general pecuniary section for non compliance can extend to 200.000 
Rupees ($ 2500) and the possibility to top it up to daily additional 10.000 Rupees ($ 125) in the 
contravention is a continuing one.  
863. The range of penalties defined under article 83 of the Banking Companies Ordinance is rather 
comprehensive, and allows for sanctions both towards the legal entities and their management (see for 
instance article 83 (5), which is the catch-all clause addressing failure to comply with any provision of the 
Ordinance or order, rule or direction adopted under the Ordinance.  
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864. In parallel, special courts have been created to consider a range of offences under the Banking 
Companies Ordinance, as defined in article 84 of the Ordinance. Only a complaint by an officer of State 
Bank can initiate such a trial. The only provisions which can be criminal sanctions and are relevant to 
AML/CFT related to the refusal to provide information to SBP as required, or to obstruct SBP officials’ 
access to information.  
865. As far as compliance with AML/CFT related regulation is concerned, SBP provides the following 
information on fines imposed for non-compliance:  
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SBP Penalty Table: Penalties Imposed on Banks/DFIs during the Last Four Years on Violations of 
Prudential Regulation M1 to M5 (amount in Rupees) 
 
Inspection 
Report 
Cut-off 
M-1 M-2 M-3 
Year Penalty 
Amount 
Cases No. of 
Times 
Reported 
Penalty 
Amount 
Cases No. of 
Times 
Reported 
Penalty 
Amount 
Cases No. of 
Times 
Reported 
Total 413,894,895 444,797 358 23,950,000 1,212 19 444,000 26 6 
                    
2003 251,270 21 5 — — — — — — 
2004 21,472,425 2,426 45 840,000 42 3 — — — 
2005 225,450,000 23,852 114 5,550,000 292 9 330,000 18 2 
2006 150,971,800 384,610 125 16,180,000 809 5 4,000 2 2 
2007 15,749,400 33,888 69 1,380,000 69 2 110,000 6 2 
                    
Total 413,894,895 
Approx 
US $5.2 
million 
444,797 358 23,950,000 
Approx 
US 
$300,00 
1,212 19 444,000 26 6 
          
Inspection 
Report 
Cut-off 
M-4 M-5 Total 
Year Penalty 
Amount 
Cases No. of 
Times 
Reported 
Penalty 
Amount 
Cases No. of 
Times 
Reported 
Penalty 
Amount 
Cases No. of 
Times 
Reported 
Total — — — 9,560,000 500 13 447,848,895 446,535 396 
                    
2003 — — — — — — 251,270 21 5 
2004 — — — — 4 2 22,312,425 2,472 50 
2005 — — — 7,080,000 366 6 238,410,000 24,528 131 
2006 — — — 2,140,000 107 3 169,295,800 385,528 135 
2007 — — — 340,000 23 2 17,579,400 33,986 75 
                    
Total — — — 9,560,000 
Approx 
US 
$120,000 
500 13 447,848,895 
Approx 
US $5.6 
million 
446,535 396 
Note: It may be noted that after revising the KYC regime by SBP during 2003 specific regulatory violations reported 
in inspection reports witnessed an increase.  However, an increased amount of penalty imposed on banks during 
2005 forced the banks to improve their behavior towards compliance with these regulatory requirements and as such 
SBP highlights a decrease in penalties imposed after 2005. 
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ECs 
866. SBP does not have a range of sanctions available against ECs. SBP has the power to suspend or 
revoke license and take other measures as necessary but it is not clear what these “other measures” might 
be.   As stated earlier, SBP claims that it resorts to actions like issuance of warning letters, suspending the 
business operations from particular locations, suspension of a particular business activity, etc.  SPB also 
stated that it issued letters to ECs for them to rectify weakness found during the inspection.   Monetary 
penalty is not currently available and SBP is currently seeking this sanction power against ECs in this 
regard as SBP acknowledges the lack of the range of sanctions against ECs. At the time of the on-site 
mission, SBP suspended or revoked 6 licenses of ECs. It is also worth noting that SBP has referred some 
of these cases to law enforcement. While the assessors welcome the SBP enforcement actions, they also 
note that success in its efforts to formalize Alternative Remittance Systems will also depend on setting the 
right incentives – and forceful enforcement action could send mixed signals in that respect.  Thus it is 
critical that SBP has and uses a range of powers before swiftly moving to the revocation of a license 
although the assessors acknowledge that at times situations may warrant such an action.  
SECP  
867. In 2008, 628 violations were identified through the system audit in the securities industry (Table 
19).  On 24 of them led to penalties, while 48 follow-up letters were sent. In 2007, 150 controls had been 
undertaken, identifying 573 violations, leading to 46 penalties. SECP indicated that in several occasions, 
it had to exercise pressure on the Exchange to increase the impact of the sanctions – and therefore their 
dissuasiveness. The significant variation in the amount of penalties over years is striking in that respect – 
all the more as the assessors understand that 2007 was the year where the SECP exercised pressure on the 
Exchange to increase the level of penalties. The very low ratio violations / penalties or even warning letter 
issues is of concern for the assessors in terms of credibility of the supervisory process. The following 
statistics relate to the whole coverage of the system audits – of which only a couple of requirements relate 
to AML/CFT.  
Table 19:  SECP Statistics—Total System Audit (all requirements together) 
Years Number of Brokers 
whose System Audit 
have been conduction 
during the Year 
Number of 
Violations 
Number of 
Penalties 
Amount of 
Penalties 
Rectified Warning letter 
issued 
2008 150 628 24 80,000 193 40 
2007 150 573 46 1,895,000 289 56 
2006 71 311 23 233,500 174 30 
TOTAL 371 1512 93 2,208,500 
Approx US 
$28,000 
656 126 
 
868. The assessors were not provided with equivalent information on the supervision of NBFCs. SECP 
currently does not conduct any system audit of NBFCs, but states that NBFCs are subject to detailed 
inspections and that follow-up enforcement actions and penalties are adopted. The assessors were not 
provided related statistical information.  
Resources of the financial supervisors 
869. State Bank is autonomous body with regulations and supervision of financial institution in its 
preview as its one of the core functions. SBP considers that its supervisory departments are overall well 
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funded, staffed and trained to enable them to perform their functions with sufficient operational autonomy 
and free from interferences.  
870. New SBP staff is hired through a rigorous process of written examination followed by group 
discussions and interviews. The new entrants are required to provide two reliable references and are also 
subject to clearance from Police. Additionally, new staff is required to sign confidentiality undertaking 
which remains part of the personal record of the staff concerned.  
871. Besides entry level training, relevant staff of supervisory departments is provided necessary 
training in AML/ CFT. A large number of officers have received foreign training as well. The objective is 
to equip the staff with necessary skills to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.  
872. SBP has set up a dedicated unit on AML issues in its regulatory division. The main 
responsibilities of the Unit include:  
 To formulate, process and issue necessary instructions/ regulations to the banking sector on 
AML/CFT in coordination with FMU; 
 To prepare briefs, status reports and other information concerning AML/CFT issues for 
competent authorities; 
 To address issues emanating from domestic and international AML/CFT bodies like Ministries 
in Pakistan, APG,  FATF & UN Monitoring Committees; 
 To issue instructions for freezing of bank accounts under UNSC Resolution e.g. 1267; 
 To call and maintain records of accounts frozen under UNSC Resolutions; 
 To conduct seminars and workshops for compliance officers of banks; 
 To respond queries of banks and provide guidance and assist them on AML/CFT issues; and 
 To coordinate and liaise with FMU and supervisory departments of SBP on AML/ CFT issues 
 
873. The examination / supervision department covers all the institutions under SBP ambit. It is staffed 
with 120 examiners (covering 77 institutions: 46 banks and micro-finance banks; 8 DFIs and 23 ECs). 
They have received training on AML/CFT issues.  
SECP 
874. SECP enjoys high level of autonomy and is almost free to take policy decisions in the areas of its 
jurisdiction.  
875. SECP is organized and staffed with a team of high caliber professionals in its various divisions / 
departments. These professionals have in-depth knowledge of their respective fields. SECP is staffed with 
high skilled professionals who meet the ethical requirements of professionalism, integrity, honesty, 
confidentiality and also with the standards set by the SECP.  
876. SECP provides on-the-job training to its officers in their relevant field. Various officers of SECP 
have been accredited as “Certified Anti-Money Launderers” by the Association of Certified Anti-Money 
Launderers (ACAMS) of United Kingdom. Further, it has organized various seminars / conferences for 
generating awareness of money laundering issue among its regulatees.  
877. SECP has also organized other in house training programmes on the AML related issues.  
878. The enforcement divisions of SECP (on-site and off-site) that cover all companies (under the 
Companies Ordinance) comprise 35 staff. The NBFCs enforcement team is set up with 23 staff (7 
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dedicated to off-site supervision, 15 to on-site supervision and one to the Modarabas). The inspection 
team in SECP for the securities sector as a whole comprises between 5 and 7 staff.  
879. As indicated earlier, most of the enforcement actions of the Exchanges are outsourced to audit 
firms. No specific staffing indications were provided overall, but the KSE only has one or two staff in-
house and the Islamabad Exchange virtually none.  
Sum-Up 
880. Overall, the regulatory and supervisory framework under the SBP and the SECP is rather 
comprehensive and sound. As indicated earlier, the coverage of the AML/CFT regulatory and supervisory 
framework is however too narrow – either because some financial institutions are not covered, or because 
the extension of the prudential framework to AML/CFT is incomplete (insurance sector for instance).The 
fragmentation of the legal basis for SECP to exercise its regulatory and supervisory powers is however 
striking. If the assessors have not identified major inconsistencies, the rationale behind such a number of 
layers of laws and regulations remains unclear to them. As far as securities markets are concerned, this 
fragmentation and complexity is compounded by the existence of two regulators and supervisors, the 
SECP and the Exchange – with lots of overlaps and very likely different (if not diverging) objectives. As 
indicated below in the effectiveness section, the challenge in the regulation and supervision of the 
securities sector is not theoretical. SECP indicates that a new Securities Act is under preparation, which 
would aim at addressing the fragmentation and layering described above. 
881. The assessment team has thoroughly analyzed the absence of formal designation of competent 
authorities for the regulation and supervision of the compliance of financial institutions with their 
AML/CFT requirements. There is no requirement under the standard that the AML Statute itself formally 
sets out which is/are the competent authority(ies) for regulation and supervision. In the specific case of 
Pakistan, the scope of the mandates of the SBP and SECP appear to the assessors as large enough to 
encompass AML/CFT requirement as integral parts of the prudential ones – step which has in addition 
allowed SBP and SECP to set out such requirements even before the enactment of AMLO. As only 
AMLO introduces the STR requirement, it should however be noted that, at least for SBP, this obligation 
has also been added into the prudential obligations. It would be worthwhile for SECP (as well as the 
Exchanges) to take similar action. The only remaining ambiguity relates to the monitoring of compliance 
with this reporting obligation – it would be a duplication to confer any mandate in that respect to the 
FMU.  
882. The fit and proper test for banks and DFIs and for NBFCs (including Modarabas) is in line with 
the Standard. As far as securities market intermediaries are concerned, the assessors are convinced that 
“moral turpitude” would provide a satisfactory basis to prevent criminal and their associates. Two 
weaknesses remain however – there is no satisfactory fit and proper requirements for agents in the 
securities market, and the assessors are not satisfied that in practice, SECP (and the Exchanges) do 
conduct the fit and proper test on the beneficial owners in the financial institutions they regulate.  
883. The supervisory powers available in law for the SBP and the SECP are comprehensive and 
satisfactory.  
884. Whether the sanctions available are proportionate, dissuasive and effective is more complex. The 
analysis of effectiveness below is important to this overall analysis. In terms of legal status, the range of 
sanctions available to the SBP is satisfactory, as administrative sanctions, except the case of ECs. The 
complementary existence of criminal sanctions, which are used, strengthens this analysis. The pecuniary 
sanctions available to the SBP appear very low on paper, and therefore do not seem dissuasive. This said, 
the maximum amount of these fines only refers to single instances: SBP indicates that it can impose total 
fines much higher by multiplying this total amount by its estimations of the number of occurrences of the 
contravention. SBP also indicated that when the failure stems from a weakness in the procedures or 
internal controls, it would extrapolate an estimation of the number of occurrences taking into account the 
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customer base. This aggregation approach has in the past allowed SBP to impose significant fines to 
individual institutions for failure with AML/CFT requirements, in particular on CDD requirements (see 
below on effectiveness). However, the assessors are not satisfied that SBP could effectively apply this 
method in the case of systemic failure, as linking such a systemic failure to specific occurrences would 
likely be very difficult, and subject to challenges by the penalized institution. For instance, they are not 
convinced that such a process would allow SBP to sanction a systemic failure in the detection of 
suspicious transactions.  
885. As far as NBFCs are concerned, the situation on pecuniary sanctions used to be similar, but the 
recent significant increase in the pecuniary sanctions that can be imposed by the SECP has obviously 
enhanced the deterrence incentives.  
886. As far as securities markets are concerned, the range of sanctions available to the Exchanges is 
not proportionate, dissuasive and effective. The level of the fines available is in the views of the assessors 
too limited to achieve this objective, and the existence of more stringent sanctions, such as suspension or 
removal from the Exchange, does not appear to them as credible enough (and used enough) to 
compensate for this weakness. That the SECP can act on its own in case of non-compliance (and now has 
stronger fines available to do so) does not sufficiently mitigate this weakness, essentially for reasons 
linked to effectiveness, as described below.  
Analysis of Effectiveness 
887. The analysis of effectiveness of the regulatory and supervisory regime for AML/CFT in Pakistan 
requires differentiating between the sector covered by the SBP and those covered by the SECP.  
888. Four majors issues need to be taken into account when assessing the effectiveness of the actions 
taken by the SBP:  
 As indicated above, the legal framework is overall satisfactory. In addition, the various tools 
available are used by the SBP, in terms of enactment of regulations, inspections and examinations 
and follow-up. That SBP acted quickly after the assessment team’s on-site visit is one revealing 
evidence. The existence of a rather comprehensive inspection manual covering all main 
AML/CFT requirements is also evidence that SBP has taken steps to foster implementation. The 
full integration of the examination of AML/CFT requirements in all prudential examination is 
also, in the context of Pakistan, a positive element. 
 SBP has at its disposal the financial and human resources necessary to undertake its mission, and 
has a strong credibility as a supervisor – as evidenced by the comments by the various financial 
institutions met. Training of staff in SBP on AML/CFT issues is satisfactory, and all staff met 
(either regulators or supervisors) clearly displayed a very good understanding of AML/CFT 
requirements and challenges – both for banks and DFIs and ECs. 
 SBP has used its powers to foster compliance, as evidenced by the fines imposed on AML/CFT 
specific regulations. 
889. Despite all these positive elements, the main pitfall in terms of effectiveness is in the views of the 
assessors the excessive focus on the recourse to NADRA/NARA identification tools. SBP indicated 
having exercise very strong pressures on this requirements, both through moral suasion, pressures on the 
compliance officers and imposition of fines. The table above summarizing the fines imposed on Banks 
and DFIs confirms this stance. Discussions with the financial institutions, including on the time and 
resources needed to phase in the implementation of IT systems to undertake effective on-going 
monitoring, lead the assessors to conclude that the monitoring of compliance on other key AML/CFT 
requirements has been less systematic and in-depth. Another evidence of this is the very low overall level 
of STRs, and their strong concentration on a very limited number of banks.  
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890. While agreeing with Pakistan that enforcement of the CDD requirements is a pre-requisite for the 
effectiveness of the AML/CFT prevention and detection measures, the assessors however note that these 
requirements have now been in place for long enough to justify a much higher level of enforcement for 
the other requirements.  
891. As far as the securities markets are concerned, the assessors are not satisfied of the effectiveness 
of the regulatory and supervisory regimes. Powers to regulate have not been sufficiently used. The basis 
for examination (SAOF essentially, through the system audits) is much too narrow. Sanctions adopted are 
not dissuasive, effective and proportionate. The Exchanges do not have the human and financial resources 
to conduct effective supervision.  
892. For NBFCs, more efforts have been made by the SECP, and overall, the SECP is better equipped. 
On the other hand, the level of details of the regulations remains insufficient – and no enforcement has 
taken place on the SAOF outside Modarabas. The inspection manual for NBFCs for the AML/CFT 
requirements has too narrow a scope, and does not cover key requirements (for instance in STRs, on-
going monitoring…). Training of inspectors includes AML/CFT, but only at a high-level, without specific 
training on how to inspect on and enforce AML/CFT requirements. The sanctions for lack of compliance 
have not been used.   
893. Finally, SBP seems equipped to undertake its roles as far as AML/CFT is concerned. The staff 
seems well trained – and discussions with the assessment team clearly evidence their in-depth 
understanding of the issues. Given the number of institutions under its supervision and the overall risks to 
the banking sector, the assessors consider that the current resources for SBP are still short. SECP is 
clearly understaffed, and not in position at the moment to dedicate staff to AML/CFT as needed. While 
the understanding and knowledge of AML/CFT is good at the theoretical level, there is obviously a need 
for more practical training and more direct engagement on practical implementation of AML/CFT 
preventive measures. The Exchanges do not have the needed trained and experienced staff to effectively 
conduct their missions on AML/CFT.  
 
3.10.2. Recommendations and Comments 
894. The authorities should take action to:  
 Expand to all financial institutions (per FATF definition) the AML/CFT regulatory and 
supervisory requirements (market entry, regulation, supervision, compliance monitoring) 
 As a whole, enlarge to all CDD and STR reporting requirements (i.e. beyond compliance with the 
NADRA obligation) the proactive compliance monitoring, and follow-up actions. This should be 
a priority for SECP, including in its division of labor with the Exchanges 
 Clarify the roles of the financial sector supervisors and the FMU in terms of regulatory and 
guidance on the one hand, and compliance monitoring on the other hand for the suspicious 
transaction reporting obligations. The assessors consider that the mandated coordination between 
the FMU and SBP and SECP for regulations is satisfactory, but that it should be made clearer that 
compliance monitoring rests with the financial sector supervisors 
 Develop “hands-on” training on the supervision of compliance with AML/CFT requirements for 
examiners 
 Increase the resources available to SECP, and SBP to a lesser extent, and as needed, the 
Exchange to fulfill their supervision mandate on AML/CFT 
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SBP 
 Amend the sanction regime to ensure that effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions are 
available to foster compliance in case of systemic compliance failure 
 Expand the range of sanction power available for non-compliance of ECs. 
SECP 
 Enforce the requirement for all professions to adopt a form for establishment of the business 
relationships, and enlarge the scope of the existing ones, with a view to allow financial 
institutions to have effective customer profiles 
 Set up a “fit and proper” requirement for agents in the securities markets 
 Expand the fit and proper tests to beneficial owners of financial institutions regulated by the 
SECP 
 Strengthen the pecuniary sanctions available to the Exchanges – or step in on a regular basis for 
significant compliance failures, in order to use the more dissuasive, proportionate and effective 
range of sanctions directly available to the SECP 
 Strengthen the coverage of system audits as far as AML/CFT requirements are concerned 
 Enlarge the coverage and depth of the compliance manual on AML/CFT for NBFCs 
 
3.10.3. Compliance with Recommendations 17, 23, 25 & 29 
 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.17 PC  Overall insufficient effectiveness of the sanctioning regime, and its application 
SBP 
 Weaknesses in the sanction regime to ensure its effectiveness, dissuasiveness 
and proportionality  
 range of sanction power available for non-compliance of ECs too narrow 
SECP 
 Insufficient pecuniary sanctions available to the Exchanges 
R.23 LC  limited coverage of financial institutions (per FATF definition) subject to 
AML/CFT regulatory and supervisory requirements (market entry, regulation, 
supervision, compliance monitoring) 
 Ambiguities in the roles of the financial sector supervisors and the FMU in 
terms of regulatory and guidance on the one hand, and compliance monitoring 
on the other hand for the suspicious transaction reporting obligations.  
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 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
SECP 
 Lack of recourse to the regulatory powers to press all professions to adopt a 
satisfactory form for establishment of the business relationships 
 Absence of “fit and proper” requirement for agents in the securities markets 
 Non application of the fit and proper tests to beneficial owners of financial 
institutions  
R.25 PC  Insufficient guidance provided by the financial sector supervisors 
R.29 PC  Compliance monitoring insufficiently proactive on CDD and STR reporting 
requirements beyond compliance with the NADRA obligation 
 Insufficient “hands-on” training on the supervision of compliance with 
AML/CFT requirements for examiners (for SBP for ECs, and for SECP as a 
whole) 
 Insufficient resources for SBP (for Exchange companies), SECP and as needed 
the Exchange to fulfill their supervision mandate on AML/CFT 
 Narrow coverage of system audits for the securities markets as far as AML/CFT 
requirements are concerned 
 Narrow coverage and depth of the compliance manual on AML/CFT for 
NBFCs 
 Insufficient effectiveness of the supervisory regime 
 
3.11. Money or Value Transfer Services (SR.VI). 
3.11.1. Description and Analysis (summary) 
895. Remittances play an important role assisting households in Pakistan. Worker’s remittances have 
been steadily growing, reaching to US $6.45 billion in FY08 from US $3.87 billion in FY04. In recent 
years, a strong growth of 17.4 percent was recorded in FY08, following previous year’s 19.4 percent 
growth. Pakistan has become world’s 12th largest remittances recipient country in 2007.  
896. Of this amount, the home remittances through Exchange Companies (ECs) stood at US $ 1.59 
billion in FY08, a substantial increase, in fact quadrupled from US $ 392 million in FY05. These 
indicators of growth are more likely attributable to an increased flow of remittances through regulated 
sectors (banks and ECs), rather than an overall increase in remittances to Pakistan from overseas.  
897. Use of hawala, although it appears to be much reduced, still exists and it remains to pose a 
challenge to authorities. The authorities acknowledge that it is still been used to transfer illicit proceeds 
abroad. It is important that the authorities continue to crack down on illegal operations through the use of 
hawala system. However, the focus has been on regulated entities that were providing parallel services. 
While this effort should not be understated, authorities should put more emphasis on going after those 
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who are yet to operate with a license. It is essential not to drive the formal sector players to underground 
or those operating underground to remain underground.  
898. Legal Framework: In 2002, SBP took a major step to regulate informal money transfer services 
such as Hawala by creating Exchange Companies (ECs) that provide money transfer and currency 
exchange business. Previously, money changers were required to obtain a license from SBP but not 
money transfer service providers. Money transfers were only allowed through banks while Hawala 
operated illegally. The introduction of ECs (category A) brought an opportunity for Hawaladars to 
operate within the regulated framework while unlicensed operation (continuation of Hawala business as 
opposed to forming an EC)) is illegal.   Upon subsequent realization that the entailing capital 
requirements were an impediment, leaving many operators remaining outside the ECs discipline, EC of 
‘B’ category was devised with lower capital requirements and operational scope limiting only to currency 
exchanges. It also mandated that at least 5 of such previous money changers licensed should pool 
resources to form an EC. Over 300 ex-money changers were as a result inducted into the formal ECs set 
up.  
899. The main objective behind the establishment of ECs was to provide a proper corporate culture 
and financial discipline in the money changing / remittance business in the country, while ensuring that 
various types of risks associated with this business are properly addressed.  
900. ECs have been established by SBP under the powers granted in Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 
1947 and its amendments 2002.  
901. Another entity that provides money transfer service in Pakistan is Pakistan Post Savings Bank. 
Currently only inward remittances are handled by the Post Savings Bank either through Western Union or 
Universal Postal Union. In 2008, they handled 24 billion Rupees (USD 300 million equivalent). 
Transaction value of more than 10,000 Rupee cannot be processed unless recipient has a savings account 
with the Post Savings Bank and is directly credited to the account. The Post Savings Bank is not subject 
to AMLO although the proposed amendments to AMLO aim to bring it under the AML regime.   
Designation of Registration or Licensing Authority (c. VI.1): 
SBP 
902. Under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947, SBP is empowered to issue license to 
Exchange Companies. There are two types of Exchange Companies, namely full-fledged Exchange 
Companies and Exchange Companies of ‘B’ category. The full-fledged Exchange Companies are 
permitted to carry out both money changing and remittance business while the Exchange Companies of 
‘B’ category are allowed only to deal in sale/purchase of foreign currencies (money change). The full-
fledged ECs were introduced in 2002 while the ECs of ‘B’ category were introduced in 2004. ECs need to 
be incorporated under the Companies Ordinance Act, thus also need to register with SECP. Only after this 
process, ECs can apply for license from SBP. The process for obtaining a license and its requirements are 
stipulated in the Rules and Regulations for ECs (Ref: FE Circular No. 9 of 2002 for full-fledged ECs and 
Circular Letter No. 6 of 2004 for ECs of ‘B’ category). The list of licensed ECs is available on the SBP 
website. As of February 2009, license has been granted to 23 full- fledged ECs and 30 ECs of ‘B’ 
category.  
Application of FATF Recommendations (applying R.4-11, 13-15 & 21-23, & SRI-IX) (c. VI.2): 
SBP 
903. As stated in the preventive section, the AML/CFT obligations imposed on ECs are limited to 
basic customer identification requirement, record keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting. For 
remittance transactions, names, addresses and other particulars of both the remitter and beneficiary should 
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be mentioned on the receipts regardless of the amount. Information on outward remittances above 
US$5,000 must be submitted to SBP with the following information: name of the remitter, CNIC or 
passport number of the remitter, address of the remitter, name and address of beneficiary, account number 
of beneficiary abroad, amount and currency of the outward remittance, and the account number of an 
exchange company used for remittance. Further, ECs are required to take prior approval of SBP before 
undertaking outward remittances involving US $50,000 or above (or equivalent in other foreign 
currencies). Ambiguity remains as to what “other particulars” needs to be obtained when the transactions 
are inward remittances of all amounts and outward remittances of less than US$5,000.  
904. Transaction record must be kept for a period specified by SBP but SBP is yet to specify the 
duration. Suspicious transaction reporting requirement is in force but no report has been made by ECs to 
FMU.  
905. Beyond these, there are no enforceable AML/CFT obligations imposed on ECs.  SBP is taking a 
gradual approach, first focusing on bringing the money changers and remittance transfer service providers 
under the regulatory ambit. Then instituting compliance requirements focusing on basic AML/CFT 
obligations (KYC, record keeping, and reporting requirements).  No guidance has been issued to assist 
ECs with implementation of obligations.  
Monitoring of Value Transfer Service Operators (c. VI.3): 
906. ECs are subject to monitoring and supervision by SBP (as per F.E. Circular No. 9 of 2002 and 
F.E. Circular No. 6 of 2004) although, as stated earlier, the scope of AML/CFT preventive measures for 
ECs is currently very limited. Annual on-site inspections which includes AML/CFT component, of all the 
full-fledged exchange companies started since 2006. Occasionally inspection was undertaken twice a year 
as per request from the exchange policy department of the SBP. The on-site inspection of the ‘B’ category 
ECs started in 2008. The findings of the on-site examination are shared with the exchange policy 
department for further actions.  
List of Agents (c. VI.4):  
SBP 
907. It is mandatory for ECs to take prior approval of SBP before opening any business location or 
entering into any agency/franchise arrangement. (Ref: FE Circular No. 9 of 2002, Circular Letter No. 9 of 
2004 and Circular Letter No. 17 of 2005)  
Sanctions (applying c. 17.1-17.4 in R.17) (c. VI.5): 
SBP 
908. Sub-section (5) of Section 3AA of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 and rules and 
regulations of ECs empower SBP to suspend the authorization or revoke license or take any other action 
as deemed necessary by SBP on failure of ECs to comply with the terms and conditions, directions or 
instructions imposed, given or issued by SBP. At the time of the on-site mission, 6 licenses have been 
suspended or revoked due to non-compliance or engagement in unauthorized or illegal activities. The 
violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is also punishable with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to two years or with fine or with both. In addition, any currency, security, gold or silver, or 
goods or other property in respect of which the contravention has taken place may be confiscated. 
Criminal investigations are undertaken by the FIA. At the time of the on-site mission, a criminal 
investigation of the largest EC was on-going and its license has been revoked by the SBP.  
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Additional Element—Applying Best Practices Paper for SR VI (c. VI.6): 
 
 
3.11.2. Recommendations and Comments 
909. The authorities should consider implementing the following recommendations. 
 Recently authorities have taken tough enforcement actions against illegal or unauthorized 
operations of licensed ECs. This should send a signal to ECs to comply with their obligations and 
not to engage with illegal or unauthorized operations. At the same time, it is important not to send 
a signal that licensed ECs are unfairly targeted while unlicensed remittance service providers 
(Hawala) are still operating at large. In this regard, authorities should identify unlicensed 
operation of money service providers, raise awareness of the licensing requirement, and give 
reasonable time to apply for a license, then after that, crack down on continued non-licensed 
operation.  
 In addition, SBP should develop effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction regime against 
ECs.  
 SBP should also extend the scope of the AML/CFT obligations which is too narrow at this point. 
 Authorities should subject remittance services offered by the Postal Savings Bank to AML/CFT 
obligations in order to create a level playing field and also to impose key obligations such as STR 
reporting, in addition to CDD and other preventive measures that are partially now practiced by 
the Postal Savings Bank.  
 
3.11.3. Compliance with Special Recommendation VI 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
SR.VI PC  The current scope of preventive measures imposed on ECs is narrow.  
  Sanctions against ECs are not effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
 No efforts have been made to identify unlicensed operation of 
remittance service providers (Hawala) although informal operators still 
exist especially in the provinces where SBP oversight is weak.  
 Pakistan Postal Savings Bank is not subject to AML/CFT obligations. 
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4. PREVENTIVE MEASURES—DESIGNATED NON-FINANCIAL BUSINESSES AND 
PROFESSIONS 
910. The Application of AML/CFT preventive measures to DNFBPs: Article 2(n) of AMLO defines 
“non-financial businesses and professions” to mean “real estate agents, jewelers, dealers in precious 
metals, precious stones, lawyers, notaries, and other legal professionals, accountants, trust and company 
service providers and such other non-financial businesses and professions as may be notified by the 
Federal Government.” The definition of NFBPs is consistent with the FATF definition of DNFBPs. The 
Ordinance, however, does not contain any reference to DNFBPs beyond providing for this definition. The 
only preventive obligation contained in the Ordinance is the one pertaining to the filing of suspicious 
transactions reports under article 7 and this obligation is only imposed upon financial institutions and 
does not extend to the NFBPs defined in art.2 (n).  
911. Discussions with the authorities and representatives of the defined professions revealed the 
extension of the scope of the Ordinance to these categories is contingent upon the issuance of 
Government notification to that effect. Such notification has not yet been issued and therefore the 
Ordinance does not yet extend to these sectors.  
912. Worth noting that under section 5(7) of AMLO, the General Committee has been mandated to 
take measures as necessary for development and review of performance and training programs for non-
financial businesses and professions relating to anti money laundering.  
4.1. Customer Due Diligence and Record-keeping (R.12) 
4.1.1. Description and Analysis 
913. Legal Framework:  The Ordinance does not contain any CDD requirements. The imposition of 
CDD requirements for the prevention of ML and TF is left to the competent supervisory authorities. 
Noting however that the Ordinance itself does not yet extend to DNFBPs in Pakistan as explained above.  
 
Casinos 
914. As gambling is prohibited, there are no casinos in Pakistan.  
 
Real Estate Agents 
915. There is no central law for registration of real estate agents in Pakistan. However, two provinces 
(Punjab and North West Frontier Provinces) and the Islamabad Capital Territory, which represent 80 
percent of the total population, require registration of real estate agents under Punjab Real Estate Agents 
and Motor Vehicle Dealers (Regulation & Business) Ordinance, 1980; the North West Frontier Province 
Real Estate Agent and Motor Vehicle Dealer (Regulation & Business) Ordinance, 1983; and Islamabad 
Real Estate Agents and Motor Vehicle Dealers (Regulation & Business) Ordinance, 1984 respectively. In 
terms of real estate companies, they are required to register with SECP under the Companies Ordinance 
1984.  
 
Jewelers, Dealers in Precious Metals and Precious Stones 
916. Under SRO 391(I)/2001 dated 18 June 2001, all jewelers having turnover above a specified 
threshold are required to register with the Collector of Sales Tax having jurisdiction for registration under 
section 14 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.  Under SRO 266(I)/2001 dated 7th May 2001, the exporters of 
jewelry and gemstones are required to register under the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 
1993. In addition they are also required to be registered with the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) and to 
  172
become member of one of the recognized Association such as “All Pakistan Gem Merchants and Jewelers 
Association, Karachi” or “All Pakistan Commercial Exporters of Rough and Unpolished Precious and 
Semi-precious Stones Association, Peshawar” or any other association recognized by the Ministry of 
Commerce under the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961.  
 
CDD Measures for DNFBPs in Set Circumstances (Applying c. 5.1-5.18 in R. 5 to DNFBP) (c. 12.1).  
Real Estate Agents 
917. Existing ordinances which govern real estate agents do not cover any specific elements of the 
Recommendation 5. The requirement on real estate agents to ensure correct account of transactions does 
not amount to CDD measures required in the Recommendation 5.  
 
Jewelers, Dealers in Precious Metals and Precious Stones 
918. Existing SROs do not cover or amount to CDD measures required under Recommendation 5. For 
example, SRO 266(I)/2001 dated 7th May 2001 requires the sale proceeds of exported gold jewelry and 
gemstones be repatriated either wholly in foreign exchange through normal banking channels or partly in 
the form of gold up to gold content of jewelry exported and partly in foreign exchange. However, this 
requirement does not amount to jewelers to undertake CDD. Similarly, section 11 of the aforesaid SRO 
requires foreign nationals and overseas Pakistanis to take out personally gold jewelry or gemstones only 
up to the limit of US dollars ten thousand, against foreign currency encashment certificate, with itemized 
purchase receipt(s) and, if the value exceeds US Dollar ten thousands, normal export procedure be 
followed. However, again this requirement does not amount to jewelers to undertake CDD.  
 
Lawyers, Accountants, Trust and Company Service Providers and Notaries 
919. Note that lawyers and accountants are the ones that typically provide the trust and company 
services defined in the international standard. According to the authorities there is no distinct category of 
businesses that provide this kind of services. Also note that notaries are required to be lawyers by 
profession. There is no separate notary profession.  
920. Lawyers and accountants are subject to the supervision of two self regulatory organizations 
(SROs): The Bar Council in the case of the former and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in the case 
of the latter. Neither SRO has issued or considered issuing rules imposing CDD obligations on the 
profession that they regulate.  
921. Covered activities: The assessors have sought to establish whether the accounting and the legal 
profession actually engage in the activities that are defined as trigger for CDD obligations under R.12.  
922. The following was confirmed:  
a. Lawyers and accountants prepare transactions for buying or selling real estate 
b. Lawyers and accountants act as formation agents of legal persons 
c. Lawyers and accountants provide a registered office and address for legal persons at least 
at the initial stage of the formation of the legal person. 
The meetings indicated however that the following activities are not common if not totally absent in legal 
and accounting profession in Pakistan. 
d. Managing of client money, securities or other assets 
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e. Managing of bank or securities accounts 
f. Operation or management of legal persons 
g. Acting or arranging for another to act as director or secretary of a company 
h. Acting or arranging for another to act as trustee 
i. Acting or arranging for another to act as nominee shareholder. 
 
Record-Keeping Requirements (Applying R. 10 to DNFBPs) 
923. While there is no record keeping requirements for NFBPs for the purpose of AML/CFT 
measures, existing ordinances and SROs require record keeping of transactions and customers for real 
estate agents and jewelers which could be also useful for AML/CFT purpose although will not go into the 
depth and scope required under Recommendation 10.. Under Punjab Real Estate Agents and Motor 
Vehicle Dealers (Regulation & Business) Ordinance, 1980, Islamabad Real Estate Agents and Motor 
Vehicle Dealers (Regulation & Business) Ordinance, 1984 and The North West Frontier Province Real 
Estate Agent and Motor Vehicle Dealer (Regulation & Business) Ordinance, 1983, the real estate agents 
are required to maintain accounts and other record of the transactions arranged, negotiated or made by 
him and in such manner as may be prescribed. Notwithstanding the above, all the transactions of sale and 
purchase require compulsory registration with the registrar of properties / revenue officer. All the record 
of ownership and changes thereof is a permanent record and is maintained by Provincial governments.   
924. As to registered jewelers, they are required to keep, inter alia, the date, name of buyer, brief 
particulars of goods sold, weight and total sale price, purchase invoices, purchase memos or receipts in 
any form received on purchase of raw materials and other inputs under the section 7 of SRO 391(I)/2001 
dated 18 June 2001. Exporters of gold jewelry and gemstones are required to maintain jewelry Pass Book 
duly authenticated by the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) and all export and import transactions, as well 
as import entitlements and actual import, shall be entered in the jewelry Pass Book and authenticated by 
the EPB.  
4.2. Recommendations and Comments 
925. Pakistan should  
 take steps to extend CDD and record keeping measures to the full range of NFBPs. 
 undertake risk assessments to determine the appropriate CDD and record keeping thresholds for 
respective NFBPs to ensure obligations imposed are balanced against the nature, size and risk of 
the NFBPs 
 designate the AML/CFT supervisory authorities for the different sectors and provide them with 
appropriate resources.  
 
4.2.1.  Compliance with Recommendation 12 
 Rating Summary of factors relevant to s.4.1 underlying overall rating  
R.12 NC CDD and record keeping requirements are not applied to NFBPs. 
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4.3. Suspicious Transaction Reporting (R.16)  
4.3.1. Description and Analysis 
926. Legal Framework: Article 7 of the AMLO imposes an STR obligation on financial institutions 
and does not extend it to NFBPs. However, AML Regulation 2008 provides Director General of FMU to 
require any NFBPs or agents of NFBPs to report STR in the manner he may prescribe.  
927. Lawyers and Accountants: Lawyers and accountants do not currently have any obligation to 
report suspicious transactions. Discussions with the relevant SROs indicated that there is no intention to 
impose such an obligation on the professions. Discussions with representatives of the professions 
indicated that such an obligation would not be acceptable.  
928. Covered activities: As indicated in the discussion of R.12 above it is quite uncommon in 
Pakistan for lawyers and accountants to carry out financial transactions for or on behalf of their clients. 
Lawyers and accountants however engage in a number of company and trust services that should be 
subject to STR obligation according under R.16.  
929. Legal Professional Privilege: Article 9 of the Evidence Order (Qanun-E-Shahadat) 1984 gives a 
privilege against disclosure without consent to any communication between the client and his advocate. 
The privilege reads as follows: “No advocate shall at any time be permitted. Unless with his client’s 
express consent, to disclose any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his 
employment as such advocate, by or on behalf of his client, or to state the contents or condition of any 
document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional 
employment, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such 
employment.” The article excludes from the privilege: (1) any such communication made in furtherance 
of any illegal purpose; or (2) any fact observed by any advocate, in the course of his employment as such, 
showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his employment”  
930. Despite the broad language of the privilege, discussions with representatives of the profession 
indicated that their understanding of this privilege is that it is limited to their defense function and courts 
representation and does not extend to activities of commercial nature that they may carry out on behalf of 
clients and that is not connected to their services as advocates in the context of litigation.  
931. It is important to note that the privilege does not extend to the accountants.   
Real Estate Agents, Jewelers, and Dealers in Precious Metals and Precious Stones 
932. As stated previously, currently there is no STR obligation to NFBPs including real estate agents, 
jewelers and dealers in precious metals and previous stones, and thus no STR is being filled by these 
NFBPs.  
4.3.2. Recommendations and Comments 
933. Pakistan should take steps to extend STR obligation to the full range of NFBPs, in particular real 
estate agents and jewelers given the high risk of ML/TF faced by these sectors.  
4.3.3. Compliance with Recommendation 16  
 Rating Summary of factors relevant to s.4.2 underlying overall rating 
R.16 NC STR requirement is not applied to NFBPs. 
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4.4. Regulation, Supervision, and Monitoring (R.24-25) 
4.4.1. Description and Analysis 
934. Legal Framework: Currently DNFBPs are not subject to the AML/CFT systems and therefore 
there is no regulation or supervision in this area.  
 
Regulation and Supervision of Casinos (c. 24.1, 24.1.1, 24.1.2 & 24.1.3): 
935. Casinos are prohibited in Pakistan.  
 
Monitoring Systems for Other DNFBPs (c. 24.2 & 24.2.1): 
936. Lawyers: The legal profession is regulated by Bar Councils, which are self-regulatory 
organizations governed by the Legal Practitioners and the Bar Councils Act 1973. There is one central bar 
council at the Supreme Court level and four provincial councils at high court level. The Bar Council 
operates through committees whose members are elected by the membership of the Bar.  
937. The main functions of Bar Councils are: to admit persons as advocates on its roll; to hold 
examinations for purposes of admission; to prepare and maintain a roll of such advocates of the province 
as well as of each Division; and to remove advocates from such roll; to admit persons as advocates 
entitled to practice before the High Court and to prepare and maintain a roll of such advocates; and to 
entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its rolls and to order punishment in 
such cases.  
938. The Bar Council has the powers to issue rules and to discipline its members. The Bar exercises 
these powers with restraint. In discussions with the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Pakistan 
Bar Council, as well as through the discussions with representative of the professions, it was indicated 
that the Bar has neither the capacity nor the will to regulate the profession for AML/CFT purposes.  
939. Accountants: The accountancy profession is regulated by the Institute of Chartered Accountants, 
which is a statutory autonomous body established under the Chartered Accountants Ordinance in 1961. 
The Ordinance was significantly amended in 1983. The main functions of ICAP are: to set the standards 
and conduct of the examinations for the purposes of admission, maintain a register of members, and the 
regulation and maintenance of the status and standard of professional qualifications of members.  
940. The powers of the Institute are vested in a Council that consists of 16 members, twelve members 
are elected from amongst the members for a period of four years and four members are nominated by the 
Government.  
941. The Council has powers to issue rules and to discipline its members. Discussions with the 
President of the Institute as well as discussions with some representatives of the professions indicated that 
the Institute has no capacity or intention to use its powers to impose and enforce AML/CFT regulations at 
this stage.  
942. Real Estate Agents: As stated earlier, real estate agents are not federally regulated. However, the 
agents in Punjab and North West Frontier Provinces and the Islamabad Capital Territory are required to 
register under their respective provincial ordinance. It is estimated that 80 percent of population is 
covered in those provinces. The remaining provinces do not have governing regulation and thus no 
registration requirement exist.   
943. Jewelers, Dealers in Precious Metals and Precious Stones: all jewelers having turnover above a 
specified threshold are required to register with the Collector of Sales Tax and the exporters of jewelry 
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and gemstones are required to register with the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) and to become member 
of one of the recognized Association. However, the main purpose of registration is for reporting purpose 
and not so much to monitor the professionals and businesses in the sector.  
Guidelines for DNFBPs (applying c. 25.1):  
944. The AML Regulations 2008 was issued in January 2009 to further guide STR and CTR 
requirements. The regulation contains an annex with examples of suspicious transactions although the 
examples are heavy on banking sector.  
4.4.2. Recommendations and Comments 
945. Pakistan should:  
 designate the AML/CFT supervisory authorities for the different sectors and provide them 
with appropriate resources. 
 take steps to supervise and monitor the full range of NFBPs for AML/CFT purposes 
 prepare more detailed sector guidelines to help respective NFBPs to implement AML/CFT 
requirements 
4.4.3. Compliance with Recommendations 24 & 25 (criteria 25.1, DNFBP)  
 Rating Summary of factors relevant to s.4.3 underlying overall rating 
R.24 NC There is no regulation or supervision in AML/CFT.  
R.25 PC Guidelines are only predominately banking orientated; no account is taken of 
other reporting entities. Examples shown are also generic international examples 
with little or no local context. 
There is no effective feedback being offered via the FMU or other competent 
body. 
 
 
4.5. Other Non-Financial Businesses and Professions—Modern-Secure Transaction Techniques 
(R.20)  
4.5.1. Description and Analysis 
946. Legal Framework: Under the AMLO, the Federal Government has the power to include any other 
non-financial business and profession in order to meet the objects of the Ordinance.  
 
Other Vulnerable DNFBPs (applying R. 5, 6, 8-11, 13-15, 17 & 21 c. 20.1): 
947. Investment advisory services are regulated under the Prudential Regulation on Non Banking 
Finance Companies (NBFCs) by the SECP. Thus, the same provisions for other NBFCs such as Mutual 
Funds, Private Equity & Venture Capital Funds, Modarabas, Pension Funds, Real Estate Investment 
Trusts, Leasing, Investment Banking, and House Financing apply to the Investment Advisors.  
948. However, using the provision in the AMLO mentioned above, which enables the Federal 
Government to include any other non-financial business and profession, no consideration has been given 
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nor any assessment undertaken to date whether other non-financial businesses and professions are 
vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing and thus should be brought under the AML/CFT 
regime.  
Modernization of Conduct of Financial Transactions (c. 20.2): 
949. The economy in Pakistan is still largely cash-based due to low literacy rate and rural population. 
However, the use of electronic transactions and payments is increasing. The largest denomination of the 
currency in Pakistan is Rs. 5,000 (roughly USD 63). The SECP prohibits cash transactions over Rs 
50,000 for NBFCs and Modaraba and Rs. 25,000 for securities transactions. Authorities also informed the 
assessment team that as per the Income Tax Ordinance 2001, all transactions over Rs. 50,000 (US $625) 
by companies and businesses should be settled through cheques/drafts/payment order or other instruments 
and not through cash to be admissible as an expense for tax purposes. In addition, the same Ordinance 
provides that cash withdrawal from bank exceeding Rs. 25,000 (US $312.5) is subject to a withholding 
tax at 0.3 percent to be deductible by the bank. The SBP is in the process of launching the Real Time 
Gross Settlement System (RTGS). At the retail payment level, the use of credit and debit cards, on-line 
banking and mobile phone banking is increasing.  
4.5.2. Recommendations and Comments 
 
950. The authorities should consider the following recommendations. 
 The NEC should undertake a risk assessment and assess whether other non-financial businesses and 
professions should be brought under the AML/CFT regime.  
 SBP should continue its efforts to modernize and securitize transactions and to expand the use of 
electronic transactions among the population.  
 
4.5.3. Compliance with Recommendation 20  
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.20 LC  Apart from inclusion of investment advisors by SECP, no comprehensive 
risk assessment has been undertaken to consider whether other non-financial 
businesses and professions should be also brought under the AML/CFT 
regime. .  
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5. LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS & NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS  
 
5.1. Legal Persons—Access to Beneficial Ownership and Control Information (R.33) 
5.1.1. Description and Analysis 
951. Legal Framework: The Companies Ordinance, 1984 and the Companies (General Provisions and 
Forms) Rules, 1985 provides the regulatory framework for registration and post-incorporation 
requirements of companies. The companies law in Pakistan does not require disclosure of beneficial 
ownership information as envisaged in the FATF standards but is limited to formal ownership.  
952. Any three or more persons associated for any lawful purpose may, by subscribing their names to 
the Memorandum of Association and complying with the requirements of the Companies Ordinance, form 
a public company. Any one or more persons so associated may, in like manner, form a private company.  
 
Measures to Prevent Unlawful Use of Legal Persons (c. 33.1): 
953. The Company Registration Office (CRO), which exists under the SECP, is responsible for the 
registration of all companies in Pakistan. A company comes into being through registration of documents 
with the registrar in one of the SECP’s eight CROs. Approximately 52,000 companies are registered, 
including 600 publicly listed companies. CROs are located in 8 cities across Pakistan and they provide 
services, guidance and ensure that companies and their directors comply with the statutory requirements.  
954. Information on the objects, structure, location, management and ownership of companies in 
Pakistan is kept centrally in the CRO and such information is publicly available via the CRO.   
955. At the time of registration of companies, the particulars of subscribers are required to be disclosed 
through memorandum and articles of association including name (present and former), father’s/husband’s 
name, nationality (including any former nationality), occupation, residential address, national identity 
card no. (passport no. for a foreign national), and number of shares taken by each subscriber.  Sponsors of 
a company convert into company members upon incorporation.  Directors and officers, including the 
chief executive, are also required to notify the CRO of business occupation; and particulars of other 
directorships or other office held in any other company.  
956. In the case of foreign legal persons holding an interest in a private company in Pakistan, Board of 
Investment (BOI) and SECP rules govern the particulars to be obtained.  Under the Companies Ordinance 
1984, foreign companies must file with the CRO certified copies of articles of incorporation, particulars 
of office holders, addresses of offices etc.  Foreign companies must receive permission from the BOI 
before opening a branch office by a foreign company.  BOI relies on the SBP to conduct due diligence on 
the bona-fides of the investing foreign company, including its place and form of incorporation, paid up 
capital, etc.  SBP’s due diligence does not extend to identifying those persons who exercise ultimate 
control over the legal person. 
957. Any change in the existing shareholding, members or directors is required to be notified by the 
company through annual return, which is to be filed within 4-6 weeks of the obligatory annual general 
meeting of members. Both private and public companies are obliged to inform the CRO of any change in 
directors, CEO, auditors or chief accountant by filing a Form-29 within 14 days of any appointment or 
change.  
958. Every company is required to notify the address of registered office or any change therein to the 
registrar within 28 days of date of incorporation and the date of change, as applicable.   
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959. All the aforesaid information is held by the corporate record of the company and is maintained 
with the CRO. Information on companies is publicly available at the office of the CRO. The CRO may 
provide certified true copies of the statutory returns on payment of a nominal fee.  
960. SECP has wide ranging powers to access company records, including records available on share 
holders, officeholders and directors as well as financial information.  The SECP possesses wide powers to 
call for any information from, as well as to carry out investigation into the affairs of companies. Section 
231 of the Companies Ordinance allows the SECP to authorize the Registrar concerned to inspect the 
accounts, books and papers of a company.  
961. Section 261 of the Companies Ordinance empowers the Registrar, by a written order, to call upon 
the company and any of its present or past directors, officers or auditors to furnish necessary documents, 
information or explanations within fourteen days with respect to any matter.  
962. If the registrar has reasonable ground to believe that books and papers relating to any company, 
chief executive, officer and associate of such person can be destroyed, mutilated, altered, falsified or 
secreted, the registrar can search and seize such books and papers after obtaining permission of the 
Magistrate of the first class or the Court.  
963. The SECP has wide ranging powers to share information obtained on companies with other 
competent authorities domestically or internationally.  
 
Access to Information on Beneficial Owners of Legal Persons (c. 33.2): 
964. The CRO has no mechanism by which to determine who else has beneficial interest in a 
registered company. There is no obligation for companies to provide information beyond the owners of 
the company and the SECP, as the regulator, does not take steps to probe beyond the legal ownership of a 
company to the underlying beneficial owner.  As such, neither law enforcement agencies, regulatory 
authorities nor financial institutions has the ability to obtain such information.  
965. At the time of the onsite visit the CRO was in the final stage of making online searches available 
for CRO records.  
 
Prevention of Misuse of Bearer Shares (c. 33.3): 
966. Bearer shares are not a permissible under the SECP law (Section 89 of the Companies Ordinance 
refers).  The process to dematerialize all shares in Pakistan was undertaken in 1996 and has been 
complete for a number of years.  
 
Additional Element—Access to Information on Beneficial Owners of Legal Persons by Financial 
Institutions) (c. 33.4): 
967. All the information filed at a CRO is public information and financial institutions have access to 
company information either through inspection of the records or obtaining certified true copies of 
documents held by the CRO.  
 
Analysis of Effectiveness 
968. Pakistan’s legal framework for corporate entities requires the registration of all forms of legal 
persons, but the registration data available with the Registrar does not contain beneficial ownership 
information, which undermines effectiveness.  
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969. Information held with the corporate entities and provided to the Registrar is verified by the SECP, 
with a reasonable level of compliance.  This information is available to law enforcement as needed, 
however its value is undermined by the absence of beneficial ownership information 
 
5.1.2. Recommendations and Comments 
970. Pakistan should require registered companies to make available accurate and current information 
on those natural persons who exercise beneficial ownership and control of legal persons.  
5.1.3. Compliance with Recommendations 33  
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.33 PC  Laws and regulations do not require adequate transparency concerning the 
beneficial ownership and control of legal persons in Pakistan.  
 
5.2. Legal Arrangements—Access to Beneficial Ownership and Control Information (R.34)  
5.2.1. Description and Analysis 
971. Legal Framework: Express trusts may be formed in Pakistan under the provisions of the Trusts 
Act 1882. The Act sets out the roles for the author of the trust, the trustee and the beneficiary and related 
obligations.  Every person capable of holding property may be a beneficiary or trustee. As such, natural 
persons, and any company, society or other entity duly formed under the relevant law may also act as 
trustee and can operate a trust.  The Trusts Act does not require disclosure of beneficial ownership 
information as envisaged in the FATF standards.  
972. Trust may be registered under the Registration Act, 1908.  For immovable property, Section 5 of 
the Trusts Act requires the written instrument of the trust to be signed by the author of the trust or the 
trustee and registered with the District Registrar’s Office.  Registration of an instrument of trust is not 
required for movable property.  An instrument of trust for movable property may be registered with the 
District Registrar on the discretion of the trustee.  
973. Pakistan law does not prevent recognition of trusts formed in other jurisdictions.  
Measures to Prevent Unlawful Use of Legal Arrangements (c. 34.1): 
974. Pakistan has a decentralized system of registration of trusts under the Registration Act. 
Registration of trust deeds is done by various Registrars at the district and city level. Details recorded 
include the trustees and beneficiaries of the trust.  The extent of beneficial ownership required to be 
disclosed under the terms of the trust act is limited to the direct beneficiary. Indirect beneficiaries, such as 
a case where a direct beneficiary is another trust, are not required to be disclosed.  
975. There is an indirect obligation for the registration of a trust deed for moveable property if the trust 
is to become a customer of a bank. This is a result of SBP KYC Regulations (M-1) relating to 
identification of customers who are trusts. The Regulation requires a certified copy of the trust deed as 
part of the identification of customers, and such certification can only be given for a registered trust deed.  
Similar requirements are not in place for SECP regulated financial institutions.   
976. The SBP KYC regulation requires identification documentation of natural persons who are 
trustees, but no clear requirement to identify legal persons acting as trustees or the case in which the 
registered beneficiary may be another trust. SECP regulations do not address trusts  
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Access to Information on Beneficial Owners of Legal Arrangements (c. 34.2): 
977. Registration of trust information is not centralized and remains a system of manual records 
controlled by various local and city government registrars implementing the Registration Act. This 
information is public and is theoretically available to law enforcement as needed, but is very hard to 
access in practice.  Based on discussions with authorities in Pakistan, there is an apparent lack of 
awareness of which agency registers trusts and how to access trust information.  
 
Additional Element—Access to Information on Beneficial Owners of Legal Arrangements by Financial 
Institutions) (c. 34.3):  
978. Financial institutions were only required to identify beneficial ownership as of March 2009 (see 
Recommendation 5). 
Analysis of Effectiveness 
 
979. As the information is not centralized, no statistics or estimates were available on the extent of 
registration of trusts formed in Pakistan.  Discussions with financial institutions and the regulators 
indicate that private trusts are relatively uncommon in Pakistan. Based on discussions with authorities in 
Pakistan, there is an apparent lack of awareness of which agency registers trusts and how to access trust 
information 
980. The information required to be included in the trust agreement on trustees, settlors and 
beneficiaries does not cover the concept of beneficial ownership, which undermines effectiveness.  
981. Registration of trust information is decentralized and remains a system of manual records 
controlled by district and city administrations. This information is theoretically available to law 
enforcement as needed, but is very hard to access in practice, which undermines effectiveness.  
5.2.2. Recommendations and Comments 
982. Pakistan should take measures to ensure that trust deed information registered with the various 
district and city registrars contains information on beneficial ownership and is readily accessible to law 
enforcement and other competent authorities.  
983. Authorities should raise awareness on where trust deed information is held and how to access 
such information for AML/CFT purposes.  
5.2.3. Compliance with Recommendations 34  
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.34 NC  The information required to be included in the trust agreement on trustees, 
settlors and beneficiaries does not cover the concept of beneficial ownership, 
which undermines effectiveness.  
 Registration of trust information is decentralized and remains in manual 
records and is very difficult for law enforcement agencies to access in 
practice. 
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5.3. Non-Profit Organizations (SR.VIII) 
5.3.1. Description and Analysis 
984. Legal Framework: The Trust Act 1882; the Charitable Endowments Act 1890; the Charitable 
Funds (Regulation of Collections) Act (1953); the Societies Registration Act (1960); Voluntary Social 
Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control Ordinance) (1961); Local Government Ordinance (2001); the 
Companies Ordinance (s. 42) (1984).  
985. Table 20 summarizes the registration laws governing the NPO sector in Pakistan:  
Table 20: Registration Laws Governing the NPO Sector 
Law Scope Registration Required 
info. 
Competent 
Authority 
Sanction for non-
compliance 
Trust Act Private trusts Mandatory 
registration of 
the trust deed as 
a document. 
The particulars 
of the trust-
property and 
names of all 
persons 
executing and 
claiming under 
the trust deed. 
Offices of the 
registrar and sub-
registrar and 
district and sub-
district level of 
the provincial 
government 
reporting to the 
office of the 
Inspector General 
designated by the 
provincial 
government. 
Voidance of the 
trust deed - 
criminal sanctions 
for making false 
statements or 
submitting false 
documents to the 
Registering Office. 
(s. 82 of the 
Registration Act 
(1908). 
Charitable 
Endowments 
Act 
Trusts for 
charitable purpose 
including relief of 
the poor, education 
and the 
advancement of 
any other object of 
public utility and 
excluding trusts for 
exclusively 
religious worship 
or teaching. 
Voluntary. Not available The Ministry of 
Social Welfare 
and Special 
Education. 
No Sanctions. 
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Law Scope Registration Required 
info. 
Competent 
Authority 
Sanction for non-
compliance 
Societies 
Registration 
Act 
- Societies 
established for the 
promotion of 
literature, science, 
or the fine arts, or 
the diffusion of 
useful knowledge, 
the diffusion of 
political education 
or for charitable 
purposes. 
- Registration of 
Deeni Madaris 
Voluntary 
except in 
relation to deeni 
madaris, whose 
registration is 
mandatory. 
- Name of 
Society 
- objects of the 
society. 
- names, 
addresses, and 
occupations of 
the governors, 
council, 
directors, 
Committee or 
other 
governing 
body. 
- Copy of rules 
and 
regulations of 
the society. 
The registrar of 
joint-stock 
companies under 
the departments of 
industry of the 
provinces.  
No penalties for 
non-compliance 
even in relation to 
the deeni madaris.  
Voluntary 
Social 
Welfare 
Agencies 
Voluntary social 
welfare agencies 
established for the 
purpose of 
rendering welfare 
services in any 
field mentioned in 
the schedule to the 
Act.  
Mandatory - a copy of the 
constitution of 
the agency 
- name of 
agency 
-area of 
operation 
- principal 
office of the 
agency 
-aims and 
objects. 
Directorate of 
Social Welfare 
with offices at 
district and sub-
district level.  
Failure to register 
is punishable by 
imprisonment up 
to 6 months or/and 
with a fine up to 
2000 Rs.  
Company 
Ordinance 
s.42 
Association formed 
as limited liability 
company for 
promoting 
commerce, art, 
science, religion, 
sports, social 
services, charity or 
any other useful 
object and intends 
to apply its profit 
towards promoting 
its objects.  
Voluntary but 
mandatory if the 
company wishes 
to enjoy the 
exemption and 
privileges 
associated with 
s.42 status.  
- Memo. of 
association. 
- Articles of 
association. 
- Particulars of 
the directors of 
the company.  
- The address 
of the 
registered 
office.  
 
The Corporate 
Law Authority 
(SECP) at Federal 
Level and the 
Directorate of 
Industry.  
Cannot enjoy the 
privileges and 
exemptions 
associated with 
s.42 status. 
 
Review of the Domestic Non-Profit Sector (c. VIII.I) 
986. The Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education (MoSW) has conducted a review of the 
domestic laws and regulations that govern the NPO sector. The review concluded that the regulatory 
situation is very weak, there is fragmentation of regulation and there is lack of compliance or monitoring. 
The review also identified as a weakness the lack of sharing of intelligence and registration details 
amongst the various tiers of the regulatory framework: federal, provincial and district level. Steps are 
being taken since to address these weaknesses. These include a project led by the Ministry of Social 
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Welfare and Special Education to create a central database that contains the registration details of all 
registered NPOs and that networks together all the relevant registration authorities. There is also a 
pending draft consolidated NPOs law that is hindered by popular opposition to government intervention 
in the NPO sector that may impinge on the constitutional freedom of association.  The authorities advised 
the team that by consulting widely and maintaining communications with NGOs at Federal and local 
level, it has been gathered that this opposition can be overcome or at least reduced.   
987. While the review focused on the adequacy of the legal framework governing the NPO sector, it 
has not reviewed sufficiently the nature and structure of the sector with a view to identifying the risk 
factors. The government review acknowledged that the sector is large and noted that it is mostly funded 
domestically.  The Ministry of Social Welfare is currently implementing a wide-based project that aims at 
creating a national database of all NPOs operating in Pakistan. The project is networking all the local 
registries and aims at collecting information on the registered NPOs including their projects and their 
financing. This ambitious project is still at an early stage. Once it is completed it will provide the 
authorities with the information necessary to monitor the risk in the sector.  
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Outreach to the NPO Sector to Prevent it from the Terrorist Financing Abuse (c. VIII.2)  
988. Outreach efforts to the NPO sector are carried out by the MoSW through a federal-level 
directorate dedicated to NPO matters. Outreach is also done at grass-root level by the Directorate of 
Social Welfare at district and sub-district level. While the MoSW does not act as the registration authority 
except for Charitable Endowments under the Charitable Endowments Act 1890, their outreach effort 
expands beyond the 18 trusts registered under this Act to cover all registered NPOs across the country. 
The Directorate of Social Welfare, which is the registration authority for agencies registered under 
Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies Act. The Directorate has representation at district, sub-district and 
union levels and they work very closely with the NPOs registered under their law.  
989. The outreach efforts of both the MoSW and the Directorate of Social Welfare focus primarily on 
promoting accountability, good governance and integrity in the administration and management of NPOs. 
A current national program of outreach is being conducted, which includes training regulators and NGOs 
in each district of Pakistan.   This program of training is highly useful for strengthening the guards of the 
sector against abuse including abuse for the purposes of terrorism financing.   The reference in this 
outreach program to the specific risks of terrorism financing and the various typologies for terrorism 
financing is still limited. 
990. It is worth noting that the MoSW has developed a “Voluntary Code of Conduct/Ethics for the 
regulation and operation of NGOs. This Code was developed with the participation of 400 NGOs. The 
code emphasizes the importance of financial transparency in general for the purposes of integrity and 
good governance. More specifically however, the Code sets best practices for preventing the threats of 
abuse of NGOs. Under this principle, the Code highlights the potential abuse of non-for-profit 
organizations for any sort of criminal financing. The practices advocated under this principle centre 
around strict due diligence measures on board and executive members, close monitoring of the NPO’s 
financing.  
 
Supervision or Monitoring of NPOs that Account for Significant Share of the Sector’s Resources or 
International Activities (c. VIII.3)   
991. Of all the registration authorities, only the Corporate Law Authority in the SECP and the 
Directorate of Social Welfare have actual monitoring powers of the NPOs that they register. According to 
the authorities, only 341 non-for-profit companies are registered under s. 42 of the Companies Ordinance 
and 21,364 are registered under the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies Act.  
992. The Companies Ordinance gives the registrar of companies 
extensive powers to access information and records (s.261), to compel 
the production of documents (s.261), and to investigate the affairs of the 
company (s. 265). Section 231 of the Companies Ordinance also gives 
the registrar the power to inspect the books of account of the company, 
imposing an obligation on every director, officer or other employee of 
the company to produce to provide the inspector with any documents that 
may be in his possession relating to the affairs of the company and to 
facilitate the investigation.  
993. At the time of the on-site visit no inspections of NPOs has been 
completed by the SECP. The team was informed after the on-site visit 
that the SECP is currently undertaking inspection of the following 
number of associations. These inspections are currently in progress:  
Name of 
CRO * NPOs 
  
Karachi 30 
Lahore 18 
Islamabad 14 
Peshawar 2 
Faisalabad 0 
Multan 1 
  
Total 65 
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994. In addition, the authorities advised the team after the on-site mission out-sourced the examination 
of annual accounts. During the last year, in order to check the transparency in the financial activities of 
the association, the Commission outsourced the examination of annual audited accounts of the following 
associations through the firms of chartered accountants. These audits are also in progress:  
995. The Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies Act requires the 
registered agencies to maintain audited accounts, submit annual reports 
and audited accounts, and furnish the registration authority upon its 
request such particulars with regard to accounts and other records. The 
Act also gives the registration authority the power to inspect the books of 
account and other records of the agency as well as any property held by 
the agency and all documents relating thereto.  
996. The Directorate of Social Welfare, which is the registration 
authority under the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies Act reaches out 
on regular basis to the agencies registered under the Act using its wide 
network of grass-roots field officers. The monitoring exercised by the 
Directorate focuses primarily on issues of good management of resources and the protection of the 
beneficiaries and members of the agencies. This outreach goes a long way towards strengthening the 
guards of these organizations against all sorts of abuse including the abuse for the purposes of terrorism 
financing.  There is not yet specific focus on the prevention of the abuse of the welfare agencies for TF 
purposes and outreach to the sector that alerts them to the specific nature of this abuse.  
997. The SECP and the Social Welfare Registers have adequate powers and some resources to 
supervise the part of the sector that falls within their competence, the capacity and power of the other 
institutions that are responsible for regulating the other parts of the sector do not have similar capacity or 
powers.  
 
Information maintained by NPOs and availability to the public thereof (c. VIII.3.1):  
998. All the registration laws governing NPOs require submission of a certain set of information. 
Table 21 summarizes the information required under the various laws and its availability to the public:  
 
Table 21: Summary of Beneficial Ownership Information Required under NPO Laws 
Law Info on 
purpose and 
objective 
Info on identity 
owners and 
directors 
Info held by 
registrar 
Info held 
by the NPO 
itself 
Publicly accessible 
Trust Act Yes Yes Yes Yes Only if it relates to 
immovable 
property. 
Charitable 
Endowments Act 
Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes 
Societies 
Registration Act 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary Social 
Welfare Agencies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company 
Ordinance s.42 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Name of 
CRO * NPOs  
  
Karachi 19 
Lahore 6 
Islamabad 13 
Peshawar 2 
Quetta  2 
  
Total 42 
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999. Both the company registrar under the Company Ordinance and the Social Welfare registrar under 
the Voluntary Social Welfare Ordinance are given explicit powers to enquire into the validity of the 
submitted information and to inspect the NPOs that they register to ensure compliance with the record-
keeping requirements. In reality actual verification of the submitted information is very limited. The 
Social Welfare registrar has an effective grass-root outreach program and on basis of that the assessors 
were satisfied that they possess actual knowledge of the agencies that they register.   The Societies 
Registrar has very limited powers to inquire into the validity of submitted information and has no powers 
to inspect the NPO.  
 
Measures in place to sanction violations of oversight rules by NPOs (c. VIII.3.2): 
1000. With the exception of the powers available to the company registrar and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the registering authorities under applicable laws do not enjoy powers to impose 
sanctions for violations of the rules governing the NPOs. The only sanctions available under these 
registration laws are either dissolution of the registered NPO itself or dissolution of the governing body. 
Both are clearly very severe sanctions that are to be applied in cases of sever mismanagement of funds or 
inability to provide the services that the NPO was set-up to provide. The applicable laws, with the 
exception of the Company Ordinance, do not give the registering authorities powers to impose fines for 
failure to keep records or to file returns. Discussions with the authorities during the on-site revealed that 
compliance with the registration and filing requirements is at 40-50 percent rate. In addition, many NPOs 
remain informal operating without registration.  
1001. Pakistani law in general does not preclude parallel civil, criminal and administrative proceedings. 
The general rule, which was confirmed by the Ministry of Law and by local barristers, is that these 
proceedings are independent.  
 
Licensing or registration of NPOs and availability of this information (c. VIII.3.3):   
1002. There is no general prohibition on the operation of NPOs without license or registration in 
Pakistan. Therefore, all independent studies confirm that the number of informal NPOs operating in 
Pakistan is very large. Registration of NPOs is mandatory in only four cases:  
 When it is a charitable trust and the property of the trust is immovable.  
 When it is private limited liability company wishing to benefit from the exemptions of s.42 under 
the Company Ordinance.  
 When it is a Social Welfare Agency registered under the Voluntary Social Welfare Registration 
Act. 
 When it is a Deeni Madrasah and therefore required to register under s. 21 of the Societies 
Registration Act.  
1003. It is important to note that apart from the loss of benefits in the absence of registration, such as in 
the case of s.42 companies under the Company Ordinance, there is no other penalty for failure to register. 
The provincial government for example does not have any power to sanction informal welfare agencies 
and mandate them to register.  Also, the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies, which is the registering 
authority for Deeni Madaris under the Societies Registration Act, has no power to compel an unregistered 
Madrasah to register in accordance with s.21.  
1004. Table 22 summarizes the number of registered NPOs under each Act. 
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Table 22:  Number of Registered NPOs under NPO Acts 
Law of Registration  Number of NGOs Percentage 
Societies Registration Act 1860 20,189 44.74 
Trusts Act 1882 93 0.22 
Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies 1961 21,364 47.36 
Companies Ordinance 1984 341 0.81 
Charitable Endowments Act 1890 26 0.06 
Local Government Ordinance 2001 3,010 6.81 
Total 45,121 100 
 
Maintenance of records by NPOs, and availability to appropriate authorities (c. VIII. 3.4): 
1005. Apart from general provisions under the applicable laws for the issuance of annual financial 
statements and the use of bank accounts, there are no obligations to document individual transactions.  
 
Measures to ensure effective investigation and gathering of information (c. VIII.4): 
1006. Pakistan relies on the general investigative and intelligence gathering powers that are available to 
law enforcement and intelligence authorities when a case arises that requires the investigation or the 
gathering of intelligence regarding an NPO.  
1007. The Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education has a directorate dedicated to NPO affairs. 
This directorate acts as liaison with law enforcement authorities. Discussions with the Director revealed 
that his directorate has received requests from other government agencies and has collaborated to the 
extent of their capacities with law enforcement agencies.  
1008. The registration of NPOs is highly fragmented and de-centralized and the information to the 
extent that it exists is mostly held in paper-records. This clearly limits the ability to share information in a 
timely fashion. The Directorate concerned with NPO issues at the Ministry of Social Welfare is currently 
in the process of building one centralized database, computerizing the registries around the country and 
connecting all the registries through an IT network. This is done in collaboration with international 
donors. The task is however of great magnitude and it will take time to be completed.  
 
Responding to international requests regarding NPOs - points of contacts and procedures (c. VIII.5): 
1009. The Directorate responsible for NPOs affairs at the Ministry of Social Welfare acts as the contact 
points in Pakistan for any foreign request for information pertaining to NPOs. Discussions with the 
Director revealed that requests for information have been received by the Directorate and have been 
responded to. Whenever necessary, the Directorate seeks the input of the Ministry of Interior.  
1010. In investigative and intelligence matters, the normal routes for international cooperation in these 
matters are pursued.   
 
Analysis of effectiveness 
1011. The Pakistani authorities are making a lot of effort in collaboration with foreign donors to 
organize the NPO sector more effectively. The work of the NGO Affairs Bureau to coordinate with all 
federal and provincial NPO regulators is a welcome development. A number of constraints remain:  
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 The NPO sector is jealous of the freedoms guaranteed to it by the constitution and resistant to 
government regulation. This is directly responsible for the fragmentation of the regulation of the 
sector and the limited regulatory powers granted in the applicable laws to the registration 
authorities.  
 The size of the sector is a big challenge to the capacity of the government to regulate.  
 The lack of computerization of the various registration authorities is an impediment to 
information sharing.  
 The human and financial resources of the registration authorities are highly limited by 
comparison to the size of the sector. 
 There is a very high degree of informality and lack of documentation in the sector.  
1012. These constraints are not unique to the Pakistani context. They are faced by many other countries 
regionally and internationally. The authorities are making substantial effort to address these constraints 
through: outreach and consultation with the sector, gradual computerization of the registries around the 
country in the context of the national database project, and harmonization amongst the regulatory 
agencies through training and outreach.  
 
5.3.2. Recommendations and Comments 
1013. Because of the constitutional constrains, the magnitude of the sector and the level of activism 
against government regulation in the sector, any approach to the regulation of the sector will have to rely 
on incentives. The following steps should be taken in order to achieve more compliance with the 
international standard:  
 A comprehensive risk assessment of the sector and identification of NPOs or categories of NPOs that 
pose greater ML or TF risk.  
 Expanding programs of outreach and training to include greater focuses on the risks of abuse for 
money laundering and terrorism financing. 
 Strengthening the regulations that require to NPOs to keep records on: sources of funds, financial 
transactions and beneficiaries.  
 Moving forward with the project of computerizing the registrars and enhancing the connectivity 
amongst them and with the Ministry of Social Welfare and populating the national NGO database.  
 Creating clear channels for information sharing and coordination amongst the competent authorities 
in matters pertaining to NPOs.  
 Support long-term efforts to streamline and improve the fragmented regulatory framework for NPOs 
in Pakistan.  
 
5.3.3. Compliance with Special Recommendation VIII  
 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
SR.VIII PC  The NPO sector assessment did not include assessment of ML/TF 
risks to the sector. 
 No ML/TF risk assessment has been conducted of the sector. 
 Efforts to raise the awareness of the sector of the risks of ML and TF 
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are still limited. 
 There is no effective monitoring or supervision of the NPOs that 
account for a significant portion of the financial resources of the 
sector and its international activities.  
 The powers of the registration authorities to sanction violations of 
the regulations of the sector are very limited. 
 The NPOs are still not required to keep records of transactions or to 
document their donors and beneficiaries.  
 The information sharing amongst competent authorities is hampered 
by the fragmentation of the registration system, the lack of 
enforcement and the lack of computerization. 
 A large segment of the NPO sector remains informal, i.e., neither 
registered not licensed.  
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6. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
6.1. National Co-Operation and Coordination (R.31 & R. 32) 
6.1.1. Description and Analysis  
1014. Legal Framework: The AMLO includes provisions for AML-related national coordination. 
Section 5 mandates the high-level National Executive Committee (NEC). The NEC is to be chaired by the 
Minister for Finance and include the Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs; Minister 
for Law & Justice, Minister of Interior; Governor SBP, Chairman SECP, , Chairman NAB, Director 
General FMU any other member nominated by the Federal Government. At present the NEC does not 
include the Minister for Narcotics Control.  
1015. The NEC’s mandate is to develop and frame an annual national AML strategy; to determine the 
predicate offences in AMLO; to provide guidance and sanction in framing of rules and regulations; to 
make recommendations to the Government on implementation of the AMLO; and issue necessary 
directions to the agencies involved in the implementation of the AMLO.  
1016. AMLO establishes the General Committee (GC) to assist the NEC. The GC is comprised of the 
Secretaries Finance, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Law, Governor SBP, Chairman SECP and Director General 
FMU, who is also secretary of the GC. The GC’s objectives include:  
 develop and review the performance of AML measures by investigation agencies, FMU, 
financial institutions and DNFBPs;  
 review training AML programs for government agencies and reporting institutions ; 
provide assistance to the NEC in carrying out its functions and duties; and 
 discussing any issue of national importance relating to money laundering  
 
1017. SBP and SECP have powers in legislation to cooperate and coordinate with information sharing 
and development and implementation of policies and activities. Section 35(6) to (11) of SECP Act 1997 
allows SECP to disclose public and non-public information within its possession to domestic 
counterparts. Similarly [SBP Act / BCO – check] allows SBP to share and exchange of information with 
other supervisors.  
Mechanisms for Domestic Cooperation and Coordination in AML/CFT (c. 31.1): 
1018. Between 2001 and 2007 Ministry of Finance convened a policy-level committee for consultation 
among all relevant departments / agencies to develop AML legislation.  
1019. The NEC and GC have taken initial steps to support policy level coordination for AML 
implementation, however key steps have yet to be taken including sharing information on AML/CFT risk 
and developing a national strategy to effectively implement the AMLO.  A sub-committee was established 
by NEC for drafting the AMLO Rules and Regulations. On the direction of the NEC the GC formed a 
sub-committee to review AMLO and make recommendations for further amendments. The GC’s 
recommended amendments have been endorsed by the NEC and referred to the cabinet for submission to 
the parliament.   
1020. The NEC and GC do not currently include all ministries and agencies involved in AML/CFT. The 
absence of Ministry of Narcotics Control and ANF in these structures is a gap.  The inclusion of customs 
in the GC sub-committee went beyond the GC membership to include Customs.  
1021. There is no mechanism to coordinate various agencies to ensure effective implementation of CFT 
measures to counter the very serious TF threats in Pakistan.  This impedes the development and 
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implementation of coordinated policies to systematically prevent, investigate and prosecute terrorist 
financing as well as freeze and seize terrorist assets, combat cash couriers, protect alternative remittance 
systems from abuse and to ensure that NPOs are not abused for TF.   
1022. Inter-agency cooperation is taking place between agencies under the Ministry of Interior involved 
in combating terrorism (provincial police, FIA, IB, ISI); however this coordination does not extend to 
CFT and does not include the FMU or other CFT stakeholders.  
1023. Ministry of Social Welfare, through the NGO Affairs Bureau, is coordinating with other NPO 
regulators and the FMU to share NPO regulatory information and coordinate training.  SECP and FBR 
could be more closely involved in this process.  MoSW is coordinating with Ministry of Interior and its 
line agencies on CFT issues.  
1024. SBP and SECP have an established mechanism for cooperation and coordination, which is 
supported by an MOU. Meetings are held between the two regulators to discuss policy and regulatory 
issues, although greater emphasis could be placed on AML/CFT coordination and the FMU could be 
more closely involved in multi-regulator discussions related to AML/CFT.  
1025. Close coordination between NAB and regulators has taken place over a number of years to 
support proceeds of crime investigations and prosecutions. This included establishing NAB desks within 
SBP. A number of SECP and SBP staff were on deputation to NAB. A number of SBP staff are currently 
on deputation to FIA to assist in financial investigations and prosecutions.  
1026. Coordination and cooperation between law enforcement agencies is undertaken for high-profile 
cases.  However where the predicate offences span the mandate of more than one agency, it is unclear 
how issues of overlapping jurisdictions will be resolved for day to day operations.  
1027. NAB, Ministry of Finance and the FMU have played roles in coordinating with various Pakistan 
agencies in the participation in the APG and related AML/CFT forums.   
Additional Element - Mechanisms for Consultation Between Competent Authorities and Regulated 
Institutions (c. 31.2):  
1028. SBP has initiated a joint Compliance Officers Forum for informal consultation between bank 
compliance officers and the SBP to discuss AML/CFT issues.  SBP held four compliance officer 
meetings in 2008. FMU held two consultation and awareness raising sessions with reporting institutions 
during 2008.  
 
Statistics (applying R.32): 
1029. Provisions of sections 5(7) (a) and 6(4) (g) of the AMLO provide for mechanisms for reviewing 
the effectiveness of AML measures. The application of these provisions has been limited to reviewing 
legal provisions in the AMLO to further align the ordinance with the international standards. 
Recommended amendments to AMLO provisions have already been submitted and approved by the 
cabinet and the draft bill will soon be placed before the Parliament.  
1030. The NEC was formed by official gazette on (date) and has held three meetings since (date). The 
GC and its subcommittee have met approximately 15 times since October 2007.  
Analysis of Effectiveness 
1031. Pakistan’s federal system, combined with its system of general and specialist investigation 
agencies and courts results in significant fragmentation and complexity.  
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1032. The welcome step of the creation of the NEC and GC has not yet yielded the needed results.  So 
far the NEC has not defined a clear strategy, based on a risk-assessment, to prioritize the implementation 
of the AML regime.  There is no impediment to domestic cooperation and coordination at the operational 
level, but the overall fragmentation of the institutional framework has so far made it difficult to achieve 
measurable results in that respect.   
1033. The assessors were not informed of a clear mechanism to coordinate and cooperate to develop 
and implement an effective policy to combat TF.   
6.1.2. Recommendations and Comments  
1034. There is a pressing need for close cooperation and coordination of effort to overcome 
fragmentation and ensure effective implementation of AML/CFT measures across the whole of Pakistan. 
The structures that are provided for in the AMLO will have no positive effect unless individual agencies 
commit to supporting coordinated approaches to implement targeted AML/CFT policies across Pakistan.  
1035. Pakistan should:  
 establish an effective coordination mechanism to set clear national policies for CFT and 
further develop and effectively implement CFT measures across Pakistan; 
 fully implement coordination mechanisms established in AMLO to coordinate AML 
policies; and  
 include all relevant agencies in various AML/CFT coordination structures, in particular 
Ministry of Narcotics Control and ANF, provincial police and customs. 
 
1036. Authorities may consider establishing a Compliance Officers Networks between the SECP, FIU 
and NBFIs.  
6.1.3. Compliance with Recommendation 31 & 32 (criterion 32.1 only) 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.31 PC  Mechanisms established in AMLO to coordinate AML policies have not 
yet been fully implemented and adequately supported by all relevant 
stakeholders in the Pakistan government. 
 No mechanism has been established to support CFT coordination at 
policy and operational levels 
 There are gaps in operational level coordination in relation to AML 
implementation, in particular supervisory agencies. 
R. 32 NC  Very limited steps have been taken to review the effectiveness of 
AML/CFT systems.  
 
6.2. The Conventions and UN Special Resolutions (R.35 & SR.I) 
6.2.1. Description and Analysis 
1037. Legal Framework: International Conventions to which Pakistan is a signatory are not self-
executing.  To give them effect, relevant obligations and powers must be incorporated into domestic law.  
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Ratification of AML Related UN Conventions (c. 35.1):  
1038. Pakistan ratified the Vienna Convention in 1991.  
1039. Pakistan signed the Palermo Convention in December 2000 but has not yet acceded to it.  The 
Evaluation Team was advised that approval documentation has been prepared and is awaiting Cabinet 
approval at the instigation of the Minister of Interior.  Pakistan is also pursuing accession to the three 
Protocols.  
Ratification of CFT Related UN Conventions (c. I.1):  
1040. At the cut-off date for this assessment Pakistan had signed but not acceded to the Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Financing.  Accession was awaiting Cabinet approval.15 
Implementation of Vienna Convention (Articles 3-11, 15, 17 & 19, c. 35.1): 
1041. Due in large part to the MLA and freezing and forfeiture related provisions within the CNSA, 
Pakistan meets the requirements of the identified Articles of this Convention.  
Implementation of TF Convention (Articles 2-18, c. 35.1 & c. I.1):  
1042. Pakistan does not conform to certain key elements of the Terrorist Financing Convention, notably 
in terms of capacity to provide mutual legal assistance in TF-related investigations (Article 12) and 
uncertainties as to the criminalization of extraterritorial financing (Article 2). 
Implementation of Palermo Convention (Articles 5-7, 10-16, 18-20, 24-27, 29-31 & 34, c. 35.1): 
1043. As noted, Pakistan has not acceded to the Palermo Convention.  Pakistan’s current conformity 
with the requirements of that Convention is deficient in several respects. Notably:  
 Contrary to Article 18, Pakistan has no capacity to provide mutual legal assistance in relation to all 
“serious crime” as defined in the Convention (i.e., in relation to all offences punishable by a 
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years) – whether or not such offending is 
transnational in nature and involves an organized criminal group. 
 Contrary to Article 16, powers of extradition are constrained to the descriptions of offences contained 
in the schedule to the Extradition Act, as opposed to all offences punishable by at least 4 years 
imprisonment (such as the full range of corruption-related offences under s9 of the NAO) – whether 
or not such offending involves an organized criminal group.   
 Contrary to Article 12, there are deficiencies in Pakistan’s capacity to freeze and seize assets (as 
noted under Rec 3).  In particular, powers of forfeiture of property of corresponding value are limited 
to offences under the NAO   
 
Implementation of UNSCRs relating to Prevention and Suppression of FT (c. I.2) 
1044. As noted in relation to SRIII, freezing pursuant to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 is deficient, including 
in relation to type of assets amenable to freezing and range of entities effecting freezing action.  
 
                                                     
15.  Pakistan has since acceded to the Convention. 
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Additional Element—Ratification or Implementation of Other relevant international conventions (c. 
35.2):  
1045. Pakistan has both signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption and has 
voluntarily acceded to the “Pilot Programme” to review implementation of that Convention.   As noted 
below, however, although the NAB is a designated Central Authority for the purpose of mutual legal 
assistance in corruption-related cases, there is no legal basis for the provision of MLA in such cases.  
Analysis of effectiveness 
1046. The CNSA and the ANF afford a sound basis for compliance with the Vienna Convention.  
However, as noted, accession to the Palermo Convention and the TF Convention – and implementation of 
these conventions and the UNSCRs – is deficient.  
6.2.2. Recommendations and Comments 
1047. The authorities should consider the following recommendations. 
 Pakistan should expedite efforts to accede to the Palermo Convention and the Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Financing.   
 Pakistan should redress the deficits identified in this report concerning criminalization of the TF 
offence (see the comments in relation to Special Recommendation II), the capacity for freezing and 
confiscation of terrorist assets (see the comments in relation to Recommendation 3 and Special 
Recommendation III) and capacity to provide mutual legal assistance in TF related cases (see the 
comments in relation to Recommendation 36 and Special Recommendation V). 
 Pakistan should redress the deficits identified in this report concerning implementation of the relevant 
UNSCRs (see comments in relation to SRIII). 
 
6.2.3. Compliance with Recommendation 35 and Special Recommendation I 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.35 NC 
 
As at the cut-off date for this assessment, Pakistan has acceded to neither 
the Terrorist Financing Convention nor the Palermo Convention. 
Pakistan’s current level of conformity with the specified articles of those 
conventions is deficient. 
 
SR.I NC Pakistan has not acceded to the Terrorist Financing Convention.  There are 
deficits in compliance with UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. 
 
 
6.3. Mutual Legal Assistance (R.36-38, SR.V) 
6.3.1. Description and Analysis 
1048. The Constitution specifically protects against any action, “other than in accordance with law”, 
that is detrimental to citizens’ rights concerning life, liberty, body, reputation or property.  This applies 
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equally to State action for the purpose of domestic law enforcement as it does to State action for the 
purpose of international cooperation.   
1049. The requirement that there be a lawful basis for State action of this type is also recognized in 
practice in the context of international cooperation.  In enacting the CNSA, the legislature expressly 
recognized this requirement by specifically enacting provisions under that Act directly enabling certain 
action (considered in more detail below) for the purpose of effecting MLA.   Similarly, under the NAO, 
the legislature took the view that powers to even request MLA needed to be expressly conferred.  Most 
recently, under AMLO the legislature again enacted specific provisions enabling the provision of MLA 
(but only on the basis of a bilateral agreement). 
1050. General powers of investigation under the CrPC do not apply other than for the investigation of 
an “offence”, which is defined as “any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in 
force”: s 4(1) (o).   Further, the CrPC (pursuant to its Short Title) extends only to Pakistan.    
1051. The Evaluation Team was advised that Pakistan has provided mutual legal assistance pursuant to 
its obligations under the Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the 
Commonwealth (“The Commonwealth Scheme”).  The Team was further advised that, in many instances, 
requests for MLA have been entertained pursuant to an undertaking of reciprocity.  The Commonwealth 
Scheme, however, is an aspirational and purely voluntary scheme, as opposed to a convention or treaty.  
Further, because treaties are not self-executing in Pakistan in any event, a multilateral convention 
governing MLA cannot substitute for domestic legislation specifically enabling assistance via the 
application of coercive powers.  
1052. Pakistan does not have a consolidated MLA regime – although officials advise that steps are in 
train to enact legislation that would supply one.  Pending this, provisions concerning mutual legal 
assistance are found in only three Acts: AMLO, the CNSA and the NAO.  These instruments cover MLA 
in relation to the offences of money laundering, narcotics-related offences and corruption offences 
respectively.  None of these instruments confers jurisdiction in relation to terrorist financing offences.  
Nor do any provisions of the ATA although a proposal to address this via amendment to the ATA has 
been submitted to cabinet.  
1053. It was also suggested to the Evaluation Team that s 24(2) of AMLO offers an avenue for the 
provision of coercive MLA.  This provision enables the Federal Government, by “special or general 
order”, to empower officers “to act as an investigating officer under this Ordinance”.  It was suggested 
that such an appointment might be made specifically in order to confer upon an officer powers available 
under AMLO for the purpose of facilitating a foreign investigation or proceeding (and that equivalent 
provisions in other enabling legislation – such as the NAO – might achieve similar ends).  The Evaluation 
Team does not accept this argument.  AMLO contains specific provisions relating to “Assistance to a 
contracting State” – as detailed below.  Further, the mere appointment of investigators cannot extend 
investigatory powers, regardless of the intended purpose of the appointment.  
1054. It was further suggested that s 35(6)(3) of the SECP Act enables the provision of MLA.  This is 
true only to the extent that it authorizes SECP to disclose to a foreign government confidential 
information that is in the possession of the SECP in circumstances where such disclosure would enable 
that government to “perform a function, or exercise a power, conferred by a law in force in that foreign 
country”.  As such, this provision is mentioned in reference to Recommendation 40 
1055. Outside these pieces of legislation, the only provisions enabling mutual legal assistance are s 93C 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and s 30 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance.  Section 
93C enables Pakistan Courts to order the execution of foreign arrest warrants as though they were issued 
domestically.  Section 30 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance enables Pakistan to 
“cooperate with any foreign Government, Interpol or any other international agency with whom it has 
established reciprocal arrangements for the purposes of investigations or proceedings” that concern 
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electronically facilitated crimes or entail electronically preserved evidence.  The capacity of the 
investigating agency (FIA) to cooperate is subject to approval from the Federal Government, which has 
power to refuse if the request “concerns an offence which is likely to prejudice” the essential interests of 
Pakistan.  The scope of such cooperation is very unclear.  The Evaluation Team was provided no 
information concerning the use of this provision in practice. Nor was the Team provided information as to 
States with which Pakistan has concluded necessary reciprocal arrangements. 
1056. Pakistan has concluded mutual legal assistance treaties with three countries: Sri Lanka, 
Uzbekistan, China, and Turkey.  These treaties cannot expand the ambit of assistance Pakistan is able to 
provide.  This ambit is dictated by Pakistan’s domestic legislation.  
 
Widest Possible Range of Mutual Assistance (c. 36.1): 
 
1057. AMLO and the CNSA each contain provisions enabling mutual legal assistance via (i) the 
deployment of coercive powers for the purpose of facilitating foreign investigations and (ii) the freezing 
and confiscation of assets.  
1058. The provisions within the NAO enable Pakistan to merely request MLA from other jurisdictions.  
Notwithstanding this, the Evaluation Team was advised that the NAB does provide investigative 
assistance when requested.  The legal basis for the provision of such assistance is therefore considered in 
this section.  
 
Assistance in foreign investigations 
 
AMLO 
1059. AMLO potentially enables Pakistan to assist foreign investigations of money laundering.  It is 
requisite, however, that the requesting State be a “contracting State”.  
1060. Under s 26 the Federal Government is empowered to conclude agreements “on reciprocal basis 
with the Government of any country outside Pakistan” for the purposes of enforcing the provisions of the 
Ordinance, exchanging information, providing assistance or transferring property in respect of any 
offence under the Ordinance (or under the corresponding law of the other country).  A “contracting State” 
is a State with which such an agreement has been concluded.  
1061. The MLA regime contemplated by AMLO therefore requires the creation of a network of 
multiple, bilateral inter-Governmental agreements that enable assistance in relation to, effectively, merely 
the offence of money laundering.  Unsurprisingly, no such agreements have been concluded.   
1062. Pakistan cannot, therefore, render mutual legal assistance in relation to money laundering 
investigations.  
1063. On the assumption that agreements are concluded, implementing AMLO would be challenging.  
The request process commences with a letter of request from the requesting State.  Although such 
requests would be channeled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in accordance with the Rules of 
Business of that Ministry), the pathway thereafter is unclear.  Under s 28, the Ministry has power to 
forward requests to “the Court” or to “the authorized officer or any authority under this Ordinance as it 
thinks fit”.  The Ordinance does not identify eligible receiving courts.  “Authorized officer” is not 
defined.  It is also unclear what is meant by “authority under this Ordinance”.  It is possibly a referral to 
the designated investigating agencies, although such agencies are especially defined as “investigating or 
prosecuting agencies” under s 2(k).  The matter is further complicated by s 31, pursuant to which every 
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“letter of request, summons or warrant” received must be transmitted to “the concerned Court in 
Pakistan”.  “Concerned Court” is not defined.  
1064. Section 29(2) provides that where a court (presumably a “concerned Court”) has received for 
“service or execution” a summons, arrest warrant, search warrant or summons to appear and produce 
documents, it “shall cause the same to be served or executed as if it were a summons or warrant received 
by it from another court in the said territories for service or execution within its local jurisdiction”.  
“Territories” is undefined and, although the provision refers to “said territories”, this is the only instance 
of use of that word.  The Evaluation Team was advised that the intention of this provision is to enable the 
Courts to enforce summonses and warrants as though they were issued domestically.   
1065. The possible intention of this scheme is to enable the execution of warrants, summonses and 
production notices to be directed by a court, whereas other forms of request are referred to an “authorized 
officer” or “authority under this Ordinance”.   
1066. Requests are actionable “so long as doing so would not violate laws of Pakistan or is, in any 
manner, not prejudicial to the sovereignty, security, national interest or public order”.16   
1067. Section 30(2) relates to inward requests for freezing and confiscation.  It enables “the Federal 
Government” to forward to NAB, FIA or ANF letters of request for “attachment or forfeiture” of direct 
and indirect proceeds of “an offence under section 3 committed in that contracting State”.  Section 3 has 
no extraterritorial application.  The intention is presumably to enable cooperation where the freezing is 
consequent upon conviction for an offence of money laundering that is criminalized in the foreign 
jurisdiction in terms similar to section 3.  Whatever the position, s 30 enables enforcement of only 
conviction-based forfeiture orders (but not pecuniary penalty orders).  
 
NAO 
1068. As noted earlier in this report, money laundering per se is not an offence under the NAO.  NAB’s 
powers cannot, therefore, be deployed in furtherance of investigation of a foreign ML offence unless the 
conduct in question is capable of founding a suspicion of offending against one of the various 
corruption/corrupt practices offences are set forth in the NAO.  
1069. Furthermore, the NAB is unable to provide mutual legal assistance, even in relation to corruption 
cases.  As noted, the NAO confers power to simply request, but not provide, MLA.  However, officials 
advised the Evaluation Team that the NAB implies, from its capacity to request MLA, a power to also 
provide assistance.  This was said to occur on an application of the “principle of reciprocity”.  This 
principle has no statutory or Common Law basis.  Any application in the present context would confer 
upon NAB capacity to deploy, for the purpose of a foreign investigation, coercive powers that have been 
conferred upon it for merely domestic investigation.  Given the availability of judicial review in Pakistan 
and the litigiously protected “fundamental rights” established by the Constitution, NAB’s self-arrogation 
of power under the “principle of reciprocity” is unpersuasive.17  No cases were cited in support of it.  The 
Evaluation Team is not convinced that the powers of NAB are legally available to investigate foreign 
offences, unless the facts support also a suspicion that an offence has been committed against the laws of 
Pakistan.  
                                                     
16. The Evaluation Team was advised that “public order” interests would be engaged if the execution of a request 
is likely to raise public discontent of a magnitude that would impair the general maintenance of civilian order.   
17. The detailed provisions of UNCAC cannot resolve these difficulties.  The Convention itself requires execution 
of requests “in accordance with the domestic law of the requested State Party”: Article 46(17).  Further, mutual legal 
assistance may be refused where it would be “contrary to the legal system of the requested State Party”: Article 
46(21). 
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1070. The Evaluation Team was further advised that, since ratifying UNCAC in August 2007, mutual 
legal assistance is requested and granted by the NAB pursuant to Article 46 of that Convention.  Article 
46 operates to create a relationship between States when none otherwise exists.  This is for the purpose of 
enabling international cooperation with respect to the corruption-related offences referred to in the 
Convention.  Money laundering is one of those offences: Article 23.  
1071. Whilst Pakistan might successfully obtain legal assistance through UNCAC in corruption-related 
cases, it has no capacity to render assistance.  As noted earlier in this report, treaties are not self-executing 
in Pakistan: relevant powers must be domestically incorporated.  Unlike the CNSA, which contains 
express provisions enabling the use of domestic powers for the purpose of facilitating foreign 
investigations/prosecutions in narcotics-related offending, there are no equivalent provisions in the NAO.   
1072. Despite these obstacles, the Evaluation Team was advised that Pakistan has provided mutual legal 
assistance, ostensibly on the basis of the principle of reciprocity and authority pursuant to UNCAC.   
 
CNSA 
1073. Under section 56 of the CNSA, Pakistan may request assistance in relation to the narcotics-
related offences contained in the Act and may grant “similar requests” received from “foreign States”.  
“Foreign States” is undefined, with the result that there is no requirement for prior agreement or treaty.  
However, if the relationship between the foreign state and Pakistan is materially subject to a treaty or 
other arrangement, the scope of available assistance is limited to assistance contemplated by that treaty or 
arrangement.  
1074. Double criminality is required under the CNSA.  Because money laundering is criminalized under 
that Act (s 12), the CNSA enables MLA in relation to laundering of proceeds of narcotics offences.  The 
predicate offence would need to be sufficiently identifiable as an offence of a type criminalized under the 
CNSA.  
1075. Requests may be refused where they might prejudice the “sovereignty, security, public order or 
other essential public interest of Pakistan”.  
1076. Section 59 enables the High Court to issue “evidence-gathering orders” (production orders) and 
search warrants.  Evidence-gathering orders may require a person to provide records or attend Court to 
give evidence on oath.  Privileges and protections recognized by Pakistan and the requesting State may be 
invoked by any person so named.  
1077. The CNSA also enables transfers of detained persons to assist foreign investigations into conduct 
that would have constituted an offence under the CNSA had it occurred in Pakistan.  
1078. As noted in more detail below (in relation to Recommendation 38), the CNSA also permits the 
restraint and forfeiture of property derived from narcotics-related offending committed abroad.  
1079. In summary, and subject to the requirements of double criminality, in narcotics-related cases the 
CNSA enables Pakistan to undertake searches, compel production of records, transfer detained persons 
and freeze and confiscate proceeds, even in the absence of any pre-existing formal relationship.  
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Assistance via freezing and confiscation of assets 
 
AMLO 
 
1080. AMLO enables Pakistan to grant mutual legal assistance by way of identification, freezing and 
forfeiture of proceeds of a money laundering transaction.  It does not enable freezing and confiscation of 
either instrumentalities or proceeds of other offences.  
1081. Section 26 of AMLO, which empowers the Federal Government to enter into agreements with 
foreign countries, enables such agreements to cover, amongst other things, the “transfer of property 
relating to any offence under this Ordinance or under the corresponding law in force in that country”.  As 
noted already, no such agreements have yet been concluded.  Accordingly, AMLO does not currently 
enable MLA related to freezing and confiscation of criminal proceeds.  
1082. Section 30 specifically deals with “attachment, seizure and forfeiture etc. of property in a 
contracting State or Pakistan.”  This section requires a letter of request from a court in a contracting State.  
As such it is more restrictive than other forms of MLA under AMLO, which may be initiated by way of 
letter of request from either a “court or authority in a contracting State”.  
1083. Requests receivable this way are requests for “attachment or forfeiture of the property in Pakistan 
derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person from the commission of an offence under section 
3 committed in that contracting State”.  As noted already, s 3 has no extraterritorial application.  The only 
meaningful interpretation of the section is as a vehicle for another State to request freezing and 
confiscation over proceeds of an offence of money laundering committed in that requesting State.   
1084. Upon receipt of such requests, the Federal Government (i.e., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
under existing Rules of Business) may forward the request “as it thinks fit” to the “investigation agency”, 
currently defined as including the NAB, FIA and ANF.  
1085. NAB, FIA or the ANF may execute the request either “in accordance with the provisions of this 
Ordinance” or “in the manner sought by the contracting State so long as doing so would not violate Law 
of Pakistan or is, in any manner, not prejudicial to the sovereignty, security, national interest or public 
order”.18  
1086. Section 30(6) specifically provides that the provisions of AMLO enabling attachment and 
forfeiture (sections 8 and 9) “shall apply to the property in respect of which letter of request is received 
from a court or contracting State for attachment or forfeiture of property”.  The reference here to the 
possibility of such a request emanating from “a court or contracting State” is anomalous given, as noted, 
that the  specified channels for onward processing of requests (i.e. reference to one of the “investigation 
agencies”) is triggered only when requests derive from a court.  
1087. Because s 30 invokes the powers under sections 8 and 9, the deficits of those provisions noted 
already in this report (under Recommendation 3) exist also in this context.  
1088. The scope of MLA relevant to the identification of proceeds amenable to freezing and forfeiture 
under s 30 is set out in sections 30(3), (4) and (5).  These provisions enable the directed agency “to take 
all steps necessary for tracing and identifying such property”.  Such steps may include any inquiry, 
investigation or survey in respect of any person, place, property, assets, documents, books of accounts in 
any bank or financial institution or any other relevant matters”.  Such powers are sweeping.  They are far 
in excess of the powers available to FIA and ANF for the purposes of domestic investigation.  They are 
                                                     
18. The ambit of the “public order” ground for refusal is considered under Recommendation 36. 
  202
subject only to any “directions” issued under the Ordinance.  This is likely a reference to the power of the 
NEC under s 5(3) (e) to “issue necessary directions to the agencies involved in the implementation and 
administration of this Ordinance”.  
1089. Given that, in the absence of any s 26 agreements, all of these provisions are effectively 
inoperative, AMLO is not analyzed further in this section.  
 
NAO 
1090. As noted, the National Accountability Ordinance has no provisions relating to the provision of 
mutual legal assistance.  Even though the Evaluation Team was advised that this has not precluded the 
provision of assistance to date, the Evaluation Team was advised that no country has yet requested the 
NAB to undertake freezing, seizing or confiscation action.   
 
CNSA 
1091. Section 62 of the CNSA enables the High Court to restrain proceeds of narcotics-related offences 
where a foreign investigation has commenced and an order for forfeiture has been made or is likely.  
Section 63 enables Pakistan to enforce foreign confiscation and forfeiture orders.  Unlike section 62, 
property able to be restrained via registration under section 63 is not limited to proceeds of crime.  Further 
still, conceivably s 63 enables the registration of civil-based orders.  
1092. Section 63(1) states that the section does not apply to “cases falling within section 40 of this Act”.  
Section 40 provides that, where a citizen of Pakistan is convicted by a foreign court of an offence “which 
is also an offence punishable under this Act”, the Special Court may order that person’s assets in Pakistan 
(if any) to be forfeited.  Unlike the MLA provisions, section 40 enables domestically initiated 
confiscation pursuant to a domestic order.  The exclusion from s 63 of “cases falling within section 40” is 
likely intended to ensure that, where an order has already been made under s 40, registration of a further 
order is not possible.   
1093. Although, technically, there is no impediment to s 40 being used to effect MLA relating to 
freezing and forfeiture (where the person subject to the request is a citizen of Pakistan), the Evaluation 
Team was advised that it has not been used that way to date.  
1094. The CNSA may also supply the only mechanism through which Pakistan can provide MLA by 
way of a freeze over intended instrumentalities.  This would be the case where the intended 
instrumentality is subject to a registrable foreign restraint and confiscation order.  
Provision of Assistance in Timely, Constructive and Effective Manner (c. 36.1.1): 
1095. The Evaluation Team was advised that, between 2005 and July 2008, Pakistan received only 22 
requests for MLA.  No breakdown was provided as to the Act or Ordinance pursuant to which these 
requests were made.  Twenty-one of these requests were granted in that same period.  The time required 
to respond was between 2 months and 3 years “depending on the nature of the request”.  Information 
received by the Evaluation Team prior to the on-site visit supports the view that Pakistan authorities are 
often slow to respond to MLA requests in ML and TF related cases and that the quality of response is 
variable.  
No Unreasonable or Unduly Restrictive Conditions on Mutual Assistance (c. 36.2):  
1096. The only Act enabling the provision of mutual legal assistance is the CNSA.  As noted, double 
criminality is required.  The particulars of details required to accompany requests for assistance pursuant 
to the CNSA (s 58(2)) are sensible and not onerous. 
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Efficiency of Processes (c. 36.3):  
1097. The Cabinet-mandated “Rules of Business” of MOFA require requests for MLA (regardless of 
their basis) to be channeled through that Ministry.  The Evaluation Team was advised that, in practice, the 
expectation is that the Ministry should at least be “advised” of the existence of such requests, should they 
be received directly on an agency-to-agency basis.  
1098. MOFA has no international cooperation division.  Instead, requests are processed through the 
relevant country desk.  MOFA acts purely as a conduit.  It assumes no responsibility for managing or 
monitoring the processing of requests.  
1099. MOFA forwards requests to whatever agency it considers appropriate, given the suspected 
criminal offending in question.  However, there are no standard operating procedures to appropriately 
contend with the challenges posed by the fragmentation of Pakistan’s law enforcement mandates.  The 
Evaluation Team was told that where the offence is money laundering, “most likely” FIA will be the 
recipient agency.  The position is unclear in relation to requests related to mixed offending that might 
span the remit of more than one agency (for example, drug offending entailing money laundering and 
corruption).  In such circumstances, MOFA officials advised that the request would be sent to MOI for 
on-referral.   
1100. Determinations as to whether any available grounds for refusal of assistance are made out are 
made by way of inter-Ministry consultation at Joint-Secretary/Director General level.  
1101. As noted, the only Act enabling the provision of mutual legal assistance is the CNSA.  The 
procedures under that Act relating to the obtaining of High Court orders (s 59) are sensible and clear. 
 
Provision of Assistance Regardless of Possible Involvement of Fiscal Matters (c. 36.4):  
1102. There are no impediments in the CNSA to the provision of MLA pursuant to requests that might, 
somehow, involve fiscal matters.19  
 
Provision of Assistance Regardless of Existence of Secrecy and Confidentiality Laws (c. 36.5):  
1103. Any person subject to an “evidence gathering” order under the CNSA is entitled to invoke any 
privileges and protections recognized by Pakistan and the requesting State.  As noted earlier in this report, 
however, obligations of confidentiality have not proved an impediment to the obtaining of information for 
law enforcement related purposes.  
Availability of Powers of Competent Authorities (applying R.28, c. 36.6):  
1104. As noted, s 59 of the CNSA enables the High Court to issue search warrants and production 
orders, which may require a person to provide records or attend Court to give evidence on oath.   
Avoiding Conflicts of Jurisdiction (c. 36.7): 
1105. The Evaluation Team was advised: (i) there are no set mechanisms for the resolution of potential 
conflicts of jurisdiction; (ii) to date, no such conflicts have arisen; and (iii) should any such conflicts 
arise, “the principle to be followed… would be mutual agreement of concerned jurisdictions on a case to 
case basis”.  
                                                     
19. However, should any s 26 agreements be concluded pursuant to AMLO, s 41 of that Ordinance would preclude 
MLA in such circumstances.  That section provides that “nothing in this Ordinance shall apply to fiscal offences”. 
  204
 
Additional Element—Availability of Powers of Competent Authorities Required under R28 (c. 36.8):  
1106. As noted, the Cabinet-mandated “Rules of Business” of MOFA require requests for MLA to be 
channeled through that Ministry and that, in practice, there is an expectation that the Ministry at least be 
“advised” of the existence of such requests, should they be received directly on an agency-to-agency 
basis.  
International Cooperation under SR V (applying c. 36.1-36.6 in R. 36, c. V.1):  
1107. No legal instrument, including the ATA, confers upon any Pakistani agency jurisdiction to deploy 
coercive powers for the purpose of facilitating a foreign TF or terrorism-related investigation or 
prosecution.   
Additional Element under SR V (applying c. 36.7 & 36.8 in R.36, c. V.6): 
1108. Pakistan cannot provide mutual legal assistance in terrorism-related matters.  
Dual Criminality and Mutual Assistance (c. 37.1 & 37.2): 
1109. Pakistan can cooperate with other countries on an informal basis where this does not entail the 
deployment of coercive or intrusive powers.  
1110. Formal assistance under the CNSA requires double criminality.  Pakistan’s capacity to provide 
assistance extends to assistance of a type “similar” to that able to be requested by Pakistan (i.e., similar to 
requests for assistance in the investigation of offences under the CNSA): s 56.  No cases were provided to 
the Evaluation Team concerning in the interpretation of this provision.  To the extent that this section 
does intend to invoke notions of double criminality, it is liberally worded and certainly does not, at face 
value, impose a strict standard.   
 
International Cooperation under SR V (applying c. 37.1-37.2 in R. 37, c. V.2):  
1111. Pakistan cannot provide mutual legal assistance in terrorism-related matters.  
Timeliness to Requests for Provisional Measures including Confiscation (c. 38.1):  
1112. As noted, s 63 of the CNSA provides the only basis upon which Pakistan can provide MLA by 
way of implementing provisional measures.  The Evaluation Team was advised that “there have been no 
requests/cases under section 63 so far”.  
Property of Corresponding Value (c. 38.2): 
1113. Recovery of property of corresponding value can occur only in relation to narcotics offences: via 
s 64 of the CNSA, Pakistan can enforce foreign “fines”, including pecuniary penalty orders.  
Coordination of Seizure and Confiscation Actions (c. 38.3):  
1114. The Evaluation Team was advised that the NAB and FIA each have protocols or informal 
arrangements with counterpart agencies in certain countries to enable coordination of seizure action.  The 
ANF, by contrast, has not entered into any such arrangements.  
International Cooperation under SR V (applying c. 38.1-38.3 in R. 38, c. V.3):  
1115. Pakistan cannot provide mutual legal assistance in terrorism-related matters.  
Asset Forfeiture Fund (c. 38.4): 
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1116. As noted, a “National Fund for Control of Drug Abuse”,  which finances initiatives related to the 
control and eradication of controlled substances and the rehabilitation of addicts, is funded in part from 
the sale proceeds of assets forfeited under the CNSA.   
1117. A percentage of assets recovered by NAB under plea bargain or “volunteered return” are 
transferrable to a fund established for the welfare of employees of the NAB but this does not extend to 
forfeited funds.  
Sharing of Confiscated Assets (c. 38.5): 
1118. Section 26 of AMLO empowers the Government to enter into agreements for the purpose of asset 
sharing.  To date, no such agreements have been concluded.  Similar agreements are contemplated by 
section 65 of the CNSA. Again, no such agreements have been concluded.  
Additional Element (R 38) – Recognition of Foreign Orders for a) Confiscation of assets from 
organizations principally criminal in nature; b) Civil forfeiture; and, c) Confiscation of Property which 
Reverses Burden of Proof  (applying c. 3.7 in R.3, c. 38.6): 
1119. As noted, at face value s 63 of the CNSA would enable the registration of civil-based orders, 
orders deriving from a reverse onus of proof and orders freezing the property of organizations that are 
found to be primarily criminal in nature.  Registration by the High Court of a foreign order is mandatory 
simply upon proof that the order is in force in the foreign state and is not subject to appeal.   
Additional Element under SR V (applying c. 38.4-38.6 in R. 38, c V.7):  
1120. Pakistan cannot provide mutual legal assistance in terrorism-related matters.  
Statistics (applying R.32):  
1121. Statistics provided to the Evaluation Team concerning MLA constituted simply numbers of 
requests received on an annual basis between 2005 and mid-2008.  No breakdown was provided in terms 
of type of request, nature of offence or requesting country.  In terms of the time taken to process these 
requests, the Evaluation Team was simply advised “from 2 months to 3 years, depending upon nature of 
request”.  
 
Analysis of effectiveness 
1122. As noted, between 2005 and July 2008, Pakistan received only 22 requests for MLA, 21 requests 
were granted and the time required to respond was between 2 months and 3 years “depending on the 
nature of the request” (some prioritization is said to occur, when required in individual cases).  Even 
allowing for repeated requests of the requesting country for further information, periods of around 3 years 
to respond to requests are excessive.  Information received by the Evaluation Team prior to the on-site 
visit supports the view that Pakistan authorities are often slow to respond to MLA requests in ML and TF 
related cases and that the quality of response is variable.   
1123. AMLO’s legal assistance provisions prescribe unclear pathways for the processing of MLA 
requests and are currently completely ineffective, for the reason that no s 26 agreements have been 
concluded.  Further, endeavoring to conclude multiple, bilateral s 26 agreements would require extensive 
work.  Cabinet approval would be required to even commence the process of negotiation.  The negotiation 
stage would require considerable intermediation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as to scope and, 
amongst other things, “conditions, exceptions or qualifications” considered appropriate within the 
meaning of s 26(2).  The Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights would need to vet both draft and 
concluded agreements.  On both sides of the negotiation, internal high-level approval of concluded 
agreements would be required (at Cabinet level in Pakistan).  As candidly acknowledged by officials, the 
effort would be the same as that required to negotiate comprehensive mutual legal assistance treaties 
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covering a comprehensive range of offences.  Further, it is questionable whether another State would 
dedicate reciprocal resources to the effort of concluding a bilateral agreement essentially covering a single 
offence.  It is telling that no country has yet entered into such an agreement.  
1124. Notwithstanding the absence of any empowering provision in the NAO, it must be acknowledged 
that the NAB has, to date, functioned (without challenge) as a Central Authority for the receipt and 
execution of MLA requests concerning corruption-related offences.  Since its inception, NAB has 
received a total of 53 requests for assistance, of which just over half (27) have been serviced.  North 
America (Canada and the United States) and Europe (including the UK) account for 43 of these requests.  
Other than being advised that this assistance has not extended to cooperation in the freezing or 
confiscation of assets, the Evaluation Team was provided no details as to the nature of the assistance 
sought – or time taken to respond.  
6.3.2. Recommendations and Comments 
1125. The authorities should consider the following recommendations. 
 Pakistan authorities should not expend valuable resources concluding s 26 agreements under AMLO.   
 The process drafting stand-alone MLA legislation that has already commenced should be expedited.  
Such legislation is urgently required.  This need was identified in Pakistan’s last assessment.   
 Given the time and resources required to conclude bilateral MLA treaties, particular consideration 
should be given to enacting MLA legislation that enables Pakistan to entertain requests for MLA 
independent of any pre-existing relationship (as under the CNSA) and in relation to a wide range of 
offences, including terrorist financing.    
 Pending the establishment of a comprehensive MLA framework, it is recommended that the current 
legislative review of AMLO at least remove the requirement that requesting States be “contracting 
States”.   
 The MLA-related procedural deficiencies and ambiguities identified in this report should also be 
addressed – as should the deficiencies here identified in relation to MLA concerning asset forfeiture. 
 Also pending the evolution of a comprehensive MLA framework, – and dependent upon imminent 
policy decisions to be taken by the Federal Government concerning the future of the NAB – the NAB 
should be conferred express power to provide, as well as receive, MLA.  Such assistance should 
extend to freezing and forfeiture of assets. 
 In general, but particularly pending the creation of a comprehensive MLA framework, officials 
should closely review MLA requests with a view to determining whether they disclose possible 
domestic offending warranting domestic investigation.  Where domestic investigations are viable, 
they may offer an alternative mechanism for the provision of international assistance, thereby 
bypassing any deficiencies or formalities associated with any MLA regime.  Given the utility of the 
ML offence in prosecuting transnational crime, particular consideration should be given to the 
possibility of initiating domestic investigations for money laundering, whether as a stand-alone 
offence or otherwise. 
 
6.3.3. Compliance with Recommendations 36 to 38 and Special Recommendation V 
 Rating Summary of factors relevant to s.6.3 underlying overall rating 
R.36 NC  The legal basis for the provision of MLA is limited to narcotics related 
offences.  
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 There is no evidence that assistance is provided in a timely, constructive 
and efficient manner. 
R.37 C  
R.38 NC  Assistance by way of freezing and seizing is limited to narcotics related 
offences under the CNSA.   
SR.V PC  There is no legal basis for the provision of MLA in terrorism-related 
matters.   
 
 
6.4. Extradition (R.37, 39, SR.V) 
6.4.1. Description and Analysis 
1126. Legal Framework: Pakistan has entered into extradition treaties with 29 countries.20  However, in 
order to be extraditable, the offence must arise from acts or omissions that fall within the descriptions set 
out in the Schedule to the Extradition Act 1972 (s 2(1) (a))21 and either (i) be listed as extraditable in a 
treaty with the requesting State or (ii), whenever “the Federal Government considers it expedient”, be 
notified in the official Gazette.  Notification in the Gazette must direct that the provisions of the Act 
“shall, with respect to such offences and subject to such modifications, exceptions, conditions and 
qualifications, if any, as may be specified therein, have effect in relation to that State” (s 4).  
1127. The model treaty vetted by the Ministry of Law that forms the basis of Pakistan’s bilateral 
arrangements enables extradition for any offence punishable “according to the law of the Parties” by a 
term of imprisonment of not less than one year.  This does not mean that all offences carrying terms of 
imprisonment of 1 year or more are extraditable: they must also be scheduled to the Act and punishable 
by more than 1 year in the treaty partner State.  
1128. Prior to October 2008, Pakistan could not extradite in TF-related cases.  In October 2008 
“financing for terrorism” was added to the Schedule to the Extradition Act as a description of an 
extraditable offence.   
                                                     
20. By way of adoption of treaties concluded by the United Kingdom: Argentina, Belgium, France, Greece, 
Switzerland, United States, San Marino, Monaco, Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Ecuador, 
Portugal, Luxemburg, Colombia, Cuba, Italy.  By way of treaties independently concluded: Iran, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Maldives, Egypt, Australia, Uzbekistan, Algeria, China, and United Arab Emirates. 
21. Offences described in the Schedule are: Culpable homicide; Maliciously or willfully wounding or inflicting 
grievous bodily harm; rape; procuring or trafficking in women or young persons for immoral purposes; kidnapping, 
abduction or false imprisonment or dealing in slaves; stealing, abandoning, exposing or unlawfully detaining a child; 
bribery; perjury or subornation of perjury or conspiring to defeat the course of justice; arson; an offence concerning 
counterfeit currency; an offence against the law relating to forgery; stealing, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, 
fraudulent false accounting, obtaining property or credit by false pretences, receiving stolen property or any other 
offence in respect of property involving fraud; burglary, house-breaking or any similar offence; robbery; blackmail 
or extortion by means of threats or by abuse of authority; an offence against bankruptcy law or company law; 
malicious or willful/damage to property; acts done with the intention of endangering vehicles, vessels or aircraft; an 
offence against the law relating to dangerous drugs or narcotics; piracy; revolt against the authority of the master of 
a ship or the commander of an aircraft; contravention of import or export prohibitions relating to precious stones, 
gold and other precious metals; Illicit dealing in arms, ammunition or explosive material used in their production; 
aiding and abetting, or counseling or procuring the commission of, or being an accessory before or after the fact to, 
or attempting or conspiring to commit, any of the aforesaid offences; financing for terrorism. 
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1129. Listed as the 23rd description in the Schedule are the offences of aiding, abetting, counseling, 
procuring, attempting or conspiring to commit any of the “aforesaid offences”.  “Financing for terrorism”, 
however, is not an “aforesaid offence” for the reason that it was inserted as the 24th description.  
 
Dual Criminality and Mutual Assistance (c. 37.1 & 37.2):  
1130. An “extradition offence” is defined as an offence “the act or omission constituting which falls 
within any of the descriptions set out in the Schedule and, if it took place [in Pakistan] would constitute 
an offence against the law of Pakistan”.  The second half of this definition establishes the requirement of 
dual criminality.  The first half ensures that this requirement turns upon a consideration not of the 
taxonomy or terminology of the foreign offence but of the underlying “act or omission”.  This is further 
ensured by s 2(2), which provides that, in determining whether any foreign offence falls within the 
scheduled descriptions, “any special intent or state of mind or special circumstances of aggravation which 
may be necessary to constitute that offence under the law shall be disregarded”.   
Money Laundering as Extraditable Offence (c. 39.1):  
1131. Money laundering was added to the Schedule of the Act by way of Gazetted notification dated 17 
March 2009.  It is therefore now an extraditable offence.  Further, the Schedule to the Extradition Act is 
augmented by section 66 of the CNSA, which renders all offences against Chapter II of that Act 
“extraditable offences”.  Accordingly, laundering of proceeds of narcotics offending, contrary to s 12 of 
that Act, was extraditable throughout the relevant assessment period.  
 
Extradition of Nationals (c. 39.2):  
1132. Section 5 of the Extradition Act sets out the grounds for refusal for extradition.  These include 
instances where the offence in question is “of a political character”, is not serious enough to warrant 
imprisonment of 12 months or more (or a death or life sentence), is one for which the person has been 
previously convicted/acquitted or where the person might be “prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained 
or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.”  
Nationality per se is not listed as a ground for refusal.  
1133. However, Article 4(3) of the Model Extradition Treaty, vetted by the Ministry of Law, Justice and 
Human Rights and forming the template for Pakistan’s extradition treaties, states that extradition “may” 
be refused where the person is a national of the requested country.  That said, the Evaluation Team was 
advised that Pakistan has twice extradited its own nationals.  The Evaluation Team was further advised 
that the only impediment to extradition of Pakistan nationals would be the absence of an undertaking of 
reciprocity on the part of the requesting State.  
Cooperation for Prosecution of Nationals (applying c. 39.2(b), c. 39.3):  
1134. As noted, Pakistan extradites its own nationals.  
Efficiency of Extradition Process (c. 39.4): 
1135. The Extradition Act offers a straightforward extradition regime.  Relevant provisions are found in 
ss 6 – 14.  Requests are received via diplomatic channels and are transferred to the Ministry of Interior.  
The Ministry has power to order an enquiry by any first class Magistrate who would have had jurisdiction 
had the offence been committed within jurisdiction.  The Court then has commensurate powers to 
summons the fugitive offender and enquire whether a prima facie case has been made out in support of 
the request.  The Court is also charged with determining whether the offence is of a political character – 
or even extraditable.  Such hearings proceed principally by way of consideration of documentation 
provided by the requesting State.  The Act enables exhibits, depositions and even “official certificates of 
facts” from foreign proceedings to be received in evidence.  The Evaluation Team was advised that, in the 
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usual course, such an enquiry is concluded within two to three months of receipt of order by the 
Magistrate.  Where a prima facie case is established, the Court reports that result to the Ministry and 
remands the fugitive in custody pending the issue by the Ministry of a “warrant for the custody and 
removal of the fugitive offender and for his delivery”.  Grounds for refusal to extradite include political 
motivation, previous conviction/acquittal for the same offence, persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality or political opinions.  
1136. Presumably, s 93C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which enables Pakistan Courts to order the 
execution of foreign arrest warrants as though they were issued domestically, is instrumental in ensuring 
the attendance of summoned fugitives.  
Additional Element (R.39)—Existence of Simplified Procedures relating to Extradition (c. 39.5): 
1137. Pakistan’s laws do not contemplate simplified procedures, such as deportation by consent or 
transfer pursuant to backed-warrant.  
Additional Element under SR V (applying c. 39.5 in R. 39, c V.8) 
1138. As noted, Pakistan’s laws do not contemplate simplified procedures.  
Statistics (applying R.32): 
1139. The Evaluation Team was provided with no detailed statistics relating to extradition.  
 
Analysis of effectiveness 
1140. In the absence of any statistics or detailed data concerning extraditions, the Evaluation Team is 
unable to analyze in any detailed way the effectiveness of the regime’s implementation.  That said, the 
statutory procedure for extradition is unremarkable and straightforward. On this basis, effectiveness was 
regarded as having a neutral effect upon ratings – including for extradition for ML, which has only 
recently become available.  
6.4.2. Recommendations and Comments 
1141. The authorities should consider the following recommendations. 
 The placement of “financing for terrorism” as a description in the Schedule to the Extradition Act 
should be reviewed so that accessorial and inchoate offences related to TF are also extraditable. 
 
6.4.3. Compliance with Recommendations 37 & 39, and Special Recommendation V 
 Rating Summary of factors relevant to s.6.4 underlying overall rating 
R.39 C . 
R.37 C  
SR.V PC Pakistan can extradite for TF but scope to extradite for ancillary offending 
should be clarified by reorganization of the offences listed in the Schedule to the 
Extradition Act. 
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6.5. Other Forms of International Co-Operation (R.40 & SR.V) 
6.5.1. Description and Analysis 
Widest Range of International Cooperation (c. 40.1)  
International Cooperation under SR V (applying c. 40.1-40.9 in R. 40, c. V.5): 
Financial Sector Supervisory Authorities:  
1142. SECP has powers to cooperate and where appropriate coordinate internationally with other 
regulatory authorities concerning information sharing and development and implementation of policies 
and activities. The law allows SECP to disclose public and non-public information within its possession 
to domestic and international counterparts (section 35(6) to (11) of SECP Act).  
1143. In the international context, SECP has developed cooperative linkages with other counterpart 
regulatory authorities and is currently, the member of the following international regulatory 
organizations:  
 International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO),  
 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS),  
 International Organization of Pension Supervisors (IOPS),  
 
1144. International cooperation between SECP and overseas counterparts is carried out on an ongoing 
basis particularly in the area of exchange of information which is performed under strict confidentiality. 
SECP is signatory to bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with counterpart regulatory 
authorities that primarily cover cross-border co-operation and exchange of information for enforcing 
compliance with respective laws and regulations of the signing authorities.  While the signing of MoUs 
with some other jurisdictions is in process, formal co-operative arrangements have been concluded with 
the following regulatory counterparts:   
 Securities & Exchange Board of India 
 Maldives Monetary Authority 
 Australian Securities & Investments Commission 
 Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan  
 Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka  
 South Asian Securities Regulators Forum (SASRF) 
 Asia Pacific Corporate Registers Forum (APCRF)  
 
1145. SECP has forwarded its application to become a signatory to the IOSCO MMoU. So far, SECP is 
not party to the MMoU, and the assessors understand that IOSCO has notified SECP that it currently 
doesn’t meet all the relevant requirements.  
1146. SBP has taken an initiative in signing MOUs with central banks of various other countries in 
particularly where Pakistani banks have branches. SBP has signed MOUs with various supervisory 
authorities of the world. SBP indicates that these MOUs have a wide variation in scope ranging from 
mere exchange of information to details pertaining to licensing criteria, on-site inspection, supervisory 
cooperation, combating money laundering and terrorist financing, nature of action to be taken in case of 
any irregularity etc. It is worth noting however that in the view of the assessors, even through these 
MOUs, SBP does not have the capacity to share confidential information, in particular customer account 
specific information with foreign counterparts. SBP considers that Section 46 A (2) of SBP Act-1956 and 
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32(2) of BCO-1962 would allow it to participate in international exchange of confidential information. 
Section 46 A(2) states that “no court, tribunal or other authority shall permit anyone to produce or give 
evidence derived from, any unpublished record of the Bank, except with the prior permission in writing of 
the Governor who may give or withhold such permission as thinks fit”. Section 32(2) lays out the SBP 
capacity to require information from financial institutions, and is of general nature (i.e. not specific to 
international cooperation).  
1147. SBP indicates that it has only received very occasional requests for information (and did not 
provide statistical data). SBP indicates that it would build on the provision in the Banking Companies 
Ordinance which gives discretion to the Governor. While taking note of this information, the assessors 
still consider this legal basis to be weak, discretionary, and susceptible to challenges before court.  
1148. SBP has signed MOUs with various supervisory authorities of the world which include:  
 Azerbaijan 
 Bahrain 
 Bangladesh 
 Kazakhstan 
 Kyrgyzstan 
 Mauritius 
 Qatar 
 Sri Lanka  
 Syria 
 Turkey 
 Vietnam 
 Indonesia 
 Oman 
 China 
 
And MOUs with Egypt, Kenya, Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Bafin (Germany), are also under 
process. 
Law Enforcement Authorities 
1149. LEA (FIA, ANF, NAB, police and customs) international co-operation: Whilst there is no explicit 
prohibition on LEA to LEA sharing of intelligence or in the conduct and support of day-to-day co-
operation at the operational level, the assessors are aware of anecdotal evidence that LEAs have 
cooperated with international counterparts.  However the assessors were not given structured statistical or 
case information from any of the agencies allowing them to be satisfied that these are standard practices. 
1150. Indeed, to the contrary, the only examples given relating co-operation were through formal 
channels through the Foreign and Interior Ministries or via Mutual-legal assistance or other bi-lateral 
requests and these primarily focused on drugs and anti-corruption cases. NAB has however signed a 
limited number of MOUs with some foreign counterparts. All was also of concern to note that the quoted 
were all reactive in their nature i.e. the agencies were responding to foreign requests for assistance but 
Pakistan was not the originator of such request to foreign jurisdictions for assistance.  
1151. There appears, to the assessors, to be a reliance on what has become a ‘standard-operating-
procedure’ whereby requests for foreign assistance are first routed via the Foreign Ministry and from 
there to either the Ministry of Interior, ANF or the NAB and then on to the Courts to provide such 
assistance. Which excludes any form of spontaneous responses to intelligence (at the LEA level) or of 
operational co-operation.  
1152. The assessors were informed that intelligence sharing did exist within the ‘intelligence 
community’ and primarily in regard to terrorist related matters but this was not evidenced to the assessors 
– LEAs commented that they were not part of this intelligence process. Whilst this sharing can be very 
productive in itself it only has limited application – as it only exists where there are partners within the 
‘intelligence community’ that do share with Pakistan and where Pakistan is able to and does share 
intelligence to their foreign counterparts. International experience shows this is generally limited to 
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specific countries and therefore does not cover the wide ranges necessary to combat ML and TF as a 
whole.  
Provision of Assistance in Timely, Constructive and Effective Manner (c. 40.1.1): 
1153. For law enforcement authorities, ‘standard-operating-procedure’ tend to preclude timely 
assistance (see comments above 40.1).  
Clear and Effective Gateways for Exchange of Information (c. 40.2): 
1154. There are no clear and effective gateways for law enforcement authorities (see comments at 40.1)  
Spontaneous Exchange of Information (c. 40.3): 
1155. No specific information was provided to the assessors on this issue by the financial supervisory 
authorities.  
1156. No evidence was given by FIA, ANF, NAB the police or customs that demonstrated spontaneous 
exchanges of intelligence or co-operation at the operational level spontaneous or otherwise.  
Making Inquiries on Behalf of Foreign Counterparts (c. 40.4): 
1157. Enquiries that were received have been routed via the ‘standard-operating-procedure’ whereby 
the law enforcement authority has then followed directions of the court.  
FIU Authorized to Make Inquiries on Behalf of Foreign Counterparts (c. 40.4.1): 
1158. In regard to FMU co-operation, AMLO places restrictions on FMU’s ability to spontaneously 
share information that appear to be too restrictive to meet the Egmont principles of information exchange 
as FMU interprets its ability to share information to have to follow the ‘standard-operating-procedure’ as 
above. (see also comment under R26 - 26.10)  
Conducting of Investigations on Behalf of Foreign Counterparts (c. 40.5): 
1159. LEAs are authorized to conduct enquires on behalf of foreign counterparts where the ‘standard-
operating-procedure’ has been followed and are directed through the court.  
No Unreasonable or Unduly Restrictive Conditions on Exchange of Information (c. 40.6): 
1160. Reciprocity in accordance with domestic law is the only stated condition given by Pakistani 
authorities.  
Provision of Assistance Regardless of Possible Involvement of Fiscal Matters (c. 40.7):  
1161. The assessors were not made aware of such restrictions – see also comments above   (40.6). 
Pakistani authorities did also point out that NAB, ANF and FIA do not deal with fiscal offences, as they 
are beyond the mandate provided under respective legislation.  
Provision of Assistance Regardless of Existence of Secrecy and Confidentiality Laws (c. 40.8): 
1162. Pakistani authorities informed us that no request has so far been refused, which was received in 
accordance with the law. Evidence was not provided that demonstrated this.  
Safeguards in Use of Exchanged Information (c. 40.9): 
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Financial Supervisory Authorities 
1163. The MoU signed by SECP for sharing of information with foreign counterpart regulatory 
authorities contain the following requirements: “The assistance or information obtained pursuant to this 
Memorandum of Understanding will not be disclosed to third parties without the prior consent of the 
Requested Authority. Each Authority will establish and maintain such safeguards as are necessary and 
appropriate to protect the confidentiality of such information or assistance. Each Authority will keep 
confidential, to the extent permitted by law; (a) any request for information made under this 
Memorandum of Understanding and any matter arising in the course of this Memorandum of 
Understanding, including consultations between the Authorities and unsolicited assistance, unless such 
disclosure is necessary to carry out the request or the other Authority waives such confidentiality; (b) any 
information received pursuant to this Memorandum of Understanding unless it is disclosed in furtherance 
of the purpose for which it was requested. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 6.9, 9.1 and 9.2, 
the confidentiality provisions of this Memorandum of Understanding will not prevent the Authorities 
from informing the law enforcement or regulatory bodies in its territory, such as the registrar of 
companies or stock exchange, of the request for the purposes of assisting the Authorities in responding to 
the request. If an Authority becomes aware that information passed under this Memorandum of 
Understanding may be subject to a legally enforceable demand to disclose that information the Authority 
will, to the extent permitted by law, inform the other Authority of the situation. The Authorities will then 
discuss and determine the appropriate course of action. Provided that neither authority will take any 
action without the consent of the other.”  
1164. Similarly, under the MOUs signed by SBP, it is obligatory to make use of information in the 
conditions of secrecy as provided in the MOU given below:  
“The Parties each agree that all possible and reasonable steps will be taken to preserve the 
confidentiality of the information received pursuant to this MOU and to ensure that employees of 
the Parties hold confidential all information obtained in the course of their duties.  
It is agreed that any confidential information received by either Party from the other should be 
used exclusively for lawful supervisory purposes and if the information is to be used for any 
purpose other than supervisory, prior written permission from the originator of the information 
must be sought.” 
Law Enforcement Authorities 
1165. The ‘standard-operating-procedure’ requires consideration in regard to reciprocity and also that 
information is used for the purpose intended (as per mutual legal assistance requests). 
Additional Element—Exchange of Information with Non-Counterparts (c. 40.10 & c. 40.10.1): 
Additional Element—Provision of Information to FIU by Other Competent Authorities pursuant to 
request from Foreign FIU (c. 40.11) 
Additional Element under SR V (applying c. 40.10-40.11 in R. 40, c. V.9): 
6.5.2. Recommendations and Comments  
1166. The authorities should consider the following recommendations. 
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 SBP should be allowed to share confidential information with its foreign counterparts. FMU 
should not be mandated to go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to negotiate and conclude 
MoUs with foreign counterparts. 
 Procedures, with an appropriate legal mandate, need to be implemented that allow for the sharing 
of intelligence and the day-to-day co-operation in operational matters across all LEA (FIA, ANF, 
NAB, police and customs). These institutions should not be mandated to go through the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to negotiate and conclude MoUs with foreign counterparts. 
 The FMU needs to have wholly independent process to enable information and intelligence. That 
are in accordance with s 4(e) AMLO and not over-ridden by s26 AMLO. Or adhere to process 
that require it to route such inbound or outbound requests via any other ministry, department or 
agency. 
 
6.5.3. Compliance with Recommendation 40 and Special Recommendation V 
 Rating Summary of factors relative to s.6.5 underlying overall rating 
R.40 NC  SBP cannot share confidential information with foreign counterparts 
 There are no appropriate procedure or working practices that evidence 
the widest possible range of international co-operation to their foreign 
counterparts 
 The ‘standard-operating-procedure’ used does not provide clear, 
effective, prompt and constructive exchanges directly between 
counterparts. 
 FMUs ability to share information is also hampered by the absence of 
conclusion of bilateral agreements which, under AMLO, condition its 
ability to engage in international exchange of information. 
SR.V PC  SBP cannot share confidential information with foreign counterparts 
 There are no appropriate procedure or working practices that evidence 
the widest possible range of international co-operation to their foreign 
counterparts 
 The ‘standard-operating-procedure’ used does not provide clear, 
effective, prompt and constructive exchanges directly between 
counterparts. 
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7. OTHER ISSUES 
 
7.1. Resources and Statistics 
7.1.1. Description and Analysis 
Resources of the Courts 
1167. As noted earlier, the Special Courts evolved from recognition by the Federal Government that 
more expeditious resolution of criminal prosecutions was required in certain categories of cases, including 
corruption, narcotics and terrorism related cases.   With the notable exception of delays in processing 
forfeiture applications in the Drugs Court (as mentioned under Recommendation 3), there appear to be no 
concerns as to the capacity of the Special Courts to expeditiously dispose of their caseloads.  However, 
issues do arise with respect to the safety of informants and judges, particularly in the Anti Terrorism 
Courts.  Pakistan authorities do not run a witness protection program.  Judges of the Anti Terrorism 
Courts have been murdered.  
1168. Inadequate resourcing is the principal cause of delay in Pakistan’s ordinary courts.  Improved 
resourcing is required to both increase the numbers of judges available to hear cases and improve 
infrastructure, including the building of new courtrooms.  The Evaluation Team was advised that the 
Asian Development Bank has provided funding for this and that, to further counter these sorts of issues, 
the Federal Government is considering introducing “night courts” and greater recourse to ‘alternative 
dispute resolution’ processes.  
1169. In Baluchistan and NWFP, increased resourcing has led to far more tolerable delays, particularly 
in Baluchistan where the period between charging and adjudication is now around one year.  However, 
the Evaluation Team was advised that in the provinces of Sindh and Punjab, delays in the order of 10 
years are common.  The Evaluation Team was further advised that, on any given court sitting day, a 
provincial judge or magistrate might have a daily “cause list” of some 70-80 cases and that, given the 
impossibility of discharging such a workload in a single day, adjournments are willingly granted.  The 
Chief Justice of Pakistan has constituted a committee to review and submit recommendations for reducing 
the backlog.  Further, the capacity of the judiciary to deny applications for adjournment is often highly 
compromised due to an inverse power relationship with the bar. Bar Associations appear to be strong.  
The Evaluation Team was advised that, in the past, barristers have successfully boycotted particular 
judges.  Power imbalances are maintained by the fact that, in the lower courts, the legal acumen of 
counsel is frequently greater than that of the presiding judicial officer due to significant differences in 
remuneration.   
1170. As a result, adjournments are routinely granted – even after the taking of evidence has 
commenced.  This has an adverse impact upon, amongst other things: the capacity of the prosecution to 
ensure the attendance of witnesses; the reliability of evidence tendered; and the integrity of judgments 
rendered – particularly given that proceedings are recorded only via the judge’s handwritten notes.  
Additionally, because (i) under the CrPC accused persons detained for a continuous period in excess of 
one year must be released on bail and (ii) time in custody is taken into account upon sentence, significant 
delays compromise both the prospects of attendance of accused persons and the deterrent effect of 
sentences.  
1171. The Supreme Court is also subject to extraordinary caseload pressure.  Appeals to the Supreme 
Court lie as of right to persons sentenced to death or to life imprisonment – and from determinations from 
the special tribunals.  Although leave is required in other cases and questions of law must be identified (as 
opposed to mere questions of fact), an extraordinarily high percentage of matters end up in the Supreme 
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Court.  In civil matters, the damages threshold is set at a mere 50,000 Pakistan rupees.  The National 
Judicial (Policy Making) Committee has recently announced the draft policy for reducing this backlog.  
1172. Recommendations of the Law & Justice Commission of Pakistan to place more workable limits 
upon access to the Supreme Court have not been followed.  As at 1 July 2005, in excess of 30,000 cases 
were pending in the Supreme Court.  Notwithstanding an annual intake of approximately 12,000 to 
15,000 new cases per year, as a result of concerted effort this pendency had reduced by March 2007 to 
10,000.  Recent upheavals within the membership of the Supreme Court have, however, stymied this 
progress.  The Court’s pendency currently sits at approximately 17,000 cases.   
1173. Decisions of the Supreme Court are made available to counsel and the remaining judiciary by 
way of privately published law reports and the internet.  However, the Evaluation Team was told that the 
burden of the Court’s caseload compromises the quality of its decisions by denying the presiding Justices 
sufficient time to fully consider judgments, particularly constitutionally interpretative judgments.   
 
High professional standards (c30.2) 
1174. Staff of FIA, ANF, NAB and the FMU are all subject to vetting procedures of their own 
organizations.  
Adequate and relevant training (c30.3) 
1175. FIA, ANF, NAB and the FMU have all received training. The majority of which has been 
provided by international donors, either in country and abroad. This approach has had some success but 
has not fully taken account of domestic circumstances and does not provide any form of sustainable 
training that meet the changing and urgent need of the Pakistani law enforcement authorities.  
1176. ANF and FIA and have designed MF training course but. ANF purely in house and relating to 
drug trafficking and FIA have attempted to develop a program with a more multi-agency approach. The 
programs deal with basic concept of ML and re-iterate domestic law and regulation. Both agencies seek 
additional support in relation to specialist training in the areas of ML and TF. 
 
Review of the effectiveness of the regime (c 32.1) 
1177. The statistical information available has been described under the relevant sections of this report. 
The authorities are not in position o review the effectiveness of the Pakistani AML/CFT regime for the 
following reasons: absence of comprehensive and authoritative review of the ML and FT risks facing the 
country; lack of centralized and aggregated statistics regarding the impact and results achieved. 
Maintenance of comprehensive statistics (c 32.2) 
1178. Several of the AML/CFT authorities in Pakistan maintain some statistics on their activities. These 
have been described in the relevant sections of the report. However, the statistical apparatus is highly 
fragmented, as a result of the fragmentation of the institutional framework itself. In addition, a high share 
of the statistical information available is not currently geared towards identifying the AML/CFT 
dimensions as such – including in terms of investigations, prosecutions and actions by the financial sector 
supervisors. 
Additional criteria – additional statistics (c 32.3) 
1179. The gaps identified for criteria 32.2 also apply. 
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7.1.2. Recommendations and Comments  
1180. The authorities should consider the following recommendations. 
 The staffing and resources across the federal investigative agencies, including FMU (commented 
on in criteria 26), needs to be addressed as a matter of priority, with the consideration to the 
formation of dedicated ML (and with FIA TF) units. 
 Any inauguration of staff or focus on specialism of ML and or TF must also be accompanied by 
the relevant training on recruitment and thereafter as needs demand. 
 The current training regime is fragmented; somewhat ad-hoc based on donor availability and to 
general to meet current ML and TF needs of Pakistan. Considerable benefit would be obtained 
from a more structured and national approach to ML and TF training that assist all federal 
agencies. This should be considered at a national policy level (and possibly as part of a national 
strategy). Such a course should be domestic, multi-agency so reflecting the dynamics of ML and 
TF and also so reflecting domestic needs, problems, laws and regulations. 
 The creation of Provincial Prosecution Services is a meritorious concept.  The centralization of 
prosecution services can help combat the considerable challenge of coordinating a criminal 
justice sector that is highly fractured.  However, whilst noting the resource constraints facing 
Pakistan, it is recommended that these services be adequately funded.  
 Funding should extend to training of both prosecution counsel and the judiciary in the field of 
financial investigation and the adducing of associated evidence. 
 The Government should continue its endeavors to reduce current court backlogs.   
 A comprehensive, aggregated and centralized statistical framework for AML/CFT should be 
devised. 
 
7.1.3. Compliance with Recommendations 30 and 32 
 Rating Summary of factors underlying rating 
R.30 PC  Overall insufficient resources available for AML/CFT efforts, 
particularly in light of the risks facing Pakistan, particularly for law 
enforcement, the FMU and the judiciary. SECP is also under-
resourced to effectively undertake its AML/CFT functions 
 Excessive fragmentation of the training, and where training has 
been delivered, usually not specific and operational enough 
R.32 NC  Absence of comprehensive and coherent statistical apparatus, 
allowing measure of results and review of effectiveness of the 
AML/CFT regime 
 
 
7.2. Other relevant AML/CFT Measures or Issues 
7.3. General Framework for AML/CFT System (see also section 1.1) 
See section 1.1 on corruption.
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Table 1. Ratings of Compliance with FATF Recommendations 
 
Forty Recommendations Rating Summary of factors underlying rating22 
Legal systems   
1. ML offense PC  The definition of the acts of laundering misses 
some of the elements required under applicable 
conventions. The gap is very small. 
 4 of the 20 categories of designated offences are 
not currently predicate offences to ML and piracy 
and insider trading are not criminal offences in 
Pakistan. 
 The investigative authorities do not envision the 
possibility of prosecuting ML as an autonomous 
offence.  
 The main ML offence under AMLO lacks a 
sufficient range of ancillary offences.   
 There is an overall lack of effectiveness of the 
investigation and prosecution of money 
laundering reflected in the nearly total absence of 
cases. 
2. ML offense—mental element and 
corporate liability 
PC  It is not currently the practice in Pakistan to 
charge legal persons for ML offences or for the 
predicate offences and there is not an alternative 
system of civil sanctions applicable to their 
breaches.  
 The maximum pecuniary punishments allowed 
for money laundering under AMLO are 
potentially too lenient for the cases involving 
large proceeds.  
 Despite the existence of a ML offence under 
CNSA since 1997 and ATA since 2005, there has 
not been any track-record of successful 
prosecution for ML under those statutes.  
 There is overall a lack of effectiveness in 
sanctioning the ML offence 
 
3. Confiscation and provisional 
measures 
PC  AMLO’s forfeiture provisions do not clearly 
enable forfeiture of proceeds of crime.   
 Only the NAO permits forfeiture of property of 
corresponding value.   
 There is no capacity to provisionally freeze under 
the ATA. 
 Only the CNSA offers effective protection to 
                                                     
22These factors are only required to be set out when . the rating is less than Compliant. 
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Forty Recommendations Rating Summary of factors underlying rating22 
third parties. 
 Only the NAO confers power to void actions.  
 Levels of forfeiture under the NAO are not high.   
 The effectiveness of forfeiture under the CNSA 
is blunted by systemic impediments in the 
Special Court.   
 AMLO’s attachment and limited confiscation 
powers have not been tested.   
Preventive measures   
4. Secrecy laws consistent with the 
Recommendations 
C   
5. Customer due diligence  PC  Lack of coverage of some financial institutions, 
particularly Pakistan Post 
 Excessive reliance on NADRA and NARA, 
without due consideration to the remaining 
weaknesses of these identification sources, 
particularly NARA 
 Excessive emphasis on NADRA and NARA 
cards as ultimate identification and verification 
of identity tools 
 Overall lack of effectiveness 
For SBP 
 The narrow scope of the identification 
requirements for legal persons and arrangements, 
as they do not extend to the identification of the 
directors (except for joint stock companies) 
 There is ambiguity on the minimum content of 
enhanced due diligence in high risk scenarios 
 The conditions for simplification or reduction of 
the CDD requirements in low risk scenarios are 
too open ended, and not enough guidance has 
been provided to the financial institutions, or 
situations of proven low risk have not been 
sufficiently defined. There is no definition either 
of the minimum level of CDD to be then 
implemented 
For ECs 
 Ambiguity as to “other particulars” that ECs need 
to obtain for inward remittances of all amounts 
and outward remittances of less than US$5,000. 
 Lack of clear guidance on the type of 
identification documents that should be used for 
verification of customers and the timing of 
verification of customers for remittance transfers 
 No obligation to conduct CDD on occasional 
customers when suspicion of ML or TF arises 
regardless of the value of the transaction or when 
there are doubts about the veracity or adequacy 
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of previously obtained customer identification 
data. 
 No obligation to identify and take reasonable 
measures to verify the identity of beneficial 
owners.  
 No enhanced due diligence measures for high-
risk customers. 
 No explicit requirement as to what course of 
actions should be taken when satisfactory CDD 
cannot be established.  
For SECP 
Absence of 
 definition of the situations for identification of 
the customer outside the account opening or 
establishment of a business relationship 
(occasional customers, doubts about the veracity 
or adequacy of previously obtained customer 
data) 
 requirement to verify the identity of the customer 
 requirement to identify the directors or trustees of 
legal persons or legal arrangements 
 requirement to identify beneficial ownership, and 
to take reasonable steps to verify the identity of 
the beneficial owner (except for situation where 
the customer is acting on behalf of another 
person) 
 requirement to obtain information on the nature 
and intended purpose of the business 
relationship, and to conduct on-going due 
diligence 
 requirements to perform enhanced due diligence 
for higher risks categories of customers, 
transactions or business relationships 
 requirements – particularly relevant for the 
securities markets – on the timing of the 
verification 
 requirements related to situations where CDD 
cannot be satisfactorily completed 
 requirements on existing customers, with a 
specific deadline 
6. Politically exposed persons PC  No requirement on PEPs for the financial 
institutions under SECP 
 No definition of PEPs, and no coverage of family 
members or associates, for financial institutions 
covered by SBP 
 No requirement for enhanced on-going due 
diligence on PEPs, and their families and 
associates, for financial institutions covered by 
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SBP 
 Insufficient effectiveness 
7. Correspondent banking LC  Banks are not required to establish a clear 
understanding as to which institution will 
perform the required measures. 
8. New technologies & non face-to-
face business 
LC  Banks are not required to have policies and 
procedures in place to address any specific risks 
associated with non-face-to-face transactions. 
9. Third parties and introducers LC  SECP does not require entities it regulates to 
immediately obtain from the third party the 
necessary information concerning certain 
elements of the CDD process. 
 SECP does not require entities it regulates to 
satisfy themselves that copies of documents 
relating to the CDD process will be made 
available by the third party without delay. 
 SECP does not require entities it regulates to 
satisfy themselves that the third party is regulated 
and has measures in place to comply with the 
CDD requirements set out in R.5 and R.10. 
 At the time of the assessment, SECP did not 
require entities it regulates to take into account 
whether countries in which the third party is 
based apply the FATF Recommendations. 
10. Record-keeping PC  The SBP has not through law or regulation 
required that banks or exchange companies 
provide information to domestic competent 
authorities on a timely basis. 
 The SBP has not defined the time period for 
which Exchange Companies must maintain 
records. 
 The SECP has not through law or regulation 
required that NBFCs provide information to 
domestic competent authorities on a timely basis. 
 The SECP has not through law or regulation 
required that NBFCs maintain records of 
customer identification for at least five years 
after the termination of a business relationship. 
 The SECP has not through law or regulation 
required that NBFCs maintain records of 
correspondence with customers for at least five 
years after the termination of a business 
relationship. 
 The SBP has not through law or regulation 
required that exchange companies maintain 
records of customer identification for at least five 
years after the termination of the business 
relationship. 
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11. Unusual transactions PC  Outside banks and Modarabas there are no legal 
or regulatory requirements or systems dealing 
with monitoring or examination and therefore no 
controls within other institutions to deal with 
monitoring or examination of transactions. 
 Effectiveness of the ability for banks and 
Modarabas to examine transactions is impeded 
by a generally poor understanding of the ML and 
TF risks faced by Pakistan or internationally. 
 Record keeping in relation to the examination of 
internal unusual reports not sent to FMU is not 
explicit. Effectiveness in relation to record 
keeping for unusual reports that formed STRs 
was not evidenced. 
12. DNFBP–R.5, 6, 8–11 NC  CDD and record keeping requirements are not 
applied to NFBPs. 
13. Suspicious transaction reporting PC  Not all predicate crimes in Rec 1 are covered. 
 Whilst AMLO covers reporting across all 
financial institutions only banks have reported 
and in very low numbers. 
 The overall STR regime is not working 
effectively. 
14. Protection & no tipping-off C   
15. Internal controls, compliance & 
audit 
PC  The SECP does not require NBFCs to establish 
initial and ongoing training programs to make 
their employees aware of the AML/CFT 
obligations or of ML and TF trends. 
 The SECP does not require all NBFCs to 
implement screening standards to ensure all their 
employees meet the highest ethical standards. 
 Brokers are not required to designate compliance 
officers, to have an adequately resourced 
independent internal audit function or to monitor 
for suspicious activity. 
 The SBP does not require exchange companies to 
appoint compliance officers, nor it requires 
exchange companies to develop and maintain 
sufficient internal controls to prevent ML/TF 
 The SBP does not require exchange companies to 
establish an independent audit function. 
 The regulatory regime does not cover Pakistan 
Post when it provides financial services. 
16. DNFBP–R.13–15 & 21 NC  STR requirement is not applied to NFBPs 
17. Sanctions PC  Overall insufficient effectiveness of the 
sanctioning regime, and its application 
 SBP 
 Weaknesses in the sanction regime to ensure its 
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effectiveness, dissuasiveness and proportionality  
 range of sanction power available for non-
compliance of ECs too narrow 
 SECP 
 Insufficient pecuniary sanctions available to the 
Exchanges 
18. Shell banks C   
19. Other forms of reporting C   
20. Other NFBP & secure transaction 
techniques 
LC  Apart from inclusion of investment advisors by 
SECP, no comprehensive risk assessment has 
been undertaken to consider whether other non-
financial businesses and professions should be 
also brought under the AML/CFT regime. 
21. Special attention for higher risk 
countries 
PC  Despite recent progress for financial institutions 
supervised by SBP, there are no rules or 
regulations for all other types of FIs 
 Pakistan is not in legal position to implement 
counter-measures for non-bank financial 
institutions 
22. Foreign branches & subsidiaries LC  The SBP has not issued a regulation requiring 
financial institutions to inform SBP when foreign 
branches cannot observe AML/CFT measures 
because of a conflict of laws in the host country. 
23. Regulation, supervision and 
monitoring 
LC  AML/CFT regulatory and supervisory 
requirements (market entry, regulation, 
supervision, compliance monitoring) 
 Ambiguities in the roles of the financial sector 
supervisors and the FMU in terms of regulatory 
and guidance on the one hand, and compliance 
monitoring on the other hand for the suspicious 
transaction reporting obligations.  
SECP 
 Lack of recourse to the regulatory powers to 
press all professions to adopt a satisfactory form 
for establishment of the business relationships 
 Absence of “fit and proper” requirement for 
agents in the securities markets 
 Non application of the fit and proper tests to 
beneficial owners of financial institutions 
24. DNFBP—regulation, supervision 
and monitoring 
NC  There is no regulation or supervision in 
AML/CFT. 
25. Guidelines & Feedback PC  Guidelines are only predominately banking 
orientated; no account is taken of other reporting 
entities. Examples shown are also generic 
international examples with little or no local 
context. 
 There is no effective feedback being offered via 
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the FMU or other competent body. 
 Insufficient guidance provided by the financial 
sector supervisors 
Institutional and other measures   
26. The FIU PC  ATA requirements to report suspicion of TF 
offences do not provide for reporting of such 
STRs to the FMU 
 No guidance is given to reporting entities on 
the completion of STRs. 
 FMU does have indirect access to other 
information for analysis but the lack of a 
systematic approach to this affects timeliness of 
obtaining such information.  
 Effectiveness of dissemination is impacted by 
staff experience and the lack of clear policies that 
deal with the differing ‘investigative agencies’. 
 FMU is judged not to have sufficient 
operational independence and autonomy. 
 No reports and or statistics are published 
 Legal and working practice constraints impede 
information sharing 
27. Law enforcement authorities PC  There is no evidence of standalone investigations 
into ML or TF. Those investigations that have 
taken place are generally associated with overt 
proceeds from the principal involved in the 
predicate crime. 
 A general insufficient understanding of 
investigative powers across all investigative 
agencies and the FMU contributes to the lack of 
investigations into ML or TF.  
 The primary agency for investigation of TF (FIA) 
is insufficiently resourced to effectively to ensure 
proper investigations. 
28. Powers of competent authorities LC  Evidence was not produced to demonstrate 
effective use of provisions for search, seizure or 
production of general or banking documentation 
or concerning obtaining of witness statements in 
relation to ML or TF. 
29. Supervisors PC  Compliance monitoring insufficiently proactive 
on CDD and STR reporting requirements beyond 
compliance with the NADRA obligation 
 Insufficient “hands-on” training on the 
supervision of compliance with AML/CFT 
requirements for examiners (for SBP, for ECs, 
and for SECP as a whole) 
 Insufficient resources for SBP (for Exchange 
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companies), SECP and as needed the Exchange 
to fulfill their supervision mandate on AML/CFT 
 Narrow coverage of system audits for the 
securities markets as far as AML/CFT 
requirements are concerned 
 Narrow coverage and depth of the compliance 
manual on AML/CFT for NBFCs 
 Insufficient effectiveness of the supervisory 
regime 
30. Resources, integrity, and training PC  Overall insufficient resources available for 
AML/CFT efforts, particularly in light of the 
risks facing Pakistan, particularly for law 
enforcement, the FMU and the judiciary. SECP is 
also under-resourced to effectively undertake its 
AML/CFT functions 
 Excessive fragmentation of the training, and 
where training has been delivered, usually not 
specific and operational enough 
31. National co-operation PC  Mechanisms established in AMLO to coordinate 
AML policies have not yet been fully 
implemented and adequately supported by all 
relevant stakeholders in the Pakistan government. 
 No mechanism has been established to support 
CFT coordination at policy and operational levels 
 There are gaps in operational level coordination 
in relation to AML implementation, in particular 
supervisory agencies. 
32. Statistics NC  Absence of comprehensive and coherent 
statistical apparatus, allowing measure of results 
and review of effectiveness of the AML/CFT 
regime 
 Very limited steps have been taken to review the 
effectiveness of AML/CFT systems. 
33. Legal persons–beneficial owners PC  Laws and regulations do not require adequate 
transparency concerning the beneficial ownership 
and control of legal persons in Pakistan. 
34. Legal arrangements – beneficial 
owners 
NC  The information required to be included in the 
trust agreement on trustees, settlors and 
beneficiaries does not cover the concept of 
beneficial ownership, which undermines 
effectiveness.  
 Registration of trust information is decentralized 
and remains in manual records and is very 
difficult for law enforcement agencies to access 
in practice. 
International Cooperation   
35. Conventions NC  As at the cut-off date for this assessment, 
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Pakistan has acceded to neither the Terrorist 
Financing Convention nor the Palermo 
Convention.  Pakistan’s current level of 
conformity with the specified articles of those 
conventions is deficient. 
36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA) NC  The legal basis for the provision of MLA is 
limited to narcotics related offences.  
 There is no evidence that assistance is provided 
in a timely, constructive and efficient manner. 
37. Dual criminality C   
38. MLA on confiscation and freezing NC  Assistance by way of freezing and seizing is 
limited to narcotics related offences under the 
CNSA 
39. Extradition C   
40. Other forms of co-operation NC  SBP cannot share confidential information with 
foreign counterparts 
 There are no appropriate procedure or working 
practices that evidence the widest possible range 
of international co-operation to their foreign 
counterparts 
 The ‘standard-operating-procedure’ used does 
not provide clear, effective, prompt and 
constructive exchanges directly between 
counterparts. 
 FMUs ability to share information is also 
hampered by the absence of conclusion of 
bilateral agreements which, under AMLO, 
condition its ability to engage in international 
exchange of information. 
Nine Special Recommendations   
SR.I Implement UN instruments NC  Pakistan has not acceded to the Terrorist 
Financing Convention.  There are deficits in 
compliance with UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. 
SR.II Criminalize terrorist financing PC  Pakistani law is ambiguous on the 
criminalization of financing of individual 
terrorists.  
  Pakistani law is ambiguous on the 
criminalization of financing of terrorist 
organizations unless they are so proscribed by the 
Federal Government.  
 There is no definition of property leaving the 
scope of the financing offences ambiguous.  
 There is ambiguity as to whether the offence 
would extend to the financing of terrorism 
committed against foreign government or 
populations.  
 The ATA does not recognize explicitly actions 
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designed to intimidate international organizations 
as terrorism.  
 - There is overall lack of effectiveness reflected 
in the fact that there has never been any 
prosecution for terrorism financing. 
SR.III Freeze and confiscate 
terrorist assets 
PC  Freezing of assets of non-1267 entities is limited 
to financial assets and compromised by the need 
for such entities to possess a “distinctive name”. 
 Although SROs relating to 1267 entities are of 
general application, only the freezing action of 
entities regulated by SBP is monitored 
 Freezing of assets of 1267 entities does not 
extend to all assets. 
 Non-compliance with freezing obligations is not 
sanctionable.  
 In the absence of indemnity/hold-harmless 
provisions, some entities do not effect freezes 
without confirmation that there has been no false-
positive name-hit, which may take up to five 
days.   
 Pakistan’s capacity to freeze assets of entities in 
line with foreign country freezing measures is not 
clear nor are there any established procedures 
enabling consideration of foreign requests for 
freezing.. 
 No guidance has been provided to entities 
expected to undertake freezing action. 
 There are no provisions for the protection of 
bona fide third parties. 
SR.IV Suspicious transaction reporting NC  There is no direct mandatory obligation to file an 
STR when there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect that funds are linked to, related to, or are 
to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist 
organizations. 
 TF STR obligations are limited to proceeds of 
terrorism 
 Emphasis on reporting requirements are biased 
towards ML and not TF. 
 Despite the prevalence of terrorism in Pakistan, 
implementation of the obligation to report TF 
related STRs is very weak 
SR.V International cooperation PC  There is no legal basis for the provision of MLA 
in terrorism-related matters.  
 Pakistan can extradite for TF but scope to 
extradite for ancillary offending should be 
clarified by reorganization of the offences listed 
in the Schedule to the Extradition Act. 
 SBP cannot share confidential information with 
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foreign counterparts 
 There are no appropriate procedure or working 
practices that evidence the widest possible range 
of international co-operation to their foreign 
counterparts 
 The ‘standard-operating-procedure’ used does 
not provide clear, effective, prompt and 
constructive exchanges directly between 
counterparts. 
SR.VI AML/CFT requirements 
for money/value transfer 
services 
PC  The current scope of preventive measures 
imposed on ECs is narrow.  
 Sanctions against ECs are not effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive. 
 No efforts have been made to identify unlicensed 
operation of remittance service providers 
(Hawala) although informal operators still exist 
especially in the provinces where SBP oversight 
is weak.  
 Pakistan Postal Savings Bank is not subject to 
AML/CFT obligations. 
SR.VII Wire transfer rules LC  No clear obligations for ECs with regards to 
verification of the identify of originator, handling 
of incoming wire that lacks full originator 
information, and sending full originator 
information throughout the payment chain.  
 Banks are not required to obtain originator 
information or documentation from ECs 
conducting wire transfers on behalf of third 
parties. 
 Pakistan Postal Savings Bank is not subject to the 
wire transfer requirements when they engage in 
wire transfers/remittances. 
SR.VIII Nonprofit organizations PC  The NPO sector assessment did not include 
assessment of ML/TF risks to the sector. 
 No ML/TF risk assessment has been conducted 
of the sector. 
 Efforts to raise the awareness of the sector of the 
risks of ML and TF are still limited. 
 There is no effective monitoring or supervision 
of the NPOs that account for a significant portion 
of the financial resources of the sector and its 
international activities.  
 The powers of the registration authorities to 
sanction violations of the regulations of the 
sector are very limited. 
 The NPOs are still not required to keep records 
of transactions or to document their donors and 
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beneficiaries.  
 The information sharing amongst competent 
authorities is hampered by the fragmentation of 
the registration system, the lack of enforcement 
and the lack of computerization. 
 A large segment of the NPO sector remains 
informal, i.e., neither registered not licensed.  
SR.IX Cross-Border Declaration & 
Disclosure 
NC  Pakistan’s partial declaration system is focused 
on foreign exchange control rather than 
AML/CFT and only covers people transporting 
foreign currency out of Pakistan and does not 
cover people bringing foreign currency into 
Pakistan, any movement of Pakistan rupees or 
bearer negotiable instruments 
 SBP and Customs authorities do not share 
information about declarations with the FMU.  
 Customs authorities do not share information 
with the FMU upon discovery of a false 
declaration. 
 Customs authorities do not share information 
with the FMU when they have a suspicion of 
money laundering or terrorist financing. 
 The existing regime is not effectively 
implemented. 
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Table 2. Recommended Action Plan to Improve the AML/CFT System 
 
FATF 40+9 Recommendations Recommended Action (in order of priority within each section) 
1.  General Priority actions over the next 18 months:  
 Engage as soon as possible a ML/TF risk-assessment in Pakistan, 
involving all Pakistani stakeholders.  This would include any 
typology identified in ML/TF cases in Pakistan.  This risk-
assessment should also seek inputs from Pakistan’s main 
international partners to integrate Pakistan-related typologies that 
they may have developed; 
 Prepare a national AML/CFT strategy, defining the main objectives 
and priorities of stakeholders and setting out a national policy on 
ML/TF.  This strategy should be driven by a high-level, centralized 
leadership and should clarify the roles and responsibilities of the 
main actors, in particular in law enforcement and prosecution 
agencies; 
 Expand the scope of the on-going revision process of AMLO, of the 
Banking Company Ordinance, of the SECP Act and of key 
regulatory provisions, in particular to: further extend the list of 
predicate offences; ensure the autonomy of the ML offence; clarify 
the ambiguities surrounding the scope of the TF offence and the 
forfeiture regime; lift the impediments to international cooperation 
(mutual legal assistance and other forms of international 
cooperation); and confer AML/CFT rule-making powers to the 
prudential supervisors, broaden the CDD requirements for financial 
institutions;  
 Deepen the engagement of financial institutions, with a mix of 
awareness raising, provision of tailored guidance on the ML/FT 
risks and typology in Pakistan and more focused enforcement action 
– notably on the suspicious transaction reporting. 
 
2. Legal System and Related 
Institutional Measures 
 
2.1  Criminalization of Money 
 Laundering (R.1 & 2) 
 Expand the scope of the acts of laundering to cover the elements 
of the Vienna and Palermo conventions. 
 Expand the scope of the predicate offence to cover a range 
within all the designated categories.  
 Create a sufficient range of ancillary offences to support the 
money laundering offence. 
 Ensure that money laundering is investigated and prosecuted as 
an autonomous offence and train the investigative authorities so 
that they can gather evidence in support of the money 
laundering offence regardless of conviction for a predicate 
offence.  
  232
FATF 40+9 Recommendations Recommended Action (in order of priority within each section) 
 Ensure that legal persons are held liable for acts of money 
laundering. 
 Ensure that there are a proportionate and dissuasive range of 
sanctions available against legal persons who may be liable for 
money laundering. 
 Review and remove the obstacles that hamper the effectiveness 
of the investigation and prosecution of money laundering. 
 Make sure that the laundering of the proceeds of terrorism 
financing is fully criminalized. 
 
2.2  Criminalization of Terrorist 
 Financing (SR.II) 
 Remove the ambiguity regarding whether the offence of 
financing terrorism would apply to financing acts of terrorism 
committed against foreign governments and populations. This 
could be achieved either through legislative amendment, court 
decision, or authoritative interpretation of the provisions of the 
Act.  
 Criminalize the participation in a terrorist organization 
regardless of whether this organization has been 
administratively proscribed or not. 
 Expand the scope of the offence to cover the financing of 
individual terrorists and the financing of terrorist organizations 
even when they are not proscribed.  
 Review the system and identify the reasons for the lack of 
effectiveness of the terrorism financing offences.  
 
2.3  Confiscation, freezing, and 
 seizing of proceeds of crime 
 (R.3) 
 Make clear that post-conviction forfeiture under s 4 covers 
proceeds of crime (both direct and indirect).   
 Resolve the inconsistencies in terminology within sections 8 and 
9, such that both proceeds of crime and instrumentalities are 
clearly amenable to freezing and forfeiture.   
 Clarify the uncertainties surrounding the procedures for seizing, 
freezing and forfeiture.   
 Cover forfeiture of property of corresponding value. 
 Introduce powers of provisional freezing in terrorism and 
terrorist financing related cases. 
 Afford protection toThird parties under AMLO and the ATA.  
Third party protection under NAO should extend to protection 
against forfeiture, as well as provisional freezing. 
 Extend the power to void actions taken to prejudice recovery of 
property subject to forfeiture to beyond forfeiture under the 
NAO.  
 Review procedures within the counter-narcotic Special Courts 
with a view to ensuring far greater expedition in the disposal of 
forfeiture applications (for example, by way of judicially-
enforced time-tabling orders).  
 
2.4  Freezing of funds used for  Amend ATA so as to provide a mechanism for the freezing of 
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 terrorist financing (SR.III) assets of entities covered by UNSCR 1373 that are not 
organisations with a distinctive name (and therefore unable to be 
proscribed).   
 Expand the scope of property capable of being frozen to cover 
all assets.  Under the SROs it is expressly limited to “bank 
accounts, funds and financial resources, including but not 
limited to those used for the provision of internet hosting or 
related services”.  Action under the ATA is limited to offices, 
accounts and seized cash.   
 Ensure that SROs come into force upon promulgation, such 
potential ambiguity as to whether they take effect “from the date 
of implementation of instructions” issued by SBP or from the 
date of implementation by “any other duly authorised authority” 
is resolved.   
 Make non-compliance with freezing obligations enforceable via 
sanction.  With respect to entities regulated by SBP, this could 
be done very simply via the issuance of a single directive under 
s 41 of the BCO concerning all entities proscribed or listed to 
date (and future disseminations by SBP being similarly coupled 
with related directions).  Additionally, an SRO could be issued 
providing penalties and enforcement procedures (as 
contemplated under the United Nations (Security Council) Act 
1948).  Such an SRO would ensure that non-compliance is 
generally sanctionable, including in relation to unregulated 
entities. 
 Extend the dissemination of SROs and notifications of 
proscriptions to SECP, such that the power to direct and enforce 
freezing action is not limited to those entities regulated by SBP. 
 Review the report-back period particularly such that same-day 
turn-around is required where entities have IT systems capable 
of concluding a same-day data-matching.    
 Considerat conferring reporting entities with indemnity from 
litigation arising from freezing action, so as to address the 
concerns of entities reluctant to undertake freezing action in the 
absence of confirmation from SBP. 
 Provide guidance to entities expected to undertake freezing 
action – particularly if, as recommended here, entities regulated 
by SECP are to be newly subject to enforced compliance.  Such 
guidance should consider matters such as access to funds, as set 
forth in UNSCR 1452.  
 More clearly and readily extend protection to third parties 
inadvertently affected by freezing action. 
 
2.5  The Financial Intelligence 
 Unit and its functions 
 ATA requirements to report suspicion of TF offences should 
include a requirement for a report to be made to the FMU as the 
national centre for receiving all ML and TF related STRs, even 
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(R.26)  if TF related STRs are made in parallel to the police.  
 FMU should clearly indicate the powers of other competent 
authorities which are used to authorizes the FMU to obtain 
additional information from reporting parties to aid in analysis  
 FMU should .  
 Authorities should provide guidance to reporting entities on 
the completion of STRs. 
 FMU should ensure that systematic procedures are in place to 
make use of indirect access to other information for 
analysis to ensure timeliness of obtaining information.  
 FMU policies for dissemination should be clarified to help 
overcome the fragmentation of responsible investigating 
agencies. 
 DG FMU should set out an action plan detailing current and 
medium term needs including staffing and infrastructure 
requirements to meet the FMU’s core functions of receipt, 
analysis and dissemination as well as its ancillary functions 
assigned through AMLO and those undertaken to support the 
NEC and GC. 
 A devolved budget should be allocated to the DG FMU to 
appropriately implement the action plan. 
 There needs to be clarity in relation to operational independence 
and autonomy of the FMU. Language in s6(3) AMLO “FMUs… 
supervision and control of the General Committee” also needs to 
be reviewed and clarified to ensure the perception of operational 
independence and autonomy is maintained. 
 A working practices document need to be developed for FMU 
operations including: priorities for STR reporting requirements 
(with SBP and SECP); STR quality; dissemination policies to 
take into account law enforcement fragmentation; standard 
operating procedures for analysis; procedures for information 
requests and responses; security policies including physical 
security and visitors. Consideration should be given to 
amending AMLO that gives FMU explicit access to additional 
financial information needed in to undertake its functions.   
 Separate the FMU database from the SBP IT systems and 
implement a policy for IT back-up and disaster recovery 
planning. 
 FMU should prepare an FMU Annual Report which includes 
statistics typologies and trends 
 The FMU should implement the Egmont Principles for 
information exchange. Powers for international co-operation 
should be clarified to allow FMU autonomy to participate in 
international cooperation. 
 FMU staff should be trained in typologies of criminal (including 
  235
FATF 40+9 Recommendations Recommended Action (in order of priority within each section) 
terrorist) structures and money flows specific to Pakistan.  
 
2.6  Law enforcement, 
 prosecution and other 
 competent authorities (R.27 
 & 28) 
 Pakistan should, as matter of priority, ensure that those agencies 
designated to pursue investigations of ML and TF are 
responsible and resourced to properly pursue ML and TF 
investigations, including ML cases beyond cases of ‘self-
laundering’ or the overt proceeds from the principal involved in 
the predicate crime.  
 Pakistan should ensure proper investigation of ML and TF is 
supported by a sufficient understanding of investigative powers 
across all investigative agencies.  
 All agencies responsible for investigating ML and TF should be 
properly resourced to ensure effective investigations.  
 The investigative agencies should appoint and adequately 
resource dedicated financial investigators to: deal with asset-
based investigations allied to the predicate crimes within their 
jurisdiction (including terrorism; ML and TF allied to the 
predicate crime) and; investigate ML and TF as a stand-alone 
crime irrespective of whether the source of information 
emanates from the FMU or any other source.  
 High-level training in current laws for all investigative agencies, 
and in particular for all dedicated financial investigators within 
these agencies, is essential, including training to dispel the 
misconception that a predicate offence conviction is required 
prior to investigating/prosecuting ML. 
 Pakistan should consider making all MF offences and associated 
investigations as cognizable to support a single approach to 
investigation. 
 The authorities should adopt a clear and definitive policy on the 
concept of “lead agency” for the investigation and prosecution 
of ML and TF.  
 Greater use of tools and techniques used in predicate crime 
investigation, such as the controlled delivery, would assist in 
understanding the concepts of ‘follow-the-money’.  
 The Pakistani authorities should ensure that deployment of 
skilled financial investigators across all provincial and federal 
agencies with mandates to investigate ML and TF and asset 
recovery.  
 Statistical framework should be put in place, particularly in 
relations to production, seizure, search and the obtaining of 
statements across all agencies.  
 
2.7  Cross-Border Declaration 
&  Disclosure (SR IX) 
 Pakistan’s limited declaration system is not an operational 
element of Pakistan’s AML/CFT regime, because, among other 
things, domestic coordination is lacking.  SBP and Customs 
authorities do not share information about declarations with the 
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FMU.  The SBP also does not inform Customs authorities or the 
FMU when it denies a person’s request to take more than 
$10,000 out of Pakistan.   Seizures are reported to the FMU on 
an annual basis, but Pakistan Customs is not currently 
authorized to share information with the FMU on a more regular 
or timely basis.  Pakistan Customs is also not authorized to 
share information with the FMU when there is a suspicion of 
ML or FT.  In addition, the limited declaration system does not 
apply to couriers bringing currency into Pakistan or to Pakistan 
rupees.  
 Pakistan is considering implementing a declaration system, but 
its porous borders make enforcement of anti-smuggling laws 
difficult.  Despite the difficulty of enforcing these laws at all 
potential points of entry, Pakistan should take efforts to combat 
cash couriers, in particular those that support TF and ML related 
to the narcotics trade.  
 Pakistan should implement a disclosure or declaration that 
achieves AML/CFT objectives and covers all forms of currency 
and bearer negotiable instruments.  
 SBP, as the foreign exchange regulator, and NBR (Customs), as 
the border enforcement agency, should share export control 
information with the FMU.  
 SBP and Customs officials should share with the FMU all 
permission requests — both granted and denied — on a timely 
basis.   
 Customs should share information with the FMU upon 
discovery of a false declaration.  
 Customs authorities should share information with the FMU 
when they have a suspicion of ML or TF.  
 Pakistan should ensure that powers available to customs to 
detect, interdict, seize and sanction cases of cash couriers are 
effectively implemented and related international cooperation is 
pursued.  
 
3.  Preventive Measures–Financial 
Institutions 
 
3.1  Risk of money laundering 
or  terrorist financing 
  
3.2  Customer due diligence, 
 including enhanced or 
 reduced measures (R.5–8) 
The authorities should:  
 Address the remaining (small) gaps in the NADRA, and 
more importantly those related tp NARA, to ensure that 
they are appropriate identification tools 
 Lessen the exclusive reliance on NADRA (and NARA) 
identification cards as the cornerstone for identification and 
verification of identity 
 Strictly enforce the deadline for identification of existing 
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accounts by June 2009 for SBP and ensure that all existing 
accounts are properly identified for SECP by September 
2009 
For SBP: 
 Enlarge the scope of the identification requirements for 
legal persons and arrangements, as they do not extend to the 
identification of the directors (except for joint stock 
companies) 
 Clarify the minimum level of additional diligences for 
enhanced due diligence in high risk scenarios 
 Specify the conditions for simplification or reduction of the 
CDD requirements in low risk scenarios, and provide 
guidance to the financial institutions on situations of proven 
low risks, as well as on the definition either of the minimum 
level of CDD to be then implemented 
 Enforce the new and additional requirements under revised 
PR-M1 
 Define PEPs, and extend the enhanced due diligence 
requirements to family members or associates 
 Require enhanced on-going due diligence on PEPs, and 
their family members and associate 
 In entering into correspondent relationship, require banks to 
establish a clear understanding as to which institution will 
perform the required measures. 
 Clearly address the money laundering and terrorist 
financing risks associated with new technologies.   
For ECs:  
Amend the AML/CFT regulatory framework of ECs to include:  
 Specifying “other particulars” that ECs need to obtain for 
inward remittances of all amounts and outward remittances of 
less than US$5,000. 
 Type of identification documents that should be used for 
verification of customers and the timing of verification of 
customers for remittance transfers. 
 An obligation to conduct CDD on occasional customers when 
suspicion of ML or TF arises regardless of the value of the 
transaction or when there are doubts about the veracity or 
adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data. 
 An obligation to identify and take reasonable measures to 
verify the identity of beneficial owners. Beneficial owners 
should be defined consistent with the standard.  
 Defining the enhanced due diligence measures for high-risk 
customers. 
 An explicit requirement as to what course of actions should be 
taken when satisfactory CDD cannot be established.  
 Defining the enhanced due diligence measures required in 
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relation to foreign PEPs.  
 Obligation to require senior management to approve new 
correspondent relationship. 
 
For SECP 
 define the situations for identification of the customer outside 
the account opening or establishment of a business relationship 
(occasional customers, doubts about the veracity or adequacy of 
previously obtained customer data) 
 require to verify the identity of the customer 
 require to identify the directors or trustees of legal persons or 
legal arrangements 
 require to identify beneficial ownership, and to take reasonable 
steps to verify the identity of the beneficial owner  
 require to obtain information on the nature and intended purpose 
of the business relationship, and to conduct on-going due 
diligence 
 require to perform enhanced due diligence for higher risks 
categories of customers, transactions or business relationships 
 specify – particularly relevant for the securities markets – the 
requirement on the timing of the verification 
 set out requirements related to situations where CDD cannot be 
satisfactorily completed 
 set out requirements for PEPs 
 specifically address the money laundering and terrorist-
financing risks associated with new technologies and non-face-
to-face transactions 
 issue regulations or guidance on new technologies and non-face-
to-face technologies for NBFCs other than brokers. 
 
3.3  Third parties and 
introduced  business (R.9) 
 The SECP should set forth specific requirements concerning 
third-party and introduced business for entities it regulates.  
Specifically, it should require financial institutions to immediately 
obtain the necessary information concerning certain elements of the 
CDD process, to satisfy themselves that supporting documentation will 
be made available by the third party without delay, to satisfy 
themselves that the third party is regulated and has measures in place 
to comply with R.5 and R.10 and to satisfy themselves that third 
parties in other countries are in jurisdictions that apply the FATF 
standards. 
3.4  Financial institution secrecy 
or  confidentiality (R.4) 
  
3.5  Record keeping and wire 
 transfer rules (R.10 & 
 SR.VII) 
 The SBP and SECP, as appropriate, should require banks, 
exchange companies and NBFCs to provide information to 
domestic competent authorities on a timely basis.  While 
examiners have the authority to demand data during an 
examination, there is no legal requirement that banks or 
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exchange companies provide information to law enforcement on 
a timely basis. 
 The SBP should require exchange companies to maintain 
records of customer identification for at least five years after the 
termination of a business relationship. 
 The SECP should require NBFCs to maintain records of 
customer identification for at least five years after the 
termination of a business relationship. 
 The SECP should require NBFCs to maintain correspondence 
between the business and the customer for five years. 
 Authorities should bring Pakistan Postal Savings Bank within 
the AML/CFT regime. 
 
3.6  Monitoring of transactions 
 and relationships (R.11 & 
21) 
 Work needs to be undertaken by the supervisory bodies to 
strengthen the systems within banks and Modarabas and across 
all other area implement such systems. 
 Training and awareness raising based on a national risk 
assessment covering ML and TF (which currently does not 
exist) would greatly assist in in fostering ST reporting. 
 Consideration should be given to incorporating all the principals 
of: monitoring; examination; record keeping; and systems for 
dealing with countries not applying FATF standards in an 
amendment to AMLO. This should then be underpinned with 
more detailed regulations from the supervisory bodies that 
reflect the different business areas covered by the supervisors.  
 AMLO should be amended to explicitly deal with record 
keeping in relation to unusual reports generated within a 
financial institution whether they are reported to the FMU or 
not.  
 Requirements under Recommendation 21 should be laid out 
outside the banking sector (SECP) 
 
3.7  Suspicious transaction 
reports  and other 
reporting (R.13, 14,  19, 25, & 
SR.IV) 
 The list or predicate offences required to be reported for the 
purpose of ML needs to cover all predicate crimes covered 
under Recommendation 1. 
 There should be a direct mandatory obligation to file an STR 
when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are 
linked to, related to, or are to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts 
or terrorist organizations. 
 The inconsistencies within the reporting requirements regarding 
TF need to be explicitly addressed by an amendment to AMLO. 
 Further encourage improved reporting, both in terms of quality 
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and quantity. Care should be taken thought not to encourage 
defensive reporting or reporting for the ‘sake of numbers’. 
Training and then an effective feed-back combined with 
enforcement action, where necessary, needs to be considered. 
 FMU should further engage SBP and SECP to devise an 
integrated approach to foster reporting. This approach should be 
based on  the potential risk posed by the different sectors  
 Deepen the training of staff in financial institutions, taking into 
account (i) possible ‘loopholes’ created by the non-reporting of 
tax matters and explain how this can be used to cover 
transactions that are otherwise suspicious and should be 
reported and (ii) that whilst transactions should be properly 
reviewed by an institution before making an STR the ‘burden’ 
on the institution did not amount to the institution have to 
evidence a suspicion.  
 Revise the reporting Guidelines (i) incorporate different 
examples covering sectors other than banking and (ii) provide 
more Pakistani based examples. 
 FMU needs to address the whole issue of the lack of feedback as 
a matter of urgency. If there is a perceived or real prohibition 
(the assessors see no legal prohibition) regarding the provision 
of feedback this needs to be also addressed urgently. 
 The maintaining of confidentiality by the FMU and other 
investigative bodies is potentially undermined by language used 
in s34(1)(3) AMLO which states “shall, as far as possible, be 
kept confidential by the FMU… ”. This does not determine 
when or where such confidentiality may be broken.  
 
3.8  Internal controls, 
compliance,  audit and foreign 
branches  (R.15 & 22) 
 The FMU should assist banks in identifying ML and TF trends so 
that banks tune their internal controls and ongoing training programs 
to address better the ML and TF risks in Pakistan. 
 The SBP should expand its internal control requirements for 
exchange companies to require the appointment of a compliance 
officer and establish and maintain strong internal policies and 
controls.  The SBP should also embody its recommendation that the 
auditors be independent in a formal rule. 
 The SECP has required NBFCs to establish ongoing training 
programs for their employees.   
 The SECP should require NBFCs to implement screening standards 
to ensure all their employees meet the highest ethical standards.  The 
SECP should also extend the requirement to all beneficial owners of 
NBFCs. 
 Brokers should be required to designate chief compliance officers 
and to establish and maintain an adequately resourced independent 
internal audit function. 
 
3.9  Shell banks (R.18)    
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3.10  The supervisory and 
 oversight system–competent 
 authorities and SROs  
 Role, functions, duties and 
 powers (including 
sanctions)  (R.23, 29, 17 & 
25)  
The authorities should take action to:  
 Expand to all financial institutions (per FATF definition) the 
AML/CFT regulatory and supervisory requirements (market 
entry, regulation, supervision, compliance monitoring) 
 As a whole, enlarge to all CDD and STR reporting requirements 
(i.e. beyond compliance with the NADRA obligation) the 
proactive compliance monitoring, and follow-up actions. This 
should be a priority for SECP, including in its division of labor 
with the Exchanges 
 Clarify the roles of the financial sector supervisors and the FMU 
in terms of regulatory and guidance on the one hand, and 
compliance monitoring on the other hand for the suspicious 
transaction reporting obligations. The assessors consider that the 
mandated coordination between the FMU and SBP and SECP 
for regulations is satisfactory, but that it should be made clearer 
that compliance monitoring rests with the financial sector 
supervisors 
 Develop “hands-on” training on the supervision of compliance 
with AML/CFT requirements for examiners 
 Increase the resources available to SECP, and SBP to a lesser 
extent, and as needed, the Exchange to fulfill their supervision 
mandate on AML/CFT 
SBP 
 Amend the sanction regime to ensure that effective, dissuasive 
and proportionate sanctions are available to foster compliance in 
case of systemic compliance failure 
 Expand the range of sanction power available for non-
compliance of ECs. 
SECP 
 Enforce the requirement for all professions to adopt a form for 
establishment of the business relationships, and enlarge the 
scope of the existing ones, with a view to allow financial 
institutions to have effective customer profiles 
 Set up a “fit and proper” requirement for agents in the securities 
markets 
 Expand the fit and proper tests to beneficial owners of financial 
institutions regulated by the SECP 
 Strengthen the pecuniary sanctions available to the Exchanges – 
or step in on a regular basis for significant compliance failures, 
in order to use the more dissuasive, proportionate and effective 
range of sanctions directly available to the SECP 
 Strengthen the coverage of system audits as far as AML/CFT 
requirements are concerned 
 Enlarge the coverage and depth of the compliance manual on 
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AML/CFT for NBFCs 
3.11  Money value transfer 
services  (SR.VI) 
 Authorities should identify unlicensed operation of money 
service providers, raise awareness of the licensing requirement, 
give reasonable time to apply for a license, then after that, crack 
down on continued non-licensed operation.  
 SBP should develop effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanction regime against ECs.  
 SBP should also extend the scope of the AML/CFT obligations 
which is too narrow at this point. 
 Authorities should subject remittance services offered by the 
Postal Savings Bank to AML/CFT obligations in order to create 
a level playing field and also to impose key obligations such as 
STR reporting, in addition to CDD and other preventive 
measures that are partially now practiced by the Postal Savings 
Bank.  
 
4. Preventive Measures–
Nonfinancial Businesses and 
Professions 
 
4.1  Customer due diligence and 
 record-keeping (R.12) 
Pakistan should  
 take steps to extend CDD and record keeping measures to the 
full range of NFBPs. 
 undertake risk assessments to determine the appropriate CDD 
and record keeping thresholds for respective NFBPs to ensure 
obligations imposed are balanced against the nature, size and 
risk of the NFBPs 
 designate the AML/CFT supervisory authorities for the different 
sectors and provide them with appropriate resources.  
 
4.2  Suspicious transaction 
 reporting (R.16) 
 Pakistan should take steps to extend STR obligation to the full 
range of NFBPs, in particular real estate agents and jewelers given the 
high risk of ML/TF faced by these sectors. 
4.3  Regulation, supervision, 
 monitoring, and sanctions 
 (R.17, 24, & 25) 
Pakistan should:  
 designate the AML/CFT supervisory authorities for the 
different sectors and provide them with appropriate 
resources. 
 take steps to supervise and monitor the full range of NFBPs 
for AML/CFT purposes 
 prepare more detailed sector guidelines to help respective 
NFBPs to implement AML/CFT requirements 
 
4.4  Other designated non-
 financial businesses and 
 professions (R.20) 
 The NEC should undertake a risk assessment and assess whether 
other non-financial businesses and professions should be brought 
under the AML/CFT regime.  
  243
FATF 40+9 Recommendations Recommended Action (in order of priority within each section) 
 SBP should continue its efforts to modernize and securitize 
transactions and to expand the use of electronic transactions among 
the population.  
 
5.    Legal Persons and 
Arrangements & Nonprofit 
Organizations  
 
5.1  Legal Persons–Access to 
 beneficial ownership and 
 control information (R.33) 
 Pakistan should require registered companies to make available 
accurate and current information on those natural persons who 
exercise beneficial ownership and control of legal persons. 
5.2  Legal Arrangements–
Access  to beneficial ownership 
and  control information (R.34) 
 Pakistan should take measures to ensure that trust deed 
information registered with the various district and city 
registrars contains information on beneficial ownership and is 
readily accessible to law enforcement and other competent 
authorities.  
 Authorities should raise awareness on where trust deed 
information is held and how to access such information for 
AML/CFT purposes. 
5.3  Nonprofit organizations 
 (SR.VIII) 
The following steps should be taken in order to achieve more compliance 
with the international standard:  
 A comprehensive risk assessment of the sector and identification of 
NPOs or categories of NPOs that pose greater ML or TF risk.  
 Expanding programs of outreach and training to include greater 
focuses on the risks of abuse for money laundering and terrorism 
financing. 
 Strengthening the regulations that require to NPOs to keep records 
on: sources of funds, financial transactions and beneficiaries.  
 Moving forward with the project of computerizing the registrars and 
enhancing the connectivity amongst them and with the Ministry of 
Social Welfare and populating the national NGO database.  
 Creating clear channels for information sharing and coordination 
amongst the competent authorities in matters pertaining to NPOs.  
 Support long-term efforts to streamline and improve the 
fragmented regulatory framework for NPOs in Pakistan. 
6.    National and International 
Cooperation 
 
6.1  National cooperation and 
 coordination (R.31) 
Pakistan should:  
 establish an effective coordination mechanism to set 
clear national policies for CFT and further develop and 
effectively implement CFT measures across Pakistan; 
 fully implement coordination mechanisms established in 
AMLO to coordinate AML policies; and  
 include all relevant agencies in various AML/CFT 
coordination structures, in particular Ministry of 
Narcotics Control and ANF, provincial police and 
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customs. 
 
Authorities may consider establishing a Compliance Officers 
Networks between the SECP, FIU and NBFIs.  
 
6.2  The Conventions and UN 
 Special Resolutions (R.35 & 
 SR.I) 
 Pakistan should expedite efforts to accede to the Palermo 
Convention and the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Financing.   
 Pakistan should redress the deficits identified in this report 
concerning criminalisation of the TF offence (see the comments in 
relation to Special Recommendation II), the capacity for freezing 
and confiscation of terrorist assets (see the comments in relation to 
Recommendation 3 and Special Recommendation III) and capacity 
to provide mutual legal assistance in TF related cases (see the 
comments in relation to Recommendation 36 and Special 
Recommendation V). 
 Pakistan should redress the deficits identified in this report 
concerning implementation of the relevant UNSCRs (see comments 
in relation to SRIII). 
 
6.3  Mutual Legal Assistance 
 (R.36, 37, 38 & SR.V) 
 Pakistan authorities should not expend valuable resources 
concluding s 26 agreements under AMLO.   
 The process drafting stand-alone MLA legislation that has already 
commenced should be expedited.  Such legislation is urgently 
required.  This need was identified in Pakistan’s last assessment.   
 Given the time and resources required to conclude bilateral MLA 
treaties, particular consideration should be given to enacting MLA 
legislation that enables Pakistan to entertain requests for MLA 
independent of any pre-existing relationship (as under the CNSA) 
and in relation to a wide range of offences, including terrorist 
financing.    
 Pending the establishment of a comprehensive MLA framework, it is 
recommended that the current legislative review of AMLO at least 
remove the requirement that requesting States be “contracting 
States”.   
 The MLA-related procedural deficiencies and ambiguities identified 
in this report should also be addressed – as should the deficiencies 
here identified in relation to MLA concerning asset forfeiture. 
 Also pending the evolution of a comprehensive MLA framework, – 
and dependent upon imminent policy decisions to be taken by the 
Federal Government concerning the future of the NAB –  the NAB 
should be conferred express power to provide, as well as receive, 
MLA.  Such assistance should extend to freezing and forfeiture of 
assets. 
 In general, but particularly pending the creation of a comprehensive 
MLA framework, officials should closely review MLA requests with 
a view to determining whether they disclose possible domestic 
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offending warranting domestic investigation.  Where domestic 
investigations are viable, they may offer an alternative mechanism 
for the provision of international assistance, thereby bypassing any 
deficiencies or formalities associated with any MLA regime.  Given 
the utility of the ML offence in prosecuting transnational crime, 
particular consideration should be given to the possibility of 
initiating domestic investigations for money laundering, whether as a 
stand-alone offence or otherwise. 
 
6.4  Extradition (R. 39, 37 & 
 SR.V) 
 The placement of “financing for terrorism” as a description in 
the Schedule to the Extradition Act should be reviewed so that 
accessorial and inchoate offences related to TF are also extraditable. 
6.5  Other Forms of 
Cooperation  (R. 40 & SR.V) 
 SBP should be allowed to share confidential information with its 
foreign counterparts. FMU should not be mandated to go 
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to negotiate and 
conclude MoUs with foreign counterparts. 
 Procedures, with an appropriate legal mandate, need to 
implemented that allow for the sharing of intelligence and the 
day-to-day co-operation in operational matters across all  LEA 
(FIA, ANF, NAB, police and customs). These institutions 
should not be mandated to go through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to negotiate and conclude MoUs with foreign 
counterparts. 
 The FMU needs to have wholly independent process to enable 
information and intelligence. That are in accordance with s 4(e) 
AMLO and not over-ridden by s26 AMLO. Or adhere to process 
that require it to route such inbound or outbound requests via 
any other ministry, department or agency. 
 
7.   Other Issues  
7.1  Resources and statistics (R. 
 30 & 32) 
 The staffing and resources across the federal investigative 
agencies, including FMU (commented on in criteria 26), needs 
to be addressed as a matter of priority, with the consideration to 
the formation of dedicated ML (and with FIA TF) units. 
 Any inauguration of staff or focus on specialism of ML and or 
TF must also be accompanied by the relevant training on 
recruitment and thereafter as needs demand. 
 Considerable benefit would be obtained from a more structured 
and national approach to ML and TF training that assist all 
federal agencies. This should be considered at a national policy 
level (and possibly as part of a national strategy). Such a course 
should be domestic, multi-agency so reflecting the dynamics of 
ML and TF  and also so reflecting domestic needs, problems, 
laws and regulations. 
 Provincial Prosecution Services should be adequately funded.  
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 Funding should extend to training of both prosecution counsel 
and the judiciary in the field of financial investigation and the 
adducing of associated evidence. 
 The Government should continue its endeavours to reduce 
current court backlogs.   
 A comprehensive, aggregated and centralized statistical 
framework for AML/CFT should be devised. 
 
7.2  Other relevant AML/CFT 
 measures or issues 
 
7.3  General framework – 
 structural issues 
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Annex 1. Authorities’ Response to the Assessment 
 
 
Relevant 
Section 
Pakistan’s Comments 
General  Pakistan is of the view that many of the legal weaknesses in legislation pointed out 
by the assessors are excessively based on a civil law approach or fall short of 
appreciating the intention of the legislation and likely interpretations in common law 
countries like Pakistan.  The assessors have erred on the side of abundant caution in 
overlooking the broad coverage afforded by e.g. TF legislation already in place.  This 
has reflected in NC or PC ratings on several recommendations rather than LC.  Also 
certain measures taken by Pakistan after the cutoff date, though acknowledged, have 
not been reflected in related ratings while lower ratings were also assigned due to 
certain legislative amendments still being in the parliamentary approval process.  
Given the amount of work and efforts already undertaken, it is Pakistan’s view that 
NC/PC ratings under at least 12 recommendations would stand transformed to LC or 
C.  In general, it is acknowledged that there are weaknesses on the implementation 
side due to resources & capacity constraints which are being progressively 
addressed, though assessors have preferred, either due to methodology edicts or as a 
matter of abundant caution not to assign any weightage to the systems already in 
place and working. Pakistan is fully aware of the need for continued improvement on 
several fronts and is committed to progressively address issues so as to accelerate 
country’s convergence to the international standards in the minimum time possible 
and appreciates all the support and inputs being provided by APG, WB, FATF and 
member countries. Pakistan recognizes that the methodology prescribes an ideal set 
of conditions and circumstances to exist irrespective of an individual country’s 
particular set of realities, stage of development and an emphasis on form over 
substance. Pakistan’s extensive indulgence in respect of meeting all MLA requests, 
despite lack of a comprehensive legal frame work, though even acknowledged at 
APG’s annual conference, therefore remains to be of no consequence in related 
assessment context. 
Section 2.2 
SR II 
 
The assigned rating of PC under this recommendation is based on perceived 
weaknesses in related legislation, as being restrictive, without reference to the 
fundamental provisions defining terrorism in a much broader way with clear 
applicability to both individuals and organizations whether proscribed or not 
domestic or international, as well as in respect of solicitation of funds or being 
concerned with any arrangement which results into availability of money or other 
property for terrorism.  Similarly, Pakistan is also of the view that undue emphasis is 
placed on certain points not relevant to the overall context e.g., the assertion that use 
of singular term in the law limits applicability whereas it is an established fact that in 
common law countries, for legal purposes, singular terms include plural unless 
specifically mentioned in that context or the use of word ‘government’ in 
administrative/enforcement context in legislation being extended to conclude that 
certain legal provisions give the laws an inward focus.  Being in the extensive 
knowledge of domestic common law based system and inclination of courts in 
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Relevant 
Section 
Pakistan’s Comments 
respect of interpretations; Pakistan is reasonably comfortable with the existing 
provisions in the law in the context of SR II and believes to be largely  compliant 
with the criteria.  However, Pakistan would still evaluate what further elaborations, if 
at all needed, can be considered to dispel perceived weaknesses. 
Section 2.7  
SR IX  
Pakistan believes that the NC rating is based on an excessively restrictive approach. 
Pakistan has a long history of Foreign Exchange Controls, liberalized over the last 12 
years.  Before the liberalization drive in the nineties, a strict currency declaration 
system was in place for decades and LEAs and regulators have extensive knowledge 
and experience of related issues. Even under the liberalized regime, outward 
movements of currency & instruments are restricted to financial institutions or 
approved transactions under existing laws & regulations.  Though currently there is 
no declaration requirement for inward movement of currency & instruments, LEAs 
at entry/exist points have extensive powers to question, detain and confiscate where 
there is a suspicion of illegality.  At the same time, the financial system is insulated 
from such undetected/elicit inflows through exhaustive KYC/CDD and customer 
profiling requirements.  Though a declaration system is being evolved which shall 
soon be formalized, even the existing system, in Pakistan’s view, does not support an 
NC rating. 
Section 3.7 
SR IV 
The indicated shortcomings for an NC rating are in Pakistan’s view not grounded in 
logical reasoning.  As per FATF standards at the level of reporting entities, specific 
ML or TF related link is not required to be established but only a suspicion of related 
illegality.  ML/TF linkages are established at the LEAs level. The entire Anti 
Terrorism Act has been included in the schedule of predicate offenses to AML 
legislation for STR reporting purposes while a number of cases were identified as 
having possible TF links at the level of FIU.  It would therefore be incorrect to 
conclude that the system of STR reporting is biased in favor of ML or obligation to 
report TF related STRs is weak.  The terrorism related problems being faced by 
Pakistan currently stem from other regional peculiarities and the financial system by 
and large is reasonably ring-fenced against possible misuse by terrorists, 
terrorist/proscribed organizations or such identified sponsors in the domestic and 
international context.  The rating of NC, in Pakistan’s view is therefore based on 
concerns & perceptions rather than actual on ground situation. 
Section 5.1 
R 33  
It is Pakistan’s view that assessment under this recommendation excessively relies on 
technicalities.  Due recognition is not afforded to the rather sophisticated level of 
related understanding & application of the long established concepts of beneficial 
ownership in the financial sector.   Such prevalent understanding and FIs own 
internal policies adequately addressing the inherent issues have not given rise to 
reasons for regulators to specifically issue regulations/guidelines/clarifications.  
There was also a disconnect in assessors understanding of beneficial owners and 
sponsors of private limited companies in Pakistan, which in the larger scheme of 
things are predominantly one and the same, as eventually established by the 
regulators while exceptions are also duly recorded as accessible information at the 
regulators level.  The technical weakness only remains in respect of additional efforts 
for establishing beneficial ownership of foreign companies incorporating as local 
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Relevant 
Section 
Pakistan’s Comments 
companies/businesses though publically available information and websites on such 
companies are accessed and assessed to provide the necessary comfort level.  
Nevertheless, existing instructions are being reviewed to evaluate the need for further 
elaborations to address assessors’ perceptions. 
Section 6.2 
R 35 
Pakistan has already subscribed fully to Vienna Convention and Terrorist Financing 
Convention while accession documents to Palermo Convention shall soon be 
submitted to the UN. Having subscribed to two out of three conventions Pakistan is 
already beyond the NC stage and would be compliant under this recommendation 
within the next few weeks upon submission to the UN of accession documents in 
respect of Palermo Convention. 
Section 6.2 
SR I 
Pakistan is of the view that even despite having deposited accession documents of 
Terrorist Financing Convention after the ME cut-off date, Pakistan largely complies 
with provisions of UNSCRs 1267 & 1373.  Assessors view that Statutory Regulatory 
Orders (SROs) of Government of Pakistan are applicable from the date of receipt by 
the addressees is erroneous as being in the nature of law, SROs are valid orders as 
from the time of issue.  FIs have in place systems to monitor issuance of UN 
resolutions having possible impact in their domain and in practice there are no delays 
in implementation.  In the overall context therefore Pakistan already largely complies 
with the prescribed requirements. 
Section 6.3 
R-36 
At present, a standalone act entitled Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2009 is under 
active consideration of the stakeholders and is likely to be put up to the parliament 
for consideration and enactment shortly. The proposed act contains the procedure, 
manners and rules on the basis of international standards and best practices for MLA. 
However, it needs to be appreciated that the existing CNSA explicitly provides the 
legal basis for provision of MLA and there is no illegality involved in other agencies 
in Pakistan providing assistance in the manner requested.  Similarly, there is nothing 
preventing NAB or FIA in using their coercive powers in eliciting 
documents/responses as may be requested, which indeed has been the case over a 
number of years. Even in cases requiring freeze on assets etc., the law already 
provides for local Courts’ vetting of such foreign jurisdictions’ requests for local 
implementation. For the purposes of accommodating for such requests, other LEAs 
use their legal authority to investigate which is not limited in relation to crimes only 
in the local context. Also, domestic action on foreign tip-offs is in no way excluded 
or not being taken cognizance of.  In fact there have been several instances of 
detailed investigations by NAB/FIA on foreign tip-offs and even based on press 
reports. In the overall context therefore Pakistan is clearly of the view that the 
assessed rating is not reflective of realities. 
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Annex 2. Details of All Bodies Met During the On-Site Visit 
 
List of ministries, other government authorities or bodies, private sector representatives and others. 
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Annex 3. List of All Laws, Regulations, and Other Material Received 
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Copies of Key Laws, Regulations, and Other Measures 
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